

CHAPTER I


THE POLITICAL AND DYNASTIC HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN WORLD (A.D. 1000-1217)

I. THE EASTERN IRANIAN WORLD ON THE EVE OF THE TURKISH INVASIONS

For nearly a thousand years—indeed, until our own century—Iran has generally been ruled by non-Persian dynasties, usually Turkish but sometimes Mongol or Kurdish. This domination at the highest level has had less effect on Iranian national psychology and literary consciousness than might be expected, for all of the alien ruling dynasties have come from races of low cultural development, and thus they have lacked the administrative expertise necessary for ruling a land of ancient settlement and civilization. Whether consciously or unconsciously, they have adopted Iranian culture at their courts, and they have been compelled to employ Iranian officials to administer the country and collect the taxes.

The first such alien rulers were the Saljuq Turks, who appeared in the Iranian world in the first half of the 5th/11th century. For them as well as for their successors, the process of assimilation to the indigenous culture and practices of Persia was not uncongenial, because they were able to draw on the country's ancient traditions of exalted monarchic power and submissiveness by the people. Moreover, in these traditions kingly authority was identified with divine authority, which helped the dynasties to rise above their tribal origins. The Saljuqs had originated as chieftains of nomadic bands in the Central Asian steppes. Their powers and ambitions often hedged about by a complex of traditional tribal rights and customs, the steppe leaders were little more than *primi inter pares* amongst the heads of all the prominent tribal families. With their entry into the Iranian world, the Saljuqs and their successors found the instruments at hand with which to make themselves, if they so desired, despots of the traditional Persian stamp: these instruments were a settled administration, a steady revenue from taxation, and usually a personal guard and standing army.

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Map 1. The Iranian world, c. 388/998.

Yet the process of self-magnification had a reverse side. What was to be done with the ladder by which these leaders had risen? For their supporters had included fellow tribesmen, e.g. the Saljuqs' Türkmen; military retainers, such as the Turkish and Mongol soldiers of the Mongol Qa'ans, and fellow sectaries and religious devotees, such as the Šafavids' Qizil-Bāsh. In the Saljuq period the Oghuz and other Türkmen were a pressing problem for the sultans. How could the Türkmen be reconciled to the new concept of royal power—especially when they saw the old tribal custom, which defined and guaranteed each man's personal position and duties, quietly set aside and replaced by the Islamic *sharī'a* and by the Iranian governmental ethos, in both of which political quietism and virtually unconditional obedience to the monarch were enjoined? This question, in varying terms, runs through much of Iran's history in the last nine centuries, underlying

many of its revolutions and crises of power. It is particularly important in the age of the Saljuqs, when the sultans were never able satisfactorily to resolve this tension in their empire.

Whilst it is true that the coming of the Saljuqs inaugurated the age of alien, especially Turkish, rule, the change was not absolutely abrupt. We shall first of all be concerned with the eastern Iranian world, comprising Khurāsān, the adjoining regions of modern Afghanistan, and the lands of the Oxus and Syr Darya basins. At the opening of the 5th/11th century, the Iranian world still extended far beyond the Oxus, embracing the regions of Khwārazm, Transoxiana (called by the Arabs *Mā warā' al-nahr*, "the lands beyond the river"), and Farghāna. In pre-Christian and early Christian times the Massagetae, the Sakae, the Scyths, the Sarmatians, and the Alans—all Indo-European peoples—had roamed the Eurasian steppes from the Ukraine to the Altai. The pressure of Altaic and Ugrian peoples from the heartland of Central Asia and Siberia gradually pushed the limits of Indo-European occupation southwards, but until the end of the 4th/10th century the lands along the Oxus and south of the Aral Sea, together with the middle and upper reaches of the Syr Darya as far as its sources in the slopes of the T'ien Shan, were still generally ruled by royal dynasties or local princes who were apparently Iranian. The picture presented by the holders of power is thus relatively straightforward, except that the Iranian names and titles of petty rulers and local landowners (*dihqāns*) in such frontier regions as Isfijāb, Īlāq, and Farghāna do not make it absolutely certain that they were racially Iranians. However, a demographic analysis of the whole population in this Iranian-ruled area involves certain difficulties. From the earliest times Transoxiana has been a corridor through which peoples from the steppes have passed into the settled lands to the south and west; thus history and geography have worked against an ethnic homogeneity for the region. Whether the invading waves have receded or been swallowed up in the existing population, a human debris has inevitably been left behind. This was undoubtedly the origin of the Turkish elements in eastern Afghanistan, for these Oghuz and Khalaj were nomads on the plateau between Kābul and Bust when Muslim arms first penetrated there in the early centuries of Islam, and they survived as an ethnic unity throughout the periods of the Ghaznavids, Ghūrids, and Khwārazm-Shāhs. It has been plausibly argued by J. Marquart that these Turks were remnants of peoples brought from north of the Oxus by the confederation of the Ephthalites

or White Huns, whose leaders seem to have been of the same race as the Iranians.¹

In Transoxiana and *Kh̲wārazm*, the infiltration of Turkish elements must also have begun early. Topography—i.e. the mountain chains running east and west, the land-locked river basins and oases—made Transoxiana and especially *Soghdia* (the basin of the *Zarafshān* river) a politically fragmented region. In the 1st/7th and 2nd/8th centuries the region was a battleground where Iranian rulers fought the invading Arabs from the south as well as the Western Türk or T'u-chüeh from the north, with the Chinese keeping an eye on what was nominally a distant province of their empire. Turkish warriors were frequently invited from outside by the local rulers in an effort to repel the Arabs, but it is also possible that some of these troops were recruited from the Turks already settled within the borders of Transoxiana.² For not all Turks were pastoral nomads or forest hunters. In such comparatively favoured spots of Central Asia as the Orkhon and Selenga valleys in Mongolia, and the Chu valley and shores of the *İsiq-Köl* in Semirechye ("land of the seven rivers", or the northern part of the modern Soviet Kirghiz republic and the parts of the Kazakh republic adjoining its northern borders)—in all these areas Turkish agriculturalists had been able to make a living in peaceful periods.³ Similarly, the rural peasantry and even the town populations of Transoxiana and *Kh̲wārazm* may well have contained Turkish elements from an early date. Firdausi's *Shāh-Nāma* speaks of Iran and *Tūrān*, i.e. the Iranians and the Turks, as two naturally antipathetic groups: "two elements, fire and water, which rage against each other in the depths of the heart",⁴ but the economic facts, well brought out by the Arabic geographers, belie this. They say that the economy of the pastoralist Turks from the steppe was complementary to and interdependent with the economy of the agricultural

¹ J. Marquart, "Ērānšahr nach der Geographie des Ps. Moses Khorenaç'i", *Abh. der Königl. Gesell. der Wiss. zu Göttingen*, p. 253; *idem* and J. J. M. de Groot, "Das Reich Zābul und der Gott Zūn", *Festschrift Eduard Sachau* (Berlin, 1915), pp. 257–8. The Iranian ethnic nature of the Ephthalites has recently been affirmed by R. Ghirshman, *Les Chionites-Hephthalites* (Cairo, 1946). For a contrary opinion see E. G. Pulleyblank, "The Consonantal System of Old Chinese: Part II", *Asia Major*, N.S., vol. ix (1963), pp. 207–65 (258–60).

² Cf. R. N. Frye and A. M. Sayili, "Turks in the Middle East before the Saljuqs", *[Journal of the] A[merican] O[riental] S[ociety]*, pp. 196 ff.; see also a forthcoming chapter by C. E. Bosworth on the Turks in the early Islamic world, in C. Cahen (ed.), *Philologiae Turcae Fundamenta*, vol. III (Wiesbaden).

³ Cf. O. Lattimore, "The Geographical Factor in Mongol History", *Geographical Journal* vol. xci (January 1938), pp. 1–20.

⁴ Cf. T. Kowalski, "Les Turcs dans le Šāh-nāme", *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, vol. xv (1939–49) pp. 87 ff.

oases and towns of the Iranian Tājiks. The settled regions supplied the nomads with cereals, manufactured goods, and arms, and the nomads reared stock animals and brought dairy products, hides, and furs to the farmers. In Transoxiana and Khwārazm, wrote al-Iṣṭakhrī (c. 340/951), the Oghuz and Qarluq from beyond the Syr Darya and from the Qara Qum steppes supplied horses, sheep, camels, mules, and asses.¹ It is likely, too, that some of the pastoralists remained in the market centres of the settled region and gradually settled down within its borders.

The rule of native Iranian dynasties in Khwārazm, Transoxiana, and Khurāsān foundered by the opening decades of the 5th/11th century. The Sāmānids of Bukhārā had ruled in the latter two provinces, first as local administrators for the 'Abbāsīd governors of Khurāsān, and then as virtually independent sovereigns.² In the last decade of the 10th century their rule sustained almost simultaneous attacks from two Turkish powers, the Qarakhānids and the Ghaznavids. The Qarakhānids originated from a confederation of Turkish tribes who had long occupied the steppes that stretched from the middle Syr Darya to the T'ien Shan. Their nucleus seems to have been the Qarluq tribe and its component peoples of the Yaghma, Tukhsī, and Chigil. The Qarluq were an old people in the steppes, known from the 1st/7th century as a constituent group within the Türkü empire. Already the characteristic title for their chiefs, *Ilig*, appears in the Turfan texts of that period; and in later times Muslim sources often refer to the Qarakhānid dynasty as that of the *Ilig-Khāns*. Within the various confederations that took shape in the steppes after the collapse of the Türkü empire in 125/741, the head of the Qarluq assumed the title first of *Yabghu* and then of *Qaghan* (Arabic form, *Khāqān*), or "supreme monarch". The adoption of this latter title was to become characteristic of the Qarakhānids, whereas the Saljuqs never felt entitled to adopt it. In the course of the 4th/10th century the Qarluq became Muslim; the first ruler to become converted is traditionally held to be Satūq Bughra Khān (d. ? 344/955), who assumed the Islamic name of 'Abd al-Karīm and reigned from Kāshghar and Talas over the western wing of his people.

¹ al-Iṣṭakhrī, *Kitāb masālik al-mamālik*, p. 274; cf. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids: their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994-1040*, pp. 154-5.

² There exists no special monograph devoted to the Sāmānids; the best account of this very important but still obscure dynasty remains that by W. Barthold in his *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, G[ibb] M[emorial] S[eries], vol. v, pp. 209 ff. See also Frye's brief survey, "The Samanids: a Little-Known Dynasty", *Muslim World*, pp. 40-5; and *idem*, *The History of Bukhara* (a translation of Narshakhi's *Ta'rikh-i Bukhārā*), the notes to which contain much valuable information on the Sāmānids.

Those who worked in the pagan outer darkness of the steppes were mainly the dervishes or *Şūfis*, i.e. religious enthusiasts whose orthodoxy was suspect, and who were often *persona non grata* to the orthodox Sāmānid government and religious institution. Nevertheless the Qarakhānids became firm Sunnis once they entered the Islamic world.¹

The Qarakhānid Bughra Khān Hārūn or Ḥasan, a grandson of Satuq Bughra Khān, temporarily occupied the Sāmānid capital of Bukhārā in 382/992. As he passed through Transoxiana he met with little opposition: indeed, he was encouraged in his action by the rebellious Sāmānid general Abū ‘Alī Simjūrī and also by discontented dihqāns. Faced with the Qarakhānid invasion from the north and the revolt of the generals Abū ‘Alī Simjūrī and Fā’iq Khāṣṣa in Khurāsān, the Sāmānid amir Nūḥ b. Maṣṣūr (366-87/976-7 to 997) was compelled to call in from Ghazna another of his Turkish slave commanders, Sebük-Tegin.²

Abū Maṣṣūr Sebük-Tegin (d. 387/997) was the founder of the Ghaznavid dynasty and father of the famous Maḥmūd of Ghazna (388-421/998-1030).³ Sebük-Tegin came originally from Barskhan, a settlement on the shores of the Īsiq-Köl, whose ruler, according to the anonymous author of the Persian geographical treatise *Hudūd al-‘ālam* (“Limits of the World”), was one of the Qarluq. It seems therefore probable that the Ghaznavids were of Qarluq origin. In a tribal war Sebük-Tegin was captured by the neighbouring Tukhṣī and sold in a Sāmānid slave market at Chāch. Because of his hardiness and his skill with weapons, he rose rapidly from the ranks of the Sāmānids’ slave guards, coming under the patronage of Chief Ḥājib or Commander-in-Chief Alp-Tegin. In 351/962 he accompanied his master to Ghazna, where Alp-Tegin henceforth established himself as ruler, and in 366/977 Sebük-Tegin succeeded to power there, continuing, like his predecessors, to regard himself as governor there on behalf of the Sāmānids.⁴ In 384/994 the amir Nūḥ b. Maṣṣūr summoned Sebük-Tegin to Khurāsān to fight the rebellious generals but this led to the establishment of the Ghaznavids in Khurāsān and all the Sāmānid

¹ The Qarakhānids and the Qarluq, from whom the dynasty very probably sprang, have been studied by O. Pritsak. Amongst his many articles on them, see especially “Karahānlılar” in *İslām Ansiklopedisi*; and on the origins of the dynasty, “Von den Karluk zu den Karachaniden”, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, pp. 270-300.

² Cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 254-61.

³ On the Ghaznavid dynasty, see B. Spuler, “Ghaznavids”, *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.); M. Nāzim, *The Life and Times of Sultān Maḥmūd of Ghazna*; and Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*.

⁴ On Sebük-Tegin’s early life and his rule as governor in Ghazna, see Nāzim, *op. cit.* pp. 28-33, and Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*, pp. 35-44.

provinces south of the Oxus. These territories were definitely annexed in 388/998 by Abu'l-Qāsim Maḥmūd b. Sebük-Tegin. Meanwhile it had proved impossible to dislodge the Qarakhānids from the Syr Darya basin, and in 389/999 the Sāmānid dynasty was definitely overthrown in Transoxiana by the Ilig Naṣr b. 'Alī (d. 403/1012-13), nephew of Bughra Khān Hārūn. The heroism of the last of the Sāmānids, Ismā'il al-Muntaṣir, could achieve nothing in the face of the division of the Sāmānid empire between the Ilig and Maḥmūd. In 391/1001 these two came to a formal agreement whereby the Oxus was to be the boundary between the two kingdoms, and in 395/1005 Ismā'il was killed through the treachery of an Arab nomad chief in the Qara Qum desert.¹

In the adjacent province of Khwārazm, the classical Chorasnia, the days of rule by native Iranian monarchs were also numbered. For several thousand years the region of the lower Oxus had held a complex of rich agricultural oases linked by irrigation canals, the full extent of which has only recently come to light through the researches of Soviet archaeologists. (The Iranian scholar al-Bīrūnī says that the Khwārazmian era began when the region was first settled and cultivated, this date being placed in the early 13th-century B.C.) That the ancient dynasty of Afrīghid Khwārazm-Shāhs survived for nearly three centuries after the coming of Islam to their land is unique in the Islamic world: al-Bīrūnī lists twenty-two rulers of this line running from A.D. 305 to 385/995.² However, the vandalism of Qutaiba b. Muslim's invading Arabs in 93/712 had an enfeebling effect on the culture of ancient Khwārazm, and this seems to have been aggravated by economic decline, whose symptoms, according to S. P. Tolstov, included the neglect of irrigation works and the decline of urban life. The system of large fortified estates, which is characteristic of Khwārazmian agrarian society at this time, was a response to increasing external pressure from Turkish steppe peoples, who were attracted not only by prospects of plunder but also by the winter pasture available along the shores of the Oxus. The Turkicizing of the population of Khwārazm probably began during this period.³ In the 4th/10th century there were

¹ Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 261-721; and *idem*, "A Short History of Turkestan", in *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, vol. 1, pp. 21-4.

² al-Bīrūnī, *al-Āḥḥār al-bāqīya 'an al-qur'ān al-khālīya* (tr. E. Sachau, *The Chronology of Ancient Nations*), pp. 40-2.

³ Sachau, "Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwārazm", *S[itzungs-] B[erichte der] W[iener] A[kad. der] W[iss.]*, Phil.-Hist. C., vol. LXXXIII, 1873; vol. LXXIV, 1873, pp. 471 ff.

villages with Turkish names on the right bank of the Oxus. The Ghaznavid historian Abu'l-Faḍl Baihaqī speaks of Qīpchaq, Küjet, and Chaghraq Turks harrying the fringes of Khwārazm in 422/1030,¹ and a few years after this the Saljuqs and their followers spent some time on Khwārazmian pastures before moving southwards into Khurāsān. The higher culture of Iranian Khwārazm offered resistance to the process of Turkicization, but the trend nevertheless continued over the next centuries (see pp. 141–2 below).

In spite of this, the downfall of the native Afrīghid dynasty of Khwārazm-Shāhs in 385/995 came about through internal disturbances. Gurganj, a town on the left bank of the Oxus, had grown in importance as the terminus of caravan trade across the Oghuz steppes to the Volga and southern Russia, thereby eclipsing the ancient capital on the right bank of Kāth. A local Gurganj family, the Ma'mūnids, succeeded in deposing the last Afrīghid, Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad, and assumed the traditional title of Khwārazm-Shāh. But their tenure of power was brief. The Sāmānids had been nominal suzerains of Khwārazm, though in practice they had rarely interfered there; now the shadow of their supplanter, Maḥmūd of Ghazna, grew menacing for the Ma'mūnids. In 406/1015–16 Abu'l-'Abbās Ma'mūn b. Ma'mūn married one of the Ghaznavid sultan's sisters, Hurra-yi Kalji; nevertheless, Ghaznavid pressure was relentless. The 'Abbāsīd caliph in Baghdad sent directly to the Khwārazm-Shāh a patent of investiture for Khwārazm, a standard, and the honorific titles '*Ain al-Daula wa Zain al-Milla*' ("Eye of the State and Ornament of the Religious Community"); but the shah did not dare to receive these publicly in his capital Gurganj for fear of provoking Maḥmūd's wrath. In the sultan's imperial strategy, possession of Khwārazm was necessary to turn the flank of the Qarakhānids, amongst whom the ruler of Samarqand and Bukhārā—'Alī b. Ḥasan Bughra Khān, known as 'Alī-Tegin (d. 425/1034)—was showing himself an implacable enemy of the Ghaznavids. After an ultimatum to the Khwārazmians, which contained humiliating demands and required the renunciation of national sovereignty, Maḥmūd's troops invaded and annexed Khwārazm in 408/1017. The sultan then installed as Khwārazm-Shāh Altun-Tash, one of his most trusted slave generals and a former *ghulām* or military retainer of his father Sebük-Tegin; for the next seventeen years Khwā-

506; A. Z. V. Togan, "The Khorezmians and their Civilisation", Preface to Zamakhshari's *Muqaddimāt al-Adab*, pp. 9–43; S. P. Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren der Altborezmischen Kultur*, pp. 9 f.

¹ Baihaqī, *Ta'rikh-i Mas'ūdi*, p. 86; cf. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*, p. 109.

razm remained a salient of Ghaznavid power that reached into the steppes.¹

Some Western orientalist have viewed the downfall of these north-eastern Iranian dynasties through a certain romantic haze. They have idealized the Sāmānids, at whose court the renaissance of New Persian culture and literature began—a court adorned by such figures as Bal‘amī, Rūdakī, and Daqīqī; or, mourning the passing of the Khwārazm-Shāhs, whose kingdom nurtured the polymath al-Bīrūnī, they have called it the end of an epoch, after which Iran lost political control of its destiny for many centuries.² On the other hand, as V. Minorsky has justly pointed out, there have been few laments for the passing of those Iranian dynasties farther west, that also went down in the course of the 5th/11th century under Turkish pressure; yet the Būyids’ court at Ray and Shīrāz, the Kākūyids’ at Iṣfahān, and the Ziyārīds’ court at Gurgān and Ṭabaristān gave shelter to such diverse geniuses as al-Mutanabbī, Avicenna, and al-Bīrūnī. To some extent these Western attitudes reflect those of the contemporary Sunnī Muslim sources which are distinctly favourable to dynasties like the Ṭāhirīds and Sāmānīds, sprung from the landed classes, while they are hostile to those of plebeian origin, e.g. the Ṣaffārīds or to those tinged with Shī‘ism or unorthodoxy, such as the Būyīds and Kākūyīds.³

The collapse of the native Iranian dynasties of the north-east was followed within a few decades by a major migration of Turkish peoples, the Oghuz, from the outer steppes. Similar population movements have been recurrent features of the history of this region from early times, for the Oxus and Syr Darya basins are a transitional zone between Central Asia and the lands of ancient civilization in the Near East. The mountain chains of the Alburz [Elburz], Pamirs, and Hindu Kush are high and, being geologically young, are sharp and jagged, yet they have never seriously hindered the passage of armies and other peoples; nor have invaders from the steppes ever found that the transition to the Iranian plateau necessitated much change in their way of life. In order for a pastoralist economy to survive, each summer the flocks and

¹ Sachau, *S.B.W.A.W.* vol. LXXIV (1873), pp. 290–301; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 233–4, 275–9; *idem*, “Short History of Turkestan”, pp. 18–19; Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren*, pp. 253–63, 286–91.

² See, for example, T. Nöldeke, *Das Iranische Nationalepos*, pp. 40–1; and G. E. von Grunebaum, “Firdausī’s Concept of History”, in *Islam, Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition* (London, 1955), pp. 168–84.

³ See V. Minorsky, Review of Spuler’s *Iran in frühislamischer Zeit* in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, vol. CCVII (1953), pp. 192–7.

herds should be driven out of their winter grounds to pastures, or *yailaqs*, in the hills. Thus the terrain of Iran was quite well suited to the traditional way of life of Central Asian invaders. For instance, the oases of Khurāsān could provide rich pasture for herds, and certain *chamans* (pasture grounds), e.g. the Ūlang-i Rādkān between Mashhad [Meshed] and Khabūshān, and the Marg-i Šā'igh near Nasā, have played significant parts in Iranian history as the camping and grazing grounds of armies. As the Türkmen moved westwards, they found the valleys of Āzarbāijān and Armenia and the plains of Anatolia highly suitable for their flocks. In this way the Saljuq and Mongol invasions inevitably had an effect on landholding and land utilization in the Iranian world.

Yet these considerations do not explain why the Türkmen succeeded in bringing about permanent changes in the ethnography and economy of the Iranian world, whereas most of the earlier invaders had eventually been absorbed into the existing way of life. It was certainly not through sheer weight of human numbers, for there were not many Türkmen bands in Khurāsān during the reign of Mas'ūd b. Maḥmūd of Ghazna (421-32/1030-41), although the damaging effects of their sheep and goats as they nibbled across the country's agricultural oases were indeed serious.¹ It seems that in the first half of the 5th/11th century, the Iranian bastion of the north-east, whose age-old function had been to hold closed this corridor for peoples, lost its resilience and no longer possessed the absorptive power it had once had. In the previous century the Afrighid Khwārazm-Shāhs had every autumn led an expedition into the steppes against the Türkmen; and the Sāmānid amīrs launched punitive expeditions and slave raids across the Syr Darya, such as the famous campaign of Ismā'il b. Aḥmad (279-95/892-907) against the Qarluq at Talas in 280/893.² It is true that the groundwork for this collapse had been in some measure prepared, with Turks taking part in the internal wars of Transoxiana and also settling peacefully within its borders. Furthermore, from the early 3rd/9th century onwards Muslim rulers in all parts of the eastern caliphate had been growing more dependent on Turkish slave troops, which increased the flow of Turks through Transoxiana and Khurāsān. This traffic in human beings became an important source of revenue for the Sāmānids, who issued licences and collected transit dues; at the same time the amīrs became

¹ Cf. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*, pp. 128, 224, 226, 241, 259-61.

² Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 224; *idem*, "Short History of Turkestan", pp. 19-20; Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren*, pp. 262-3; Bosworth, *op. cit.* pp. 31-3.

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dependent on Turkish ghulāms for their own bodyguard, seeking to use them as a counterbalance to the indigenous military class of the dihqāns.¹

To sum up: the disappearance of the native Khwārazm-Shāhs and Sāmānids meant the end of two firmly constituted states in the eastern Iranian world, and the result was a power vacuum. The authority of the Qarakhānids in Transoxiana and that of the Ghaznavids in Khurāsān and Khwārazm had no organic roots; in the first region it was diffused and less effective than Sāmānid rule had been, and in the other two regions it was despotic, capricious, and operating from a very distant capital, Ghazna. These points will be examined at greater length in the next section.

II. KHURĀSĀN: THE DECLINE OF GHAZNAVID POWER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SALJUQS

All through their period of domination the Qarakhānids in Transoxiana remained a tribal confederation and never formed a unitary state. Their territories straddled the T'ien Shan, where their yailaqs lay, and on the facts of geography alone it is hard to see how such an empire could have been governed by one power. Originally the dynasty did have a certain unity, although there was from the start the old Turkish double system of a Great Khan and a Co-Khan. But as early as the first decades of the 5th/11th century the sources mention internecine strife in the family; and two distinct branches—which may be called after their characteristic Islamic names, the 'Alids and Ḥasanids—begin to emerge. After 433/1041–2 there were lines of eastern and western Qarakhānids, established at first in Balāsāghūn and Uzkand respectively, and then in Kāshghar and Samarqand. Within the family there existed the complicated system of a double khanate and subordinate under-khans, so that several princes might hold power simultaneously in various regions; and the family's titulature and onomasticon, combining both Turkish tribal and totemistic titles with Islamic names and honorifics, was confused and constantly changing. The task of sorting out the genealogy of the dynasty has thus been very difficult; only the researches of the numismatist R. Vasmer and the Turcologist O. Pritsak have thrown light on it.²

¹ Bosworth, pp. 208–9.

² Cf. Pritsak, "Karahanlilar", *İslām Ansiklopedisi*; *idem* "Karachanidische Streitfrage", *Oriens*, pp. 209–28; and "Titulaturen und Stammesnamen der altäischen Völker", *Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher*, vol. XXIV (1952), pp. 49–104.

In the early part of the 5th/11th century the administration of Transoxiana reverted to a pattern resembling that which had prevailed on the eve of the Muslim conquests: small city-states were scattered along the Zarafshān, and the middle Syr Darya was under the general supervision of Qarakhānid princes. With this trend towards regionalism, the landed aristocracy enjoyed a resurgence of power. The dihqān of Īlāq, on the north bank of the Syr Darya, began for the first time to mint his own coins.¹ The general weight and expense of administration decreased. A continuator of Narshakhī, the historian of Bukhārā, records that the land tax of Bukhārā and its environs was everywhere lightened after the fall of the Sāmānids, in part because irrigation works were neglected and land became water-logged and unproductive.² Hence after the disappearance of the Sāmānid amīrs, with their centralizing administrative policy and their standing army, Transoxiana was ill-prepared to meet fresh waves of invaders from the steppes.

We have seen that Khurāsān passed into the Ghaznavids' hands. Towards the end of his life the restless dynamism of Sulṭān Maḥmūd made him press westwards across Iran against his rivals the Dailamī Būyids, various branches of whom ruled in western and central Iran and in Iraq (see below, section III, pp. 25 ff.). The Shi'ism of the Būyids and their tutelage of the 'Abbāsīd caliphs in Baghdad gave the early Ghaznavids plausible pretexts for intervention in the west. They had grandiloquent plans for liberating the caliphs, opening up the pilgrimage route to Mecca and Medina, and then pushing on to attack the Shi'i Fāṭimids in Syria and Egypt; but the Türkmen's pressure in the east ensured that these designs remained only dreams.³ It was not until 420/1029, the last year of his life, that Maḥmūd came to Ray in northern Iran and deposed its Būyid ruler Majd al-Daula Rustam b. 'Alī (387-420/997-1029). At the same time that the province of Ray and Jibāl was being annexed, another Dailamī ruler, the Kākūyid 'Alā' al-Daula Muḥammad b. Duṣḥmanziyār of Iṣfahān (398-433/1008 to 1041-2), was made a tributary, and various petty Kurdish and Dailamī rulers of north-western Persia, such as the Musāfirids of Ṭārum, were also forced to recognize the sultan. The Ziyārid Manūchīhr b. Qābūs (403-20 or 421/1012-13 to 1029 or 1030) was already

¹ Barthold, "Short History of Turkestan", in *Four Studies*, vol. 1, pp. 23-4.

² Narshakhī, *Ta'riḫ-i Bukhārā*, ed. Mudarris Riḍavī, pp. 39-40 (Frye tr., p. 33).

³ Cf. Bosworth, "The Imperial Policy of the Early Ghaznavids", *Islamic Studies*, pp. 67-74; *idem*, *The Ghaznavids*, pp. 52-4.

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paying tribute to Maḥmūd; now he had to allow Ghaznavid armies transit through his territories and was forced on at least one occasion to contribute troops to them. (For a detailed survey of these minor Dailamī dynasties, see below, section III.) In the province of Kirmān in south-eastern Iran, which was under the control of the Būyids of Fārs and Khūzistān, Maḥmūd had in 407/1016-17 attempted to set his own nominee on the throne, but without lasting success; thereafter he left Kirmān alone. One of Mas'ūd b. Maḥmūd's armies did temporarily occupy the province in 424/1033, but was shortly afterwards driven out by the returning Būyids.¹

When Maḥmūd died in 421/1030, the territory of the Ghaznavid empire was at its largest. It had become a successor state to the Sāmānids in their former lands south of the Oxus, but its original centre was Ghazna and the region of Zābulistān on the eastern rim of the Afghan plateau. As soon as he came to power in Ghazna in 366/977, Sebük-Tegin began a series of raids against the Hindūshāhi rajahs of Vaihand, and Maḥmūd gained his lasting reputation in the Islamic world as the great *ghāzī* (warrior for the faith), leading campaigns each winter against the infidels of the plains of northern India. Maḥmūd's thirst for plunder and territory, and also his need to employ a standing army of some 50,000 men, combined to give Ghaznavid policy a markedly imperialist and aggressive bent;² whilst from the religious aspect, the Ghaznavids' strict Sunnī orthodoxy enabled the sultan to pose as the faithful agent of the caliph and to purge his own dominions of religious dissidents such as the extremist Shī'ī Ismā'ilīs and the Mu'tazilis.

The spoils of India were insufficient to finance this vast empire; the steady taxation revenue from the heartland of the empire, Afghanistan and Khurāsān, had to supplement them. Khurāsān suffered most severely from the exactions of Ghaznavid tax collectors, who were driven on by the sultan's threats of torture and death for those who failed him. For some ten years, until his dismissal and death in 404/1013-14, the Vizier Abu'l-'Abbās al-Faḍl Isfarā'inī mulcted the merchants, artisans, and peasants of Khurāsān, causing misery and depopulation. In the words of the Ghaznavid historian 'Utbī, "Affairs were characterized there by nothing but tax levies, sucking which sucked dry, and attempts to extract fresh sources of revenue, without any construc-

¹ Cf. Nāzim, *The Life and Times of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazna*, pp. 77-9, 80-5, 192-3; Bosworth, *Islamic Studies*, pp. 69-72.

² On the Ghaznavid military machine, see Bosworth, "Ghaznavid Military Organisation", *Der Islam*, pp. 37-77.

tive measures". Hence after a few years there was nothing more to be got in Khurāsān, "since after water had been thrown on her udder, not a trickle of milk could be got nor any trace of fat".¹

Mas'ūd continued to act irresponsibly in Iran. When Ray had first been conquered there had been some sympathy for the Ghaznavids, for they delivered the people from the Shī'ī Būyids and their turbulent soldiery. But the exactions of the Ghaznavid officials soon alienated all support: "Tash Farrāsh [the Ghaznavid military governor] had filled the land with injustice and tyranny, until the people prayed for deliverance from them [the Ghaznavids] and their rule. The land became ruined and the population dispersed."² This policy of *Raubwirtschaft* prevented the growth of any bond of sympathy or feelings of interdependence between the sultan and his Iranian subjects. Loyalty and patriotism as we know them had no meaning in the Islamic world at this time, as can be seen in Maḥmūd's words to the people of Balkh after the Qarakhānid invasion of 397-8/1006-8: he reproached them for putting up a spirited defence against the besiegers, because some of the sultan's personal property had been destroyed in the fighting. On their side, the attitude of the merchants and landowners of Khurāsān was purely pragmatic; they tolerated Ghaznavid rule as long as it could secure the external defence of the province. In Mas'ūd's reign it became clear that the Ghaznavids could not provide this protection, so there was no reason for the Khurāsānian cities to retain any further loyalty to them. Even as early as 397/1006, a considerable number of the *dihqāns* and notables had inclined towards the Qarakhānid invaders.³

The Ghaznavids failed, therefore, to identify themselves with the historic interests of Khurāsān, that is, with the securing of internal prosperity, an atmosphere in which commerce and agriculture could flourish, and with the preservation of the north-eastern frontier against external invaders from Central Asia. In both spheres their achievements fell short of those of earlier, Iranian rulers of the province, such as the Sāmānids. The racially Turkish Ghaznavids adopted the government's traditional institutions and practices, encouraged Iranian culture, and held court with the magnificence of Iranian monarchs;⁴ but their

¹ 'Utbī, *al-Ta'rikh al-Yamīnī*, vol. II, pp. 158-9; cf. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 65 ff., 86-9.

² Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi'l-Ta'rikh*, vol. IX, p. 292; cf. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 85-6.

³ Baihaqī, *Ta'rikh-i Mas'ūdi*, p. 551; 'Utbī, II, p. 77; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 291, and Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 253, 259-66.

⁴ Cf. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 129-39.

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identification was not deep enough, or perhaps it did not have time to develop: the sultans ruled in Khurāsān for only forty years, and in Ray and Jibāl for only seven or eight years. In basic outlook the sultans remained in large measure Turkish *condottieri*, thus the lure of India and their dreams of expansion towards Iraq and beyond distracted them from proper attention to the defence of the Oxus line. Until it was too late, the Ghaznavid sultans regarded the Türkmen as minor irritants, just one more wave of raiders from the steppes who would either sweep through Iran to regions beyond or else become absorbed into the existing economy and social structure of Persia.

When the Saljuqs first appeared in Transoxiana and Khurāsān in the 5th/11th century, they came as marauders and plunderers. It has been suggested that the Turkish peoples' conversion to Islam and their consequent zeal for *jihād* (holy war) helped them to overrun so much of the Middle East.¹ It is true that in the course of the 5th/11th century the Türkmen carried on warfare against the Byzantines and the Christian kingdoms of Armenia and the Caucasus, and that the Saljuqs achieved some prestige in the eyes of the orthodox by overthrowing Shī'ī Būyid rule in western Iran. Sunnī writers even came to give an ideological justification for the Turks' political and military domination of the Middle East. The Iranian historian Rāvandī dedicated his history of the Saljuqs, the *Rāḥat al-ṣudūr wa āyat al-surūr* ("Solace of Hearts and Signal for Gladness", begun in 599/1202), to one of the Saljuq sultans of Rūm or Asia Minor, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kai-Khusrau b. Qīlij-Arslan. Rāvandī tells of a hidden, supernatural voice from the Ka'ba at Mecca, which spoke to the Imām Abū Ḥanīfa and promised him that as long as the sword remained in the hands of the Turks, his faith (that of the Ḥanafī law school, which was followed *par excellence* by the Turks) would not perish. Rāvandī himself adds a pious doxology: "Praise be to God, He is exalted, that the defenders of Islam are mighty and that the followers of the Ḥanafī rite are happy and joyful! In the lands of the Arabs, Persians, Byzantines, and Russians, the sword is in the hands of the Turks, and fear of their sword is firmly implanted in all hearts!"²

Yet these considerations, valid though they may be for the second half of the 5th/11th century and after, have no relevance for the

¹ This view is put especially clearly by August Müller in his *Der Islam im Morgen- und Abendland* (Berlin, 1884-7), vol. II, pp. 53-4.

² Rāvandī, *Rāḥat al-ṣudūr*, pp. 17-18; cf. O. Turan, "The Idea of World Domination among the Mediaeval Turks", *Studia Islamica*, vol. IV (1955), pp. 84-5.

preceding decades of the Saljuq invasions of Khurāsān. Barthold has pointed out that the Šūfī shaiḫs who worked in the steppes were usually evangelical hell-fire preachers, who dangled their audiences over the pit rather than painting for them the delights of a warriors' paradise.¹ Moreover, it is hard to see that the orthodox Muslim *faqīhs* and theologians, who came mainly from the property-owning classes, could positively have welcomed the Qarakhānids or Saljuqs. It is safest to treat this passing of Transoxiana and Khurāsān into Turkish hands as acts of resignation by the landowning and religious interests, which feared the centralizing policy of the Sāmānīd amīrs more than they did the incoming Qarakhānids; moreover the merchants and landowners had despaired of getting further help against the Türkmen from the distant government in Ghazna.

The Saljuqs belonged to the Oghuz Turks, who appear in history as a grouping of nine tribes, the Toquz Oghuz. These tribes formed part of the eastern Türkü and are mentioned in the royal annals of the confederation, the Orkhon inscriptions of Outer Mongolia, written in the first half of the 2nd/8th century. When that empire collapsed in 125/741 and a fresh confederation was formed, the Oghuz chief eventually came to hold the military office of Yabghu of the "right wing of the horde", although he never acquired the supreme title of Qaghan. Towards the end of the 2nd/8th century the Oghuz moved westwards through the Siberian steppes to the Aral Sea and to the Volga and southern Russia. With their attacks on Ushrūsana in the reign of the Caliph al-Ma'mūn (198-218/813-33), they come within the purview of Islamic writers.²

Some Oghuz also moved into the Dihistān steppes north of the Atrak river, and others took over the existing settlements at the mouth of the Syr Darya, where the Islamic sources of the 4th/10th century mention three Turkish towns: Jand, Khuvār, and the "new town" of Yengi-Kent. Most of the Turks were Oghuz, and they included both nomads and sedentaries. They acquired a certain amount of culture, for this region had economic connexions with Khwarazm and Transoxiana, but the cultural and material level of those Oghuz who were nomads between the Dihistān steppes and the Urals remained perceptibly lower. The Arab traveller Ibn Faḍlān was passing through their territories in 309-10/921-2 on an embassy from the caliphate to the Bulgars of the middle Volga, and he met a band of Oghuz who were

¹ *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, pp. 57-9.

² Cf. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 210-11.

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living in extreme wretchedness and wandering "like straying wild asses". Ibn Faḍlān met amongst them certain leaders whose titles recur in later Saljuq history; their chief had the title of Yabghu, whilst the military leader was called *Ṣāhib al-jaish* (*Sü-Baṣhī* or *Sü-Begī* in Turkish), or "army leader"; and there was a subordinate commander called the Lesser *Yināl*. It is in the 4th/10th century too that the term "Türkmen" first appears in Islamic sources; about 370/980 the geographer Maqdisī, speaking of two strongholds in the province of Isfījāb, calls them "frontier posts against the Türkmen". It is not clear whether the term has a political or an ethnic denotation, but in the 5th/11th century and after it was undoubtedly applied to the south-western Turks, the Oghuz and Qipchaq, whereas the term "Turk" is used for the more easterly Turks of the Qarluq group. Ghaznavid sources frequently call the incoming Oghuz "Türkmen", and in his "Mirror for Princes" (the *Siyāsat-Nāma*) the Saljuq vizier Nizām al-Mulk uses the term for the tribal followers of the Great Saljuqs who had remained nomads within Iran and the lands to the west.¹

According to Maḥmūd Kāshgharī, author of the pioneer Turkish-Arabic dictionary, the *Dīwān lughāt al-Turk* (completed 466/1074), the leading tribe of the Oghuz, from whom their princes sprang, was the Qīnīq. The Saljuq family (it does not seem originally to have been any bigger social unit than this) belonged to the Qīnīq.² At the end of the 4th/10th century the ruler of the Oghuz was the Yabghu, who had a winter capital at Yengi-Kent in the Syr Darya delta, and whose authority ranged over the steppes from there to the Volga. The lower Syr Darya was at this time in the zone where Islam and paganism met, and where Muslim *ghāzīs* (fighters for the faith) were active; at one stage in their rise to power the Saljuqs themselves operated here as typical *ghāzīs*. According to the *Malik-Nāma*, an account of Saljuq origins which Cahen believes to have been written for Sultān Alp-Arslan, the progenitor of the Saljuq family was one Duqaq, called *Temür-Yalīgh* ("iron-bow"). He and his son Saljuq served the "king of the Turks", i.e. the Yabghu, with Saljuq holding the important military office of *Sü-Baṣhī*. Certain sources state that Duqaq and Saljuq served the king

¹ Cf. Togan, "Ibn Faḍlāns Reisebericht", *Abhandlung für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. xxiv (1939), pp. 15-17 (tr., pp. 28-31); Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren*, pp. 263 ff.; İ. Kafesoğlu, "A Propos du nom Türkmen", *Oriens*, vol. xi (1958), pp. 146-50; Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 211-18.

² Kāshgharī, *Dīwān lughāt al-Turk*, vol. i, pp. 55-9; cf. Cahen, "Les Tribus Turques d'Asie Occidentale pendant la Période Seljukide", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, pp. 179-80.

of the Khazars, whose kingdom embraced the lower Volga and southern Russia, but this seems to be merely a memory of earlier Oghuz-Khazar connexions. Eventually the Yabghu became jealous of Saljuq's power, and the latter was forced to flee with his retainers and their flocks to Jand; it was in the region of Jand, apparently in the last decade of the 10th century, that the Saljuq family became Muslim and then turned to *ghazw*, or raiding, against those Turks who remained pagan, including the Yabghu of Yengi-Kent. The fierce hostility between these two branches of the Qīnīq was not resolved until 433/1042, when the Saljuqs took over Khwārazm and drove out the Yabghu's son and successor, Shāh Malik b. 'Alī (see below, section iv, p. 52).¹

Over the next decades the Saljuqs (now led by the three sons of Saljuq who had reached manhood, Mūsā, Mikā'il, and Arslan Isrā'il, as well as by Mikā'il's two sons Toghrīl Beg Muḥammad and Chaghri Beg Dā'ūd) hired out their services to the warring factions of Transoxiana and Khwārazm, fighting for anyone who would assure them pasture for their herds. Indeed, some sources specifically say that it was pressure of population and the need for pasture which compelled them to move southwards. They can have had no thoughts of a more ambitious role in the Iranian world, even though the *Malik-Nāma* (preserved in al-Ḥusainī's historical account of the dynasty, *Akḥbār al-dawla al-Saljuqiyya*) describes a dream in which Saljuq saw himself urinating fire, whose sparks spread all over the world: a shaman (priest-doctor) interpreted this to mean that a son of his would rule over all the world. The Yabghu of Yengi-Kent became a Muslim in 393/1003 and aided the last of the Sāmānids, Ismā'il al-Muntaṣir (see p. 7 above). His Saljuq rivals, who on the fall of the Sāmānids had moved to pastures near Bukhārā, therefore gave their services to the Sāmānids' enemies, the Qarakhānids. Toghrīl and Chaghri fought for a Qarakhānid called Bughra Khān (possibly the ruler of Talas and Isfijāb, Yīghan-Tegin b. Qadīr Khān Yūsuf) and then joined forces with their uncle Arslan Isrā'il in the service of a rival Qarakhānid, 'Alī-Tegin of Bukhārā and Samarqand. Their followers were now living on winter pastures at Nūr Bukhārā or Nakhshab, near 'Alī-Tegin's capital, moving eastwards into Soghdia for the summer.²

When in 417/1026 'Alī-Tegin was temporarily defeated by the united

¹ Cahen, "Le Malik-Nameh et l'Histoire des Origines Seljukides", *Oriens*, pp. 41-4; Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 219-23.

² Cahen, *Oriens*, pp. 44-52; Bosworth, *op. cit.* pp. 223-4.

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forces of Maḥmūd of Ghazna and Qadīr Khān Yūsuf of Kāshghar and Khotan, the Saljuq bands split up once more. Arslan Isrā'il's followers, comprising 4,000 tents, complained of the oppression of their own chiefs and requested permission from Maḥmūd to settle on the northern fringes of Khurāsān near Sarakhs, Abīvard, and Farāva; they promised to act as auxiliaries for the Ghaznavids and to refrain from encroaching on the settled land. Either at this point or shortly afterwards, Arslan Isrā'il himself fell into Maḥmūd's hands and later died in prison. Toghrīl and Chaghri remained in the neighbourhood of Bukhārā with 'Ali-Tegin; after 420/1029 they quarrelled with the Qarakhānid, yet in 423/1032 the Saljuqs were to be found fighting on 'Ali-Tegin's side against the Ghaznavid general Altun-Tash at the battle of Dabūsiyya. When in 425/1034 'Ali-Tegin died, they moved into Khwārazm at the invitation of Altun-Tash's son Hārūn, who was then in virtual rebellion against Maḥmūd. At this point the old enmity between the Saljuqs and the line of the Oghuz Yabghus of Yengi-Kent flared up: the Saljuqs were overwhelmingly defeated by Shāh Malik of Jand, who aimed at annexing Khwārazm for himself.¹

The Saljuqs' only recourse now was to follow the example of Arslan Isrā'il's band and head southwards for Khurāsān. A group of 7,000 or 10,000 Türkmen were led by Toghrīl, Chaghri, Mūsā Yabghu (the Saljuqs had themselves assumed this title in rivalry to the Yabghus of Yengi-Kent and Jand), and by Ibrāhīm Īnal, who is described as a son of Toghrīl's mother and the leader of the Ināliyān, a section of the Türkmen mentioned separately in the sources. Their defeat in Khwārazm had left the Ināliyān in a state of utter wretchedness, and in 426/1035, in a very humble letter to Mas'ūd of Ghazna's vizier, the leaders described themselves as "the slaves Yabghu, Toghrīl, and Chaghri, Clients of the Commander of the Faithful" and asked that the towns of Nasā and Farāva be granted to them. The existing depredations caused by the wave of Türkmen who had entered Khurāsān in 416/1025, the so-called "Irāqī" Türkmen, were now aggravated by the Saljuqs' spoliations. They sent cavalry columns into Afghanistan as far as Gūzgān, Tukhāristān, and Sīstān, where they carried off livestock, pastured their sheep on agricultural land, and interrupted the caravan trade, generally terrorizing the towns of Khurāsān and causing starvation in both countryside and town. For the seven years 422-9/1031-8, until the town capitulated to Toghrīl, no sowing was possible outside

¹ Cahen, pp. 52-5; Bosworth, pp. 224-5.

the walls of Baihaq (modern Sabzavār), and during all this time mutton was unobtainable there.¹


The Ghaznavid sultans alternated between attempts at conciliation and punitive expeditions. They tried to enrol the Saljuq leaders as frontier guards against further Türkmen inroads, giving them each in 426/1035 the title *Dihqān* and the insignia and dress of a governor, and they even offered marriage alliances to Toghrīl, Chaghri, and Mūsā Yabghu. But it was soon obvious that the Saljuqs, being nomads, were unfamiliar with the concepts of defined frontiers and the sanctity of landed property. During the period 426-31/1035-40 large Ghaznavid armies were almost continually in the field against the Türkmen. The sultan blamed his Turkish ghulām commanders for pusillanimity and incompetence, even accusing them of collusion with the Saljuqs. The Ghaznavid armies were better led, better armed, and probably numerically superior to the poorly armed, half-starved nomad bands, and at first glance the advantages were all on one side. Yet though the sultan's forces scored some successes in pitched battles, they were never able to follow them up. The nomads had a clear advantage in mobility. They were unhampered by the elephants, siege machinery, and camp-following without which no Ghaznavid army could move; they were more hardened to the extremes of climate, the lack of water, and the famine conditions then prevailing in Khurāsān; and they did not have to operate, as did the Ghaznavid armies, from fixed bases.²

Meanwhile, the position of the Khurāsānian towns became perilous. There was little danger that the Saljuqs would storm them directly, for the nomads were unequipped for siege warfare and fought shy of it. The great cities surrendered voluntarily to them: Marv in 428/1037 and Herāt and Nishāpūr in 429/1038 (this last was recovered by the sultan's forces and not lost again till 431/1039). In each case the notables and landowners took the initiative in making peace, having despaired of receiving adequate protection from the sultan in Ghazna, who only latterly came to Khurāsān to lead his armies. Economic and commercial life was at a standstill. The 8th/15th-century historian Mirkhwānd describes the distressed state of the Nishāpūr area thus: "That region became ruinous, like the dishevelled tresses of the fair ones or the eyes of the loved ones, and it became devastated by the pasturing of [the Türkmen's] flocks."³ Of the Saljuq chiefs, only Toghrīl seems at this

¹ Cahen, pp. 55 ff.; Bosworth, pp. 225-6. ² Cahen, pp. 57 ff.; Bosworth, pp. 241-9.

³ Mirkhwānd, *Rauḍat al-safā*, vol. IV, p. 102.

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Map 2. The Ghaznavid empire at its greatest extent, c. 421/1030.

point to have had an eye to the future and to have adopted a statesmanslike attitude. He had difficulty in restraining his own brother from looting Nishāpūr, and the task was *a fortiori* more difficult where the ignorant and rapacious masses of the Türkmēn were concerned. On occupying Marv, however, Chaghri did give orders that tillage should be restored and refugees summoned back.¹

Ghaznavid authority was declining even in the more easterly regions of Bādghīs and Tukhārīstān, where the mountainous terrain was less suitable for the nomads to operate in. Law and order broke down, ‘*ayyārs* or brigands flourished, and the officials and leading citizens in cities such as Herāt began to negotiate with the Saljuqs for the surrender of their cities.² The final, decisive blow to Ghaznavid authority in the west came in 431/1040. A large army, led personally by Sulṭān Mas‘ūd

¹ Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 252–65.

² *Ibid.* pp. 265–6.

and accompanied by elephants and the full impedimenta of war, allowed itself to be drawn into battle at the *ribāt* (stronghold) of Dandānqān in the waterless desert between Sarakhs and Marv. The Türkmen fielded 16,000 cavalrymen and had left 2,000 of their less experienced and less well-mounted members to guard their baggage. Facing them was a dispirited and exhausted Ghaznavid army. In what must rank as one of the decisive battles of Khurāsān's history, Mas'ūd's forces were utterly routed. The Türkmen then dispersed to receive the final surrender of the cities, with Toghrīl going to Nīshāpūr, Mūsā Yabghu and the Ināliyān to Marv, and Chaghri to Balkh and Tukh-āristān. Mas'ūd's nerves failed completely. Resigning himself to the Saljuqs' inevitable occupation of Ghazna itself, he left for India; but his army had lost confidence in him, and the commanders deposed him when he reached the upper Indus valley, setting up his brother Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd for a brief sultanate.¹

On taking over Khurāsān, the Saljuq leaders became territorial sovereigns and not merely chiefs of nomadic bands. They learned to negotiate with the rulers of other states, and they gained knowledge of the administrative techniques practised in settled states. But even for the Saljuq leaders this process of acquiring political responsibility was disturbing, for it involved a changed mode of life and a changed outlook. Sultans such as Toghrīl, Alp-Arslan, and Malik-Shāh adapted themselves in some measure to the Iranian-Islamic monarchical tradition, leaning more and more heavily on their Iranian officials. Yet in his *Siyāsat-Nāma* the great vizier Nizām al-Mulk lamented that the sultans were neglecting the wise administrative practices followed by the Ghaznavids and other former rulers; thus the Iranian officials were never able to mould their masters into the exact shape they would have liked. As soon as Khurāsān and western Iran had been overrun, various members of the Saljuq family were allotted regions to govern (see p. 49 below). Nevertheless their frequent rebellions—those of Ibrāhīm Īnal, of Qutlumush b. Arslan Isrā'il, and even of the senior member of the family, Mūsā Yabghu—show that these provincial rulers never understood their subordinate position in the hierarchy of power that was roughly taking shape under the sultan. As for the masses of the Türkmen, now nominally Muslim, they remained at a cultural level little higher than that which they had enjoyed in the

¹ Baihaqī, *Ta'rikh-i Mas'ūdī*, pp. 616-34, 653-4; Gardizī, *Zain al-akbbār*, pp. 107-12; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, pp. 329-33; Spuler, *Iran in frühislamischer Zeit*, pp. 123-4.

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steppes, and their irreconcilable attitude towards any settled government was kept alive by the arrival of fresh tribal elements from Central Asia, who were attracted westwards by prospects of plunder.

Toghril's first occupation of Nishāpur, the administrative capital of Khurāsān, elated him. He behaved as independent ruler of the province, installing himself in the sultan's palace in the suburb of Shādīyākh and sitting upon Mas'ūd's throne (this last profanation so roused Mas'ūd that he subsequently had the throne broken up). According to the historian of the Saljuqs, 'Imād al-Dīn, who wrote in 579/1183, Toghril "forbade, gave orders, made grants, levied taxes, administered efficiently, abolished things, ordered affairs correctly, entrusted matters and presided every Sunday and Wednesday over the investigations of complaints".¹ The *khuṭba* (Friday sermon) was read in his name, and he assumed the royal title *al-Sultān al-Mu'azzam* ("Exalted Ruler").² Despite all this, it is possible that the pro-Saljuq sources which depend on the *Malik-Nāma* exaggerate the degree of Toghril's political sophistication at this time. As late as 430/1039 the Saljuqs still had a great fear of Sultān Mas'ūd's power, and they doubted whether they would be able to hold on in Khurāsān; it seems that they still placed Mas'ūd's name in the *khuṭba* alongside their own. But at the same time Toghril was in touch with the caliph, employing a *faqīh* as his secretary and envoy from Nishāpur. After the Dandānqān victory, this man was dispatched to Baghdad with the Saljuqs' *fath-nāma* (formal announcement of victory), a document written on the battlefield with materials salvaged from the abandoned Ghaznavid chancery.³

III. WESTERN AND CENTRAL IRAN IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 5TH/11TH CENTURY

With the east secured by the success at Dandānqān, the lands farther west now lay open to Saljuq attack. In 431/1040 western and central Iran were in the last phase of what V. Minorsky has called the "Dailami

¹ Investigation into complaints of tyranny (*maẓālim*) was one of the traditional duties of Islamic rulers; cf. H. F. Amedroz, "The Mazalim Jurisdiction in the Akham Sultaniyya of Mawardi", *[Journal of the] R[oyal] A[sianic] S[ociety]* (1911), pp. 635-74.

² Baihaqī, p. 553; Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra wa nukhbat al-nuṣra*, in *Recueil de Textes relatifs à l'Histoire des Seljoucides*, vol. II, p. 7; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, p. 15; Rāvandī, p. 97; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. IX, p. 328; Mirkhwān, vol. IV, p. 102; Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 256-7, 267.

³ Baihaqī, pp. 570, 628; Bundārī, p. 8; Nishāpūrī, p. 18; Rāvandī, p. 104; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. IX, p. 312; Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 243-4, 268.

interlude" of Iranian history.¹ Headed by the various branches of the Būyids, dynasties of Dailamī origin flourished not merely in their *Urheimat*, the mountains of northern and north-western Iran, but also as far south as lower Iraq and the shores of the Persian Gulf. Intermingled with these dynasties were some Kurdish rulers, notably the 'Annāzids of the *Shāhanjān* tribe (c. 381-511/c. 991-1117), successors in *Ḥulwān* and *Kirmānshāh* to the *Ḥasanūyids*. Other semi-nomadic Kurds were the effective holders of power in the mountainous regions of *Kurdistān* and *Luristān*; in the eastern part of *Fārs*, around *Dārābjird*, the *Shabānkāra*'i Kurds were especially influential. The *Marwānids* of *Diyārbakr*, *Akhlat*, and *Malāzgard* (372-489/983-1096) were also of Kurdish origin, but they rose to power as vassals of the *Fāṭimids*. During the long reign of *Naṣr al-Daula Aḥmad b. Marwān* (401-53/1011-61), his cities of *Āmid*, *Mayyāfāriqin*, and *Ḥiṣn Kaifā* in *Diyārbakr* enjoyed considerable material prosperity and a vigorous cultural life; an invasion of the *Oghuz* in 443/1041-2 was beaten off, and the annalist *Ibn al-Athīr* records that the sense of security and the prevailing justice in *Ibn Marwān*'s dominions were such that people actually dared openly to display their wealth.² A local historian of *Mayyāfāriqin*, *Ibn al-Azraq* (d. after 572/1176-7), describes enthusiastically how *Naṣr al-Daula* lightened taxes and, as part of his charitable works, supplied the town with piped water. However, the *Marwānid* territories came under *Saljuq* suzerainty soon after *Naṣr al-Daula*'s death. They were divided between his two sons, and in 478/1085-6 *Saljuq* armies under *Fakhr al-Daula Ibn Jahīr* and his son 'Amīd al-Daula *Ibn Jahīr* conquered *Diyārbakr* (see p. 98 below).³

On the western edges of the Iranian plateau, where it merges into the plains of Iraq, al-Jazireh, and northern Syria, there were various Arab amirates including the *Mazyadids* of *Ḥilla*, the 'Uqailids of *Mosul*, and the *Mirdāsids* of *Aleppo*. Militarily they depended on the *Bedouins* of the region; strategically they were important, first because they commanded the approaches into eastern Anatolia, Armenia, and western Iran, and second, because they were in the buffer zone between the rival dynasties of the Būyids and *Fāṭimids* and later between the

¹ On the region of Dailam and its role in Iranian history at this time, see below, pp. 30 ff.; see also the references in n. 2, p. 30 below.

² *Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil*, vol. x, p. 11.

³ Cf. Amedroz, "The *Marwānid* Dynasty at *Mayyāfāriqin* in the Tenth and Eleventh centuries A.D.", *J.R.A.S.* pp. 123-54; and Zetterstéen, "Marwānids", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.).

Saljuqs and Fātimids. Their religion, like that of almost all the Arabs of the Syrian desert and its fringes, was Shī'ī. In the fourth and fifth decades of the eleventh century these amirates were threatened by the Oghuz marauders who preceded the arrival of Toghrīl and the Saljuqs, and their grazing grounds were encroached upon by the Türkmen's flocks. In general they adopted a hostile attitude towards Toghrīl when he appeared in Iraq; the Mazyadid Dubais gave much support to Arslan Basāsiri, who was his own brother-in-law (see pp. 46-7).

The Dailamī dynasty of the Ziyārīds (c. 316-483/928-1090) reigned in the Caspian provinces of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān, and also at times in the province of Qūmis to the south of the Alburz mountains.¹ They arose from one of the fiercest and most ambitious Dailamī *condottieri* of the early 4th/10th century, Mardāvij b. Ziyār (d. 323/935). Later in the century the Ziyārīds' strategic position, commanding the routes which connected western Iran and Iraq with Khurāsān and Central Asia, allowed them to play a prominent role in the struggles between the Sāmānīds and Būyīds in northern Iran. The most famous of the dynasty, Shams al-Ma'ālī Qābūs b. Vushmagīr (366-403/977 to 1012-13), united something of his grandfather's ferocity with an enlightened love of letters and culture; some of his Arabic and Persian verses are known, and al-Bīrūnī and Avicenna both spent some time at his court. Though Mardāvij himself had been violently anti-Muslim, his successors were Sunnīs (this was unusual amongst the generally Shī'ī Dailamīs), and almost at the end of the dynasty Kai-Kā'ūs still called himself *Mawlā Amīr al-Mu'minīn*, the "Client of the Commander of the Faithful".² Qābūs felt the pressure of the Ghaznavīds and was compelled to recognize the suzerainty of Maḥmūd, although 'Utbī's grandiose claim, that "Jurjān and Ṭabaristān as far as the shores of the Caspian and the region of Dailam, by dint of the combining of circumstances, became just like one of the Sultan's own dominions", is certainly exaggerated. Falak al-Ma'ālī Manūchīhr b. Qābūs, the original patron of the Ghaznavīd poet Manūchīhrī Dāmghānī, became Maḥmūd of Ghazna's son-in-law; he ruled somewhat uneasily in the sultan's shadow, but did succeed in retaining some freedom of action.³

¹ For general surveys of this dynasty, see C. Huart, "Les Ziyārides", *Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, vol. XLII (1922), pp. 357-436; *idem*, *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.); and H. L. Rabino di Borgomale, "L'Histoire du Māzandarān", *J[ournal] A[siatique]*, vol. CCXXXIV (1943-5), pp. 229-33.

² Kai-Kā'ūs b. Iskandar, *Qābūs-Nāma*, p. 5 (tr. R. Levy, *A Mirror for Princes*, p. 1).

³ 'Utbī, *al-Ta'rīkh al-Yamīnī*, vol. II, p. 15; cf. Nāzīm, *Life and Times of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazna*, pp. 77-9.

With Manūchīhr's death in 420/1029 or 421/1030 (the date of 424/1033, given by the local but non-contemporary historians Ibn Isfandīyār and Zāhīr al-Dīn Mar'ashī, is too late), the Ziyārid dynasty ceased to count for anything outside the specific boundaries of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān. At this point the family's chronology and order of succession become confused and uncertain.¹ Of all the existing accounts—in Ibn Isfandīyār, Zāhīr al-Dīn Mar'ashī (whose material here derives from the former source), Ibn al-Athīr, and Baihaqī—only the last is contemporary. It seems that Manūchīhr's son Anushīrvān succeeded, but since he was a minor, effective power was held by his maternal uncle and chief minister, Abū Kālījār b. Vaihān al-Qūhī. This man was Mas'ūd of Ghazna's father-in-law, but in 425/1034, while the sultan was away in India, he seized the opportunity to ally with the Kākūyid 'Alā' al-Daula of Isfahān, and together they cut off tribute and rebelled. The violent behaviour of a Ghaznavid punitive expedition, which was sent in the next year and which penetrated as far westwards in Ṭabaristān as Nātil, alienated all sympathy for Mas'ūd in the Caspian provinces.² Despite this disharmony, Abū Kālījār and the sultan had a common interest in warding off the Türkmēn, for the line of the Atrak river and the Dihistān region had been from early Islamic times a *thaghīr* (frontier region) against the Türkmēn of the Qara-Qum and beyond.

Abū Kālījār maintained contact with Mas'ūd till 431/1040; thereafter he had to make his own terms with the Saljuqs, but in fact all mention of him now disappears from the sources. In 433/1041-2 Toghrīl arrived in Gurgān accompanied by one Mardāvīj b. Bishūi; this man and Anushīrvān b. Manūchīhr divided power between themselves, placing Toghrīl's name in the *khutba* and paying an annual tribute to him.³ Shortly afterwards a collateral branch of the Ziyārids took over, continuing as Saljuq vassals. From 441/1049-50 until a date after 475/1082-3 the ruler was 'Unsur al-Ma'ālī Kai-Kā'ūs b. Iskandar, author of another famous "Mirror for Princes", the *Qābūs-Nāma*. Before coming to the throne, he had spent some years in Ghazna as a boon-companion of Sulṭān Maudūd b. Mas'ūd, but he also had connexions with the north-western corner of the Iranian world: he

¹ An attempted elucidation is made by C. E. Bosworth in his article, "On the Chronology of the Ziyārids in Gurgān and Ṭabaristān", *Der Islam*, pp. 25-34.

² Baihaqī, *Ta'rikh-i Mas'ūdi*, pp. 340, 376, 394, 451-63; Ibn Isfandīyār, *Ta'rikh-i Ṭabaristān*, p. 235; and Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, p. 301.

³ *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, p. 340.

had fought in Armenia and Georgia with the Shaddādīd amīr Abu'l-Asvār Shāvūr b. Faḍl (d. 459/1067), lord of Dvin and Ganja (see below, pp. 34-5), and he spent some time amongst the Shaddādīds.¹ It is probable that Kai-Kā'ūs ruled only in the mountainous interior of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān while nominees of the Saljuqs held the coast. His son Gilān Shāh was the last of the line; the chief of the Assassins of Alamūt, Ḥasan-i Šabbāh, conquered the mountain regions of Ṭabaristān, and after c. 483/1090 the Ziyārīds disappear from history.²

Ibn Isfandiyār records that Ṭabaristān suffered much during the reign of the Saljuq sultan Alp-Arslan, because his troops moved frequently through the region. (This was in the seventh decade of the century: see pp. 64 ff., below.) However, the Ziyārīds' western neighbour, the Bāvandīd Ispahbadh Qārīn b. Surkhāb, was able to consolidate his power in the mountains. Thus it was the coastal plain which suffered, whilst the mountains either remained in the hands of local chieftains or else fell under Assassin control. In the 5th/11th and 6th/12th centuries the Caspian provinces often served as a corridor for the passage of nomads from Central Asia, but the coastal lands were unsuitable for their permanent settlement: the damp and malarial climate of the region and its dense vegetation and forest are singled out for mention by many of the Islamic geographers, and one writer calls Gurgān "the graveyard of the people of Khurāsān".³ Down to the nineteenth century the raids and transits of the Türkmēn must have retarded agriculture, though the fertility of the area gave it considerable natural resilience.

The Bāvandīd Ispahbadhs (45-750/665-1349) had their roots in the pre-Islamic Iranian past, for they sprang from the Sassanian Kā'ūs b. Qubād, brother of Anushīrvān the Just. Their Kā'ūsiyya branch reigned till 397/1006-7, followed by the Ispahbadhiyya from 465/1073 till 606/1210; and then, under Mongol suzerainty, the Kinkhwāriyya held sway from 635/1237 onwards. They ruled in Ṭabaristān (or Māzandarān, as it became known in the course of the 6th/12th century),⁴ often relinquishing control of the plains to rulers such as the 'Alid

¹ *Qābūs-Nāma*, pp. 24-5, 135-6 (Levy tr., pp. 35-7, 230, 234).

² Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ṭabaristān*, p. 236; Zahir al-Dīn Mar'ashī, *Ta'rikh-i Ṭabaristān u Rūyān u Māzandarān*, pp. 143-4. However, Rabino di Borgomale (*J.A.* p. 233) mentions a later possible scion of the Ziyārīds.

³ *Tha'ālibī, Laṭā'if al-Ma'ārif*, p. 113.

⁴ See Nöldeke, *Das Iranische Nationalepos*, p. 61, for a discussion of this change in nomenclature.

Dā'īs, the Būyids, and the Ziyārīds; but they retained authority in the mountains. The Kā'ūsiyya reigned from Firīm or Shahriyār-Kūh in the mountains to the south-west of Sārī, and they were Shī'īs, as the formula on their coins—"Alī is the Friend of God"—shows.¹ The last Ispahbadhs of this line were connected by marriage to the Būyids and Ziyārīds; one of them was Rustam b. Marzbān (d. ?407/1016-17), author of a well-known collection of fables, the *Marzbān-Nāma*, and a vassal of the Būyid Majd al-Daula of Ray. The line ended in 397/1006-7, with the death of Shahriyār b. Dārā at the hands of Qābūs b. Vushmagīr.

Other members of the Bāvandid dynasty survived, and as the Ziyārīds gradually lost control of the Caspian littoral to the Türkmen invaders, the Ispahbadhiyya entrenched themselves in the mountains. In the early Saljuq period they extended down to the coast; in the third quarter of the 11th century Rustam b. Shahriyār founded a *madrasa*, or college, at Sārī, which became the capital of their principality. These Ispahbadhs were generally vassals of the Saljuqs; in the reign of Sulṭān Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh, for example, there was a son of the Ispahbadh Ḥusām al-Daula Shahriyār b. Qārīn at the court of Iṣfahān, and another son married one of the sultan's sisters. On the other hand, they were not invariably servile towards their suzerains. When the same Saljuq sultan sent an expedition against the Ismā'īlīs of Alamūt, Shahriyār was offended by the sultan's peremptoriness, refused all help, and routed a Saljuq punitive force sent against him. This expedition was probably in 501/1107-8 or 503/1109-10 under the sultan's vizier and Amīr Chavli; see section VIII, pp. 118-19, below.²

During the 6th/12th century the Caspian provinces frequently fulfilled one of their historic roles, that of a refuge area, with the Bāvandids giving shelter to various Saljuq contenders for the sultanate, as well as to a Ghaznavid prince, to the sons of the Khwārazm-Shāh Qutb al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Anūsh-Tegin, and even to the son of the Mazyadid Ṣadaqa b. Maṣṣūr. With the decline of Saljuq power, the Ispahbadh Shāh Ghāzī Rustam b. 'Alī (534-58/1140-1 to 1163) became a major figure in the politics of northern Iran, pursuing an independent policy aimed at the expansion of his principality. He campaigned each

¹ P. Casanova, "Les Ispehbeds de Firīm", *Essays to E. G. Browne* (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 117-26.

² Ibn Isfandiyār, *Tabaristan*, pp. 240-2; cf. M. G. Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins, the Struggle of the Early Nizārī Ismā'īlīs against the Islamic World*, pp. 97, 100.

year against the Ismā'īlis of Alamūt and led one unsuccessful expedition against the Oghuz of the Dihistān steppe. Zāhīr al-Dīn Mar'ashī calls him the richest and greatest of the rulers of Ṭabaristān: he conquered Gurgān and Qūmis, and his power in the west extended as far as Mūghān. He helped the Saljuq Sulaimān-Shāh to gain the sultanate (see below, pp. 169 and 176), and in reward he was given Ray and Sāveh. Shāh Ghāzī's grandson Ḥusām al-Daula Ardashīr b. Ḥasan (576-602/1171-2 to 1205-6) aided Sultān Toghrīl b. Arslan and the atabeg Pahlavān Muḥammad b. Eldigūz (see p. 179 below), and he also had friendly relations with the Khwārazm-Shāh Tekīsh b. Il Arslan, the Ayyūbid Saladin, and the Caliph al-Nāṣir. But pressure from the aggressive Khwārazm-Shāhs became hard to resist, despite the Ispahbadhs' attempts to conciliate them by marriage alliances. In the reign of Nāṣir al-Daula Rustam b. Ardashīr, the Ismā'īlis overran most of the Bāvandid territories in Ṭabaristān, and when in 606/1210 he was assassinated, the Khwārazm-Shāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad seized the Caspian provinces and the Ispahbadhiyya line of the dynasty came to an end.¹

The Bādūspānids were western neighbours of the Bāvandids in Ṭabaristān, ruling for nearly a thousand years (c. 45-1006/665 to 1597-8) in the mountains of Rustamdār, Rūyān, Nūr, and Kujūr, and bearing the princely titles of *Ispahbadhs* and *Ustūndārs*. The dynasty, which traced its origins to a Sassanian governor of the Caspian provinces, vanished only when the Ṣafavid Shāh 'Abbās exterminated its last members. At times the Bādūspānids recognized Ṣaffārid and Būyid suzerainty, and later they were generally subordinate to the Bāvandids. Shahrnūsh b. Hazārāsp (510-23/1116-17 to 1129) married a sister of Shāh Ghāzī Rustam, and his brother Kai-Kā'ūs b. Hazārāsp (523-60/1129-65) was also an ally of the Bāvandids and a resolute foe of his neighbours the Ismā'īlis; but unlike the Ziyārids and Bāvandids, the Bādūspānids obtruded little on Iranian affairs outside their own corner of the Caspian region. Ibn Isfandiyār says that it was Kai-Kā'ūs b. Hazārāsp and his descendants who became followers of the Sayyid Abu'l-Ḥusain al-Mu'ayyad Billāh, yet according to Zāhīr al-Dīn Mar'ashī it was not until a Bādūspānid of the 9th/15th century imposed

¹ Ibn Isfandiyār, pp. 256-7; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. XII, pp. 166-7; Juvainī, *Ta'rikh-i Jabān-Gushā* (tr. J. A. Boyle, *The History of the World-Conqueror*), vol. I, pp. 340-1; Rabino di Borgomale, "Les Dynasties du Māzandarān", *J.A.* (1936), pp. 409-37; *idem*, *J.A.* (1943-5), pp. 218-21; Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti tarihi* (485-617/1092-1229), pp. 180-2; Frye, "Bāwand", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

Shī'ism on Rūyān and Rustamdār that most of the population there adopted that faith.¹

Between Ṭabaristān in the east and Āzarbāijān and Mūghān in the west lay Gilān and Dailam. Strictly speaking, Gilān was the coastal plain and Dailam the mountainous interior through which ran the Safid Rūd and Shāh Rūd, but up to the 5th/11th century the Muslims applied the term Dailam to the whole region. Islam was late in coming here; the Dailamī mountaineers were notorious for their depredations in the settled lands to the south of the Alburz, and Qazvīn was long regarded as a ṭhaghr against these infidels. In the early part of the 3rd/9th century Dailam was a centre for 'Alid propaganda, and the local people were gradually won over to Shī'ism. Here then is why the majority of Dailamī dynasties in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries were Shī'ī.²

The 4th/10th century was the period of the Dailamīs' greatest expansion; in the next century they tended to give way in Iran to Turkish dynasties such as the Ghaznavids and Saljuqs. The oldest of the Dailamī dynasties was that of the Justānids, who ruled at Rūdbār. Some seven or eight members of the family are known, the first of whom was mentioned in 189/805 when the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd received at Ray the submission of "the lord of Dailam". But the dynasty declined as their rivals of the Kangarid or Musāfirid family grew more powerful in Dailam. The last Justānid ruler definitely known was defeated by the Dailamī general Asfār b. Shīrūya (d. ?319/931). However, the dynasty may have survived much longer than this, for in 434/1042-3 Toghrīl Beg received at Qazvīn the submission of the "King of Dailam", and Kasravī has surmised that this was a surviving member of the Justānids. Less certain is a mention by the Persian traveller Nāṣir-i Khusrau, who passed through the region in 437/1046; he spoke of "the Amīr of Amīrs, who is from the Kings of Dailam", but this may refer to one of the Musāfirids.³

The Musāfirids or Sallārids were originally and more correctly called Kangarids.⁴ They arose in Dailam in the early years of the 4th/10th

¹ Rabino di Borgomale, *J.A.* (1936), pp. 443-74; *idem*, *J.A.* (1943-5), pp. 221-2; B. Nikitine, "Bādūsbānids", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

² On Dailam and the Dailamīs, see Aḥmad Kasravī, *Shahriyārān-i gum-nām*, vol. 1, pp. 2-20; Minorsky, *La Domination des Dailamites*, pp. 1-5; *idem*, "Daylam", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

³ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, p. 348; Nāṣir-i Khusrau, *Safar-Nāma*, p. 5. On the dynasty in general, see Kasravī, *Shahriyārān*, vol. 1, pp. 22-34; Rabino di Borgomale, "Les Dynasties Locales du Gilān et du Daylam", *J.A.* pp. 308-9.

⁴ Cf. Kasravī, *op. cit.* pp. 36-7, on the name of this dynasty.

century through the efforts of Muḥammad b. Musāfir, who was allied by marriage to the older dynasty of the Justānids, and whose power grew at the latter's expense. A contemporary Būyid source says that it was this marriage connexion plus the acquisition of the fortress of Samīrān in the region of Ṭārum which established the Musāfirids' fortunes.¹ Samīrān was then one of the key fortresses of Dailam, just as Alamūt was to be in Saljuq times, and several Islamic travellers and geographers described its wonders. After the deposition of Muḥammad b. Musāfir in 330/941, there were two lines of Musāfirids. One remained in the ancestral centre of Ṭārum; the other expanded northwards and westwards into Āzarbāijān, Arrān, and eastern Transcaucasia. This branch pushed as far as Darband on the Caspian coast, but its power was eventually destroyed by the Rawwādids. The Ṭārum branch lost Samīrān to the Būyid Fakhr al-Daula in 379/989, but they recovered it on that ruler's death, and in the period of his son Majd al-Daula's minority, the Musāfirids pressed southwards to Zanjān, Abhar, Suhraward, and Sarchahān.² The ensuing decades of Musāfirid history are very dark, but the dynasty was directly threatened when in 420/1029 Maḥmūd of Ghazna seized Ray (see p. 12 above). Against the Musāfirid Ibrāhīm b. Marzbān the sultan sent a "descendant of the Kings of Dailam", probably a Justānid, and then Mas'ūd b. Maḥmūd came in person and captured Ibrāhīm. Although a Ghaznavid garrison was left in Ṭārum, by 427/1036 it was again in Musāfirid hands.³ The early Saljuqs did not try to establish direct rule in Dailam, but were content to exact tribute; then in 434/1042-3 Toghrīl came westwards, retrieved Ray from the hands of his half-brother Ibrāhīm Īnal, and gained submission from "the Sālār of Ṭārum" on the basis of 200,000 dīnārs' tribute. Nāṣir-i Khusrau speaks with admiration of Samīrān and of the security and justice prevailing in the lands of the "Marzbān al-Dailam, Jil-i Jilān, Abū Šāliḥ [Justān b. Ibrāhīm], Maulā Amīr al-Mu'minīn". In 454/1062, shortly before his death, Toghrīl went to Samīrān and again took tribute from the local ruler Musāfir. After this the sources are quite silent about the dynasty, and it is likely that the line was extinguished when, as the geographer

¹ Letter of Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad to the Šāḥib Ibn 'Abbād, in Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-Buldān*, vol. III, pp. 256-7, s.v. "Samīrān".

² Yāqūt, *loc. cit.*; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. IX, pp. 262-3; Münejjim Bāshī, in Minorsky, *Studies in Caucasian History*, p. 165.

³ Baihaqī, *Ta'rikh-i Mas'ūdi*, pp. 16, 18, 49, 218; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. IX, pp. 262-3, 304; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, pp. 165-6.

Yāqūt relates, the Ismā'īlis of Alamūt destroyed the fortress of Samīrān.¹

The Rawwādids (latterly the form "Rawād" is commoner in the sources) were another product of the upsurge of the mountain peoples of northern Iran; their domain was Āzarbāijān, and particularly Tabriz. Strictly speaking, the Rawwādīd family was of Azdī Arab origin, but by the 4th/10th century they were accounted Kurdish. At the opening of the 'Abbāsīd period Rawwād b. Muḥannā had held a fief which included Tabriz. Over the course of the next two centuries his descendants became thoroughly Kurdicized, and the "Rawwādī Kurds" emerged with Iranian names, although the local poet Qaṭrān (d. c. 465/1072) still praised them for their Arab ancestry. Early in the 4th/10th century the Sājīd line of Arab governors in Āzarbāijān collapsed, and the region became politically and socially disturbed. A branch of the Musāfirīds of Ṭārum first emerged there, but despite Bi yid help the Musāfirīd Ibrāhīm b. Marzbān was deposed in c. 370/980-1, probably by the Rawwādīd Abu'l-Haijā' Ḥusain b. Muḥammad (344-78/955-88); certainly it was the Rawwādids who succeeded to all of the Musāfirīd heritage in Āzarbāijān.²

The most prominent member of the dynasty in the 5th/11th century was Vahsūdān b. Mamlān b. Abi'l-Haijā' (c. 410-46/c. 1019-54). It was in his reign that the Oghuz invaded Āzarbāijān. These were some of the first Tūrkmen to come westwards, being the so-called "Irāqīs", or followers of Arslan Isrā'il, expelled from Khurāsān by Maḥmūd of Ghazna (see pp. 38 and 40-1). Vahsūdān received them favourably in 419/1028, hoping to use them as auxiliaries against his many enemies, such as the Christian Armenians and Georgians and the rival Muslim dynasty of Shaddādīds. He even married the daughter of an Oghuz chief, but it still proved impossible to use the anarchic nomads as a reliable military force. In 429/1037 they plundered Marāgheh and

¹ Nāṣir-i Khusrāu, p. 5; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, p. 348, vol. x, p. 15; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, p. 166; and Cahen, "L'Iran du Nord-Ouest face à l'expansion Seldjukide, d'après une source inédite", *Mélanges d'Orientalisme Offerts à Henri Massé* (Tehran, 1963), pp. 65-71. On the dynasty in general, see Huart, "Les Mosāfirīdes de l'Adherbāidjān", *Essays to E. G. Browne*, pp. 228-56; E. D. Ross, "On Three Muhammadan Dynasties in Northern Persia in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries", *Asia Major*, pp. 213-15; Kasravi, *Shahriyārān*, vol. i, pp. 36-49; Minorsky, "Musāfirīds", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.); and *idem*, *Caucasian History*, pp. 158-66 (= the section from the Ottoman historian Müncejjim Bashi's *Jāmi' al-duwal* on this dynasty).

² Kasravi, *op. cit.* vol. ii, pp. 163-4, 176; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, pp. 162-4. On the dynasty in general, see Kasravi, vol. ii, pp. 160-225; Minorsky, "Tabriz" and "Marāgha", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.).

massacred large numbers of Hadhbānī Kurds.¹ Vahsūdān allied with his nephew, the chief of the Hadhbānīs, Abu'l-Haijā' b. Rahīb al-Daula, against the Türkmen; many of them now migrated southwards towards Iraq, and in 432/1040-1 Vahsūdān devised a stratagem by which several of the remaining leaders were killed. The rest of the Oghuz in Āzarbāijān then fled to the territory of the Hakkārī Kurds south-west of Lake Vān. Vahsūdān's capital, Tabriz, was destroyed by an earthquake in 434/1042, and fearing that the Saljuqs would take advantage of his resulting weakness, he moved to one of his fortresses; but the city was soon rebuilt, and Nāsir-i Khusrāu found it populous and flourishing.²

Despite Vahsūdān's apprehension, a considerable time elapsed before the Saljuqs themselves moved against Āzarbāijān. Meanwhile the main threats came from independent Türkmen bands who passed continuously through the province towards Armenia and the Caucasus; it was in 437/1045 that Qubādīh b. Yazīd, ruler of Shīrvān in the eastern Caucasus, was forced to build a defensive wall round his capital Yazīdiyya.³ In 446/1054 Toghrlīl at last resolved to bring Āzarbāijān and Arrān under his sway. Vahsūdān, making no attempts at opposition, handed over his son as a hostage. The sultan then passed to the Shaddādid capital of Ganja and also received the homage of other minor rulers of eastern Transcaucasia before pressing westwards into Anatolia as far as Malāzgird and Erzerum.⁴

In 450/1058 the eldest of Vahsūdān's sons, Mamlān, was confirmed by Toghrlīl in his father's territories, but the last days of the dynasty are obscure, as indeed is most of the history of Āzarbāijān at this time. The Ottoman historian Münejjim Bāshī (d. 1113/1702), whose vast historical compilation incorporates some ancient and otherwise lost sources for the history of north-western Iran and the Caucasus region, says that the Rawwādids came to an end in 463/1070-1 when Alp-Arslan returned from his Anatolian campaign (see pp. 63-4 below) and deposed Mamlān. However, one later member of the family is known: Aḥmadīl b. Ibrāhīm b. Vahsūdān held Marāgheh and took part in the Crusading warfare in Syria, and the name Aḥmadīl was perpetuated by the line of his own Turkish ghulāms, who began to

¹ According to the 7th/13th-century biographer Ibn Khallikān, the Ayyūbid Sultān Salādin came from this tribe of Kurds; cf. Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, pp. 124-5, 128-9.

² Nāsir-i Khusrāu, *Safar-Nāma*, p. 6; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, pp. 269-72, 351; Kasravī, *Shahriyārān*, vol. II, pp. 174-209.

³ On the dynasty of the Shīrvān-Shāhs, see p. 35 below.

⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, pp. 410-11; Kasravī, *op. cit.* pp. 211-14; Minorsky, *A History of Shīrvān and Darband in the 10th-11th Centuries*, pp. 33, 65-6.

rule at Marāgheh after his death in 510/1116. (For these Aḥmadilīs see below, pp. 170-1.)¹

The Shaddādids of Arrān and Dvin (c. 340-468/951-1075) were almost certainly Kurds, as Mūnejjim Baṣḥī suggests. They arose from a Kurdish adventurer called Muḥammad b. Shaddād, who established himself in Dvin in the middle of the 4th/10th century, the town being held at that time by the Musāfirids. The ethnic origins of the family are complicated because its members frequently adopted Dailamī names, such as Laṣḥkarī and Marzbān, and even the Armenian one of Ashot; but their basic Kurdishness seems very likely, and the variety of their onomasticon is doubtless a reflexion of the confused ethnic and political condition of the region.² Muḥammad b. Shaddād could not hold on to Dvin, but in 360/971 his sons Laṣḥkarī and Faḍl displaced the Musāfirids by agreement with the notables of Ganja. Faḍl eventually secured power in Arrān and reigned there for close to half a century (375-422/986-1031). Armenian sources stress his violence and military vigour: he recovered Dvin, fought the Georgian Bagratids and the Armenian rulers of Anī, Alvank' (Albania), and Tashīr, and he subdued the Hungarian Sevordik' in the upper Kur valley. His construction of a fine bridge over the Araxes in 421/1030 points towards ambitions against the Rawwādids in Āzarbāijān. Faḍl's son and grandson had to cope with attacks from the Georgians, from other Caucasian mountaineers such as the Alans or Ossetes, from the Russians, and the Rawwādid Vahsūdān b. Mamlān. In about the year 440/1048-9 there was a Byzantine invasion under the eunuch Nicephorus, aimed principally at the Shaddādid branch in Dvin. Ominous, too, was the appearance of the Oghuz, from whom the Rawwādids south of the Araxes suffered severely. The historians al-'Aẓīmī and Ibn Duqmāq record an attack by Qutlumush b. Arslan Isrā'īl on Ganja in 438/1046-7, and there may have been other incursions which have not been noted in the chronicles.³

The Shaddādids reached their zenith under Abu'l-Asvār Shāvur b. Faḍl, who ruled in Dvin from 413/1022 to 441/1049 and then in Ganja till 459/1067. The Byzantines' devastation of the Dvin area probably

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, p. 448, vol. x, p. 361; Kasravī, *Shahriyārān*, vol. II, pp. 214-16; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, pp. 167-9.

² Minorsky, *ibid.* pp. 5, 33-5. On the dynasty in general, see Ross, "Banū Shaddād", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.); *idem*, *Asia Major* (1925), pp. 213-19; Kasravī, *Shahriyārān*, vol. III, pp. 264-313; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, pp. 1-77.

³ Kasravī, *op. cit.* vol. II, pp. 203-4, vol. III, pp. 274-8; Minorsky, *op. cit.* pp. 16-17, 40-9, 54-64; and Cahen, "Qutlumush et ses Fils avant l'Asie Mineure", *Der Islam*, p. 20.

influenced his decision to leave Dvin, where he had faced Armenian princes on his west and south. In 434/1042-3 or 435/1043-4, at the instigation of the Byzantine emperor, Abu'l-Asvār invaded the principality of Ani and thereby acquired a great contemporary reputation as a "warrior for the faith", praised for his courage and sagacity by the Ziyārid Kai-Kā'ūs b. Iskandar, who fought with him as a *ghāzī* against the Christians. Abu'l-Asvār submitted to Toghril in 446/1054-5, and towards the end of his life he was associated with Türkmen expansion into Armenia and Anatolia; in 457/1065 he became governor of Ani, which had been captured from the Christians in the previous year.¹ Before that he had been involved with his neighbours the *Shīrvān-Shāhs*. In the latter half of the 2nd/8th century the Arab family of the Yazidids had governed Arrān for the 'Abbāsids.² During the ensuing decades they were pushed northwards by Dailamī pressure, becoming completely Iranian in their way of life, and though they acquired close marriage connexions with the *Shaddādids*, these did not prevent Abu'l-Asvār from invading the territories of his nephew the *Shīrvān-Shāh* Fariburz b. Sallār (455-after 487/1063-after 1094) on four separate occasions during these years.³

In the end, the extension of Saljuq power into this north-western region, under the leadership of Alp-Arslan and his *ghulām* commander 'Imād al-Dīn Sav-Tegin (? *Shād-Tegin*), proved fatal to the *Shaddādids*. Abu'l-Asvār's son Faḍl II was captured by the Georgians, and the *Shīrvān-Shāh* invaded Arrān. An army under Sav-Tegin passed through Arrān in 460/1068, and seeing internal dissensions within the *Shaddādīd* family, the sultan allotted fiefs in Darband and Arrān to his general. Sav-Tegin once more appeared with an army, this time in 468/1075, and Faḍl III b. Faḍl II was obliged to yield his ancestral territories. This ended the main line of the *Shaddādids*, though the members of a junior branch, descended from Abu'l-Asvār's son Manūchīhr, became governors on behalf of the Saljuqs in Anī, and the family can be traced there till the Georgians recaptured the town in 556/1161.⁴

¹ *Qābūs-Nāma*, pp. 24-5 (Levy tr., pp. 35-7); Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, p. 411; Kasravi, *Shāhriyārān*, vol. iii, pp. 292-304; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, pp. 19-22, 50-6.

² The Yazidids originated with one Yazid b. Mazyad, but the designation "Mazyadid" for this dynasty is best avoided, since it is likely to cause confusion with the Mazyadids of Hilla.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 20-1, 74-5; *idem*, *A History of Shīrvān and Darband* (= an anonymous *Ta'rikh Bāb al-Abwāb* preserved in Münējīm Bashī), pp. 34-5, 56-65.

⁴ Kasravi, *op. cit.* vol. iii, pp. 304-12; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, pp. 23-5. On the *Shaddādids* of Anī, see Kasravi, vol. iii, pp. 316-27, and Minorsky, *op. cit.* pp. 79-106.

We have noted that on the eve of the Saljuq invasions, the western and central parts of the country were in the last phase of the Dailamī ascendancy in Iran: indeed the principal Dailamī dynasty, that of the Būyids, was already in a state of confusion and decay when Toghrīl moved westwards from Khurāsān. The Būyids had brought with them from their Caspian homeland a patrimonial conception of power in which each member of the dynasty acquired a share of territory and power; from the very start there had been three Būyid principalities in Iran. Moreover, since the Būyids came to rule over such scattered provinces as the Iranian ones of Jibāl, Fārs, Khūzistān, and Kirmān, and the Arab ones of Iraq and even Oman, the lack of geographical cohesion in their empire undoubtedly favoured the dispersal of political power among several members of the family. In the middle decades of the 4th/10th century the Būyids were held together by family solidarity, which was furthered by the energy and capability of such amīrs as the original three sons of ‘Alī b. Būya and those of the next generation, including ‘Aḍud al-Daula Fanā-Khusrau (d. 372/983) and Fakhr al-Daula ‘Alī (d. 387/997). But ‘Aḍud al-Daula made plans to perpetuate after his own death the unified rule which he had achieved in his lifetime, and the family henceforth became fragmented and divided against itself. Militarily the Būyids at first depended for infantrymen on their fellow Dailamīs, supplemented by Turkish cavalrymen; but in the 5th/11th century the recruitment of Dailamī soldiers seems to have dwindled (the reasons for this are unclear) and the amīrs became almost wholly dependent on Turkish mercenaries, over whom they frequently lost control.¹

On the religious plane the Būyids’ tenure of power was definitely favourable to the consolidation of ‘Alid and Twelve Shī‘ī organization and doctrine, but with the rise of the Turkish dynasties in eastern Iran, intellectual as well as political trends were no longer so clearly helpful for the Būyids. Political Shī‘ism was clearly failing to gain power in the eastern Islamic world, and even the successes of the Nizārī Ismā‘īlīs were to be fairly limited geographically. In addition, the caliphate of al-Qā‘im (422-67/1031-75) witnessed a certain revival of ‘Abbāsīd power, at least in Iraq; here in 437/1045-6, after a century in which the caliphs had been politically impotent under Būyid control,

¹ Cf. Bosworth, “Military organisation under the Būyids of Persia and Iraq”, *Oriens*, vol. XVIII (1968). There exists no special monograph on the Būyids, but a valuable provisional survey is given by C. Cahen in his “Buwayhids”, *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

al-Qā'im appointed a forceful, strongly Sunnī vizier, the Ra'is al-Ru'asā' Abu'l-Qāsim Ibn al-Muslima.¹ Intellectually the Sunnī revival had already been visible in several phenomena, such as the madrasa-building movement, the gradual rise to respectability of the *Ash'ari kalām* or theological system (although it was a long time before this process was completed), and the vitality of the conservative and traditionalist law school of Ḥanbalism. The incoming Saljuq rulers enthusiastically aided the progress of this revival.²

The territories held by the Būyids in 421/1030 were still extensive. The most serious inroads on their possessions had been made in northern and central Iran. Ray and Jibāl had not been under strong rule since Fakhr al-Daula's death, when power there had been divided between his two young sons, Majd al-Daula at Ray and Shams al-Daula at Hamadān and Kirmānshāh. Majd al-Daula was an ineffectual ruler, and in practice his territories were governed by his mother Sayyida. After her death in 419/1028, he was unable to keep order or control his troops, and he foolishly appealed to Maḥmūd of Ghazna for help. This request was the pretext for Maḥmūd's Jibāl campaign. In 420/1029 he sacked Ray, deposed Majd al-Daula, and carried him and his son off as prisoners to Khurāsān, installing a Ghaznavid governor in Ray. From here, operations were carried out against the Musāfirids of Ṭārum. The area to the south and west of Ray, including Iṣfahān, Hamadān, and Kirmānshāh, had passed out of Būyid control before this time, but into the comparatively friendly hands of the Kākūyids, another dynasty of Dailamī origin which was closely connected to the Būyids.

The Kākūyids exercised considerable, if transient, authority in central Iran. The founder of the line, Rustam b. Marzbān Duḥmanziyār, attracted the favour of the Būyids of Ray by helping them against the Ziyārids. His son 'Alā' al-Daula Muḥammad³ was first appointed by the Būyids to govern Iṣfahān, and he later adopted this as the capital of his principality.⁴ After 398/1007-8 he was virtually independent of Būyid control, extending his power over the towns of Hamadān, Dināvār, and Shābūr-Khwāst. From Ṭabaristān to Khūzistān, Ibn Kākūya was continually involved in warfare, and, with the resources

¹ Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntaẓam fī ta'rīkh al-mulūk wa'l-umam*, vol. VIII, pp. 127, 200-1; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. IX, p. 362.

² For more on the Sunnī revival, see section VI, pp. 70 ff.

³ In the sources he is generally called Ibn Kākūya, for *kākū* in the Dailamī dialect is said to mean "maternal aunt", and 'Alā' al-Daula was the son of Majd al-Daula's maternal aunt.

⁴ An alternative etymology, from a place-name, is suggested by Rabinowitz di Borgomale in *J.A.* (1949), pp. 313-14.

of the rich cities of central Iran at his disposal, he hired mercenaries. Thus in 428/1037, in preparation for an attack on the Ghaznavid-held city of Ray, he was using his wealth to recruit not only local Kurdish and Dailami troops but also the "Irāqī" Türkmen, these last comprising some who had come directly from the Balkhān-Kūh area to the east of the Caspian together with others who had just fled westwards from Nishāpūr. Indeed, Ibn Kākūya's dynamism was a major factor in the brevity of Ghaznavid rule in western Iran. Although he was twice driven from Iṣfahān, by Mas'ūd of Ghazna in 421/1030 and by another Ghaznavid army in 425-7/1034-6, his resilience was such that on each occasion he re-established himself, and the sultan had to recognize him as his vassal.

It was the growing power of the "Irāqī" Türkmen in northern and central Iran which curbed Ibn Kākūya's ambitions. Deflected from Āzarbāijān by the Rawwādid Vahsūdān b. Mamlān and the Kurdish chieftain Abū'l-Haijā' b. Rahib al-Daula, two groups of these Oghuz turned to attack Ray (428/1037 or 429/1038) and Hamadān (430/1038-9). Shortly afterwards, the Kākūyids became Saljuq vassals. On the battlefield of Dandānqān in 431/1040, Toghrīl awarded Ray and Iṣfahān to Ibn Kākūya's son Abū Maṣṣūr Farāmūr; on Ibn Kākūya's death in 433/1041-2 Farāmūr succeeded him in Iṣfahān, and Farāmūr's brother Abū Kālījār Garshāsp was given Hamadān. Farāmūr attempted to keep on equal terms with both the Saljuqs and the Būyid al-Malik al-Rahīm, yet he only managed to exasperate Toghrīl. In 442/1050-1 the sultan besieged and captured Iṣfahān and moved his capital thither from Ray; in exchange, Farāmūr received Yazd and Abarqūh, while Garshāsp lost Hamadān and Kangāvar to Ibrāhīm Īnal and died in exile amongst the Būyids in Khūzistān.¹ Later descendants of Farāmūr adapted themselves more smoothly to Saljuq masters. His son Mu'ayyid al-Daula 'Alī, ruler of Yazd, married one of Chaghri Beg's daughters, and in 488/1095 he died fighting for Tutush b. Alp-Arslan against Berk-Yaruq (see below, p. 107). 'Alī's son 'Aḍud al-Dīn Abū Kālījār Garshāsp also held Yazd, and, being high in Muḥammad's favour, he married a sister of Sultans Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh and Sanjar; but Sultān Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad dispossessed him of Yazd, and henceforth he became a fierce partisan of Sanjar, urging him in 513/1119 to join battle with Maḥmūd at Sāveh (see below, pp. 135-6).²

¹ Baihaqī, *Ta'rikh-i Mas'ūdi*, p. 628; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, pp. 339, 384-5.

² Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Ta'rikh-i Saljuqiyan-i Kirman* in *Recueil de Textes*, vol. 1, p. 26. Cf. M. T. Houtsma, "Zur Geschichte der Selguken von Kermān", *Z.D.M.G.* pp. 374-5;

The Būyid territories in Iraq and southern Iran were broadly divided between Jalāl al-Daula Abū Ṭāhir Shirzīl and his nephew 'Imād al-Dīn Abū Kālījār Marzbān in 421/1030. The former was *Amir al-Umarā'* or "Supreme Commander"—as the Būyid rulers in Iraq called themselves—in Baghdad and the rest of Iraq excepting Basra, but though he ruled from 416/1025 to his death in 435/1044, his authority was never very firm. It is true that in Baghdad the caliph did not yet feel strong enough to exert much political pressure. In 429/1037–8 al-Qa'im was powerless to prevent Jalāl al-Daula from assuming the ancient Sassanian title of *Shāhanshāh* ("King of Kings"), although five years later his opposition to the amir's appropriation of poll-tax revenues collected in Baghdad from the People of the Book (i.e. Christians and Jews) did deter the Būyid from trying to take them again the next year.¹ The real holders of power in the city were the violent and undisciplined Turkish and Dailamī soldiery, the opposing Ḥanbalī and Shī'ī mobs, and the ubiquitous 'ayyārs.² Furthermore, a good proportion of the Turkish troops supported the claims of Abū Kālījār, who ruled in Baṣra, Khūzistān, Fārs, Kirmān, and Oman. In the years after 423/1032, Jalāl al-Daula was thrice expelled from his own capital by pro-Abū Kālījār forces; on one Friday in the year 428/1037, the khuṭba in Baghdad was made for four different persons, the caliph, Jalāl al-Daula, Abū Kālījār, and the 'Uqailid Qirwāsh b. al-Muqallad. After this, however, the two Būyid rulers made peace, and 'Irāq was comparatively peaceful until Jalāl al-Daula's death in 435/1044.³

The vigorous Abū Kālījār was master in his Iranian territories to an extent that Jalāl al-Daula never enjoyed in Iraq. As well as his father's heritage of Khūzistān and Fārs, he fell heir to the adjoining province of Kirmān when in 419/1028 his uncle Qiwām al-Daula Abu'l-Fawāris died, and this province he successfully defended against an incoming Ghaznavid army. Jalāl al-Daula had intended that his son Abū Maṣṣūr

Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 133; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kamil*, vol. x, pp. 315, 387. On the dynasty in general, there is an indifferent article by Huart in *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.), s.v.; much more informative is that by G. C. Miles, "The Coinage of the Kākwayhid Dynasty", *Iraq*, pp. 89–104.

¹ Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. viii, pp. 97–8, 113–14; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, pp. 312–13, 350. Cf. Amedroz, "The Assumption of the Title *Shāhanshāh* by Buwayhid Rulers", *Numismatic Chronicle*, pp. 393–9.

² On the 'ayyārs and other groups who flourished in times of stress and weak government, see Cahen, *Mouvements Populaires et Autonomisme Urbain dans l'Asie Musulmane du Moyen Âge*, *passim*.

³ H. Bowen, "The Last Buwayhids", *J.R.A.S.* pp. 228–9.

Khusrau Firūz, called al-Malik al-'Azīz (d. 441/1049), should succeed him, but al-'Azīz's ineffectual character was no match for his cousin Abū Kālījār's military and financial resources. It was Abū Kālījār alone who was able to pay the *ḥaqq al-bai'a*, or the subsidies demanded by the Būyid troops on the accession of a new ruler, and for the last four years of his life, until his death in 440/1048, he was ruler of the whole of the Būyid possessions in Iraq and southern Iran.¹

Towards the end of his reign, Abū Kālījār realized that the Türkmēn were becoming a major threat to his dynasty, and indeed, within fifteen years of his death, the Turks were to extinguish the independent rule of the Dailamīs. We have already touched upon the raids of the Oghuz into western Iran and beyond. Several Christian sources—such as Matthew of Edessa, Samuel of Ani, Vardan, and the continuator of Thomas of Ardzrun, as well as a Muslim source that depends on the *Malik-Nāma*—all of these place the first penetration of Armenia at a date between 407/1016-17 and 412/1021, when Türkmēn under the leadership of Chaghri Beg ravaged the district of Vāspūrakān between Lakes Vān and Rezā'iyeh. But this is almost certainly too early.² The stimulus for these movements by the Oghuz was Maḥmūd of Ghazna's seizure of Arslan Isrā'il (c. 418/1027), after which his Türkmēn followers spread out in various directions plundering aimlessly. Since many of these came to western Iran, which is often called in early Muslim sources 'Irāq-i 'Ajam "Persian Iraq", they became known as the 'Irāqī Türkmēn. Although the names of several of their leaders are known, it does not seem that they had any one outstanding leader; thus they were a more anarchic group than those Türkmēn headed by the Saljuq leaders.

Over the next few years the various Oghuz bands were a turbulent factor in the politics of central and western Iran, where Ghaznavids, Būyids, Kākūyids, and local Kurdish chiefs endeavoured to use them against their rivals. The insecurity of this period prompted the construction of town walls in various places: in 429/1038 'Alā' al-Daula Ibn Kākūya fortified Iṣfahān, and between 436/1044-5 and 440/1048-9 the Būyid 'Imād al-Dīn Abū Kālījār put a wall round Shīrāz for the

¹ Baihaqī, *Ta'rīkh-i Mas'ūdi*, pp. 423, 426, 429-32; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, pp. 282 bis, 353; Bowen, *op. cit.* pp. 231-3.

² The historicity of this expedition is maintained by Kafesoğlu in "Doğu Anadoluya ilk Selçuklu akını (1015-21) ve tarihi ehemmiyeti", *Köprülü Armağanı*, pp. 259-74; but that an expedition was possible at such an early date is denied by Cahen, "A Propos de Quelques Articles dans le Köprülü Armağanı", *J.A.* vol. CCXLII (1954), pp. 271-81.

first time in its history;¹ rich cities such as Ray and Hamadān were other natural targets for the predatory Oghuz. By themselves the Türkmén were militarily and psychologically unfitted for siege warfare (p. 20 above), yet they could benefit from temporary alliances with one or another side in local disputes. It was because of a triple alliance against him, consisting of the Oghuz, the Būyid Fanā-Khusrau, who was a son of the dispossessed Majd al-Daula, and finally the Dailamī ruler of Sāveh, Kām-Ravā, that Ibn Kākūya was forced to evacuate Ray after taking it over from the Ghaznavids in 428/1037. A fearful slaughter followed, and this was repeated in 420/1038-9 when the Oghuz and Fanā-Khusrau's Dailamīs captured Hamadān, expelling Ibn Kākūya's son Garshāsp. Prudently, the inhabitants of Qazvin bought off the Oghuz for 7,000 dinārs.²

Armenia, Diyārbakr, al-Jazīreh, and Iraq likewise suffered from the Oghuz, who spread out from Āzarbāijān after Vahsūdān treacherously massacred several of their leaders in 432/1040-1. The establishment of Ibrāhīm Īnal at Ray in 433/1041-2, and then at Hamadān the next year, drove more numbers of the 'Irāqī Türkmén out of Jibāl into Iraq and al-Jazīreh. It seems that Toghrīl and the Saljuq leaders were already endeavouring to exercise some control over the whole body of Türkmén in the Iranian world, and this was being resisted by the anarchistic 'Irāqīs. When Toghrīl came westwards he notified Gök-Tash, Bughra, and other leaders, then he encamped at Zanjān, hoping to win them over. But they were too suspicious, and told him: "We realize full well that your intention is to seize us if only you can get hold of us. It is fear of you which has made us stay apart and encamp here, and if you persist in trying to get your hands on us, we will make for Khurāsān or Rūm, and will never under any circumstances join up with you." Toghrīl nevertheless regarded himself as overlord of all the Oghuz, and in 435/1044, after Gök-Tash's followers had savagely sacked Mosul, he wrote to Jalāl al-Daula, the ruler of 'Irāq, excusing the Türkmén's conduct; they were, said Toghrīl, mere dependents of the Saljuqs, rebellious slaves who deserved severe punishment.³

¹ Ibn al-Balkhī, *Fārs-Nāma*, p. 133; Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, vol. III, p. 351, s.v. "Shīrāz"; but according to Ḥamd Allāh Mustaufī (*Nuzhat al-qulūb*, p. 113) it was Shamsām al-Daula b. 'Aḍud al-Daula who first put a wall round Shīrāz.

² Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. IX, pp. 269-71.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 272, 275, 348.

THE IRANIAN WORLD (A.D. 1000-1217)

IV. TOGHRĪL'S STRUGGLE WITH THE BŪYIDS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE EASTERN CONQUESTS

After settling affairs in Khwārazm and the Caspian provinces, Toghrīl came westwards to Jibāl in 434/1042/3 and took over from Ibrāhīm Īnal the city of Ray, which was to serve briefly as his capital.¹ Ibrāhīm Īnal now moved into Kurdistān to conduct operations against the Kākūyids and the Kurdish 'Annāzids, but he was already showing signs of the rebelliousness that was to lead to his downfall. In 441/1049-50 he was arrested by Toghrīl, then later released and restored to favour; on this occasion Toghrīl gave him the choice of staying with him or of being allocated a territory which he could carve out as his own principality.²

The Oghuz successes in Iran and the consequent crumbling of Ghaznavid and Būyid defences inevitably attracted more Türkmen from Central Asia; indeed, the westward deflexion of unruly elements was now becoming one of Toghrīl's instruments of policy. We are badly informed about the tribal affiliations of the Türkmen in Iran at this time. After their appearance in the accounts of Saljuq origins, the Qīnīq disappear wholly from mention. The 7th/13th-century Armenian historian Vardan calls Toghrīl "leader of the Döger", another Oghuz tribe, who, unlike the Qīnīq, did play a significant role in northern Iran; and Cahen has suggested that in his capacity as chief of a coalition of tribes, Toghrīl might be considered the head of the Döger. Only in the 6th/12th century do we have some information about the activities of individual Oghuz tribes,³ though we do know that in the middle decades of the 5th/11th century there had been a considerable influx of Central Asian elements into northern Iran and thence to the borders of Armenia and Byzantium.

From this same period dates the especial importance of Āzarbāijān as a base for Türkmen expansion. This area lay at one end of the route through Ray and northern Iran along which Türkmen passed from Khurāsān and beyond, and its fertile valleys—Āzarbāijān is one of the few regions of Iran where dry farming can be practised to any considerable extent—provided pasture for the nomads' herds. Political authority in the region was fragmented, which gave numerous oppor-

¹ See also p. 33 above.

² Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, pp. 380-1.

³ Cf. Cahen, "Les Tribus Turques d'Asie Occidentale pendant la Période Seljukide", *W.Z.K.M.* pp. 178-87.

tunities for employment in the service of local rulers. Moreover, as a frontier province sharing a border with Christian powers, Āzarbāijān had long-established traditions of *ghāzī* warfare, in which families like the *Shaddādids* were prominent, as we have seen. All these factors combined to make Āzarbāijān a concentration-point for the *Türkmen*, and at this period it began to acquire the Turkish ethnic and linguistic colouring which it still has today.¹ Over the next century or so, *ghāzī* elements from this area put pressure on the Christian kingdoms of Armenia and Georgia, while at the same time they infiltrated into Anatolia, founded *ghāzī* states such as those of the *Dānīshmanids* and *Mangūjekids*, and laid the foundation for a Saljuq sultanate at Rūm which would endure for many decades after the Great Saljuqs had disappeared from Iran and Iraq.

It is unlikely that the Saljuq Sultans Toghrīl and Alp-Arslan conceived of their mission in the west as an all-out offensive against Christian Armenia, Georgia, and Byzantium.² Their main interests were, first, to occupy and bring under direct control the rich lands of ancient Iranian civilization: *Khurāsān*, *Jibāl*, and *Fārs*; and second, they wanted to hold Iraq as a bastion against the *Fāṭimids* and their satellites in Syria and al-Jazīrah. Warfare in Armenia and Anatolia was therefore left primarily to the *Türkmen* and *ghāzīs*, troublesome and undisciplined marauders whose presence in the settled lands of *Īrān* and Iraq would have been an embarrassment to the sultans. *Ibrāhīm Īnal* does not represent the more mature outlook of the sultans, but on one occasion he expressed what must have been their desires. In 440/1048 he sent a large body of *Oghuz ghāzīs* from Transoxiana to raid Byzantium. He told them previously, "My territory [the region of *Hamadān* and *Ḥulwān*] is not extensive enough to support you or provide for your needs. The most sensible policy for you is to go and attack Rūm, fight in the way of God, and gain booty. I will follow after you and assist you in this." He and *Qutlumush b. Arslan Isrā'il* then led them personally as far as *Malāzgird*, *Erzerum*, and *Trebizond*, eventually capturing the Georgian prince *Liparit* (called in the Islamic sources "[*Li*]fārit").³

¹ Cf. *idem*, "La Première Pénétration Turque en Asie-Mineure", *Byzantion*, pp. 5-15.

² Cahen, "La Campagne de Mantzikert d'après les sources Musulmanes", *Byzantion*, pp. 621 ff.

³ *Ibn al-Athīr*, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, pp. 372-3; *Barhebraeus*, *Chronography*, p. 206; E. Honigsmann, *Die Ostgrenze des Byzantinischen Reiches von 363 bis 1071 nach griechischen, arabischen, syrischen und armenischen Quellen* (= A. A. Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* vol. III), pp. 179-81;

Yet this policy was not of infinite applicability. Many tribal leaders viewed with suspicion the moves by Toghrīl and Chaghri to appropriate the rich land of Iran for themselves, as well as their claims to a general control over all the Oghuz. Ibrāhīm Īnal's own jealousies and ambitions could not be stilled, and it is clear that he represented a substantial body of conservative Türkmen feeling. Toghrīl's magnanimity was now stretched to breaking point. In 451/1059 Ibrāhīm Īnal and the two sons of his brother Er-Tash rebelled, at a time when affairs in Baghdad and Iraq were critical for Toghrīl, and the latter had to appeal for help from Chaghri's son Alp-Arslan in Sīstān, who came with his brothers Qavurt and Yāqūtī. When the revolt was suppressed, Ibrāhīm Īnal was found strangled with a bowstring; Ibn al-Jauzī adds that Toghrīl had now destroyed all trust and loyalty on the part of the Türkmen.¹

Sporadic Türkmen revolts, such as those of Ibrāhīm Īnal, of Qutlumush and his brother Rasūl-Tegin, together with events in 'Irāq and Īrān, prevented Toghrīl himself from taking much part in the raids against Rūm. In 446/1054 he went to Āzarbāijān to receive the homage of the Rawwādids and Shaddādids, at Tabriz and Ganja respectively. He then led his forces into the region of Vān and against Trebizond and Kars, but without decisive result, and with the onset of winter the siege of Malāzgird had to be lifted.² In the following years Qutlumush and Yāqūtī were raiding Armenia and eastern Anatolia, and in 450/1058 Kars and Malatya fell. Just before his death Toghrīl appeared briefly in Āzarbāijān (454/1062), but in general he was content to leave the conduct of warfare in the hands of Yāqūtī.³

Toghrīl's other great concern was his position *vis-à-vis* the Būyids and the caliph. Toghrīl and 'Imād al-Dīn Abū Kālījār, leader of Khūzistān and Fārs, had come to an understanding: the Saljuq had restrained Ibrāhīm Īnal from raiding Būyid territory in Luristān and Fārs and had married one of Abū Kālījār's daughters, whilst the Būyid's son Fūlād-Sutūn had married one of Chaghri's daughters

M. H. Yinanç, *Anadolu'nun fethi*, pp. 46-8; Cahen, *Byzantion* (1948), pp. 15-16; Minorsky, *Studies in Caucasian History*, p. 57; Cahen, "Qutlumush et ses Fils avant l'Asie Mineure", *Der Islam*, p. 20.

¹ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-Nusra*, pp. 15-16; Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. viii, p. 202; Ḥusainī, Ṣadr al-Dīn 'Alī, *Akbbār al-daula al-Saljuqiyya*, pp. 19-20; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, p. 444; Barhebraeus, p. 213; Mirkhwānd, *Rauḍat al-ṣafā'*, vol. iv, p. 106.

² Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 410-11; Barhebraeus, p. 207; for much more detailed information in the Christian sources, cf. Honigmann, *Die Ostgrenze des Byzantinischen Reiches*, pp. 181-2; Yinanç, *Anadolu'nun fethi*, pp. 49-50; and Cahen, *Byzantion* (1948), pp. 16-17.

³ Yinanç, *op. cit.* pp. 50-7.

(439/1047-8).¹ Abū Kālījār died the next year, before he could recover his province of Kirmān from the Saljuq Qavurt b. Chaghri Beg, and he was succeeded by his eldest son Khusrau Firūz, who took the title *al-Malik al-Raḥīm* ("the merciful king"). It was fortunate for Toghrīl's ambitions that al-Malik al-Raḥīm's succession was disputed by his brother Fūlād-Sutūn, for a period of internal strife within the Būyid family now ensued, in which several of Abū Kālījār's sons (at least nine of them are known) took part. Al-Malik al-Raḥīm was never able to rule outside Iraq, and Fārs and Khūzistān were generally in the hands of Fūlād-Sutūn and several other brothers. It was inevitable that one of the contending parties should call in the Saljuqs. In 444/1052-3, Oghuz raiders had penetrated as far as Shīrāz. In the next year Fūlād-Sutūn inserted Toghrīl's name in the khutba in his capital of Shīrāz for the first time, and in 446/1054-5 Toghrīl sent a group of Türkmen to take over Khūzistān.²

We have seen that when in 426/1035 the three Saljuq leaders crossed the Oxus, they styled themselves "Clients of the Commander of the Faithful", and that when he captured Nishāpūr and assumed the title of "Exalted Sultan", Toghrīl opened up diplomatic relations with the caliphate (pp. 19 and 23 above). The Saljuqs soon saw the weakness of Būyid rule in Iraq. In 441/1049-50 Saljuq pressure compelled Naṣr al-Daula Ibn Marwān to put Toghrīl's name in the khutba in Diyār-bakr,³ and northern Iraq, already much ravaged by Oghuz raids, was open to attack by the Saljuqs. Toghrīl's march to Baghdad has often been viewed as a Sunnī crusade to rescue the caliph from his Shī'i oppressors, and it is true that it was the Shī'i proclivities of a Turkish commander in Baghdad, Arslan Basāsiri, which prompted al-Qā'im's appeal to Toghrīl. We can only guess at Toghrīl's inner motives, but it is surely relevant to note that his Iranian advisers included many officials from Khurāsān, the most strongly Sunnī part of Iran. The sources give varying lists of the viziers who are said to have served Toghrīl, but the backgrounds of these men are predominantly Khurāsānian, and most of them started their careers with the Ghaznavids. Thus the Ṣāhib Ḥusain Mikālī, whom Ibn al-Athīr includes in his list, entered the Saljuqs' service some time after being captured from the Ghaznavids; he came from a prominent Nishāpūr family which had

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, pp. 365-6.

² *Ibid.* pp. 401-2, 414; Bowen, "The Last Buwayhids", *J.R.A.S.* pp. 233-7.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, p. 380; Barhebraeus, *Chronography*, pp. 205-6.

produced a long line of Ḥanafī scholars and traditionists as well as administrators.¹ The most famous of Toghrīl's viziers was the 'Amīd al-Mulk Abū Naṣr Kundurī, who had been recommended to Toghrīl shortly after the latter's occupation of Nīshāpūr. Kundurī was a fierce Ḥanafī, and when Toghrīl gave permission for the *khutba* in Kḥurāsān to include the cursing of the *Shī'a*, Kundurī added the cursing of the *Ash'aris*, who tended to be of the *Shāfi'i* law school; this caused prominent scholars such as al-Qushairī and Abū'l-Ma'ālī al-Juvainī to flee to the Ḥijāz.² Hence there is much justification for regarding the early years of the Great Saljuq sultanate as strongly Sunnī and Ḥanafī in ethos and outlook.

Al-Malik al-Raḥīm's seven-year reign in Baghdad (440-7/1048-55) was racked by continual violence and rioting, with hostility polarized around the figures of the caliph's Vizier Ibn al-Muslima on one side, and the Turkish general Abū'l-Ḥārith Arslan Basāsiri on the other. The vizier accused Basāsiri of being in touch with the Fāṭimid caliph of Egypt, al-Mustanṣir (427-87/1036-94), the 'Abbāsids' great rival, and it is true that a Fāṭimid *dā'i* (agent), al-Mu'ayyad fī'l-Dīn Shīrāzī, became very active in Iraq shortly after this time.³ In 447/1055 Toghrīl was assembling forces at Hamadān, Dīnāwār, Kirmānshāh, and Ḥulwān, and he now announced his intention of making the pilgrimage to Mecca and then of mounting a crusade against the Fāṭimids. Al-Malik al-Raḥīm and the caliph accepted Toghrīl's appearance at Baghdad in Ramaḍān 447/December 1055, but the Būyid prince was unable to preserve his power: he was arrested and deposed by Toghrīl that same month, and spent the remaining four years of his life in Saljuq captivity.⁴ In this fashion, the rule of the Dailamīs in 'Irāq was extinguished after over a century's tenure of power, although Būyid rule continued for a few years more in Fārs.

At this time Fūlād-Sutūn was ruling in Fārs with the support of the Vizier Abū Maṣṣūr al-Fasawī, called Muḥadhdhib al-Daula, but chaos increased there with the rise of a chieftain of the *Shabānkāra'i* Kurds,

¹ Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. ix, p. 359; on the Mikālīs, see the notes to Sa'īd Nafīsī's edition of Baihaqī's *Ta'rikh-i Mas'ūdi*, vol. iii, pp. 969-1009; see also Bowen, "Notes on some Early Seljuqid Viziers", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. xx (1957), pp. 107-8.

² Ibn al-Aṭhīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, p. 21; but according to Bundārī, p. 30, Kundurī later moderated his Ḥanafī views and sought to reconcile the Ḥanafīs and *Shāfi'is*.

³ Cf. M. Canard, "al-Basāsiri", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

⁴ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 10-11; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, pp. 418-22; Barhebraeus, *Chronography*, pp. 207-9; Mīrkhwānd, *Rauḍat al-safā*, vol. iv, pp. 105-6; Bowen, *J.R.A.S.* (1929), pp. 237-8.

Abu'l-'Abbās Faḍlūya, who in 454/1062 overthrew and killed Fūlād-Sutūn, setting up one of the latter's brothers as a Būyid puppet ruler. However, Faḍlūya was defeated in this same year by a Saljuq army from Kirmān under Qavurt; the *khutba* in *Shīrāz* was then made in Toghrīl's name and the rule of the Būyids finally ended there.¹ Another of Abū Kālījār's sons, Abū 'Alī Fanā-Khusrau, prospered under later sultans, residing on his fief at Naubandajān in Fārs, enjoying the privileges of a standard and a salute of drums, and dying full of days and honour in 487/1094. The sources also mention one of Jalāl al-Daula's sons, Abū Maṣṣūr 'Alī, who held the fiefs of al-Mada'in and Dair al-'Āqūl in Iraq until 490/1097.²

In 'Irāq, Basāsiri had allied with his brother-in-law the Mazyadid Dubais in an open campaign under the Fātimid white colours, having received an investiture patent from al-Mustanṣir in Cairo. Toghrīl remained in Baghdad for thirteen months without personally meeting al-Qā'im, all communication being handled by their respective viziers. After campaigning in al-Jazīrah, Toghrīl entered Baghdad once more, and at the end of 449/beginning of 1058 he was at last received by the caliph. 'Imād al-Dīn describes at length the splendour of the occasion, during which al-Qā'im bestowed on Toghrīl the honorifics *Rukn al-Daula* ("Pillar of the State") and *Malik al-Maṣhriq wa'l-Maghrib* ("King of the East and West"), together with seven robes of honour in the 'Abbāsid colour of black and two crowns signifying rule over the Arabs and 'Ajāmiṣ.³ Later the distraction caused by Ibrāhīm Īnal's rebellion allowed Basāsiri and the 'Uqailid Quraish b. Badrān to re-enter Baghdad in 450/end of 1058, when they attracted strong popular support, both Sunnī and *Shī'i*; now the Fātimid *khutba* was made, the caliph expelled, and the old enemy Ibn al-Muslima savagely executed.⁴ A year passed before Toghrīl was able to return. Basāsiri had been abandoned by the Fātimids and, in the final battle, by Dubais too, and in 451/1060 he was killed. Thus Fātimid ambitions in Iraq were finally thwarted and a decisive check placed first on the *Shī'i* element in Baghdad (where the Saljuqs now carried out an intensive purge) and second on the *Shī'i*-tinged Arab amīrs of Iraq.⁵

¹ Ibn al-Balkhī, *Fārs-Nāma*, p. 166.

² Bowen, *op. cit.* pp. 241-5.

³ Bundārī, pp. 13-14; Ḥusainī, *Akhhbār al-daula*, pp. 18-19; Barhebraeus, pp. 209-12; Mirkhwānd, vol. iv, p. 106.

⁴ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 15-16; Ibn al-Tiqaqā, *Kitāb al-Fakhri*, pp. 263-4 (tr. C. E. J. Whitting, pp. 285-6); Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz al-Hunafā'* (Cairo, 1367/1949), pp. 62-3; Canard, *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

⁵ Ḥusainī, *Akhhbār al-daula*, pp. 20-1; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, p. 448; Barhebraeus, *Chronography*, pp. 213-15; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, vol. i, pp. 172-3.

Toghrīl's campaigns in Iraq not only relieved the caliph of his enemies, but also crystallized the new division of power and influence in the central lands of the *Dār al-Islām*. This duality—between the caliph-imāms as spiritual heads and the Saljuq sultans as secular rulers—had eventually to be recognized in Islamic constitutional theory, although it had not occurred in time to be considered in the famous treatise of al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), *al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya* ("The Principles of Government"). Toghrīl seems to have exulted in his role as deliverer of the caliph: a document of 454/1062, issued by Toghrīl's chancery and quoted by the Baghdad historian and theologian Ibn al-Jauzī, is headed, "From the exalted Emperor of Emperors, King of the East and West, Reviver of Islam, Lieutenant of the Imām, and Right Hand of the Caliph of God, the Commander of the Faithful".¹ He now sought to draw the two houses more closely together. In 448/1056 al-Qā'im had married one of Chaghri's daughters, Arslan Khātūn Khādīja; Toghrīl himself aspired to marry one of the caliph's daughters. That an 'Abbāsīd bride should be given to a rough Türkmen was, however, a different matter, and al-Qā'im replied that such alliances were not customary amongst the caliphs. To the importunings of Kundurī, which were supported by the caliph's own daughter Arslan Khātūn, al-Qā'im proudly replied, "We are the children of al-'Abbās, the best of mankind; both the Imamate and temporal leadership shall remain in us until the Day of Resurrection. He who supports us will be guided aright, but he who opposes us will fall into error".

Yet to the caliph's moral authority Toghrīl could oppose a judicious measure of *force majeure*. The caliphate at this time was relying financially on gifts from outside powers and their envoys, on the sale of honours, and on revenues granted to them by the secular rulers of Iraq. On Toghrīl's orders, Kundurī threatened to sequester the caliph's *iqṭā'as* (estates), leaving him only with those which his father al-Qādir had possessed.² al-Qā'im had no alternative but to comply, and in 454/1062 the marriage contract was made at Tabriz by Toghrīl's representative, the Ra'īs al-'Irāqain Abū Aḥmad al-Nihāwandī, and by that of the caliph, Abu'l-Ghanā'im b. al-Muhallabān. The sultan himself was absent in Armenia, and did not meet his wife in

¹ Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntaḡam*, vol. VIII, p. 223.

² Bundārī, *Zubda tal-nuṣra*, pp. 11-12, 19-20; Ḥusainī, *Aḥbār al-daula*, pp. 17-18; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. IX, p. 424; Barhebraeus, *Chronography*, p. 209.

Baghdad until the following year, 455/1063, shortly before his death at Ray.¹

The conventional eulogies on his death stress Toghrīl's piety and clemency on the one hand, and his vigour, even harshness, on the other. We need only note that it was surely a remarkable man who, in a life span of seventy years, could rise from a hand-to-mouth existence as a nomadic chief to a position of sovereignty over lands extending from Kirmān to Diyārbakr. At the time of his death the regions of Anatolia, northern Syria, and the Caucasus still provided ample scope for the energies of ghāzis and tribesmen, although the Türkmen revolts which Toghrīl had to quell were a reminder that the Saljuq leaders' progress from steppe chieftains to monarchs in the Iranian style would not be untroubled.

Whilst Toghrīl was occupied with the west, Khurāsān and the east remained under the control of Chaghri Beg, according to the division of authority made by the Saljuqs after the Dandānqān victory. Chaghri was allotted Khurāsān and all the lands north of the Oxus that he might conquer, while Marv became his capital; down to the end of Sanjar's reign, Marv was to remain the centre of Saljuq administration for the east. If he could wrest them from the sultans, Mūsā Yabghu was to have the frontier territories which accompanied the Ghaznavid empire: i.e. Herāt, Pūshang, Isfizār (Aspuzār), Ghūr, Sīstān, and Bust; but his main efforts were in fact to be directed in the direction of Sīstān (see below, pp. 50-1). Qavurt, Chaghri's eldest son, was to expand southwards and occupy Kirmān, Kūhistān, and Ṭabas, the latter being an important fortress and trading-post on the route that skirted the great salt desert and connected Khurāsān with Kirmān. Ibrāhīm Īnal, Qutlumush b. Arslan, and Chaghri's other two sons, Yāqūti and Alp-Arslan, accompanied Toghrīl westwards.²

Chaghri thus remained ruler in the east until his death in 452/1060, though in the final years his son and successor Alp-Arslan took an increasing share in the business of ruling. Noting the paucity of information in the sources on Chaghri's personality and his system of government, Cahen has concluded that he was a somewhat colourless person.³ He does seem to have been content with the very extensive

¹ Bundārī, pp. 22, 25-6; Ḥusainī, p. 21; Barhebraeus, p. 215; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, vol. III, p. 232.

² Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūri, *Saljūq-Nāma*, p. 18; Rāvandī, *Rāhat al-Sudūr*, p. 104. A slightly different account of their spheres of influence occurs in Bundārī, *Zubdat al-muṣṣra*, pp. 8-9, and Ḥusainī, *Akhhbār al-dawla*, p. 17. ³ "Chaghri", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

power which he wielded in the east, and was never tempted into the acts of rebelliousness which characterized the careers of so many lesser Saljuq amirs. Toghril, suzerain of the whole of the Saljuq dominions, was without male heir, and thus it was almost certain that one of Chaghri's own sons would succeed to the unified sovereignty of east and west, which in fact happened under Alp-Arslan. The two brothers always remained on friendly terms. Chaghri accepted Toghril's intervention in Sistān on behalf of Mūsā Yabghu and his son, and when Ibrāhīm Īnal rebelled, Toghril received valuable help from Chaghri's sons.

Chaghri had wide responsibilities in the east. Beyond the Atrak and the Oxus, Dihistān and Khwārazm had to be defended against Qipchaq pressure and a possible revival of Qarakhānid activity. But relations with the Ghaznavids were his foremost concern. Only gradually over the next few decades did the Ghaznavid sultans become reconciled to the permanent loss of their Khurāsānian provinces. Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd is said to have mourned his inability to recover the lost territories: "He used to say, 'If only I had been in my father Mas'ūd's place after the death of my grandfather Maḥmūd, the bastions of our kingdom would not have collapsed. But now, I am too weak to regain what they have taken, and neighbouring kings with extensive territories and powerful armies have conquered it.'"¹

Sistān had been ruled in the 4th/10th century by amirs descended from collaterals of the Ṣaffārid brothers Ya'qūb and 'Amr b. Laith. But in 393/1002 Maḥmūd of Ghazna deposed the Amir Khalaf b. Aḥmad (d. 399/1008-9) and annexed Sistān to his empire. The unknown but very patriotic author of the *Ta'rikh-i Sistān*, a local history of the province, regards the coming of the Turks, i.e. the Ghaznavids, as a major disaster for his country.² Because of feelings like this, Sistān under Ghaznavid rule was usually racked by the activities of patriotic 'ayyārs. Mas'ūd ruled Sistān through a scion of the Ṣaffārid dynasty, Amir Abu'l-Faḍl Naṣr. Türkmen raids on Sistān are recorded from c. 427/1036 onwards, and soon afterwards the Saljuqs were definitely called in by some Sagzī rebels against the Ghaznavids. Er-Tash (d. 440/1048-9), who is described as a brother of Ibrāhīm Īnal, came and compelled Abu'l-Faḍl to make the khuṭba in the name of Mūsā Yabghu, who was then in Herāt; after Dandānqān, Mūsā came in person to Sistān. Abu'l-Faḍl remained faithful to his new Saljuq masters: his

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, p. 111.

² *Ta'rikh-i Sistān*, p. 354.

brother Abū Naṣr Maṣṣūr married a Turkish princess, and when in 432/1041 Sultān Maudūd b. Mas'ūd of Ghazna (432-41/1041-50) sent an army into Sistān, Abū'l-Faḍl and Er-Taṣh eventually repulsed it decisively. Abū'l-Faḍl also purged the land of Ghaznavid sympathizers, who seem to have been especially well represented amongst the religious classes.¹

The frontier between this south-easternmost outpost of Saljuq influence and the Ghaznavid empire was finally stabilized in the lower Helmand valley between Sistān and Bust. In 434/1042 Maudūd repulsed an attack on Bust by Abū'l-Faḍl and Er-Taṣh, but it was Sultān 'Abd al-Raṣhīd b. Maḥmūd who took the offensive in this region. In 443/1051-2 his slave general Toghrīl invaded Sistān and drove out Abū'l-Faḍl and Mūsā Yabghu, who were forced temporarily to flee to Herāt.² Saljuq suzerainty was re-established in Sistān, but it seems that Chaghri Beg now asserted his own superior rights over Sistān, first sending his son Yāqūtī and then in 448/1056-7 coming personally to Zarang, the capital of Sistān, where he minted his own coins. Relying on his position as ruler of Khurāsān and the east, Chaghri clearly hoped to reduce Mūsā Yabghu to a subordinate status in which Sistān should be held as an apanage of Khurāsān. But later in that year, Mūsā appealed to Toghrīl as supreme head of the Saljuq family. Toghrīl, who was in 'Irāq, thereupon sent Mūsā a patent of investiture for Sistān and ordered that the khuṭba and the *sikka* (right of coinage) should both be in Mūsā's name, as before. Mūsā's son Qara-Arslan Böri resumed these rights on his father's behalf, and the local administration of the province remained in the hands of the Ṣaffārid Abū'l-Faḍl until his death in 465/1073, when his son Bahā' al-Daula wa'l-Dīn Tāhir took over.³

Towards the middle of Mas'ūd of Ghazna's reign, Khwārazm had fallen under the control of rebellious governors, who had taken advantage of the province's geographical isolation and its remoteness from Ghazna. It came briefly into the hands of Hārūn b. Altun-Taṣh Khwārazm-Shāh, and then, after his murder in 426/1035, into those of his brother Ismā'il Khandān. Both of them lent their support to the Saljuqs—e.g. Hārūn supplied them with arms and beasts of burden—for they were enemies of the Ghaznavids.⁴ Shāh Malik, the Oghuz ruler of Jand, therefore allied with Mas'ūd, and in 429/1038

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 354, 364-8; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, pp. 330-1, 346.

² *Ta'rikh-i Sistān*, pp. 368, 371-2; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, pp. 354, 399; Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī* (tr. H. G. Raverty), vol. i, p. 99.

³ *Ta'rikh-i Sistān*, pp. 375-82.

⁴ Baihaqī, *Ta'rikh-i Mas'ūdi* (ed. Ghānī and Fayyād), p. 684.

the sultan sent him a patent of investiture for Khwārazm, with the implicit invitation to overthrow Ismā'il. In the winter of 432/1040-1 Shāh Malik marched across the desert into Khwārazm to assert his claim, and after a long and singularly bloody battle, he went to the capital and proclaimed the khuṭba for Sulṭān Mas'ūd, although by this time Mas'ūd was in fact dead.¹

The Saljuqs had meanwhile taken over Khurāsān, and were now able to turn their attention to Khwārazm and settle scores with their ancient enemy. Toghrīl and Chaghrī combined for this campaign, and in 433/1042 they drove Shāh Malik from Khwārazm. He fled with his forces across the Dihistān steppe to Kirmān and Makrān, and Pritsak has surmised that he was unable to return to his former territories in the Syr Darya delta because these had now passed into the hands of the Qipchaq. Eventually Shāh Malik was captured in Makrān by Er-Tash, who had been securing Sīstān; he was then handed over to Chaghrī, who killed him. Khwārazm was placed under a Saljuq governor, and the only other information recorded about this region during the rest of Chaghrī's lifetime is a revolt by the governor of Khwārazm, which was suppressed personally by Chaghrī at the end of the fifth decade of the eleventh century. In the course of this campaign, Chaghrī also received the submission of the "Amīr of Qipchaq", who became a Muslim and married into Chaghrī's family.²

As well as securing the defence of his south-western frontier in the Sīstān and Bust area, Maudūd of Ghazna managed to halt the Saljuqs in north-western Afghanistan and even to push them back temporarily. He drove them from Balkh, Herāt returned to Ghaznavid allegiance, and Tirmidh, the important bridgehead on the Oxus, remained in his hands for some years more. An army which he had fitted out for the reconquest of Khurāsān was in 435/1043-4 defeated by Alp-Arslan, but Maudūd's prestige was so great that the "King of the Turks in Transoxiana" (probably the Qarakhānid Bōri-Tegin, the later Tamghach-Khān Ibrāhīm b. Naṣr of Samarqand) submitted to him, and eventually Maudūd married one of Chaghrī's daughters.³ Towards the

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 689-90; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, pp. 345-6; Sachau, "Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwārizm", *S.B.W.A.W.* pp. 309-12; Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 302.

² Ibn Funduq, *Ta'rikh-i Baihaq*, p. 51; Ḥusainī, *Akhhār al-dawla*, pp. 27-8; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. ix, p. 346, vol. x, p. 4; Mirkhwānd, *Rauḍat al-ṣafa'*, vol. iv, p. 105; Sachau, *op. cit.* pp. 303-12; Pritsak, "Der Untergang des Reiches des Oğuzischen Yabgu", *Köprülü Armağanı*, pp. 405-10.

³ Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. ix, pp. 334-54; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 303-4.

end of his reign he planned another *revanche* against the Saljuqs in Khurāsān, by means of subsidies and promises of territory which stirred up several of their enemies. The Kākūyid former ruler of Hamadān, Abū Kālījār Garshāsp, sent a contingent of troops, while the “Khāqān, King of the Turks” (doubtless Bōri-Tegin again), with his commander Qashgha, attacked Tirmidh and Khwārazm respectively. Unfortunately for Maudūd, these strategies came to naught with his own death. At some time before his death, Tirmidh had been finally lost to the Ghaznavids; the Saljuqs were now in possession of the upper Oxus valley as far as Qubādhiyān and Vakhsh, and these regions were now entrusted to one of Alp-Arslan’s officials, Abū ‘Alī b. Shādhān.¹

The decade 1050–60 was a troubled one for the Ghaznavids. Of the four short reigns in it, the most important were those of ‘Abd al-Rashīd b. Maḥmūd (441–4/1050–3) and Farrukh-Zād b. Mas‘ūd (444–51/1053–9), and these two were separated by the short but violent usurpation of the throne by the Turkish slave commander Toghrīl.² The fact that the Saljuqs derived no great advantage from these disturbances shows that they had reached the natural geographical limits of their expansion in the east. Indeed, at one point ‘Abd al-Rashīd successfully launched a counter-attack, defeating Chaghri and forcing the Oghuz to withdraw for a while from Sīstān and Kirmān (see above, p. 51). Farrukh-Zād repelled Chaghri’s forces from Ghazna and captured several important Saljuq commanders before he in turn was defeated by Alp-Arslan. Thus the warfare was in general indecisive, and the two sides were fairly evenly balanced. Farrukh-Zād’s brother and successor, Ibrāhīm b. Mas‘ūd, accordingly made a formal peace treaty with Chaghri.³ Ibrāhīm’s long reign marked a period of prosperity and consolidation for the Ghaznavid empire, and the frontier with the Saljuqs remained essentially stable during his lifetime.⁴ The Ghaznavid empire was henceforth based upon the two centres of Ghazna in Afghanistan and Lahore in northern India; from the time of the reign of Maudūd these are the only two mints recorded for the Ghaznavids, in contrast to the multiplicity of mints used in the previous reigns.⁵

¹ Husainī, pp. 27–8; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, pp. 381–2; Barthold, *loc. cit.*

² For an attempt to sort out the confused chronology of this decade, see Bosworth, “The Titulature of the Early Ghaznavids”, *Oriens*, pp. 230–2.

³ Husainī, *Akbbār al-daula*, pp. 28–9; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. ix, pp. 398–401, vol. x, pp. 3–4; and Jūzjānī (Raverty tr.), vol. i, pp. 98–9, 103–4, 133.

⁴ For the relations between Ibrāhīm and Malik-Shāh, see section vii, pp. 93–4 below.

⁵ Cf. D. Sourdcl, *Inventaire des monnaies musulmanes anciennes du Musée de Caboul*, pp. xv–xvi.

V. THE REIGN OF ALP-ARSLAN

Before he died, Toghrīl seems to have designated as his successor Chaghri's younger son Sulaimān, a virtual nonentity who is hardly mentioned in the sources before this. Yet the union of both eastern and western lands under one Saljuq sultan surely demanded the strongest possible man at the top. Direct, unified rule by one man had never before been achieved, and there were powerful centrifugal forces at work in the Saljuq dominions, including the ambitions of other members of the Saljuq family and the naturally anarchical tendencies of the Türkmen. These latter considerations were probably in the minds of several Saljuq slave commanders, whose own interests lay in a strong central authority and the maintenance of a powerful professional army. Two such men, Yaghī-Basan and Erdem, proclaimed at Qazvin the succession of Sulaimān's brother, Abū Shujā' Alp-Arslan Muḥammad. Sulaimān himself was the candidate of Toghrīl's vizier and adviser, the 'Amīd al-Mulk Kundurī, who doubtless hoped to perpetuate his own influence in the state; it was patent that if Alp-Arslan came to the throne, it would be the star of his own vizier and protégé, Nizām al-Mulk, which would rise, whereas that of Kundurī would fall. The percipient Nizām al-Mulk therefore threw his weight into the struggle on his master's side, and since Alp-Arslan already had possession of Khurāsān and was obviously superior in military experience, Kundurī and Sulaimān had to yield. Speedy recognition of Alp-Arslan's claim was imperative at this point, for Qutlumush and a large Türkmen following were lurking in the Alburz mountains to the south of the Caspian, awaiting the chance to descend on the key cities of Ray and Qazvin and thus seize power.¹

Alp-Arslan's succession was duly effected, and Kundurī's fall was now inevitable. Shortly after the new sultan's accession in 455/1063, Kundurī was arrested and later executed on the prompting of Nizām al-Mulk. Kundurī is said to have reflected philosophically that his old master Toghrīl had given him secular power, and now his nephew was going to give him a martyr's crown for the next world; but he warned Nizām al-Mulk with the words, "You have introduced a reprehensible innovation and an ugly practice into the world by executing a [dismissed] minister and by your treachery and deceit, and you have not fully considered what the end of it all will be. I fear that

¹ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 28; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 18-19.

this evil and blameworthy practice will rebound on the heads of your own children and descendants." The 'Abbāsīd caliph's assent was now secured for Alp-Arslan's assumption of the sultanate. In his embassy Alp-Arslan tactfully allowed Togh̃rīl's widow, the daughter of al-Qā'im, to return home; he never attempted to emulate his uncle and contract a liaison with the 'Abbāsīds, nor does it seem that he ever even visited Baghdad. The caliph agreed to designate the new sultan "Trusted Son", and he bestowed on him the honorifics *ʿAḏud al-Daula* ("Strong Arm of the State") and *Ḍiyā' al-Dīn* ("Light of Religion") in 456/1064.¹

Alp-Arslan's reign of ten years (455–65/1063–73) and the succeeding twenty years' rule of his son Malik-Shāh form the apogee of the Great Saljuq sultanate. During these decades the Saljuq dominions were united under the rule of one man, and the energetic and unceasing journeys and campaigns of the sultans meant that this unity was far from theoretical. Īrān was now enjoying an intellectual and cultural florescence as well as a considerable commercial and agricultural prosperity. The chaos caused by the Tūrkmen and their flocks was alleviated both by the policy of diverting them westwards as far as possible, and also by the Saljuq governors' control over the provinces. After the great famine and pandemic of 448–9/1056–7 (its effects were felt in regions as far apart as Egypt, the Yemen, and Transoxiana), Īrān was relatively free of the plagues and other misery which had earlier come in the wake of warfare and other devastation.² There are indications that in the cities of *Khurāsān*, firmer rule and internal pacification checked the endemic violence of the 'ayyārs and the sectarian factions (*ʿaṣabiyyāt*). According to the historian of Baihaq, Ibn Funduq, Malik-Shāh's death was followed by a period of bloody sectarian strife and the dominance of 'ayyārs in the towns.³ For Iran as a whole, however, trade with Central Asia and the Qipchaq steppe, together with trade through Kirmān and the Persian Gulf, was facilitated. Although there may have been a decline in the commerce of the Persian Gulf during the 5th/11th century—Lewis has surmised that the diversion of trade from India to South Arabia, the Red Sea,

¹ Bundārī, pp. 29–30; Zahr al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, pp. 23–4; Rāvandī, *Rābat al-ṣudūr*, p. 118; Ḥusainī, *Al-kh̃bār al-daula al-Saljūqiyya*, pp. 23–6; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 20–3, 37; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, vol. III, pp. 300–1.

² Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. VIII, pp. 170–1, 179–81; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. IX, pp. 434–5, 438–9.

³ *Ta'rikh-i Baihaq*, pp. 274–5.

and Egypt was a deliberate, anti-'Abbāsīd policy on the part of the Fāṭimids of Cairo—Kirmān nonetheless prospered under the descendants of Qavurt. In the last decades of the 5th/11th century and the early ones of the next, the towns of Kirmān or Bardasir and Jiruft enjoyed great mercantile activity, and their commercial quarters contained colonies of foreign traders from as far afield as Byzantium and India.¹

This combined period of thirty years may also be characterized as the age of the great Vizier Nizām al-Mulk, or *al-Daula al-Nizāmiyya* as Ibn al-Athīr specifically calls it, and it is worth pausing to consider this outstanding figure of Iranian history. Not only was he mentor to the Saljuq sultans, encouraging them to act as sovereign monarchs in the Iranian tradition, but in his *Siyāsāt-Nāma* or "Book of Government" he provided a precious source of information on the political ethos of the age and on the administrative and court procedures then prevalent in eastern Islam. He typifies the class of Iranian secretaries and officials upon whom the sultans relied, and his book is not merely a theoretical "Mirror for Princes" but also a blueprint according to which Nizām al-Mulk hoped to fashion the sultan and his empire.

Abū 'Alī Ḥasan b. 'Alī Tūsī (408 or 410-85/1017 or 1019-92) was given the honorific *Nizām al-Mulk* ("Order of the Realm") at some point early in his career, perhaps by Alp-Arslan in Khurāsān. Like so many of the Saljuqs' Khurāsānian servants, he had begun as an official of the Ghaznavids. He never ceased to have as his ideal the centralized despotism of the Ghaznavids, and in the *Siyāsāt-Nāma* it is not surprising to find forceful monarchs such as Maḥmūd of Ghazna and the Būyid 'Aḍud al-Daula continually held up as models for the Saljuqs to emulate. Nizām al-Mulk's family background and early life are well-documented by Ibn Funduq, for the family had marriage connexions with the Sayyids of Baihaq.² His studies with the Imām Muwaffaq, one of the outstanding Shāfi'ī 'ulamā of Nishāpūr, helped to form his enthusiasm for both the Shāfi'ī law school and the Ash'arī kalām, while his zeal for education, and for these two fields of knowledge in particular, were later put into practice by his extension of the madrasa system (see pp. 72-4 below).

¹ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Ta'rikh-i Saljūqiyān-i Kirmān*, pp. 2, 25-6, 49. Cf. Houtsma, "Zur Geschichte der Selgugen von Kermān", *Z.D.M.G.* pp. 372, 380; B. Lewis, "The Fatimids and the Route to India", *Revue de la Faculté des Sciences Economiques de l'Université d'Istanbul*, vol. XI (1953), pp. 50-4.

² Cf. *Ta'rikh-i Baihaq*, pp. 73-83.

After the expulsion of the Ghaznavids from Khurāsān, the young Nizām al-Mulk spent three or four years in Ghazna and then entered the service of Chaghri and Alp-Arslan in his native Khurāsān. It may be that he saw himself as a representative of the Persian dihqān and official classes, with a duty and mission to perpetuate the traditions of those classes by civilizing their Turkish masters and thereby preserving Īrān from Türkmen anarchy. On the death of Alp-Arslan's vizier, Abū 'Alī b. Shādhān, Nizām al-Mulk took over the post, and thus with Chaghri's death he became the administrator of all Khurāsān. We have seen that his fame aroused the jealousy of Toghril's vizier, Kundurī, who attempted to push the candidature of Sulaimān and so prevent Alp-Arslan and Nizām al-Mulk from gaining supreme power in the Saljuq dominions. During Alp-Arslan's reign Nizām al-Mulk had a free hand in directing the administration of the empire; in addition, he spent much time on military duties, accompanying his master and also undertaking expeditions of his own, such as those of 459/1067 and 464/1071-2 in Fārs, whose success greatly increased his prestige.

Bowen has tabulated five main points of policy in Alp-Arslan's reign, although, he says, whether they were formulated by the sultan himself or by his minister is uncertain.¹ First, the Türkmen were employed for raiding the Christian kingdoms of Asia Minor and the Caucasus, as well as the lands of the Shi'ī Fātimids in Syria; hence at the outset of his reign, when his position as sultan was far from secure, Alp-Arslan thought it wise to lead a campaign into Georgia and Armenia (see below, p. 62). Second, the irresistibility of the sultan's forces was demonstrated—coupled, however, with clemency towards and the reinstatement of rebels who submitted. Next, local rulers, both Sunnīs and Shi'īs, were maintained in such regions as Iraq, Fārs, Āzarbāijān, and the Caspian provinces, while members of the Saljuq family were used as provincial governors. Fourth, to prevent the kind of crisis that had occurred on Toghril's death, there was the early appointment of Malik-Shāh as *valī 'abd* (heir) even though he was not the eldest son. And finally, good relations were established with the 'Abbāsīd caliphs. Bearing these policies in mind, we shall now consider the events of the reign, so far as they relate to the history of the Iranian world, under the three headings of dynastic affairs in the heartlands of the empire; the campaigns in the west; and the securing of the east.

¹ "Nizām al-Mulk", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.); see also Cahen, "Alp Arslan", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

When Alp-Arslan obtained the throne, the most immediate problem was to secure it against his uncle Qutlumush b. Arslan Isrā'il. In his claim Qutlumush had voiced the old Turkish idea of seniorate, or the right of the eldest competent male member of the family to have supreme control: "By right, the sultanate should come to me, because my father was the senior and leading member of the tribe."¹ There is no doubt that this argument appealed to many of the Türkmén. Qutlumush raised the standard of revolt at Sāveh in 456/1054, accompanied by his brother and by large numbers of Türkmén. Against him, Nizām al-Mulk fitted out for the sultan an army whose chief commanders were, as their names show, slave soldiers; prominent among them was the eunuch Sav-Tegin, who became one of Alp-Arslan's most trusted generals. In this way the two opposing sides exemplified the dual aspect of the Saljuq military and ruling institution: on one side there were the free-ranging, independent, tribally organized Türkmén; and on the other was the new, professional army of the sultan, predominantly slave soldiers whose only loyalty was to the sultan, on whom they depended for their salaries or for grants of land. With typical Türkmén disregard for the agricultural economy of the region, Qutlumush devastated the neighbourhood of Ray, but was defeated in battle and was afterwards found dead in mysterious circumstances.²

Difficulties also arose in Alp-Arslan's reign when another important member of the Saljuq family, the sultan's own elder brother Qara-Arslan Qavurt, ceased to be content with a subordinate position. Kirmān had formed part of the Būyid territories in southern Iran held by 'Imād al-Dīn Abū Kālījār (see above, p. 39). The origins of Saljuq rule in the province are not very clear, for the accounts in Ibn al-Athīr and in Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm's special history of the Saljuqs of Kirmān do not coincide in all points, and the opening pages of the latter work are in any case lost. But the Ghaznavid defeat of Dandānqān certainly allowed Saljuq raiders to penetrate southwards through Kūhistān and the towns of Ṭabas and Qā'in in order to attack the oases of Kirmān province. Whether it was Ibrāhīm Īnal or Qavurt who was attacking Bardasīr, the chief town of Kirmān, in

¹ Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, p. 22.

² Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 28-9; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *loc. cit.*; Ḥusainī, *Akhhbār al-dawla*, pp. 30-2; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 23-4; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yan*, vol. III, p. 236; Cahen, "Qutlumush et ses Fils avant l'Asie Mineure", *Der Islam*, pp. 23-4.

434/1042-3 is unclear, but the Būyid vizier Muḥadhḥib al-Daula was sent out from Fārs to defend it, and it seems to have remained in Būyid hands for a few years more. However, shortly before Abū Kālījār's death in 440/1048-9, the Dailamī commander of Bardasīr, Bahram b. Laṣḥkarsitān, delivered the capital into Qavurt's hands.¹ In this way the rule of Qavurt and of his descendants became established in the province for the next 140 years, and until the irruption of the Ghuzz in the latter half of the 6th/12th century, Kirmān enjoyed a period of comparative stability and prosperity—especially since it lay on the overland trade-route from Khurāsān to the Gulf and to the lands farther east. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm stresses Qavurt's just rule: the Türkmen were allotted fiefs in Kirmān, but the amir himself was careful to pasture his own extensive flocks well out in the steppe, where agricultural land would not be damaged. He also sent an expedition against the Kūfichīs or Qufš, the Balūchī mountaineers whose banditry had long made the southern and eastern parts of the province insecure; the Saljuq invasion of Kirmān seems to have given a general stimulus to the eastward migration of the Balūchīs into Makrān and the modern Balūchistān.² Qavurt was even strong enough to mount an expedition across the Persian Gulf and seize the former Būyid dependency of Oman from the local Khawārij; it was to remain under Saljuq suzerainty until c. 536/1140.³

When his father Chaghri died, Qavurt recognized the succession of Alp-Arslan in the east, and after Toghril died and Alp-Arslan came to Kirmān in 456/1064, Qavurt recognized him as supreme Saljuq sultan and gave him his allegiance. This he withdrew three years later, removing his brother's name from the *khutba*.⁴ Alp-Arslan then came with an army and restored the status quo, granting Qavurt full forgiveness; yet the latter was never fully reconciled to the exaltation of another man over the whole of the Saljuq family, and when Malik-Shāh took over his father's throne, Qavurt rebelled against the new sultan (see below, pp. 88-9). After the siege of Jiruft in Kirmān in 459/1067, Alp-Arslan's army marched into Fārs, which five years previously had been conquered by Qavurt from the Shabānkārā'i

¹ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Kirmān*, pp. 2-3, cf. Houtsma, *Z.D.M.G.* (1885), pp. 367-8; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, pp. 349-50.

² Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, pp. 4, 7-8 (cf. Houtsma, *op. cit.* pp. 368-9); R. N. Frye, "Remarks on Baluchi History", *Central Asiatic Journal*, p. 47.

³ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, pp. 8-10, cf. Houtsma, *op. cit.* pp. 369-70.

⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 28, 36-7.

chieftain Faḍlūya, though it had afterwards slipped from Saljuq control. In the course of this campaign in Fārs several fortresses were taken: indeed, the conquest of Iṣṭakhr is said to have given a great fillip to Niẓām al-Mulk's fame. A further campaign against Faḍlūya was required in 461/1069, but this particular menace was now removed by the capture and killing of Faḍlūya and of his brother Ḥasan or Ḥasanūya.¹

It has been noted that Alp-Arslan never visited Baghdad personally.² He was nevertheless concerned to maintain his rights in Iraq, and above all to watch over the Arab amīrs there and ensure that they did nothing more to encourage the Fāṭimids' ambitions in Iraq. The sultan's military representative in the Iraq was *shahna*, a position normally given to one of his ghulām commanders. As far as possible, the sultan always appointed a man who was *persona grata* to the 'Abbāsīd caliph. Al-Qā'im objected to Ai-Tegin, appointed in 464/1071, because his son had killed one of the caliph's ghulāms; so Alp-Arslan and Niẓām al-Mulk agreed to remove him and substitute Gauhar-Ā'in, a former ghulām of the Būyid Abū Kālījār.³ As was customary, administrative and diplomatic contact between the sultanate and caliphate was channelled through the respective viziers. When in 450/1058 Ibn al-Muslima was killed, his successor as vizier to al-Qā'im was the capable and energetic Fakhr al-Daula Muḥammad b. Jahīr, who had formerly served the 'Uqailids, Mirdāsids, and most recently the Marwānīd Naṣr al-Daula.⁴ Over the next fifteen years Ibn Jahīr strove to maintain the influence of the caliphate in Iraq. By a skilful cultivation of the Arab amīrs, most of whom were Shī'īs, he won their allegiance to the 'Abbāsīds. Niẓām al-Mulk was on friendly terms with his opposite number, and in 462/1069-70 his daughter Ṣafīyya was married to Ibn Jahīr's son 'Amīd al-Daula. At the same time he received from the caliph the honorifics *Qiwām al-Dīn* ("Support of Religion") and *Raḍī Amīr al-Mu'minīn* ("Favoured One of the Commander of the Faithful"). Indeed, in 460/1068 al-Qā'im had temporarily dismissed Ibn Jahīr for his subservience to the Saljuqs, "because", in the words of Ibn al-Jauzī, "you have put on robes of honour from 'Aḍud al-Daula

¹ Ibn al-Balkhī, *Fārs-Nāma*, p. 166; Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 30-1; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 36-7, 48-9; Bowen, "The Last Buwayhids", *J.R.A.S.* p. 244.

² Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, vol. III, p. 235.

³ Bundārī, p. 44; Ibn al-Jauzī, IX, pp. 115-16; Ibn al-Athīr, x, pp. 47-8, 200-1.

⁴ Bundārī, pp. 24-5; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 14-15; Cahen, "Djahīr (Banū)", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

[i.e. from Alp-Arslan]”.¹ The sultan used caliphal support in 458/1066 to make his son Malik-Shāh valī ‘ahd; at a ceremony near Marv, the assembled amīrs took an oath of allegiance to Malik-Shāh and his name was placed in the *khutba*. At the same time, Alp-Arslan publicly allotted the governorships of *Khawārazm*, *Khurāsān*, the upper Oxus lands, and the Caspian provinces, to several of his brothers, sons, and other relatives. The seal was set on cordial relations with the caliph when in 464/1071-2 Alp-Arslan’s daughter was married to al-Qā’im’s son and heir, who was later to become Caliph al-Muqtadi.²

Saljuq policy in Iraq and the Syrian desert fringes was to maintain the existing power of the Arab amīrs while keeping them under close surveillance. Thus it was from the sultan in the first place that the ‘Uqailid *Sharaf al-Daula Muslim b. Quraish* of Mosul (d. 478/1085) sought the grant of Anbār, Hit, and other places in central ‘Irāq, and only afterwards did he get caliphal confirmation. In Baṣra, the sultan in 459/1067 restored to the governorship and to the tax-farm there the Kurd Tāj al-Mulūk Hazārasp b. Bankīr, and he linked his fortunes to those of the Saljuqs by giving Hazārasp one of his own sisters in marriage. After Hazārasp’s death three years later, this same sister was again given in a political marriage, this time to the ‘Uqailid *Sharaf al-Daula Muslim*.³ Thanks to this policy, Iraq enjoyed a period of tranquillity after the violence of Toghri’l’s reign. The Fāṭimids did not dare to interfere there, and their influence also diminished in some parts of the Arabian peninsula. In 462/1070 the *sharīf* of Mecca, Muḥammad b. Abī Hāshim, came to Alp-Arslan with the news that the *khutba* in Mecca was now being made for the ‘Abbāsīd caliph and the Saljuq sultan, and no longer for the Fāṭimid al-Mustanṣir; and further, the *Shi’i adhān* (call to prayer) had been abolished. The sultan attempted to make this *volte-face* permanent by allotting the *sharīf* a generous pension.⁴

It was his activities in the west, and above all his victory at Malāzgird (Mantzikert), which established Alp-Arslan in the eyes of posterity as a Muslim hero. In some respects this victory was a fortuitous one, for a crusade against the Christians does not appear to have been one of the mainsprings of the sultan’s policy. Wittek and Cahen have shown that in dealing with the overrunning of Anatolia at this time,

¹ Bundārī, pp. 34-6; Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntaḡam*, vol. VIII, p. 249; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 39, 41.

² *Ibid.* pp. 34, 48.

³ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 31, 36-7; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 35, 37, 41.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 41.

we must distinguish clearly between the official policy of the Saljuq sultans and the uncontrolled activities of Türkmen raiders. The moderate, even magnanimous, attitude adopted by Alp-Arslan towards the defeated Byzantine Emperor Romanus Diogenes shows that his most basic policy at this time was essentially one of co-existence between the two great empires, Christian and Islamic. Just as the Oghuz bands when they first entered Khurāsān had been unable to conceive that the formidable Ghaznavid empire might crack under their puny attacks, so the Byzantine empire, which had withstood many Muslim attacks in the past, was regarded by the Saljuqs as ageless and invincible. The Türkmen, on the other hand, sought plunder and pasture for their herds wherever they could find them. They too had no thoughts of overthrowing Byzantine rule in Anatolia, for they were militarily incapable of besieging and taking the Byzantine strongholds there; but their spreading out through the Anatolian countryside inevitably led to the surrender of the Greek cities, which were now encircled and cut off from their rural hinterland. In effect, the Türkmen on the Byzantine and Armenian frontiers in eastern Anatolia swelled the ranks of older Muslim ghāzī elements, Arab, Kurdish, and Dailamī—warriors who had long faced their Byzantine counterparts, the *akritai*. With this increase of Turks on the frontiers, the Turkish terms *aqññi* (raider) and *ıj* (properly extremity, border > fighter on the border) come into use side by side with that of ghāzī.¹

Shortly after his accession, Alp-Arslan, accompanied by his son Malik-Shāh and by Nizām al-Mulk, campaigned in Armenia, capturing Ani from its Byzantine garrison. Gagik-Abas of Kars submitted and the sultan penetrated into Georgia, where he consolidated his influence by marrying a niece of the Georgian King Bagrat IV, but in 460/1068 a further campaign against Georgia was necessary.² In 459/1067 Alp-Arslan was in Arrān, where he received the tribute of the Shaddādīd Faḍl II b. Shāvur and also of the Shīrvān-Shāh Fakhr al-Dīn Fariburz b. Sallār; in the ensuing years Turkish ghulām governors were appointed for the western shores of the Caspian as far north as Darband.³

¹ Cf. P. Wittek, "Deux Chapitres de l'Histoire des Turcs de Roum", *Byzantion*, pp. 285-302; *idem*, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938), pp. 16 ff.; Cahen, "La Première Pénétration Turque en Asie-Mineure", *Byzantion*, pp. 5 ff.

² Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 31; Ḥusainī, *Akḥbār al-dawla*, pp. 35-8, 43-6; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 25-8; W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People*, pp. 90-2; Honigsmann, *Die Ostgrenze des Byzantinischen Reiches*, pp. 185 ff.; R. Grousset, *Histoire de l'Arménie des Origines à 1071*, pp. 610-16; Minorsky, *Studies in Caucasian History*, pp. 64-7.

³ Minorsky, *A History of Shīrvān and Darband*, pp. 37-8, 41, 66.

Meanwhile, virtually independent Türkmen bands were already raiding far into Anatolia: in 459/1067 Caesarea (Kayseri) in Cappadocia was sacked; in the next year Amorium in Phrygia, and in the next year Iconium (Konya). Despite all this, the Byzantines still occasionally followed their traditional practice of employing predatory bands such as these Türkmen as auxiliaries (*foederati*) against other Türkmen.

The attacks on central Anatolia menaced the Byzantine lines of communication that stretched through the Taurus and Cilicia to their cities of Antioch, Edessa, and Malatya in northern Syria and Diyarbakır. The Emperor Romanus accordingly sent an army to northern Syria, which secured the defence of these cities and then took the offensive against the Muslims: Artāḥ, between Antioch and Aleppo, and Manbij on the Euphrates were both captured, and Aleppo itself was menaced. It is likely that a truce was made in 462/1070 between Alp-Arslan and Romanus, since the sultan now felt free to turn his attention to what had long been a favoured project of his: the expulsion of the Fāṭimids from Syria and even perhaps a march on Egypt. According to two writers, the historian of Aleppo, Ibn al-ʿAdīm, and the Egyptian Ibn Muyassar, an appeal was made to Alp-Arslan at this time by a certain rebel against the Fāṭimids in Egypt. Yet whatever type of truce may have been made, no real cessation of hostilities in Anatolia was possible, for the sultan had very little control over the activity of the Türkmen there.¹

In the spring of 463/1071 Alp-Arslan was in northern Syria when he heard the news that Romanus had assembled a vast army at Erzerum and had marched eastwards into Armenia. The sultan was taken by surprise and treated this as a breach of the truce. With wild exaggeration, Muslim and Christian sources variously number the emperor's army at between 200,000 and one million; more reliable sources say that it included Frankish, Russian, Khazar, Pecheneg, Oghuz, and Qipchaq mercenaries, as well as Greeks and Armenians. The pitched battle which took place at Malāzgird was the first major one that the Turks had ever ventured against a Byzantine army. It ended in disaster for the Greeks, the supreme indignity being the capture of the Basileus by the Muslims. But even in his hour of victory Alp-Arslan did not endeavour to destroy the Byzantine empire. Romanus was allowed to ransom himself, promising tribute and a

¹ Cf. Cahen, "La Campagne de Mantzikert d'après les sources Musulmanes", *Byzantion*, pp. 621-5; *idem*, *Byzantion* (1948), pp. 29-30; Honigmann, *Die Ostgrenze*, pp. 117-22.

marriage alliance, and it is possible that he promised to cede such cities as Malāzgird, Edessa, Antioch, and Manbij; as it was, the deposition and death of Romanus rendered all these provisions void.¹

The defeat at Malāzgird was a symptom rather than a cause of the Greeks' downfall in eastern Anatolia. In the years just before this, the will to resist among the Byzantine *akritai* had been weakening, especially as many of these warriors were Armenians, resentful of Byzantine political and ecclesiastical policy in their country; moreover the poor quality of Romanus's army, huge though it may have been in numbers, was reflected in what was at least a trickle of desertions to the enemy. From 464/1072 onwards, eastern and central Anatolia lay open to the Türkmén, who speedily overran all the region except for the strongholds in the Taurus. Alp-Arslan's victory at Malāzgird also meant that, apart from the districts of Tashīr and eastern Siunik, Armenia passed definitely into Muslim hands; and within the next decade or so, the Byzantines, resolutely anti-Armenian to the end, exterminated several survivors of the native Bagratid and Ardzrunid dynasties.² Thus in succeeding centuries only the tiny kingdom of Georgia survived as an independent Christian power in the Caucasus.

Alp-Arslan took steps early in his reign to secure his eastern frontiers, where there were old rivals such as the Qarakhānids and Ghaznavids whose attitude might flare up into hostility should a favourable opportunity present itself. The western Qarakhānid khanate of Soghdia and Farghāna was at this time under the rule of Tamghach-Khān Ibrāhīm b. Naṣr (c. 444-60/c. 1052-68). The historical sources and the "Mirrors for Princes" both portray this khan as a man of outstanding justice and piety: he cultivated the 'ulamā, was careful not to introduce uncanonical taxation, and protected the common people against banditry and exploitation by commercial interests.³ Already in Toghril's lifetime Alp-Arslan had demonstrated by a show of force against the Qarakhānids that his father's old influence along the Oxus valley was to be upheld; now that Alp-Arslan was supreme sultan, he invaded the territories of Tamghach-Khān Ibrāhīm, causing the latter to protest to the caliph about this unprovoked aggression. Over the following years, however, Alp-Arslan adopted a more pacific policy here and

¹ Bundāri, pp. 38-44; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. VIII, pp. 260-5; Husainī, pp. 46-53; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 44-6; cf. Cahen, *Byzantium* (1934), pp. 627 ff.; Honigmann, *op. cit.* pp. 189-90; Grousset, *op. cit.* pp. 626-9.

² Grousset, pp. 616-17, 629-35.

³ Cf. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp. 311-13.

endeavoured to secure harmony with the Qarakhānids through a series of marriage alliances. He himself married the widowed daughter of Qadīr Khān Yūsuf, formerly ruler of Kāshghar and Khotan; his daughter 'Ā'isha was given to Ibrāhīm's son and successor, Shams al-Mulk Naṣr; and his son Malik-Shāh married another Qarakhānid princess, who eventually gave birth to the future Saljuq Sulṭān Maḥmūd (see below, p. 103).¹

The links between the two Turkish houses were therefore ostensibly close, though they did not prevent tension from arising at the end of Alp-Arslan's reign between the sultan and Shams al-Mulk Naṣr (460-72/1068-80). In 465/1072 Alp-Arslan crossed the Oxus on a bridge of boats with an army alleged to number 200,000, but this campaign was cut short by his death: he was stabbed by a local castellan whom he had condemned to death. Shams al-Mulk thereupon took the offensive and carried the war over to the Saljuq side of the Oxus. He captured Tirmidh and ejected Ayaz b. Alp-Arslan from Balkh before the new sultan Malik-Shāh could intervene and cause the Qarakhānid forces to retreat.² Throughout this period relations with the Ghaznavids were harmonious, and the frontier agreed upon by Chaghri Beg and Sulṭān Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd remained respected.³

Apart from dealings with these two great powers, Alp-Arslan had had to contend with a certain amount of unrest and rebelliousness on the eastern fringes of the empire, where some local rulers and governors tried to take advantage of the troubled circumstances surrounding the sultan's accession. In 456/1064 he had to subdue and finally kill the rebellious amir of Khuttal and the governor of Chaghāniyān (whether these were the descendants of former local rulers or merely nominees of the Saljuqs is unknown), while a revolt of his uncle Fakhr al-Mulk Mūsā Yabghu in Herāt also had to be suppressed.⁴ In the following year the sultan undertook an expedition from Marv to Khwārazm and then into the Ūst Urt and Qipchaq steppes, the ancestral home of the Oghuz; and at this time he did in fact take the opportunity of visiting Jand, where Saljuq b. Duqaq was buried. These events are

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, p. 212, vol. x, p. 28; cf. Sachau, *S.B.W.A.W.* (1873); Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 314.

² Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 45-7; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, pp. 28-9; Husainī, *Akhhār al-dawla*, pp. 53-4; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 49-50; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, vol. iii, p. 235; Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 314-15.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 28; Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāsirī*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī, vol. i, p. 239 (Raverty tr., vol. i, pp. 103-4).

⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 22.

treated in some detail by Mirkhwānd, but both the events and the personages involved remain somewhat shadowy and mysterious. It appears that Alp-Arslan was formally recognized in Khwārazm as sultan and that he then left as governor there his son or brother Arslan-Arghun;¹ from Khwārazm he led a punitive campaign against the Qipchaq, penetrating as far as the Manqishlaq peninsula on the eastern Caspian shore.²

We have seen that when Malik-Shāh was made heir to the throne in 458/1066, Alp-Arslan chose the occasion to redistribute governorships in the east among members of the Saljuq family. According to Ibn al-Athīr, Ṭabaristān was given to Īnanch Yabghu (? Bighu), Balkh went to the sultan's brother Sulaimān, Khwārazm to his brother Arslan-Arghun, and Chaghāniyān and Tukhāristān to his brother Ilyās; Marv was given to his youngest son Arslan-Shāh, the district of Bāghshūr (near Marv ar-Rūd) to Mas'ūd b. Er-Tash, and Isfizār to Maudūd b. Er-Tash.³ That he continued to grant the eastern fringes as appanages for lesser members of the family, despite the opportunities this gave for rebelliousness, seems to show that the sultan was still mindful of traditional obligations to family members; it further seems to imply that he now considered western Iran and Iraq to be the Saljuq empire's centre of gravity and the regions most demanding of his personal presence.

VI. NIẒĀM AL-MULK AND THE ZENITH OF THE GREAT SALJUQ EMPIRE

Jalāl al-Daula Mu'izz al-Dīn Abu'l-Faṭḥ Malik-Shāh (465-85/1072-92) continued and in some ways surpassed the triumphs of his father. The lands of the Great Saljuqs were never more extensive than during Malik-Shāh's reign. In the east there was something like a state of equilibrium with the Ghaznavid Sulṭān Ibrāhīm, although the pretensions of the Qarakhānids in Tukhāristān and in the other lands to the south of the Oxus—pretensions which had already caused anxiety to Alp-Arslan—made the north-eastern frontier a certain source of worry in the early part of Malik-Shāh's reign. When internal dissension

¹ On the confusion surrounding this personage, see Cahen, "Arslan-Arghūn", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

² Ḥusainī, p. 40; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 33; Mirkhwānd, *Rauḍat al-ṣafā'*, vol. iv, pp. 111-12; Sachau, *S.B.W.A.W.*, pp. 313-14.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 34; cf. Ḥusainī, p. 41.

within the Qarakhānid dominions afforded a chance for intervention, the sultan undertook an important campaign into Transoxiana and beyond, carrying Saljuq arms into places where they had never been seen before, such as Talas and Kāshghar. In the north-west, Saljuq troops operated amongst the Muslim amīrs of Mūghān, Arrān, and Shīrvān, and also amongst the Christian peoples of the southern Caucasus. In Anatolia, following Malāzgird and the Muslim conquest of Armenia, Qutlumush's two sons Sulaimān and Manṣūr took advantage of the collapse of the Byzantine *limes* (frontier defence line) to raid as far as the shores of the Aegean. The generally hostile attitude of these two Saljuq princes towards Malik-Shāh, the son of their father's rival and vanquisher, makes it questionable whether the Türkmen conquests in Anatolia were in any measure attachable to or dependent upon the Great Saljuq empire. In the Arab lands south of Anatolia, however, the sultan's direct influence was extended by several means: through the agency of such slave commanders as Aq-Sonqur, Bursuq, and Khumar-Tegin; by Türkmen *begs*, e.g. Artuq and Atsiz b. Uvak; by members of the Saljuq royal family, such as Tutush b. Alp-Arslan; and also by the two Ibn Jahīrs, father and son, who were Arab soldier-officials. These latter extinguished the independence of the Marwānids, whose attitude in the Saljuq-Fātimid conflict had been at times ambiguous; in addition they reduced the power of other Arab amirates such as the 'Uqailids, they mopped up survivals of Greco-Armenian resistance in northern Syria, expelled the lieutenants of the Fātimids from the whole of Syria and the greater part of Palestine, and they even undertook successful expeditions into the Arabian peninsula as far as the Yemen in the southwest and al-Aḥsā' in the east.

Such an achievement is an impressive one for a comparatively young man—Malik-Shāh was only thirty-seven when he died—and it contrasts with the disunity and the squabbling amongst the sultan's children after his death in 485/1092. Thereafter, Saljuq power in Iraq and western Irān was to become increasingly enfeebled. Khurāsān and the east were under the rule of Sanjar, the most capable of Malik-Shāh's sons and the one favoured by a long life, and this region enjoyed the greatest degree of stability and continuity of rule in the first half of the 6th/12th century; yet even here, Sanjar's dominion was to end in tragedy and confusion at the hands of intransigent Türkmen tribesmen.

Malik-Shāh's achievement was by no means a wholly personal one; indeed, the contribution of Vizier Nizām al-Mulk was even greater than that of his master. Whereas in the years before 465/1072 Nizām al-Mulk had served men of maturity and experience, such as Chaghri Beg and Alp-Arslan, now his sultan was a young man of eighteen whom he hoped to control and adapt to his own ideal of a despotic monarch in the Iranian-Islamic tradition. His entire period as vizier to the Saljuq sultans extended over thirty years, not counting his service to the prince Alp-Arslan when Toghril was still sultan.¹ His famous boast to Malik-Shāh, made just before his assassination in 485/1092 and when his enemies at court were concerting their plans against him, was tactless but substantially true:

Tell the Sultan, "If you have not already realized that I am your co-equal in the work of ruling, then know that you have only attained to this power through my statesmanship and judgement." Does he not remember when his father was killed, and I assumed responsibility for the conduct of affairs and crushed the rebels who reared their heads, from his own family and from elsewhere, such as so-and-so and so-and-so (and he named a whole group of those who had risen up in revolt)? . . . Tell him that the stability of that regal cap is bound up with this vizierial inkstand, and that the harmony of these two interests is the means of securing all objects sought after and the ultimate cause of all objects gained. If ever I close up this inkstand, that royal power will topple.²

Nizām al-Mulk acted in effect as the *atabeg*, or tutor, of Malik-Shāh. This Turkish title, meaning literally "Father-commander", was not in wide use till after Malik-Shāh's death, when there were several young Saljuq princes who were provided with atabegs (see below, pp. 111-12); but Nizām al-Mulk himself received the title amongst the epithets bestowed on him at the beginning of Malik-Shāh's reign, and he was usually addressed by the sultan as "Father".³

Nizām al-Mulk directed policy primarily through the Great Divān or administrative office (*Divān-i Vazīr*, *Divān-i Sultān*), the executive centre of the state, over which he presided. He had considerable influence within the sultan's standing army and an important voice in the nomination of amīrs for specific campaigns. On occasion he

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 137-8.

² *Ibid.* pp. 138-9; abridged in Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 63, Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, p. 33, Rāvandī, *Rābat al-ṣudūr*, p. 134, Ḥusainī, *Akhhār al-daula al-Saljūqīyya*, p. 69, and Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. ix, p. 67.

³ Cahen has pointed out that according to Ḥusainī (*op. cit.* p. 29), the young Alp-Arslan apparently had an atabeg ("Atabak", *Encyc. of Islam*, 2nd ed.).

would still undertake expeditions himself, but increasing age and the feeling of power which he already derived from being at the centre of things in his *divān*, led him during Malik-Shāh's reign to prefer the role of organizer and diplomat to that of field commander. Either in this *divān*, which was normally located in the sultan's capital of Iṣfahān, or else while he was accompanying the monarch on his campaigns and missions, Niẓām al-Mulk supervised the operation of the subordinate departments: those of the *Mustaufī* (Chief Accountant), of the *Munshī*¹ or *Ṭughhrāʾī* (Chief Secretary), of the *ʿArid al-Jaiṣh* (Chief of Military Affairs and Organization), and of the *Muḥṣrif* (Chief of Intelligence and Investigation Services). This central bureaucracy, whose five-part division obviously follows that of the Ghaznavids, he succeeded in moulding largely to his own liking. He filled it with officials who were either from his own family or were his protégés and supporters; in many cases the two categories became coterminous through the marriages which he arranged. In the early part of Malik-Shāh's reign two men are specially mentioned in the sources as having aided Niẓām al-Mulk in making the bureaucracy a pliant instrument for the execution of his policy: the *Ṣāhib Dīwān al-Inṣhāʾ wa'l-Ṭughhrāʾ* ("Head of the Department of Correspondence and the Seal"), one Kamāl al-Daula Abū Riḍā Faḍlallāh; and the *Ṣāhib al-Zimām wa'l-Istifāʾ* ("Head of the Department of Financial Control and Accounting"), a man named Sharaf al-Mulk Abū Saʿd Muḥammad.¹

Niẓām al-Mulk's own children were a numerous and ambitious clan; Rāvandī numbers his sons at twelve, all of whom, so he says, held some office or other.² Certainly we find several of them entrenched in lucrative posts throughout the empire, not only in the central bureaucracy but also in the strategically important provincial governorships, where the vizier required trusty supporters to put his decrees into practice. Shams al-Mulk ʿUṭhmān was governor of Marv. Jamāl al-Mulk Maṣṣūr was governor of Balkh till his murder in 475/1082; in Alp-Arslan's times his pride had made him reject his father's request that he should act as vizier to the prince Malik-Shāh. "It is not fitting", he said, "for someone like me to act as vizier to a mere boy."³ Muʾayyid al-Mulk ʿUbadallāh's power and influence were almost as great as

¹ Bundārī, pp. 59 ff.

² *Rāḥat al-ṣudūr*, p. 133. According to a report in Mirkhwānd (*Rauḍat al-ṣafāʾ*, vol. iv, p. 115), these twelve sons received as much honour in the people's eyes as did the twelve Imāms of the Shīʿa.

³ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 73-4; Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntaẓam*, vol. ix, p. 67.

those of his father. At one point Nizām al-Mulk hoped to impose him on the 'Abbāsid caliph as his vizier, but al-Muqtadī strenuously objected; eventually Mu'ayyid al-Mulk replaced Kamāl al-Daula as Ṭughrā'ī in the Saljuq administration. In 475/1082-3 Mu'ayyid al-Mulk entered Baghdad from Iṣfahān and assumed the privilege, normally bestowed only by express royal command on the greatest men in the state, of having a salute of drums and military music (*nauba*) playing outside his house at three of the daily prayer times; a handsome payment persuaded him to desist from this. Likewise, when Nizām al-Mulk's daughter died in 470/1077-8, her father secured for her body the privilege of burial in the grounds of the caliphal palace at Baghdad.¹ It was not surprising that the vizier's opponents accused him and his family of arrogance and of the abuse of political and social power.

In addition to his own family, Nizām al-Mulk had a numerous following of secretaries and officials who were seeking his patronage, together with a personal household of *ghulāms* who were said to number several thousand.² According to Anushīrvān b. Khālīd, parents hastened to send their children to the great vizier's household for their education.³ For his part, Nizām al-Mulk was always careful to attract useful, capable men into his service and into the administration, and the power of this retinue is shown by their activities after Nizām al-Mulk's death. Within a short time his *ghulāms* had wreaked vengeance on his old rival Tāj al-Mulk Abu'l-Ghanā'im, who was widely suspected of having instigated Nizām al-Mulk's murder. More important, his descendants played a prominent part in public affairs for at least half a century after his death, many of them acting as viziers and officials for the Saljuq sultans and for the caliphs, despite the fact that only one or two of these officials seem to have had outstanding ability.

Nizām al-Mulk also tried to buttress the structure of the Saljuq empire, and to counter the splendour and prestige of the Fātimid caliphate in Cairo, by encouraging the progress of the Sunnī revival in Iraq and Iran. The sources attribute to him a decisive role as the protagonist of Sunnī orthodoxy, saying that he restored political and social order in Iran by repairing the damage to state and religion wrought by the heretical and tyrannical Būyids. Later in Malik-*Shāh's*

¹ Bundārī, pp. 52, 60, 73; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 82-3, 85.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 84; according to Ḥusainī, *Akhhbār al-daula*, p. 67, he had over 20,000 *ghulāms*.

³ Bundārī, p. 57.

reign, the Ismā'īlis or Assassins appeared in several areas of Iran, disturbing in some measure the course of this return to orthodoxy; since several of the Assassin strongholds were in the Alburz mountains, the region in which the province of Dailam lay, it is not unreasonable to see this outbreak of political and religious heterodoxy as a recrudescence of earlier Iranian opposition to the orthodox institutions of the Baghdad caliphate and of Sunnī Islam. However, the Ismā'īli movement in Iran never constituted a major threat to the established institutions, and it is likely that Ismā'īlism's conspiratorial methods, in particular its weapon of political assassination, caused contemporaries to exaggerate its importance. [For a detailed treatment of Ismā'īlism in Iran, see below, pp. 422-82.]

It seems that Nizām al-Mulk desired to speed up the provision of educational institutions within the eastern Sunnī world and to make them comparable with those still flourishing in Umayyad Spain and Fāṭimid Egypt. There is some controversy about his exact motives in founding these *madrasas*, or colleges of higher learning, which were named *Nizāmiyyas* in his honour. Did he seek to create a network of these institutions personally dependent on himself, meaning to further his own political plans; or was his aim the more general one of raising intellectual standards throughout eastern, non-Fāṭimid Islam, with the *madrasas* fitting into a pattern of state-supported education?¹ The latter view is probably the more likely one in the context of contemporary events. The Sunnī *madrasa*-building movement had begun in the second half of the 4th/10th century and was in full swing well before Nizām al-Mulk's time. It was a response first to the challenge of Mu'tazilī thought, and subsequently to the Fāṭimid institutions for training *Shī'ī dā'īs* or propagandists: i.e. the Azhar mosque of the Fāṭimid general Jauhar and the Caliph al-Mu'izz (founded in 359/970), the *Dār al-Ḥikma* ("House of Learning") of the Caliph al-Ḥākim (founded in 395/1005), and the various local *dār al-da'was*, or rallying-places and centres for propaganda. To implement Nizām al-Mulk's administrative policies throughout the Saljuq empire required the training of reliable personnel as secretaries and officials, and herein probably lies the key

¹ For these two views, see the articles of G. Makdisi, "Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-century Baghdad", *B.S.O.A.S.* pp. 1-56, and A. L. Tibawi, "Origin and Character of *al-Madrasah*", *B.S.O.A.S.* pp. 225-38. Tibawi's standpoint is nearer to that of the earlier, classic writers on the subject: see Goldziher, "Education—Muslim", *Encyc. of Religion and Ethics*; and Pedersen, "Masjdīd", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.). On the *madrasa* under the Saljuqs see also below, pp. 214-17 and 289-90.

to his motives. Moreover, not only was madrasa education free, as of course it was in other educational institutions, but generous living allowances were allotted to students at the Nizāmiyyas.¹

Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, the 8th/14th century compiler of a biographical dictionary of Shāfi'i scholars, attributes to Nizām al-Mulk the foundation of a madrasa in every important city of Iraq and Iran, and he specifically mentions nine of them: the ones at Baghdad and Nishāpūr (the two most famous Nizāmiyyas), and those at Balkh, Herāt, Marv, Āmul in Gurgān, Isfahān, Baṣra, and Mosul.² This prominence of Khurāsānian cities may not be fortuitous. During the 5th/11th century Sunnī scholarship in Khurāsān was at its most brilliant. It had behind it a long tradition of political and cultural orthodoxy, stretching back through the Ghaznavids and Sāmānids to the Tāhirids, whereas central and western Iran were for a long time in the Saljuq period still politically and religiously suspect because of their association with heterodox Dailamī dynasties. Nizām al-Mulk regarded the appointment of suitable scholars to teach at his Nizāmiyyas as a personal responsibility. When the Baghdad Nizāmiyya opened in 459/1067, he took considerable pains to secure for it the scholar Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī, and later, in 484/1091, he brought the theologian and philosopher Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī to lecture there when the latter was only thirty-three and little known outside his native Khurāsān. On Malik-Shāh's first visit to Baghdad in 479-80/1081, after the conclusion of the campaign in northern Syria, Nizām al-Mulk personally lectured on *ḥadīth* or tradition at his madrasa and dictated to the students there.³

The use of scholars from Khurāsān is bound up with another controversial aspect of Nizām al-Mulk's educational policy: the degree to which he specifically hoped to further his own Shāfi'i law school and the Ash'arī kalām. Many of the sources may have over-emphasized the Shāfi'i and Ash'arī nature of the teaching at the Nizāmiyyas. Before the great vizier achieved such power in the Saljuq state, these doctrines were very suspect to men such as Toghrīl and

¹ Subkī, *Tabaqāt al-shāfi'iyya al-kubrā*, vol. III, p. 137, rightly refutes the assertion made in many sources, that the great vizier was the first person to build madrasas; but, says Subkī, he may have been the first to assign allowances to the students. However, even this is dubious.

² See his article on Nizām al-Mulk, *op. cit.* vol. III, pp. 135-45.

³ Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. IX, pp. 36, 55; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. X, p. 104; Subkī, vol. IV, pp. 103-4; cf. W. Montgomery Watt, *Muslim Intellectual, a Study of al-Ghazālī* (Edinburgh, 1963), pp. 22-3.

his minister Kundurī,¹ and Nizām al-Mulk's support for the doctrines did not guarantee their acceptance and recognition, especially outside Khurāsān. In Baghdad and the western provinces they were anathema to conservative religious circles, Ḥanafī as well as Ḥanbalī, who regarded them as alien, Khurāsānian imports. If the Nizāmiyyas were institutions for the propagation of Shāfi'ism and Ash'arism, they failed in Iraq and western Iran. Although the 'Abbāsīd caliphs were Shāfi'is, the Saljuq sultans themselves remained staunch Ḥanafis, and the fervent Ḥanafī Rāvandī, who wrote his history of the Saljuqs in the opening years of the 13th century, still couples together for denunciation the Rāfiḍīs (i.e. the extremist Shī'is and Ismā'ilīs) and the Ash'aris. 'Imād al-Dīn stresses the violent Ḥanafī partisanship shown by several of Sulṭān Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's ghulām amirs. Between the years 536/1141-2 and 542/1147-8 he speaks of the persecution and expulsion of Shāfi'ī scholars by Saljuq governors and commanders in Baghdad, Ray, and Iṣfahān, where some Shāfi'is found it politic to change to Ḥanafism.² In Baghdad the Nizāmiyya declined in the 6th/12th century, and it was the Ḥanbalī colleges which were intellectually the most vital in Baghdad at this time. But perhaps the most significant piece of evidence which we have against any undue partisanship by Nizām al-Mulk is his soothing pronouncement, as reported by the fiercely Ḥanbalī Ibn al-Jauzī, when the Ḥanbalis of Baghdad were protesting against the public teaching of Ash'arism:

The Sultan's policy and the dictates of justice require us not to incline to any one rite [*madhhab*] to the exclusion of others; we aim at strengthening orthodox belief and practice [*al-sunan*] rather than at fanning sectarian strife. We have built this madrasa [i.e. the Nizāmiyya] only for the protection of scholars and in the public interest, and not to cause controversy and dissension.³

Nizām al-Mulk was not by any means the sole person to busy himself with founding madrasas. Makdisi has drawn up an impressive list of the Ḥanafī, Shāfi'ī, and Ḥanbalī colleges which were flourishing in Baghdad at this time, and he has pointed out that the madrasa built around the shrine of the Imām Abū Ḥanīfa (this was built in 457-9/1065-7 under the authority of Alp-Arslan's mustaufī, Sharaf al-Mulk Abū Sa'd Muḥammad) was doubtless of equal importance to the

¹ Kundurī's hatred for and persecution of the Ash'aris are stressed in several of the sources, e.g. in Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, vol. III, pp. 297-8.

² Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣṣa*, pp. 193-4, 220-1; Rāvandī, *Rāḥat al-ṣudūr*, pp. 30-2.

³ Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. VIII, p. 312.

Nizāmiyya, though less publicized in the sources.¹ Nizām al-Mulk's example stimulated other leading figures to found educational institutions; in 480-2/1087-9 his own great enemy, the mustaufī Tāj al-Mulk Abu'l-Ghanā'im, founded a Shāfi'i madrasa in Baghdad, the *Tājiyya*, where Abū Bakr al-Shāshī and Abū Ḥāmid's brother Abu'l-Futūḥ al-Ghazālī both taught.²

Despite his commanding position in the Saljuq state, Nizām al-Mulk's authority did not go unchallenged. His arrogant trust in his own powers and indispensability did not endear him to other courtiers or even to the sultan himself, once he had outgrown his initial dependence on the vizier. Nor was Nizām al-Mulk without enemies within the Saljuq administration itself, in large measure because of his partisanship and his way of pushing his own relatives and protégés. The officials of the bureaucracy had entered their profession in the expectation of a reasonable rotation of offices in which persons of merit would have a fair chance of obtaining the most coveted and lucrative posts, such as the directorship of the central *Dīvāns* and of the provincial administrative organs. Nizām al-Mulk's long tenure of office, together with his control of so much of the stream of patronage, upset these expectations; at the best of times not everyone could be satisfied, but Nizām al-Mulk now stood as a tangible target for frustrated and ambitious rivals. On the whole, his firm policy and his emphasis on military preparedness made him popular in the army, but it was natural that those commanders close to the sultan or personally attached to him should come to share Malik-Shāh's restiveness.

For the first seven years of the sultan's reign, the authority of Nizām al-Mulk had gone unchallenged; then in 472/1079-80 two of Malik-Shāh's slave generals precipitated a major crisis by their act of defiance of the vizier's power. The *shaḥna* of Baghdad, Sa'd al-Daula Gauhar-Ā'in, and the governor of Fārs and *Khūzistān*, Najm al-Daula *Khumar-Tegin al-Sharābī*, were Nizām al-Mulk's deadly enemies, and together killed one of his protégés, Ibn 'Allān, the Jewish tax-farmer of Baṣra, and despoiled him of his wealth. The sultan sought the vizier's pardon but no retribution was exacted, which showed that the latter's partisans were not personally above the law.³ In the next year Malik-Shāh insisted, against Nizām al-Mulk's advice, on dismissing from the army

¹ *B.S.O.A.S.* (1961), pp. 17-44; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 23.

² *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 120, 147; Ibn al-Jauzī, ix, pp. 38, 46.

³ *al-Muntazam*, vol. viii, p. 323; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 75.

7,000 Armenian mercenaries (see below, p. 81). In an effort to counter the vizier's influence, he began to encourage the latter's opponents in the administration, and two rival parties now emerged.

The central figure in the opposition was Tāj al-Mulk Abu'l-Ghanā'im Marzbān b. Khusrau Firūz, who came from a vizierial family in Fārs. Through the patronage of the slave general Sav-Tegin he had risen in royal favour, becoming successively vizier to the sultan's male children (known as *maliks*), then treasurer, overseer of the palace buildings, and finally head of the *Diwān al-Inshā' wa'l-Ṭughrā*. At his side were other high officials: first the son of Kamāl al-Daula Abū Riḍā, the Sayyid al-Ru'asā' Abu'l-Maḥāsin Muḥammad, hostile to Niẓām al-Mulk even though he was the vizier's son-in-law;¹ next, 'Amīd al-Daula Ibn Bahmanyār, vizier to the governor of Fārs, Khumar-Tegin; and finally the 'Ariḍ Sadīd al-Mulk Abu'l-Ma'ālī al-Mufaḍḍal, one of Tāj al-Mulk's protégés. Ibn Bahmanyār tried in 473/1080-1 to procure the poisoning of Niẓām al-Mulk, but he failed and was blinded by the vizier.² Another manifestation of the feeling against Niẓām al-Mulk was the circulation at court of satirical poetry and slanderous stories aimed at him and his sons. One of Malik-Shāh's court jesters, Ja'farak, had been active in this work, and in retaliation Jamāl al-Mulk al-Manṣūr b. Niẓām al-Mulk, governor of Balkh, came in a rage to Iṣfahān in 475/1082-3 and tore out the jester's tongue, killing him in the process. Malik-Shāh made no open protest, but he had the civil governor of Khurāsān, Abū 'Alī, secretly poison Jamāl al-Mulk at Nīshāpūr; he then hypocritically commiserated with Niẓām al-Mulk.³

Where Ibn Bahmanyār had failed to secure the vizier's downfall, the Sayyid al-Ru'asā' Abu'l-Maḥāsin, one of the sultan's intimates, now tried, accusing Niẓām al-Mulk of amassing wealth and offices for his family. The vizier did not deny this, but retorted that these were the just rewards for his service to three generations of Saljuq rulers; that the thousands of Turkish *ghulāms* in his service added to the sultan's military potential; and that much of his wealth was expended on pious and charitable works which redounded equally to the sultan's glory. Malik-Shāh did not feel able to withstand the power of Niẓām al-Mulk's *ghulāms* and the general support for him within the Saljuq army.⁴ He let Abu'l-Maḥāsin be blinded and imprisoned, while the

¹ See above, p. 69.

² Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 59-62; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. viii, p. 330.

³ Bundārī, pp. 73-4; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, p. 5; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 79-80.

⁴ Cf. Ḥusainī, *Akbbār al-daula*, p. 67.

latter's father Kamāl al-Daula lost to Nizām al-Mulk's son Mu'ayyid al-Mulk his office of *Tuḡhrā'i* (478/1083-4).¹

In this way Nizām al-Mulk surmounted a prolonged period of crisis: but opposition would again build up towards the end of his life, this time centred round Tāj al-Mulk and the sultan's first wife, the Qarakhānid princess Jalāliyya *Khatun* or Terken *Khatun* (usually spelt "*Turkān*" in the sources), whom he had married in 456/1064.² For although Nizām al-Mulk achieved a dominant position in the administration, he never enjoyed equal influence at the court (*dargāh*). It is for this reason that in his *Siyāsāt-Nāma* much is said about how the sovereign should comport himself and how the court institutions and officials should be organized to serve the ideal of a despotic state, but there is little about the procedures of the *dīvāns*, which the vizier had already largely moulded to his own satisfaction. Further, the vizier did not consider that the Saljuq court was organized with requisite strictness and care for protocol, especially in comparison with the *Ghaznavid* court; nor was the sultan distant and awe-inspiring enough. Nizām al-Mulk expatiates on such topics as the arrangement of royal drinking sessions, the need to keep an open table and thus maintain traditions of hospitality, and the creation of a proper circle of *nadīms*, or boon companions, around the ruler. Offices vital for the maintenance of order and discipline at court and within the empire at large have been allowed to lapse, he alleges.³ The fearsome *Amīr-i Hāras* (Captain of the Guard), who maintained discipline through his force of lictors or club-bearers, has lost importance; the *Vakīl-i Khāṣṣ* (intendant of the court and of the sultan's private domains) has declined in status. The court *ghulāms*, who perform many personal services for the sultan—one is the armour-bearer, another the keeper of the wardrobe, another the cup-bearer, etc.—are no longer adequately trained. Worst of all, Alp-Arslan has allowed the *Barīd* (intelligence network), which Nizām al-Mulk considers one of the pillars of the despotic state, to decay, on the grounds that it engendered an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion amongst friend and foe alike.⁴

Nizām al-Mulk is further apprehensive about the relationship between

¹ Bundārī, pp. 60-1; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 6-7; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 85.

² See above, section v, p. 65.

³ *Siyāsāt-Nāma*, chs. xvii, xxix, xxxv (tr. H. Darke, *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings*, pp. 92-4, 122-3, 127-30).

⁴ *Siyāsāt-Nāma*, chs. x, xiii, xvi, xxvii, xxxix (Darke tr., pp. 74-5, 78 ff., 92, 105 ff., 135); Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 67; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, p. 306.

the dargāh and the divāns, and concerned lest the court should interfere in the mechanism of administration. Thus he says the sultan's nadims should never be allowed to hold official posts; letters sent directly from the court to the divāns should be as few as possible; only in emergencies should ghulāms be used as court messengers, and especial care should be taken with verbal commands from the sovereign, their transmission supervised and their subject matter checked before they are executed.¹

Nizām al-Mulk's position *vis-à-vis* the sultan was thus to some extent unsatisfactory, and his influence at the subordinate households of the sultan's wives and those of the princes (*maliks*) was still weaker. Terken *Khatun*'s household became the focus of opposition, for Tāj al-Mulk was also her personal intendant (*vakīl*). The vizier doubtless had Terken *Khatun* in mind when in the *Siyāsāt-Nāma* he denounced the malevolent influence of women at court, citing their misleading advice to the ruler and their susceptibility to promptings from their attendants and eunuchs.² Terken *Khatun*'s son Dā'ūd had been his father's favourite, but he died in 474/1082. Six years later Malik-*Shāh* had caliphal approval when he proclaimed as heir another of her sons, Abū *Shujā'* Aḥmad, and gave him a resplendent string of honorifics: *Malik al-Mulūk* ("King of Kings"), '*Aḥd al-Dawla* ("Strong Arm of the State"), *Tāj al-Milla* ("Crown of the Religious Community"), and '*Uddat Amīr al-Mu'minīm* ("Protecting Force of the Commander of the Faithful"); but in the following year he too died. After these disappointments it was not surprising that Terken *Khatun* wanted to promote the succession of her third son Maḥmūd (b. 480/1087), despite the fact that he was the youngest of all the possible candidates. Berk-Yaruq, Malik-*Shāh*'s son by the Saljuq princess Zubaida *Khatun* (she was the daughter of Yāqūti b. *Chaghri* Beg), had been born in 474/1081, and there were also two younger sons, Muḥammad and Sanjar, born of a slave wife in 474/1082 and 477/1084 respectively.³ Nizām al-Mulk and much of the army supported Berk-Yaruq because he was the eldest and, so far as could be seen, the most capable claimant. There were, however, further collateral members of the Saljuq family who thought that they had a claim to the succession, and on Malik-*Shāh*'s death there was to be a period of civil war and confusion before Berk-Yaruq established his right to the throne.

¹ *Siyāsāt-Nāma*, chs. xi, xii, xv, xvii (Darke tr., pp. 75-7, 91-4); cf. Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 308-9.

² Ch. xlii (Darke tr., p. 185).

³ Cf. İ. Kafesoğlu, *Sultan Melikşah devrinde Büyük Selçuklu imparatorluğu*, pp. 200-1.

Despite the ideals of men like Nizām al-Mulk, the constitution of the Saljuq empire remained at this time far from monolithic. Malik-Shāh called himself *Sultān-i A'zam*, "Supreme Ruler", but the title of sultan was gradually adopted by other members of the family, in particular by Sulaimān b. Qutlumush in Rūm, who was, as we have seen, on cool terms with Malik-Shāh and who acted as a virtually independent sovereign. Normally the Saljuq princes below the supreme sultan were known by the titles of *malik* (ruler) or simply *amir* (prince, commander).¹ We have to conceive of the Saljuq empire as a series of political groupings rather than as a unitary state. The most extensive and powerful grouping was that surrounding Malik-Shāh himself, with his power centred on Iṣfahān and exercised immediately over central and western Iran, Iraq, and Khurāsān. But beyond this his direct influence diminished. On the fringes of Iraq and Syria several Arab amirates were his tributaries and their functions were to repel Fāṭimid influence in the Syrian desert and to supply troops for the sultan's army. In the mountainous interiors of Fārs and Kurdistān, Kurdish tribes such as the Shabānkāra enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, and their dislike of outside control made them a frequent source of trouble to the sultans.

In the frontier areas of Āzarbāijān, the Caucasus, Armenia, Anatolia, Khwārazm, and the eastern fringes of Khurāsān, Saljuq influence was upheld by the Saljuq princes and governors and also by Türkmen begs.² To the Türkmen tribesmen the sultan in Iṣfahān was a very remote figure, and it was natural that their first allegiance should be given to their own tribal chiefs who were there with them. The begs themselves regarded the sultan more as a supreme tribal khan than as an autocratic sovereign. For the three generations down to Berk-Yaruq the sultanate had descended from father to son, but in the eyes of Türkmen leaders and even of many members of the Saljuq family, this fact did not establish a precedent. At times of stress and crisis, tribal beliefs about succession—e.g. the idea of a division of the family patrimony, and the traditional supremacy of the eldest capable male in the princely family—came to the surface. On Malik-Shāh's death, Berk-Yaruq had to contend not only with the claims of his half-brother Maḥmūd, but also with the pretensions of his maternal uncle Ismā'il b. Yāqūtī and of his paternal uncles Tutush and Arslan-Arghun.

¹ Cf. M. F. Sanaullah, *The Decline of the Saljuqid Empire*, pp. 1-2; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* p. 143.

² Cf. Kafesoğlu, pp. 159-63.

Many old Turkish traditions and practices were still of significance during Malik-Shāh's reign, although this is frequently obscured by the exclusively Arabic and Iranian nature of the historical sources. For example, on his death-bed Alp-Arslan had recommended that his brother Qavurt should marry his widow, according to the Turkish levirate; the purpose of this custom was to keep wealth within the family (and perhaps, in this case, to prevent undue fragmentation of the empire which Alp-Arslan had assembled).¹ Again, the early sultans, from Toghrīl to Malik-Shāh, kept up the practice of giving regular feasts (*shölen*), just like those which tribal leaders held for their retainers. Malik-Shāh gave one in his palace each Friday, where, amongst others, scholars and theologians came and held disputations. On the other hand, he neglected to give the customary banquets for the Chigil tribesmen of the Qarakhānid forces at Samarqand and Uzkand whilst on his Transoxianan campaign of 482/1089, and his consequent loss of prestige is chided by the *Siyāsat-Nāma*.²

Much attention had therefore still to be given to the claims of the Türkmen of the empire, who were established in those regions of Irān suitable for pastoral nomadism, i.e. northern Khurāsān, Gurgān and Dihistān; Āzarbāijān, Arrān, and parts of Kurdistān and Luristān. One would not expect that Nizām al-Mulk, the supreme exponent of the Iranian tradition of order and hierarchy in the state, would have much sympathy with the turbulent and non-assimilable Türkmen. Yet in the *Siyāsat-Nāma* he recognizes that they have legitimate claims upon the dynasty: in the early days of the Saljuq sultanate, he says, they were its military support, and they are of the same racial stock as the sultans.³ It is likely that as early as Malik-Shāh's reign the fiscal agents of the central administration were trying to extend their operations into the outlying tribal areas. Furthermore, the sultan was now established at Iṣfahān, not at Nishāpūr, Marv, or Ray, and therefore he was much occupied with events in 'Irāq and northern Syria. Because he was less accessible to the Türkmen, their just complaints of encroachments on their rights had little chance of being heard at court. This was to be demonstrably true in Sanjar's reign (511-52/1118-57).

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, p. 52; Barhebraeus, *Chronography*, p. 224; cf. Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* p. 17 n. 30.

² Ch. xxxv (Darke tr., pp. 127-8); cf. I. H. Uzünçarşılı, *Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtına medhal* (Istanbul, 1941), pp. 33-4; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 137-8.

³ Ch. xxvi (Darke tr., p. 105).

Militarily the sultan no longer depended primarily on the Türkmen bands. Continuity in military and political affairs required a permanent, professional force. The empires of Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shāh could not have held together on the deaths of those sovereigns without a loyal core of permanent troops and slaves, directed on the first occasion by Nizām al-Mulk and on the second by his sons and retainers. The constitution of the army now approximated more to the Ghaznavid pattern.¹ There was in the standing army a nucleus of either *ghulāms* or slave troops, and the rest were mercenaries. Both groups were drawn from various nationalities, including Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Arabs, and Slavs; Nizām al-Mulk especially commended the employment of Dailamis, *Khurāsānis*, Georgians, and *Shabānkāra'ī* Kurds. This army was normally stationed in the capital, and its commanders were directly under the sultan's orders; according to Rāvandī, the number of cavalrymen was not allowed to fall below 46,000.²

The *ghulam* commanders were extensively used by the sultan for personal service in the palace and for such administrative posts as provincial governorships; and the course of events during Malik-Shāh's reign amply demonstrates that, in contrast to the rebelliousness of certain members of the Saljuq family, the faithfulness of the *ghulāms* towards their master rarely faltered. The sources are not very explicit, but it is probable that the Saljuq maliks in their appanages, as well as the slave generals who were detailed for provincial governorships, also had households of *ghulāms* and permanent forces of their own. The *Siyāsat-Nāma* advises the great men of state to expend their wealth on military equipment and the purchase of *ghulāms* rather than on luxury articles for consumption; and we have seen that the vizier himself justified his extensive following of personal *ghulāms* by the plea that the sultan's general striking power was thereby increased (see p. 75 above).³

The maintenance of a standing army was naturally expensive. Reliance on a professional army instead of on tribesmen or local levies has in the course of human history generally meant a rise in state expenditure, resulting in fresh taxation and an increase in the central power of the state. Though Malik-Shāh must have welcomed such an accession of power, he was seized at times with desires for economy,

¹ For this last, see Bosworth, "Ghaznevid Military Organisation", *Der Islam*, pp. 37-77.

² *Siyāsat-Nāma*, ch. xxiv (Darke tr., pp. 103-4); Rāvandī, p. 131.

³ *Siyāsat-Nāma*, ch. xxxi (Darke tr., p. 124); cf. Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 155-9.

feeling perhaps that the burden was excessive, and that troops could safely be dismissed in the peaceful intervals between campaigns. Against this, Nizām al-Mulk advocated a permanently high level of expenditure on the army, believing this to be the prime buttress of royal power, and he regarded projects for economies as pernicious. At the beginning of Malik-Shāh's reign the vizier had increased the soldiers' allowances by 700,000 dinārs in order to secure their loyalty against possible rivals for the succession. In 473/1080-1, however, the sultan reviewed the army at Ray and, in the teeth of the vizier's opposition, discharged from it thousands of Armenian mercenaries. Nizām al-Mulk expostulated:

There are no secretaries, merchants, tailors, or craftsmen of any kind amongst these persons—the only profession they have is soldiering. If they are discharged, we can never be sure that they will not set up some person from amongst their own number and make him Sultan. We shall have to deal with them, and until we overcome them, we shall expend several times more than we normally allot for their salaries.

The sultan would not listen, and the unemployed troops went off to Pūshang and joined his brother Tekish, who used them in a rebellion against Malik-Shāh.¹ Again, towards the end of the reign someone at court, probably from the circle of Tāj al-Mulk and Terken Khatun, suggested to Malik-Shāh that because of the general peace then prevailing, the greater part of the standing army could be dismissed and its numbers thereby cut from 400,000 to 70,000. The vizier denounced this project by saying that it would create 330,000 enemies for the sultan, stop the empire's momentum of expansion, and reduce the kingdom to a state of defencelessness.²

The standing army was supported partly by payments in cash or kind, and partly by revenues from lands or fiefs (*iqṭā's*) assigned to the soldiers. In the chapter of the *Siyāsāt-Nāma*, in which Nizām al-Mulk asserts the necessity of having reserves of cash to pay those soldiers and ghulāms who do not have *iqṭā's*; he also points to the fact that both systems exist side by side.³ Thus it is inaccurate to say that pay-

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 52, 76.

² *Siyāsāt-Nāma*, ch. xli (Darke tr., pp. 170-1). There is a disparity between the vizier's figure for the army and that given by Rāvandī, but the higher figure may perhaps be a grand total that includes provincial levies, Türkmen, and other troops outside the core of the standing army.

³ Ch. xxiii (Darke tr., pp. 102-3). On the complex question of *iqṭā's* under the Būyids and Saljuqs, see Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 307-8; Cahen, "L'Évolution del'Iqta' du IX^e au XIII^e Siècle", *Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, pp. 32 ff.; A. K. S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*, pp. 49-76.

ment through fiefs was universal in the Saljuq empire at this time. The central treasury, which held large reserves of cash and treasure, was always sought by claimants to the throne whenever a sultan died; Tāj al-Mulk and Terken Khatun secured it in 485/1092 and used it to buy military support for Maḥmūd's candidature (see below, p. 103).¹ The system of *iqṭā's* was certainly not invented by Niẓām al-Mulk, despite the assertions of such authorities as 'Imād al-Dīn and al-Ḥusainī. The only novelty in the vizier's use of the system appears to be that mentioned by Rāvandī, namely, that he allotted to each soldier "grants of taxation" in various provinces of the empire so that wherever a soldier was campaigning, he would have at hand some means of support.²

It has been stressed that the so-called Empire of the Great Saljuqs, far from being a homogeneous, centralized political entity, was really an assemblage of provinces that differed in their geography, their social systems, and historical backgrounds. In the case of the *iqṭā'* system, the distinction between the old Būyid lands in the west and the old Ghaznavid ones in the east is significant. Amongst the Būyids and amongst the Ḥamdānids in al-Jazīreh and northern Syria, the main prop of the military regime had been a system of grants of taxation issued to each soldier—theoretically for life only—and collected from the peasants by the fiscal agents of the non-resident grantees (this is the type of fief which the jurist al-Māwardī calls *iqṭā'āt al-istiḡhlāl*, or assignments of revenue for living-allowances). This system of *iqṭā's* was taken over unchanged by the Saljuqs in the western Iranian lands, and it is this one which Niẓām al-Mulk discusses in the *Siyāsat-Nāma*. His chief concern here is to guard against abuses by the fief-holders (*muṣṭa's*) and to prevent the land thus granted from slipping out of the state's control. Consequently, he asserts the sultan's ultimate ownership of all land, perhaps in accordance with the Sassanian idea of the ruler's absolute ownership of his kingdom, or perhaps with the aim of extending the ruler's authority over the peasants and thus protecting them from any arbitrariness by the fief-holders. Other safeguards suggested by the vizier are that the peasants should have free access to the court; that the *muṣṭa'* should collect no more than the sum specified, and only at the appropriate time in the agricultural year; and

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 142, 145.

² Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 58; Ḥusainī, *Akhhbār al-dawla*, p. 68; Rāvandī, *Rāḥat al-sudūr*, p. 131.

that fiefs should be changed round every three years to avoid the perpetuation of abuses.¹

In this system the fief-holders tended to acquire direct rights to exploit the estates granted to them; however, there also existed pure grants of taxed revenue, which carried no rights over the tax-paying land. In 457/1065, in exchange for the fiefs of Qum and Kāshān, Alp-Arslan granted to the Būyid Abū 'Alī Fanā-Khusrau b. Abī Kālījār 50,000 dinārs from the taxes of Baṣra, together with the right of residing there but with no further privileges. Al-Ḥusainī says that when Nizām al-Mulk paid the soldiers' allowances of 1,000 dinārs each, half of this was charged to the revenues of Samarqand (from whose Qarakhānid ruler the Saljuqs drew tribute) and half to the revenues of Anatolia, which again was not under the direct control of the sultan. This report may well be exaggerated, probably to emphasize the extent of the Saljuq empire and the careful control which the vizier kept over it; but it does show that money payments could be assigned where there was no question of tenurial rights involved.² [For more on the iqta's, see chapter 2, pp. 230 ff.]

The position was different in Khurāsān and in the marches along the Atrak, Murghāb, and upper Oxus. As Nizām al-Mulk notes, "former kings", i.e. the Sāmānids and Ghaznavids, did not generally give land-grants to their soldiers: such factors as the economic richness of Khurāsān and the proximity of India as an inexhaustible source of plunder enabled them to pay their troops at stipulated points of the year in cash as well as kind.³ It is true that the concepts of the fief and of commendation by the weak to the strong (*talji'a*) were known in the east, for the explanation of their technical terminology is given in al-Khuwārizmī's encyclopaedia of the sciences, the *Maṣāṭiḥ al-'ulūm* (written c. 367/977).⁴ But their occurrence was exceptional. Under the Saljuqs Khurāsān remained what it had always been, a border land; now, however, it looked out upon the Saljuqs' rivals, the Qarakhānids and Ghaznavids, and it formed a corridor through which Türkmen from Central Asia passed to the west. Like Āzarbāijān in the north-west—also a frontier march, to which similar considerations applied—

¹ *Siyāsat-Nāma*, chs. v, xxxvii (Darke tr., pp. 33 ff., 152) cf. Lambton, *op. cit.* pp. 66-7.

² Sibī b. al-Jauzī, *Mir'āt al-Zamān*, quoted by Bowen, *J.R.A.S.* (1929), pp. 243-4; Ḥusainī, p. 68. The well-known story that Nizām al-Mulk made financial drafts on Antioch in order to pay the boatmen who ferried Malik-Shāh's army across the Oxus, clearly has a similar aim of vaunting the extent of the empire.

³ *Siyāsat-Nāma*, ch. xxiii (Darke tr., p. 103); cf. Bosworth, *Der Islam* (1960), pp. 71 ff.

⁴ Ed. G. van Vloten, pp. 60, 62.

Khurāsān was peopled extensively with Türkmen pastoralists. They could not be fitted into the Būyids' static framework of fiefs, and their interspersions among the sedentary Tājik agricultural population created many problems for the central financial system. Instead of fiefs, the nomads had been granted collective grazing rights since Ghaznavid times, and in the Saljuq period these rights provided the livelihood and maintenance of the Türkmen. Furthermore the Saljuq military organization, despite increasing emphasis on professionalism, still gave these Türkmen a significant role to play. Kafesoğlu has shown that outside Iran and Iraq, the majority of new territories added to the Saljuqs' empire or sphere of influence were conquered by Türkmen: men such as Atsız b. Uvak in Syria, Artuq on the fringes of Arabia, and Sulaimān b. Qutlumush in Anatolia; and the number of Türkmen who could be called upon to swell the Saljuq army was probably 300,000 or more.¹

Because of their strategic importance, Khurāsān and the upper Oxus lands were usually granted at this time to members of the Saljuq family. At the beginning of each reign there was a general allocation of these eastern governorships,² and since administrative continuity and a permanent state of defence were necessary, changes were as far as possible avoided; thus conditions favoured the growth of hereditary lines. In the sources, most of which are non-contemporary, these appanages are often called iqta's; but this is probably an anachronism, for in the latter half of the 5th/11th century the land system of the east was clearly different from that of the west. The Saljuq principality of Kirmān under Qavurt and his descendants was typical of these eastern appanages. Hereditary succession continued here for over a century, not only because the province was somewhat isolated from the rest of Iran, but because it adjoined Sistān and southern Afghanistan where the Šaffārids and Ghaznavids had to be watched. Likewise in the west the positions of Tutush in Syria and Sulaimān in Rūm were analogous to those of the Saljuq maliks in the east, and once again a frontier situation helps to explain their existence.

The sources all praise Malik-Shāh and his vizier as the architects of an empire where prosperity reigned and security was established. There is much in this view, for the age of Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shāh

¹ Kafesoğlu, *Sultan Melikşah devrinde Büyük Selçuklu imparatorluğu*, pp. 162-3.

² Cf. Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 34, 51-2; Kafesoğlu, *Sultan Melikşah*, pp. 152-3.

was one in which the Great Saljuqs were at last in strong control: rebellious members of the family were firmly handled, a powerful fighting machine enabled the momentum of expansion to be kept up, and the leading talents of the Iranian administrative tradition were taken into the service of the regime. The sources contrast this period, if only implicitly, with the dissension among Malik-Shāh's sons and the eventual splitting of the fabric of the empire. Of greater value than the stylized eulogies of Muslim authors is the high praise given to both Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shāh by Armenian and Syriac Christian writers.

According to the 8th/14th-century historian and geographer Ḥamd Allāh Mustaufī, who is quoting a certain *Risālat-i Malikshāhī*, the annual revenue of Iran during Malik-Shāh's reign amounted to 215 million dinārs.¹ Despite heavy expenditure on the administration and army, which was only partly alleviated by the practice of granting iqtā's, a good proportion of the sultan's income was used to erect tangible memorials to his power—roads, walls, charitable and educational institutions, mosques, and palaces. The capital Iṣfahān benefited especially. There he laid out several palaces and gardens, together with a madrasa, the citadel of the town, and a fortress at nearby Dizkūh, where his armoury and treasury were housed; it was in fact this stronghold which fell into the hands of the Ismā'īlis during Berk-Yaruq's reign.² In the frontier regions and in those provinces where there was a large proportion of Türkmen pastoralists, the provision of town walls was of prime importance. In the exposed province of *Khurāsān*, for example, Malik-Shāh built a wall round Marv that measured 12,300 paces, and he laid out the town of Panj-Dih in the district of Marv ar-Rūd; in 464/1071–2 Nizām al-Mulk raised the height of the walls around Baihaq, which were previously only as high as two men.³ Internal security and the safe movement of travellers and merchants were facilitated by the building of *ribāts* and caravanserais. In stressing the sultan's piety, the sources describe his zeal in keeping the pilgrimage route from Iraq to the Ḥijāz in good order; e.g. he provided beacons, wells, and cisterns, and he compensated the amir of the *Haramain* (or "two holy places") with a subsidy, in order that a

¹ *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, pp. 33–4.

² Rāvandī, pp. 132, 156; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 215; cf. Kafesoğlu, *Sultan Melikshah*, p. 167.

³ Ibn Funduq, *Ta'riḫ-i Baihaq*, p. 53; Ḥamd Allāh Mustaufī, *op. cit.* pp. 154–5.

tax levied on pilgrims might be abolished: hence from 479/1086 till the sultan's death, the pilgrimage was performed each year without mishap.¹ The Saljuq amīrs and great men of state were similarly encouraged by the sultan and by Nizām al-Mulk to expend their wealth on good works. As for Malik-Shāh's reputation as a just and equitable ruler, Husain b. Muḥammad al-Ḥusainī relates how the sultan sent heralds all round the empire, had boards put up in the towns, and had the *khaṭībs* (official preachers) proclaiming from the pulpits—all to announce that he would personally hear and investigate every complaint of injustice.²

We have little direct information on the economic condition of Iran at this time, although the sources frequently mention that by the middle of the reign, in 476/1083-4, there was unparalleled security on the roads and prices were low throughout the empire.³ The measures to improve internal security and communications must have helped economic growth, as must the lightening or abolition of many transit dues and market tolls. *Khurāsān* continued to flourish, once the Türkmen nomads had been assigned a definite place in the agrarian structure of the province, and in the second half of the 5th/11th century it was still the centre of the most lively intellectual currents in Iranian life. Kirmān, according to Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, flourished under the firm rule of the local Saljuq line. There Qavurt suppressed the Balūchī brigands and put watchtowers, cisterns, and caravanserais along the caravan route through the desert to Sīstān; foreign merchants were encouraged to trade with India and the east via Kirmān, so that colonies of foreigners grew up in the capital there, and Qavurt was careful to maintain a high standard of coinage.⁴

Conditions in the adjacent province of Fārs were less encouraging. Whereas Qavurt was largely successful in stopping the depredations of the Balūchīs, Fārs continued to be racked by brigands and by internecine warfare amongst the local Kurdish tribes of the *Shabān-kāra*. Ibn al-Balkhī, writing in the first decade or so of the 12th century, records that the Saljuq governors in Fārs—first Najm al-Daula *Khumar-Tegin* and then, after c. 493/1099, *Fakhr al-Din Chavli*—sent many

¹ Bundārī, pp. 69-70; Ḥusainī, pp. 73-4; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 144.

² Husain b. Muḥammad al-Ḥusainī, *Tarjama-yi Maḥāsīn-i Iṣfahān*, pp. 140-1. (al-Ḥusainī's Persian translation of al-Māfarrūkhī's local history of Iṣfahān.)

³ E.g. *ibid.* p. 85.

⁴ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Ta'rikh-i Saljūqiyān-i Kirmān*, pp. 4 ff. Cf. Houtsma, "Zur Geschichte der Seljuquen von Kermān", *Z.D.M.G.* pp. 369 ff.

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expeditions against the bandits but failed to pacify the province. Shīrāz, once the flourishing capital of the Būyids, was sacked on several occasions by both Türkmen and Shabānkāra's, and she did not recover till the end of the 6th/12th century. The trade from the orient to the port of Sīrāf on the coast of Fārs was permanently ruined and the town itself depopulated by the piracy of the amīrs of the island of Qais, whom frequent Saljuq expeditions failed to subdue.¹

VII. EVENTS DURING MALIK-SHĀH'S REIGN

The military and political events of Malik-Shāh's reign can conveniently be reviewed under three headings: first, the crushing of opposition from ambitious members of the Saljuq family; second, the humbling of external foes on the eastern and north-western frontiers of Iran; and third, relations with the caliphate and the extension of Saljuq power into Syria and the Arabian peninsula.

It was fortunate that Alp-Arslan lingered on for four days after he had been fatally wounded on the Oxus banks in Rabi' I 465/November 1072 (see above, p. 65); for within these four days he was able to set out his final wishes. He had a numerous family, including his sons Malik-Shāh, Ayaz, Tekish, Tutush, Böri-Bars, Toghan-Shāh, and Arslan-Arghun, but since 458/1066 Malik-Shāh had been recognized as heir. Nizām al-Mulk now secured recognition for him by sending to Baghdad asking that the khutba be made in his name. Malik-Shāh himself dropped back to Nishāpūr, the key city of Khurāsān, and with the treasure from its citadel Nizām al-Mulk increased the salaries of the troops by a total of 700,000 dinārs, "and thereby won over the hearts of the regular army [*askar*] and the auxiliary troops [*bashar*]"'. Not only was it necessary at this point to secure the loyalty of the army against possible rivals, but the Saljuqs were in the midst of a campaign against the Qarakhānids, and the vizier did not want the pressure on them relaxed. Alp-Arslan was mindful of the claims of his other relatives when he enjoined Malik-Shāh to look after their due rights. His brother Qavurt, he said, was to continue in Kirmān and the parts of Fārs which he then held, and he was to receive a stipulated sum of money; his son Ayaz should rule the upper Oxus provinces from Balkh, for which he would have his grandfather Chaghri's annual

¹ Ibn al-Balkhī, *Fārs-Nāma*, pp. 136-7; J. Aubin, "La Ruine de Sīrāf et les routes du Golfe Persique aux XI^e et XII^e Siècles", *Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale*, pp. 295-301.

allowance of 500,000 dinārs, but Malik-Shāh was to keep a garrison in the citadel of Balkh.¹

Obviously Qavurt was Malik-Shāh's most serious potential rival, for he was Alp-Arslan's brother and a commander of great experience. Moreover he had ruled in Kirmān for over thirty years. His Türkmen followers had settled on estates in the province (Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm calls them *iqṭā's*), but Qavurt's success in taking over Kirmān early in Toghrīl's reign had attracted thither larger numbers of Türkmen than that relatively poor region could stand. Qavurt's policy had therefore been to divert them into those outlying parts that were infested with Balūchī brigands, and he also sent a force under his son Amīrān-Shāh against Sistān. As a further outlet for expansion he mounted an expedition against Oman, and after crossing the Persian Gulf in ships chartered from the local ruler of Hurmuz, he deposed the Būyid governor and brought Oman under Saljuq suzerainty. Qavurt, in fact, behaved almost as an independent ruler, adopting the royal insignia of a parasol (*chatr*), stamping on documents a *tugbra* or official emblem—this was the Saljuq bow and arrow symbol—and assuming regal titles.²

On hearing the news of Malik-Shāh's accession, Qavurt hurried back to Kirmān from Oman, losing several ships and many men in the crossing. He set before Malik-Shāh a claim based on the principle of seniority: "I am the eldest brother, and you are a youthful son; I have the greater right to my brother Alp-Arslan's inheritance." Against this, Malik-Shāh asserted the concept of father-son succession: "A brother does not inherit when there is a son." Qavurt then occupied Iṣfahān, and in 465/1073 a three-day battle took place outside Hamadān. Fighting with his seven sons at his side, Qavurt expected the support, and even the defection to him, of much of his opponent's army. The Turks and Türkmen in Malik-Shāh's forces did show this expected sympathy, although the sultan's ghulām commanders, such as Sav-Tegin and Gauhar-Ā'in, stood firmly by their master. There was sharp tension in Malik-Shāh's army between the Turkish elements and the contingents of Arabs and Kurds led by the 'Uqailid Sharaf al-Daula Muslim b. Quraish and the Mazyadid Bahā' al-Daula Maṣṣūr b. Dubais. The latter groups played a decisive part in crumpling up

¹ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 48; Ḥusainī, *Akḥbār al-daula al-Saljuqiyya*, pp. 55-6; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 51-2.

² Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Ta'rikḥ-i Saljuqiyyān-i Kirmān*, pp. 1-12. Cf. Houtsma, "Zur Geschichte der Seljuken von Kermān", *Z.D.M.G.* pp. 367-71.

Qavurt's right wing, and this blow against their fellow Turks so incensed Malik-Shāh's own Turkish troops that some of them turned aside to plunder the baggage of the Arabs and Kurds as well as that of the caliph's envoy. This episode brings out the differing outlooks of the two constituents of the Saljuq army, the Turkish tribesmen and the multi-national professional and slave soldiery; the unreliability of the former must now have been quite clear to the sultan.

With Qavurt defeated and captured, Malik-Shāh was disposed to be merciful to his uncle, who at one point offered to retire to Oman; but Nizām al-Mulk was adamant, insisting that clemency would only be taken as a sign of weakness. According to Zahīr al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, the sultan's army was still restive and threatening to support Qavurt if their pay and shares in the booty were not increased. Qavurt was strangled with a bowstring, presumably to prevent the spilling of royal blood, and two of his sons were at least partially blinded. Malik-Shāh then appointed as amīrs Rukn al-Daula Qutlugh-Tegin over Fārs and Sav-Tegin over Kirmān. To mark the prominent role taken by the Arabs and Kurds, they were granted extensive fiefs and extra shares in the plunder.¹

Malik-Shāh eventually restored Kirmān to Qavurt's sons; Rukn al-Daula Sulṭān-Shāh ruled from 467/1074 to 477/1085, followed by 'Imād al-Daula Tūrān-Shāh from 477/1085 to 490/1097. At one point Sulṭān-Shāh's loyalty to the Saljuqs became ambiguous, and in 473/1080-1 Malik-Shāh marched to the capital of Bardasīr, receiving there Sulṭān-Shāh's homage and contenting himself with the destruction of one of the towers in the citadel. Tūrān-Shāh, the last survivor from amongst Qavurt's sons, was praised for his justice and piety, and his tomb became a place of pilgrimage. His vizier was the capable al-Mukarram b. al-'Alā', who won the gratitude of the common people of Bardasīr by removing the turbulent Turkish soldiery from quarters within the town to a new suburb (*rabaḍ*) outside it, where he also built himself a palace and erected several public buildings.² It seems that the Saljuqs of Kirmān kept control of Fārs, for Ibn al-Athīr records that in 487/1094, presumably just before her death, Terken Khatun deputed

¹ (Anon.), *Mujmal al-tawārīkh wa'l-qīṣaṣ*, p. 408; Bundārī, pp. 48-9; Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, pp. 12-13 (cf. Houtsma, *op. cit.* p. 370); Zahīr al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, p. 30; Rāvandī, *Rābat al-sudūr*, pp. 126-8; Ḥusainī, *Akhhbār al-daula*, pp. 56-8; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 53; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, vol. II, p. 587.

² Bundārī, pp. 71-2; Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, pp. 17-21 (cf. Houtsma, *op. cit.* pp. 371-3); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 74-5 *bis*.

the Amīr Öner to wrest Fārs from Tūrān-Shāh. The attempt failed, in part because the sympathies of the local people were with Tūrān-Shāh, who is reported to have been mortally wounded in the fighting.¹ Bahā' al-Daula Īrān-Shāh succeeded his father for a reign of five years (490-5/1097-1101), and during this time Fārs continued to be a subject of dispute with the Great Saljuq sultans. Öner was again sent into Fārs, this time by Berk-Yaruq to subdue Īrān-Shāh's allies the Shabān-kāra'i Kurds, but he had to retire in defeat to Iṣfahān.² In the eyes of the chroniclers, the most noteworthy feature of Īrān-Shāh's reign was his alleged acceptance of Ismā'īlī propaganda, which is reputed to have been disseminated in Kirmān shortly after 486/1093. According to Ibn al-Athīr it was brought by a secretary from Khūzistān, one Ibn Zur'a, but Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm says that it originated with the amīr's companion, Kākā Balīmān; it is possible that these two are one person. Īrān-Shāh was opposed by his own atabeg, Nāṣir al-Daula (this is the first tutor mentioned in the history of the Kirmān Saljuqs), by the orthodox ulema, and also by his own commanders. The representatives of the religious institution finally issued a *fatwā* (legal decision) authorizing the heretic ruler's deposition; Īrān-Shāh fled, but was finally trapped and killed.³

Shortly after Qavurt's revolt and death, Malik-Shāh received with much relief the news of his own brother Ayāz's death. Balkh and Tukhāristān were now granted to another of his brothers, Shihāb al-Dīn Tekīsh, who installed himself in these territories after 466/1073-4, the year in which Malik-Shāh defeated the Qarakhānid Shams al-Mulk and ejected his troops from the south bank of the Oxus. A further brother, Böri-Bars, was given the governorship of Herāt, Gharchistān, and Ghūr, while the sultan's uncle 'Uthmān b. Chaghri Beg received Valvālī in eastern Tukhāristān.⁴ For some years Tekīsh governed his province without recorded incident, until in 473/1080-1 the arrival of the 7,000 mercenaries whom Malik-Shāh had discharged, and who now sought to enter Tekīsh's service, tempted him to rebel. But the sultan beat him in the race to secure Nishāpūr, the capital of Khurāsān, and after being besieged in Tirmidh, Tekīsh was compelled

¹ *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, p. 163. This conflicts with Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, who places his death in 490/1097.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 192.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 213, 219-20; Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, pp. 21-5 (cf. Houtsma, *op. cit.* pp. 373-4); Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins*, p. 87.

⁴ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 49; Ḥusainī, *Akhhbār al-daula*, pp. 58-61; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 64.

to yield. His brother pardoned him. Four years later, however, whilst Malik-Shāh was at the opposite end of the empire in Mosul, where Fakhr al-Daula Ibn Jahir and Artuq Beg had been conducting operations against the 'Uqailids, Tekish again rebelled in Khurāsān. His forces were held up at the fortress of Sarakhs, and the sultan managed to gain time for the march across Iran. Tekish was captured and now paid the penalty for his disloyalty: he was blinded and imprisoned, and his territories given to his son Aḥmad.¹ The firmness of Malik-Shāh and Nizām al-Mulk in dealing with rebels from the Saljuq family forms a contrast to Alp-Arslan's comparatively lenient treatment of such claimants; but it seems to have had an exemplary effect, for there was no more trouble from the rest of the family for the remaining years of Malik-Shāh's reign.

It has been noted that towards the end of Alp-Arslan's reign, when warfare had broken out between the Saljuqs and the Qarakhānid Shams al-Mulk Naṣr b. Ibrāhīm, the sultan's assassination gave the khan the opportunity to invade Tukhāristān (see p. 65 above). Malik-Shāh's brother Ayāz was unable to withstand the invaders, but once the new sultan was firmly on the throne, he came eastwards in 466/1073-4, drove Shams al-Mulk's brother from Tirmidh, and pushed on to Samarkand; the khan was now forced to seek the intercession of Nizām al-Mulk and sue for peace. Malik-Shāh entrusted the key of Tirmidh to Sav-Tegin, with instructions for its refortification with stone walls and a ditch, and it was then that he gave the governorship of Balkh and Tukhāristān to Tekish.² At some point in his reign Shams al-Mulk became involved in a war with the eastern branch of the Qarakhānids, who were ruled by the two sons of Qadīr-Khān Yūsuf of Kāshghar and Khotan. Forced to abandon to them Farghāna and the province of Īlāq north of the Syr Darya, he must have become eager to preserve peaceful relations with the Saljuqs.³

Like his father, Shams al-Mulk was famed for his equity and piety, particularly in the sphere of public buildings and charitable works. He built celebrated ribāṭs at Khardhang near Karminiyā and also at Āq-Kutāl on the Samarkand-Khujand road; the splendid palace of Shamsābād near Bukhārā, and a Friday mosque in that city. Nevertheless he fell foul of the religious classes, and in 461/1069 was driven to

¹ Bundārī, p. 71; Husainī, *op. cit.* p. 64; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 88-9.

² Husainī, *op. cit.* pp. 59-61, 63; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 63-4; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp. 314-15; Kafesoğlu, *Sultan Melikshah*, pp. 19-20, 28-9.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, p. 212.

execute the Imām Abū Ibrāhīm Ṣaffārī. In the brief reign of Shams al-Mulk's brother Khiḍr Khān (472-3/1080-1) the western kingdom of the Qarakhānids is said to have reached its zenith of prosperity and splendour.¹

Nothing is recorded of Saljuq-Qarakhānid relations for several years until the accession in Transoxiana of Aḥmad Khān b. Khiḍr (473-82/1081-9), the nephew of Malik-Shāh's wife Terken Khatun. Saljuq influence beyond the Oxus continued to be strong, and it is in this period that the double honorifics *al-Dunyā wa'l-Dīn* ("... of the Secular World and of Religion") first appear amongst the Qarakhānids (coin of 474/1081-2).² However, Aḥmad Khān stirred up the opposition of the orthodox religious institution to such a pitch that in 482/1089 a Shāfi'ī faqīh, one Abū Ṭāhir b. 'Aliyyak, came to Malik-Shāh's court seeking aid.³ The sultan was at this time at the peak of his prestige. He had successfully settled affairs in Syria and al-Jazīrah, humbling the pretensions of his brother Tutush and installing several of his reliable ghulām commanders as governors (see below, p. 98); he had also brought off a diplomatic *comp* by marrying his daughter to Caliph al-Muqtafī. He was accordingly well disposed to listen to the Transoxianan faqīh's appeal for intervention against the impious khan. The sultan occupied Bukhārā without difficulty; Samarqand was obstinately defended by its inhabitants, but Malik-Shāh broke into it, captured Aḥmad Khān, and deported him to his capital Iṣfahān. Leaving the civil governor of Khwārazm to hold Samarqand, the sultan now pushed on to Talas and into Semirechye with the aim of bringing the eastern Qarakhānids equally under his suzerainty. At Uzkand he received the personal submission of the Khān of Kāshghar, Hārūn b. Sulaimān b. Qadīr-Khān Yūsuf (d. 496/1103); the khan promised to place Malik-Shāh in the khuṭba and offered one of his daughters in marriage to one of the sultan's sons.

Meanwhile, the kingdom had become temporarily endangered by revolts among the people of Samarqand and among the Chigil or Qarluq tribesmen who had passed from Qarakhānid into Saljuq service; Nizām al-Mulk explains that Malik-Shāh's failure to give the customary feasts for them had displeased them. A three-cornered struggle began with the appearance of Ya'qūb-Tegin, brother of the

¹ Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 315-16, who is quoting Nizāmī 'Arūdī Samarqandī.

² Pritsak, "Karahānlilar", *İslām Ansiklopedisi*.

³ 'Aliyyak's obituary is in Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. ix, pp. 58-9.

Khān of Kāshghar, and Malik-Shāh had to undertake the recovery of Samarqand and a further trip to Uzkanḍ. Saljuq fortunes were helped by the eternally present family conflicts of the Qarakhānid dynasty. A new aggressor appeared, Toghrīl b. Īnal, who drove the khan out of Kāshghar.¹ The sultan's representatives Tāj al-Mulk now brought the khan and his brother Ya'qūb-Tegin together, and left them to regain their territories as best they could; the sultan himself returned to Khurāsān, and at some unknown time later restored Aḥmad Khān to Samarqand.² Soon afterwards, in 488/1095, Aḥmad Khān was overthrown and executed by the agents of the religious leaders in Samarqand, on the grounds that he had embraced Ismā'īlī doctrines (see below, p. 106).³

Although there had been peace between the Ghaznavids and Saljuqs during Alp-Arslan's reign, the troubled events surrounding Malik-Shāh's accession tempted Ibrāhīm of Ghazna to try and regain former Ghaznavid territory in Badakhshān and Tukhārīstān. He attacked Malik-Shāh's uncle, the Amir al-Umarā' 'Uthmān b. Chaghri Beg, at a place named Sakalkand, then he sacked it and carried 'Uthmān ignominiously off to Ghazna. (Since the latter was soon afterwards made Governor of Valvālīj, he must have been speedily ransomed or released from captivity.) Malik-Shāh sent an army under Gümüş-Tegin Bilge Beg and his slave Anūsh-Tegin Gharcha'i, and the *status quo* was presumably restored (465/1073). Little more is recorded of relations between the two sultans, though one other expedition by Malik-Shāh against the Ghaznavids is mentioned. This got as far as Isfīzār in western Afghanistan, where it was halted by a clever piece of psychological warfare on Ibrāhīm's part which made the Saljuq sultan believe that his own army was disaffected.⁴

The Ghaznavid empire in eastern Afghanistan and northern India flourished during Ibrāhīm's forty-year reign, and the sultan acquired a great reputation as a patron of learning and religion, building many mosques, madrasas, and public buildings. He made several fresh

¹ Perhaps originally the ruler of Barskhan, Toghrīl b. Īnal was probably also Qadīr Khān Jibrā'il b. 'Umar who was to invade Transoxiana in 495/1102: see below, sec. x, p. 109.

² *Siyāsāt-Nāma*, ch. xxxv (Darke tr., p. 128); *Mujmal al-tawārikh*, p. 408; Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣṣa*, pp. 55, 71; Narshakhī, *Ta'rikh-i Bukhārā*, p. 34 (Frye tr., p. 29); Zāhir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljuq-Nāma*, p. 31; Rāvandī, *Rāhat al-sudūr*, pp. 128-30; Husainī, *Akhhār al-Daula*, pp. 65-6; Barthold, "History of the Semirechye", in *Four Studies*, vol. 1, pp. 97-8; *idem*, *Turkestan*, pp. 316-18; Kafesoğlu, *Sultan Melikşah*, pp. 119-23.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 165-6.

⁴ Husainī, p. 16; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 53, 110; I. M. Shafī, "Fresh Light on the Ghaznavids", *Islamic Culture*, pp. 206-11; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* p. 30 n. 49.

conquests of fortresses in the Punjab, and after 469/1076-7 he assigned the governorship of India to his son Saif al-Daula Maḥmūd, patron of the famous poet Mas'ūd-i Sa'd-i Salmān. Ibrāhīm and Malik-Shāh negotiated as equals, and marriage links between the two houses were kept up. Ibrāhīm's son, the later 'Alā' al-Daula Mas'ūd III (492-508/1099-1115), had married a daughter of Alp-Arslan, and later he was to marry one of Malik-Shāh's daughters, Jauhar Khatun, known in Ghazna as *Mahd-i 'Irāq*, "the wife from Iraq [i.e. western Persia]".¹ The extent of Saljuq influence in Ghazna at this time can be seen in the Ghaznavid sultans' formal assumption of a typically Saljuq title—*al-Sultān al-Mu'aẓẓam*—in addition to their own normal ones of *Amīr* and *Malik*; the title first appears on the coinage of Farrukh-Zād.²

Sistān had come under Saljuq suzerainty soon after the Ghaznavids' expulsion from Khurāsān. Though it remained under the general supervision of the Saljuqs of Kirmān, it was left in practice to its own ancient rulers of the Saffārid line (see above, pp. 50-1). In 465/1073, the year of Malik-Shāh's accession, it passed to Amīr Bahā' al-Daula wa'l-Dīn Ṭāhir, but his authority was soon disputed by other powerful nobles of Sistān, in particular by one Badr al-Dīn Abu'l-'Abbās. The mediation of Malik-Shāh's governor in Khurāsān was sought, yet internal strife ended only when Ṭāhir was strangled by his opponent in 480/1088. Abu'l-'Abbās now moved against Kūhistān, but he too died shortly afterwards. Malik-Shāh himself was at this time occupied in Transoxiana; in 485/1092, however, the Saljuq amīr Qizil-Sarīgh linked up with one of the local amīrs of Sistān, and until the sultan's death joint operations were conducted against the Ismā'īlis of Kūhistān. In Sistān itself, Ṭāhir's son Tāj al-Dīn Abu'l-Faḍl Naṣr came to power in 483/1090-1 as a Saljuq vassal, and after a long reign largely coterminous with that of Sanjar, he died a centenarian in 559/1164.³

Malik-Shāh's concern with the north-western frontiers of Iran was twofold: first, to secure Arrān and thus protect Āzarbāijān, and second, to hold the route that led up the Araxes into Armenia against any Georgian attack. During his reign, Āzarbāijān conserved its importance both as a region of Türkmen concentration and as the base from which Türkmen amīrs fighting in Anatolia drew replenish-

¹ Ḥusainī, *loc. cit.*; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 111; Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāsirī* (Raverty tr., vol. 1, pp. 103-4, 107); Mirzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī, "Mas'ud-i Sa'd-i Salman", *J.R.A.S.* pp. 711-15; Kafesoğlu, *Sultan Melikşah*, pp. 29-30.

² Sourdél, *Inventaire des Monnaies Musulmanes Anciennes du Musée de Caboul*, pp. xiii-xiv.

³ (Anon.), *Tārīkh-i Sistān*, p. 383; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 117-19.

ments for their forces; this importance was recognized by the sultan's eventually placing the whole of the Arrān-Āzarbāijān area under his cousin Quṭb al-Dīn Ismā'il b. Yāqūtī, who was given the title Malik.

When Malik-Shāh came to the throne, he considered that he needed to strengthen the somewhat nominal dependence of Faḍl (Faḍlūn) III b. Faḍl II, the Shaddādid ruler of Ganja and Dvin who had succeeded his father in 466/1073. Accordingly, the sultan sent an expedition to Arrān; Ganja was occupied and Faḍl deposed, receiving in exchange Astarābād in Gurgān. Sav-Tegin, already familiar with the area from his campaigns there in Alp-Arslan's time, was installed in Ganja as governor (?468/1075-6; the chronology of these events is uncertain). But aggressive activity by the king of Georgia, Bagrat IV's son Giorgi II (1072-89), led to the temporary recapture of Kars by the Christians. The sultan came personally to Georgia in 471/1078-9, and shortly afterwards he entrusted operations there to the Türkmen amīr Aḥmad, who regained Kars in 473/1080 and, after returning to his base in Arrān, sent two more Türkmen begs, Ya'qūb and 'Īsā Böri, against Georgia. They penetrated as far as Lazistān and the Chorukh valley on the Black Sea coast and they also threatened Trebizond; according to Anna Comnena, this city was in fact taken, but was recaptured soon afterwards by a Byzantine general.¹

A revolt by the restored Shaddādid Faḍl III, probably after the death of Sav-Tegin in 478/1085, necessitated Malik-Shāh's appearance in the Caucasus in 478/1086. After receiving the homage and tribute of the Shīrvān-Shāh Fariburz b. Sallār, the sultan reached the Black Sea coast, where the slave commander Bozan was detailed to take Ganja. Faḍl was finally deposed and the Shaddādid line in Ganja extinguished, although the collateral line in Ani, under Amīr Abu'l-Faḍl Manūchihr, one of Malik-Shāh's faithful vassals (?464-c. 512/?1072-c. 1118), continued to flourish in the 6th/12th century. The Shīrvān-Shāh seems to have exercised some influence over Arrān, but much of the Araxes basin was doubtless parcelled out into military fiefs and absorbed into the existing pattern of Türkmen occupation in Āzarbāijān; the region as a whole was under the control of Quṭb al-Dīn Ismā'il.²

¹ Allen, *A History of the Georgian People*, pp. 93-4; Yinanç, *Anadolu'nun fethi*, pp. 110-13; Cahen, "La Première Pénétration Turque en Asie-Mineure", *Byzantion*, p. 49; Minorsky, *Studies in Caucasian History*, pp. 67-8.

² *Caucasian History*, pp. 68, 81-2; *idem*, *A History of Sharvān and Darband*, pp. 68-9; *idem*, and Cahen, "Le Recueil Transcaucasien de Mas'ūd b. Nāmdār (début du VI^e/XII^e siècle)", *J.A.* pp. 119-21.

The sons of Qutlumush had arrived in Anatolia at the beginning of Malik-Shāh's reign and had put themselves at the head of certain of the Türkmen bands which were gradually isolating and compelling the surrender of the remaining Byzantine strongholds in Anatolia. The later historiography of the Rûm Saljuqs posits that Malik-Shāh officially invested these sons with the governorships of Anatolia, intending the region to be an appanage of the Saljuq empire as Khurāsān, Kirmān, and Damascus had been under Tutush. In fact, relations here were never very cordial. Assumption of the title Sultān by Qutlumush's sons (this occurred after c. 473/1080-1) seems to have been a unilateral act and cannot have pleased Malik-Shāh, whose own title of Supreme Sultān implied an overlordship of the Saljuq family. Indeed, in 467/1075 two of Qutlumush's sons—Alp-Ilig and Daulab, in the view of Cahen—were fighting in Palestine for the Fātimids against Malik-Shāh's lieutenant Atsız b. Uvak.¹

In Anatolia itself, the other sons Sulaimān and Manşūr were taking advantage of the succession disputes which racked Byzantium until the last and most successful claimant, Alexis Comenus (1081-1118), emerged triumphant. The various contenders—Michael Dukas, Nicephorus Botaniates, Nicephorus Melissenos, and Alexis himself—all sought help from the Turks, with the result that by 474/1081 Sulaimān's forces had reached the shores of the Sea of Marmara and had taken Nicea (Iznik). Malik-Shāh regarded his cousins in Anatolia as semi-rebels, and he cannot have viewed their successes with enthusiasm; his attitude towards Byzantium was no doubt the same as his fathers: that the two empires of the Greeks and the Saljuqs should exist side by side (see p. 62 above). Barhebraeus speaks of a punitive expedition under Amir Bursuq, sent by Malik-Shāh c. 470/1077-8; though it succeeded in bringing about Manşūr's death, Sulaimān had to be left with most of the western and southern parts of Anatolia.² In Cappadocia, Pontus, and the east there were several other Türkmen begs, some related to the Saljuqs, others independent of them. Certain of the legends and traditions which surround the beginnings of the Türkmen Dānishmand Beg ascribe to him a part in the victory of Malāzgird, and they ascribe a similar role to Artuq, Mengüjek, and Saltuq, other Türkmen amirs who later became famous.³ In reality,

¹ Cf. Cahen, *Byzantion* (1948), pp. 35-6.

² Barhebraeus, *Chronography*, p. 227.

³ This tradition is found in the works of the 8th/14th-century historian of the Rûm Saljuqs, Aqsarāyī, and it is also mentioned by the later Ottoman historians.

Dānīshmand Beg does not become a historically authenticated figure till the time of the First Crusade, in Berk-Yaruq's reign, but it is quite possible that the foundations of the important Dānīshmanid principality were being laid in the regions of Sīvās, Kayseri, Amasya, and Tokat during the latter part of Malik-Shāh's reign.¹

However, events in the Anatolian interior were of less immediate importance to the Great Saljuqs than were those taking place on the south-eastern fringes of Anatolia, in al-Jazīreh and in Syria. South of the Taurus and the Anatolian plateau we are outside the Irano-Turkish world on which the Saljuqs' political power and culture were based, and only a brief outline of the extension of Saljuq influence as against that of the Fāṭimids in Syria and Arabia need be given here. The tasks of Saljuq arms and diplomacy in the shifting and complex politics of this region to the south of Anatolia were, first, to ensure that cities like Antioch, Aleppo, and Edessa were in friendly Sunnī Muslim hands; and second, to bring into the Sunnī-Saljuq sphere of influence the local Arab amirates (e.g. those of the Mirdāsids, the Banū Munqidh of Shaizar, and the Banū 'Ammār of Tripoli) as well as the tribal groups, such as those of Kilāb and Numair, many of which were Shi'i and possibly pro-Fāṭimid in sentiment. Roving Türkmen bands injected a fresh element of unrest into the region; and in the years after Malāz-gird an ephemeral but significant Greco-Armenian principality grew up along the Taurus under the leadership of Philaretos, a former general of Romanus Diogenes, who extended his power from Hişn Manşūr, Abulustān, and Mar'ash, over the cities of Malatya, Samosata, Edessa, and Antioch.²

Malik-Shāh's reign saw the destruction of the Marwānids, the long-established Kurdish dynasty in Diyārbakr, although there are no indications that this action came from deliberate Saljuq policy; it was some decades since Fāṭimid influence had been a danger in this area. After the death of Naşr al-Daula Ibn Marwān in 453/1061, the power and splendour of the dynasty waned perceptibly under his sons, and its end came when the private ambitions of the Banū Jahīr finally worked upon Malik-Shāh and Nizām al-Mulk.³ Accompanied by a Saljuq army

¹ Cahen, *Byzantion* (1948), pp. 35 ff.; I. Mélikoff, *La geste de Melik Dānīshmend, étude critique du Dānīshmendnāme* (Paris, 1960), vol. 1, pp. 71 ff.; *idem*, "Dānīshmendids", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

² J. Laurent, "Des Grecs aux Croisés; Etude sur l'Histoire d'Edesse entre 1071 et 1098", *Byzantion*, pp. 387 ff.; Honigsmann, *Die Ostgrenze des Byzantinischen Reiches*, pp. 142-6; Cahen, *Byzantion* (1948), pp. 39-41.

³ See p. 24 above.

and by the *ghulām* generals Qasīm al-Daula Aq-Sonqur and Gauhar-Ā'in, and later helped by Artuq Beg, Fakhr al-Daula Ibn Jahīr conducted a long and strenuous campaign in 477-8/1084 against the Marwānids in Āmid, Mayyāfāriqīn, and Jazīrat ibn 'Umar, afterwards annexing Diyārbakr to the Saljuq empire and appropriating for his personal use the Marwānids' treasury.¹

The disappearance of the Marwānids was a palpable threat to another local power, the 'Uqailids. By 477/1084 the dominions of the very capable Sharaf al-Daula Muslim b. Quraish stretched from Mosul through Diyār Rabi'a and Diyār Muḍar to Manbij and Aleppo, and he had reached an entente with the Armenian general Philaretos. At the beginning of his reign Malik-Shāh had sent his brother Tutush to hold Syria as an appanage, and from his base of Damascus, Tutush and later Artuq Beg conquered all the territories in southern Syria and Palestine formerly held by Atsiz b. Uvak. The prize of Aleppo brought Tutush into rivalry with its ruler, Sharaf al-Daula Muslim, and in 477/1084 a complex pattern of warfare broke out in the region of Aleppo and Antioch, involving Tutush, Sharaf al-Daula Muslim, Philaretos, Sulaimān b. Qutlumush, and an army from Iṣfahān under the personal command of Malik-Shāh and his generals Bozan and Bursuq. In the fighting the 'Uqailid was killed (478/1085), while Sulaimān either died in battle or else committed suicide (479/1086). The sultan's Syrian campaign was crowned with triumph as one after another Mosul, Harrān, Aleppo, and Antioch submitted, and he was at last able to let his horse stand on the shores of the Mediterranean. When Tutush and Artuq had withdrawn to Damascus and Jerusalem respectively, Malik-Shāh installed *ghulām* governors in Antioch (Yaghī-Basan), Aleppo (Aq-Sonqur), and Edessa (Bozan).²

Saljuq influence during his reign was even carried into the Arabian peninsula. In 469/1076-7 Artuq marched through al-Aḥsā' in eastern Arabia as far as Qatīf and Baḥrain Island, attacking the local Qarmatian sectaries *en route*. After the sultan's second visit to Baghdad, in 484/1091, he conceived the idea of making it the centre of his empire (see below, p. 101), and it was probably in connexion with this that he deputed

¹ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 75-6; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 86-8, 93-4; Amedroz, "The Marwānid Dynasty at Mayyāfāriqīn in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries A.D.", *J.R.A.S.* pp. 146 ff.; Kafesoğlu, *Sultan Melikşah*, pp. 46-56; Cahen, "Djahīr (Banū)", *Encyc. of Islam*.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 75-72 *bis*, 74, 82, 89-91, 96-8, 107; Barhebraeus, pp. 230-1; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 40-5, 86-94.

Gauhar-Ā'in and Chabaq to bring the Ḥijāz and the Yemen under his power. Through his diplomacy the *khutba* at Mecca was returned to the 'Abbāsids in 468/1075-6, which meant in effect that he had outbid the Fātimids for the support of the venal *Sharīf* of Mecca—although according to Ibn al-Jauzī, there was also a project for the *sharīf* to marry one of the sultan's sisters. In the last year of Malik-Shāh's life, Gauhar-Ā'in sent a force of Türkmén under Tirsek and Chabaq, and the Yemen and Aden were temporarily occupied.¹

The exclusion of the 'Abbāsid caliphs from secular affairs in Iraq was maintained during Malik-Shāh's reign, and on his first visit to Baghdad, in 479-80/1086-7, he had received the formal grant of this secular authority from al-Muqtadī. Within Baghdad the sultan's *shahna*, or military commander, was Gauhar-Ā'in, who had been appointed in his father's reign. Not only did he have the task of keeping public order in the city and of mediating among the hostile factions of *Shī'is*, *Ḥanbalis*, *'ayyārs*, and so on, but Gauhar-Ā'in also had a general responsibility for the security of Iraq; thus when in 483/1090 a force of 'Āmirī Bedouins from the Qarmatians of al-Aḥsā' sacked Baṣra, he had to come from Baghdad and restore order.² Financial and civil affairs in the capital and in Iraq in general—including supervision of those *iqṭā's* allotted to the caliph, together with the transmission to him of their revenues—were the responsibility of a civilian '*amid* or governor. In the latter part of Malik-Shāh's reign, when relations between sultan and caliph became very strained, the '*amid* clearly had the power of making life unpleasant in many ways for the caliph. One '*amid*, Abu'l-Faṭḥ b. Abī Laith, even interfered with the caliph's own court and retinue, until in 475/1082-3 al-Muqtadī complained to the sultan and Nizām al-Mulk.³

For most of Malik-Shāh's reign Nizām al-Mulk was left to mould Saljuq policy towards the caliphate, and this meant that he was thrown into close contact with the caliph's viziers; down to 507/1113-14, with only a few breaks, the vizierate for the 'Abbāsids continued to be held by the Banū Jahīr, namely Fakhr al-Daula and his sons 'Amīd al-Daula and Za'im al-Ru'asā'. Saljuq pressure on the caliphate increased during this period, as the firm hand of Gauhar-Ā'in in Baghdad showed. At the opening of the reign Nizām al-Mulk had reversed his previously conciliatory attitude, and the climax of this new harshness came in

¹ Bundārī, pp. 70-1; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. viii, p. 298; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 137.

² *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 103-4, 121-3.

³ *Ibid.* p. 81.

471/1079, when he secured Fakhr al-Daula's dismissal on the pretext that he was behind Ḥanbalī attacks on the Nizāmiyya madrasa. He even tried, without success, to impose on the caliph his own son Mu'ayyid al-Mulk as vizier. The family's fortunes were restored through the tact of 'Amīd al-Daula Ibn Jahīr, who came personally to Nizām al-Mulk's camp to intercede for his father's restoration, and who in the following years grew so close to Nizām al-Mulk that he was given successively two of the vizier's daughters in marriage.¹ Over the next few years the Banū Jahīr oscillated between support for the interests of the sultan and for those of the caliph. In 474/1081-2 Fakhr al-Daula and Nizām al-Mulk arranged the betrothal of one of Malik-Shāh's daughters to the caliph, but the condition was imposed on al-Muqtadī that he should take no concubine and no other wife but this Saljuq princess. Hence by 476/1083-4 al-Muqtadī had lost all patience, and he installed as vizier a firm supporter of his own interests, Abū Shujā' al-Rūdhrawārī; Nizām al-Mulk was furious that his ally 'Amīd al-Daula should be dismissed, and according to Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī he even contemplated abolition of the caliphate.²

Harmony was restored for a time when Malik-Shāh, victorious after his Syrian campaign, visited Baghdad for the first time. Nizām al-Mulk took the opportunity of impressing the caliph with the military might of the sultanate by parading before him the Saljuq amīrs—they numbered over forty—while he detailed their iqtā's and the number of their retainers. The sultan's euphoria at this time was such that he increased the caliph's own iqtā's, and at the same time abolished throughout Iraq illegal taxes, transport dues on goods, and the transit payment levied on pilgrims.³ The marriage alliance with the caliphate was celebrated in 480/1087 with enormous pomp, in the presence of Nizām al-Mulk, Abū Sa'd the Mustaufī, Terken Khatun, and the caliph's vizier Abū Shujā'. Very soon a son was born, the short-lived Abu'l-Faql Ja'far.⁴ Nizām al-Mulk's reception at Baghdad turned him into a warm partisan of the caliphate, but the marriage did not bring the expected harmony between sultan and caliph. As early as 481/1088 the Turks who had accompanied the Saljuq princess were expelled

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 74-5; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. VIII, pp. 317-19.

² Bundārī, pp. 72-3, 77-8; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. IX, pp. 2-3, 5-6; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. X, pp. 77, 83; Bowen, "Nizām al-Mulk", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.).

³ Bundārī, pp. 80-1; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. IX, pp. 28, 30, 35-6; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. X, pp. 103-5, 111.

⁴ *al-Kāmil*, vol. X, pp. 106-7; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. IX, pp. 30, 36.

from the caliph's harem because of their rowdiness. By the next year the princess was complaining to her father of al-Muqtadī's neglect of her, so Malik-Shāh demanded the return of his daughter and his grandson Ja'far; she died shortly after reaching Iṣfahān, but her son, the so-called "Little Commander of the Faithful", became the sultan's favourite.¹

During Malik-Shāh's second visit to Baghdad relations with al-Muqtadī were at their nadir, and the sultan ignored him. He resolved, however, to make Baghdad his winter capital, and in the winter of 484-5/1091-2 extensive building operations were begun in the city, comprising a great mosque, markets, and caravanserais, while the important ministers such as Nizām al-Mulk and Tāj al-Mulk were ordered to build houses there for themselves. The sultan came to Baghdad again at the end of 485/1092. Nizām al-Mulk had just been assassinated and the sultan, freed from all restraint, decided to expel the caliph from his ancient capital, delivering this ultimatum to him. "You must relinquish Baghdad to me, and depart to any land you choose." It seems that the sultan had the idea of setting up his grandson Ja'far as caliph, even though his tender age of five years made him ineligible according to Islamic law. As events turned out, al-Muqtadī was saved when Malik-Shāh died from a fever, fifty-three days after the passing of Nizām al-Mulk.²

During the last two or three years of Malik-Shāh's reign, certain disquieting events occurred which showed that his impressive empire was not unassailable. In 483/1090, for example, Baṣra was savagely sacked by Qarmatians.³ More serious was the emergence of several centres of Ismā'īlī activities within the empire, notably in Syria, al-Jazīreh, and Persia. Propagandists having connexions with the Nizārī faction in Fāṭimid Egypt began work in such parts of Iran as Kirmān, Tukhārīstān, Kūhīstān, Qūmis, the Caspian provinces, and Fārs (see above, p. 90). Those regions where there were already pockets of Shi'ism or of older Iranian beliefs seem to have been particularly susceptible. The Ismā'īlīs were even active in the capital city of Iṣfahān, under the dā'ī 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Attāsh and his son Aḥmad, who in Berk-Yaruq's reign was to seize the nearby fortress of Shāhdiz. Another dā'ī, Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ, worked in Ray during Malik-Shāh's time, and in

¹ *al-Muntazam*, vol. ix, pp. 44, 46-7; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 109, 116.

² Bundārī, p. 70; Zahir al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, p. 35; Rāvandī, p. 140; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 60-2; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 133-5; Barhebraeus, pp. 231-2.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 121-3.

483/1090 he seized the fortress of Alamūt in the Alburz mountains near Qazvīn. In the last year of his life Malik-Shāh, conscious of this threat to the line of communications through northern Persia, sent the amīrs Arslan-Tash and Qizil-Sarīgh against the Ismā'īlis of Alamūt and Kūhistān, respectively, but operations were broken off at his death.¹

At Shīhna, a place in Fārs on the Iṣfahān-Baghdad road, Niẓām al-Mulk had met death at the hands of a Dailamī youth, ostensibly a *fidā'ī* (assassin) of the Ismā'īlis.² Several sources state that shortly before this killing, the sultan had dismissed him and several of his protégés in the administration, putting in their places Tāj al-Mulk and his friends; it is also possible that Niẓām al-Mulk, now at an advanced age, laid down office of his own accord. Yet one of the earliest sources, Anu-shīrvān b. Khālīd, says nothing of Niẓām al-Mulk's departure from office. Contemporaries generally attributed his death to the machinations of Malik-Shāh and Tāj al-Mulk, and the view is expressed by the later historian Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 718/1318) that the vizier's enemies at court concocted the murder in association with the Assassins; in view of Rashīd al-Dīn's access to the Ismā'īlī records at Alamūt, the story is worthy of consideration. The last weeks of Malik-Shāh's own life were spent in drawing up his extravagant plans for the deposition of al-Muqtadī. After 485/1092 the caliphs would never again have to fear so powerful a member of the Great Saljuq dynasty.³

VIII. THE FIRST SIGNS OF DECLINE: BERK-YARUQ AND MUḤAMMAD B. MALIK-SHĀH

The twelve years that followed Malik-Shāh's death were ones of internal confusion and warfare, ended only by Berk-Yaruq's death in 498/beginning of 1105. Despite this, the external frontiers of the empire held firm thanks to Malik-Shāh and his vizier, whose policy had been to buttress the north-western frontiers through the concentration of

¹ Cf. *ibid.* pp. 215-17; Juvainī, *Ta'rikh-i Jabān-Gushā*, vol. II, pp. 666 ff.; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 128-35; Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins*, pp. 47-51, 72-8, 85-7.

² Bundārī, pp. 62-3; Rāvandī, p. 135; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. IX, pp. 66-7; Husainī, *Akbbār al-dawla*, pp. 66-7; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. X, pp. 137-9; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, vol. I, pp. 414-15; Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyya al-kubrā*, vol. III, pp. 142-4; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 203-7.


³ Cf. Houtsma, "The Death of the Niẓām al-Mulk and its Consequences", *Journal of Indian History*, pp. 147-60; Bowen, *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.); and K. Rippe, "Über den Sturz Niẓām-ul-Mulks", *Köprülü Armağanı*, pp. 423-35.

Türkmen in Āzarbāijān and Arrān, and to hold the Qarakhānids firmly in check on the north-eastern borders. Sanjar's governorship in eastern Khurāsān and Tukhāristān from 490/1097 onwards discouraged possible moves by the Ghaznavids at this time, though they might well have seen in this period of Saljuq confusion a heaven-sent chance to recover their *terra irredenta*. Only in the extreme west was there potential disquiet with the appearance in 1097 of the First Crusade: within three years the Franks had entrenched themselves on the Levant coast, had advanced as far as western Diyārbakr, and had taken such key cities as Jerusalem, Antioch, and Edessa. Yet the Islamic world had seen aggressive infidels on its borders before. Moreover the Saljuq sultans were never directly threatened by the Crusaders, and they regarded the troubles of Tutuṣh and his family in Syria as his own affair. When the news of the First Crusaders' successes in Syria first reached Baghdad, Berk-Yaruq wrote letters to the various amīrs urging them to go and fight the unbelievers (Rabī' II 491/March 1098), but this exhortation seems to have exhausted his concern.¹ There are few indications that thoughts of the Frankish threat seriously worried at any time the contestants who fought over the heartland of the empire, Iran and Iraq.

When Malik-Shāh died, Tāj al-Mulk and Terken Khatun acted vigorously. Their policy in building up a party amongst Nizām al-Mulk's enemies in the army and bureaucracy, together with the fact that they happened to be in Baghdad at the crucial time, enabled them to place the four-year-old prince Maḥmūd on the throne as sultan, the caliph being reluctantly forced to grant him the honorific *Nāṣir al-Dunyā wa'l-Dīn* ("Helper in Secular and Religious Affairs"). Occupation of Iṣfahān was now the next aim, for despite large accession subsidies the army was again restive for pay. Maḥmūd was placed on the throne in Iṣfahān and the royal treasuries thrown open. Meanwhile the rival party of the Nizāmiyya, which contained the great vizier's relatives and partisans, led by the ghulām Er-Ghush, had managed to seize the armaments stored up by the vizier at Iṣfahān and had taken with them to Ray the twelve-year-old Abu'l-Muẓaffar Berk-Yaruq (Turkish for "strong brightness"). At Ray the *ra'īs*, or chief notable, crowned him sultan. Anushīrvān b. Khālīd states that only obscure people and opportunists supported Berk-Yaruq and that the majority favoured Maḥmūd; but this merely reflects Khālīd's partisanship for Berk-Yaruq's

¹ Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. ix, p. 105.

THE IRANIAN WORLD (A.D. 1000-1217)



Map 3. The Saljuq Empire at the death of Malik Shāh (485/1092).

rival Muḥammad, under whom he later became Mustaufī and ‘Ārid al-Jaish.¹

As a youth approaching manhood, Berk-Yaruq was clearly more fitted to hold together his father’s heritage, and in the struggle against Tutuṣh and Muḥammad he generally had the support of the Nizāmiyya. This does not necessarily imply that the Nizāmiyya had a collective policy, for none of the sons of Nizām al-Mulk was his father’s equal in ability, and opportunism and personal factors seem often to have swayed them. At the outset they desired vengeance on Tāj al-Mulk, who was captured on the defeat of Terken Khatun in 485/beginning

¹ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 82-3; Ḥusainī, *Akbbār al-daula al-Saljuqiyya*, pp. 74-5; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljuq-Nāma*, pp. 35-6; Rāvandī, *Rābat al-sudūr*, pp. 140-2; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 145-6; Barhebraeus, *Chronography*, p. 232. For general surveys of Berk-Yaruq’s reign, see M. F. Sanaullah, *The Decline of the Saljuqid Empire*, pp. 83-113 and Cahen, “Barkyārük”, *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

of 1093. Mindful of his capabilities, however, Berk-Yaruq wished to make him vizier, and Tāj al-Mulk mollified a good proportion of the Nizāmiyya by judicious payments; but an irreconcilable element of them finally secured his death.¹ In the next few years personal animosities among Nizām al-Mulk's sons placed them on opposite sides in the conflict. Berk-Yaruq's first vizier was the drunkard 'Izz al-Mulk Ḥusain, and then in 487/1094 the capable Mu'ayyid al-Mulk 'Ubaidallāh. Unfortunately, the hostility of the sultan's mother Zubaida Khatun led to his dismissal, and a further son, Fakhr al-Mulk Abu'l Muẓaffar, was appointed in his place. The latter and Mu'ayyid al-Mulk were strong enemies, for they had quarrelled over some jewels left by their father, and henceforth Mu'ayyid al-Mulk became the guiding spirit behind Muḥammad's bid for the sultanate.²

Terken Khatun's final act was to invite another member of the Saljuq family, Ismā'il b. Yāqūtī, to march against Berk-Yaruq. Although Ismā'il collected an army from the Türkmen of Āzarbāijān and Arrān, he was defeated and Berk-Yaruq's former atabeg Gümüşh-Tegin put him to death. From Iṣfahān Terken Khatun tried to make contact with Tutush, but she died suddenly in 487/1094, to be followed a month later by her son Maḥmūd.³

Early in this year Berk-Yaruq disposed of two other possible rivals, his uncle Tekish, who had been blinded by Malik-Shāh and imprisoned at Takrīt, and Tekish's son; Tekish, in an attempt to overthrow the youthful sultan, had allegedly been in touch with former supporters in his old appanage of Tukhāristān.⁴ Despite the firmness of Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shāh, the traditional idea of a paternal inheritance divided amongst members of the family, coupled with the absence of any clear succession law, came to the surface in these uncertain times. In addition to his struggle with Terken Khatun, Berk-Yaruq was faced with a *coup d'état* in the east by one uncle, Arslan-Arghun, and in the west by a bid for the sultanate from another uncle, Tāj al-Daula Tutush.

Arslan-Arghun's rebellion was the less dangerous, for he seems to have had only the limited aim of making Khurāsān an autonomous province for himself. On hearing of Malik-Shāh's death he left his iqtā' in Jibāl, seized several of the cities of Khurāsān, and demanded

¹ (Anon.), *Mujmal al-tawārīkh*, pp. 408-9; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 146-7.

² Bundārī, pp. 83-6; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 192-5.

³ *Mujmal al-tawārīkh*, p. 409; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 36; Rāvandī, p. 141; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, p. 84; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 152, 159, 163; Barhebraeus, pp. 232-3.

⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 162.

recognition as tributary ruler of the whole province except for Nishāpūr. Against him Berk-Yaruq sent his uncle Böri-Bars b. Alp-Arslan, who had some initial successes but was captured in 488/1095 and strangled. Arslan-Arghun now began a reign of terror in Khurāsān, purging it of disaffected amīrs and demolishing the walls and fortifications of potentially rebellious places. It was his excesses which caused one of his own ghulāms to murder him in 490/1097. Berk-Yaruq had meanwhile appointed his half-brother Sanjar as governor in Khurāsān, providing him with an atabeg and vizier. A feeble attempt to set up Arslan-Arghun's young son in Balkh collapsed, and Berk-Yaruq and his army spent seven months at Balkh suppressing a further revolt by a Saljuq claimant, Muḥammad b. Sulaimān b. Toghril, who had received aid from the Ghaznavids (for more on this see p. 136 below). Beyond the Oxus, the situation in the Qarakhānid lands was somewhat troubled after the deposition and death of Aḥmad Khān in 488/1095 (see p. 93 above), which was followed shortly afterwards by the death of his successor Mas'ūd; Berk-Yaruq now confirmed the succession in Samarqand on Sulaimān and then on Maḥmūd Khān.¹

The threat from Tutush was far more serious, for it threatened the whole basis of Berk-Yaruq's sultanate. Soon after his brother's death, Tutush had left Damascus accompanied by the ghulām commanders whom Malik-Shāh had installed in Syria, Aq-Sonqur, Yaghī-Basan, and Bozan; and in 486/1093 in the city of Baghdad he proclaimed himself sultan. He routed the Arabs of the 'Uqailid Ibrāhīm b. Quraish of Mosul, and in Baghdad itself Malik-Shāh's former shāḥna, Gauhar-Ā'in, showed himself favourable to the new ruler. Soon afterwards his plans were disrupted by the desertion of Aq-Sonqur and Bozan, but in the next year Tutush killed these two undependable commanders and resumed the attack. Berk-Yaruq was recognized in Baghdad by the new caliph, al-Mustaẓhir (487-512/1094-1118), who granted him the honorific *Rukn al-Dīn* ("Pillar of Religion"), but Tutush was soon in occupation of all the western lands of the empire, and Berk-Yaruq had the misfortune to fall into the hands of Maḥmūd's partisans at Iṣfahān, who planned to blind him and so render him unfit for the sultanate. Before doing this, however, they decided to wait and see whether the child Maḥmūd should recover from his

¹ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 85, 255-9; Ibn Funduq, *Ta'rikh-i Baihaq*, pp. 53, 269; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljuq-Nāma*, p. 37; Rāvandī, *Rāhat al-sudūr*, pp. 143-4; Ḥusainī, *Akbbār al-dawla*, pp. 78, 84-7; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 178-81; Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, p. 318.

smallpox. As we have seen, he did not recover: thus Berk-Yaruq's sight was saved, and those many amīrs who feared Tutuṣh now rallied to the sultan. Even so, his position still seemed desperate, for he himself was suddenly stricken with smallpox; but now he had the help of Mu'ayyid al-Mulk as vizier, and he was even given a breathing space when Tutuṣh withdrew temporarily to Ray, probably because the provisioning of his large army in mid-winter was proving difficult. Berk-Yaruq soon collected 30,000 troops and defeated Tutuṣh near Ray; during the battle one of Aq-Sonqur's ghulāms avenged his master and slew Tutuṣh (488/1095). The remnants of his army fled to Syria, and Berk-Yaruq seemed secure on the throne.¹

The seat of Berk-Yaruq's personal power was essentially Iraq and western Iran. *Khurāsān*, of course, always remained important to the Saljuqs because it had been the cradle of their power, and in the brief period of peace before the rise of his rival MuḤammad, the sultan devoted to it as much attention as he was able. He went personally to suppress Arslan-Arghun's revolt, but shortly after his return to Iraq in the latter part of 490/1097, he had to send the *Amīr-i Dād* ("Chief Justiciar") Ḥabashī b. Altun-Taq to deal with Qodun, the governor of Marv, and with another amīr, Yaruq-Tash. These two had killed the Saljuq governor of *Khawārazm*, Ekinchi b. Qochqar, and had tried to annex the province for themselves, but Ḥabashī suppressed the outbreak and appointed as *Khawārazm-Shāh* a man named Quṭb al-Dīn MuḤammad b. Anūsh-Tegin Gharcha'i, founder of the line of *shāhs* who were to play such a big role in Persian history in the decades before the Mongol invasions (see below, pp. 185 ff.). After this, distractions in the west forced Berk-Yaruq to leave *Khurāsān* to Sanjar.²

Likewise, he granted Ganja to Sanjar's uterine brother, MuḤammad, with Qutluḡ-Tegin as his atabeg; very soon MuḤammad threw off the latter's control, killing him and taking over the whole of Arrān. Syria was always of peripheral importance to Great Saljuqs, and Berk-Yaruq never went there in person, despite al-Mustaẓhir's message to

¹ *Mujmal al-tawārīkh*, p. 409; Bundārī, pp. 84-5; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 36; Rāvandī, pp. 142-3; Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. ix, pp. 76-7, 80, 84-5, 87-8; Ḥusainī, pp. 75-6; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 149-51, 155-9, 166-7; Ibn *Khallikān*, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, vol. i, pp. 273-5.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 181-3; Juvainī, *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushā*, vol. i, 277-8; Sachau, "Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khawārazm", *S.B.W.A.W.* pp. 314-16; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 333-4; İ. Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti tarihi*, pp. 37-8.

him in 491/1098 expressing alarm at the successes of the Crusaders. Tutush's two sons Ridwān and Duqaq were left in Aleppo and Damascus respectively, where they were duly provided with atabegs. The formerly 'Uqailid amirate of Mosul then passed to a succession of Turkish and Türkmen commanders. In central Iraq, Saif al-Daula Ṣadaqa (479-501/1086-1108) made the Mazyadids a considerable power in this period. He intervened frequently in the confused affairs of Baghdad—this city alternated between allegiance to Berk-Yaruq and to his rivals Tutush and then Muḥammad—and in 496/1103 he added the formerly 'Uqailid town of Hit to his possessions.¹ Farther south, in the marshlands of the Baṭīḥa, there was the local dynasty of the Banū Abī'l-Jabr under Muḥaddhib al-Daula Abū'l-'Abbās. Baṣra and Wāsiṭ were nominally under Berk-Yaruq's control, but the Turkish muqta's of this region were in practice little troubled.² In Khūzistān and its chief town Shustar, Toghril's former amīr Bursuq and his four sons established themselves as hereditary muqta's. These sons remained generally attached to Berk-Yaruq's cause, and the sultan on more than one occasion dropped back from central Iran into Khūzistān to rest and to assemble fresh armies.³

The remaining years of Berk-Yaruq's reign, from 490/1097 to 498/1105, were taken up with the struggle against his half-brother Abū Shujā' Muḥammad Tapar (*Tapar* = Turkish for "he who obtains, finds"),⁴ who, in accordance with his claim to the sultanate, secured from the caliph in 492/1099 the honorific *Ghiyāth al-Dunyā wa'l-Dīn* ("Support in Secular and Religious Affairs").⁵ These years were full of warfare and of shifting alliances amongst the Turkish amīrs. Muḥammad received much help from Sanjar; he also had at his disposal the administrative skill of Mu'ayyid al-Mulk, and the bulk of the Nizāmiyya now fought on his side. For his part, Berk-Yaruq had only his own military skill and the loyalty of a nucleus of amīrs, including Ayāz and the governor of Hamadān, Il Ghāzī. Even for the support of the sons of Bursuq he had to pay a price: in 492/1099 Zangī and Aq-Bōri insisted that he sacrifice his vizier Majd al-Mulk Abū'l-Faḍl

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 247-8. Several of the sources state that it was Ṣadaqa who built for the dynasty a splendid new capital at Ḥilla, but this is not accurate: see G. Makdisi, "Notes on Ḥilla and the Mazyadids in Mediaeval Islam", *J.A.O.S.* pp. 249-62.

² Cf. Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 232-4.

³ Cf. Cahen, "Bursuk", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

⁴ Cf. P. Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or* (Paris 1950), pp. 182-3.

⁵ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 195-6.

al-Balāsānī, who had Shī'ī sympathies and was allegedly privy to the Ismā'ilīs' assassination of Bursuq.¹ The accusation that he had Ismā'ilī sympathies was frequently hurled at Berk-Yaruq by his opponents. On the occasions when his fortunes were low he certainly seems to have accepted Ismā'ilī troops in his army;² and it is said that when besieging Terken Khatun and Maḥmūd in Iṣfahān, he feigned sympathy in order to get the support of local Ismā'ilīs. But there are no signs of an active sympathy with these schismatics, which would have brought down on his head fierce condemnation from the Sunni religious institution and from the 'Abbasid caliph.

A former governor of Fārs whose reputation there had been damaged by his failure to quell the Shabānkāra, the Amīr Öner, was persuaded by Mu'ayyid al-Mulk to rebel against Berk-Yaruq. In 492/1099 Öner took 10,000 troops to Ray, but his rising collapsed when he was murdered by a Turkish ghulām; as so often happened when an army became leaderless, the troops mutinied, plundered the dead commander's treasury, and then scattered. Mu'ayyid al-Mulk now fled to Ganja, becoming vizier to Muḥammad, who at this point formally proclaimed himself sultan. The killing of his own vizier al-Balāsānī created a crisis of confidence for Berk-Yaruq. He still had a fair-sized army under Inal b. Anūsh-Tegin, as well as the help of one of Niẓām al-Mulk's sons, 'Izz al-Dīn Maṣṣūr; yet Iṣfahān refused to admit him, and then his mother Zubaida Khatun was captured at Ray and strangled by Mu'ayyid al-Mulk. Support for Muḥammad was growing among the Turkish amīrs of Iraq and al-Jazīrah, men such as Kür-Buḡha in Mosul and Chökermish in Jazīrat ibn 'Umar; in Kurdistān the 'Annāzid Surkhāb b. Badr joined him, and in Baghdad Gauhar-Ā'in secured the khuṭba for him.³

Still further changes of allegiance took place. When in 493/1100 Berk-Yaruq faced his brother in battle, he had at his side Gauhar-Ā'in, Kür-Buḡha, Surkhāb, and the Mazyadid 'Izz al-Daula Muḥammad b. Ṣadaqa. This clash, the first of five between the rival sultans, nevertheless ended disastrously for Berk-Yaruq. He fled from Hamadān to Nīshāpūr, seeking for help from the governor Ḥabashī, and it is on this march through northern Iran that he is said to have joined forces with

¹ Bundārī, pp. 87-8; Zāhir al-Dīn Nīshāpūri, pp. 37-8; Rāvandī, pp. 145-6; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 196-7.

² Cf. Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins*, pp. 86-8.

³ Bundārī, pp. 84-91; Zāhir al-Dīn Nīshāpūri, p. 37; Rāvandī, pp. 144-5; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 109-10; Ḥusainī, pp. 76-7; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 192-7.

5,000 Ismā'īlī troops, presumably from Dailam or Kūhistān. He then marched across Iran to Khūzistān, where Bursuq's sons Zangī and Il-Begī gave him their support, and in the second battle with Muḥammad, in 494/1101, the latter was defeated and Mu'ayyid al-Mulk captured. In revenge for his mother, and because the vizier had imputed to him Ismā'īlī sympathies, Berk-Yaruq killed him personally.¹

Muḥammad now called in Sanjar from Balkh, and the union of their two armies caused support to melt from Berk-Yaruq. Part of his forces had to be detached and sent with Kūr-Bugha to Āzarbāijān, where Maudūd b. Ismā'il b. Yāqūtī was in revolt against Berk-Yaruq and was vowing vengeance for his father. Problems of logistics and an inability to pay his troops troubled the sultan. He appeared in Baghdad with 5,000 unruly cavalymen who plundered the Sawād and made his cause very unpopular, and when he tried to get a subsidy from the caliph by asking for the arrears of tribute from the Mazyadid ruler Ṣadaqa, he only caused the latter to declare for Muḥammad.² Now he had to retreat southwards into Khūzistān, destroy the bridges behind him to prevent pursuit. Muḥammad's followers had jeeringly called his troops *Bāṭiniyya*, and at some point during his withdrawal from Baghdad, Berk-Yaruq carried out a purge of the Ismā'ilīs in his army. The organizer of Ismā'īlī propaganda in the army is said to have been one of the last scions of the Kākūyids, Muḥammad b. Duṣhmanziyār of Yazd; whether this fact is an instance of Dailamī heterodoxy, or just a fiction hiding other reasons for his killing, is unknown.³

The third battle, at Rūdhrahvar in 495/1102, consisted of indecisive personal combats, after which negotiations were opened up and a settlement reached. Muḥammad was to bear the title of Malik and have Arrān, Āzarbāijān, Diyārbakr, al-Jazīreh, and Mosul; whilst Berk-Yaruq was to have all the rest and the title of Sulṭān. But Muḥammad repudiated this in less than two months and arrogated for himself the sultan's privilege of five *naubas* (salutes of military music). He was routed in a fourth battle and shut himself in Iṣfahān, after hurriedly restoring the walls around 'Alā' al-Daula Ibn Kākūya's palace. Berk-Yaruq now

¹ *Mujmal al-tawārikh*, pp. 409-10; Bundārī, pp. 88-9, 260; Ṣahīr al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, pp. 38-9; Rāvandī, pp. 148-9; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 112-13, 123, 129; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 198-202, 205-7.

² For more on Ṣadaqa, see below, p. 115.

³ Bundārī, p. 261; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 120, 122-4; Ḥusainī, pp. 77-8; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 207-10, 220-1. According to the *Mujmal al-tawārikh*, p. 409, another Kākūyid, 'Alī b. Farāmūz b. 'Alā' al-Daula, fought for Tutuṣh and was killed with him at the battle of Dāshlū (see above, p. 107).

began a nine-month siege of the city during which the occupants suffered terrible deprivations, though Muḥammad managed to escape. Simultaneously the struggle for power in Baghdad and Iraq was being carried on by Berk-Yaruq's shaḥna, Gümüş-Tegin al-Qaiṣarī, and Muḥammad's shaḥna Il Ghāzī b. Artuq. Then in 496/1103 Berk-Yaruq marched into Āzarbāijān against Muḥammad and Maudūd b. Ismā'il b. Yāqūtī, and a fifth and last battle, again a defeat for Muḥammad, took place at Khuy between Lakes Urmīyeh and Vān.¹

Berk-Yaruq's illnesses and the exhaustion of his resources inclined him to make peace in 497/1104, even though he held at this time most of western and central Iran, along with Iraq and Diyārbakr. There was to be a full *divisio imperii*, each ruler becoming sultan in his own lands. Muḥammad was to have north-western Iran, Diyārbakr, al-Jazīreh, Mosul, and Syria; Berk-Yaruq was to have the core of the empire, Jibāl, Ṭabaristān, Fārs, Khūzistān, Baghdad, and the Ḥaramain, i.e. Mecca and Medina; whilst Sanjar was to remain in Khurāsān, making the khutba for Muḥammad. Whether this precarious arrangement would have lasted can only be surmised. A year later Berk-Yaruq died, leaving an infant son Malik-Shāh as his successor and Ayāz as his atabeg. Ayāz and Il-Ghāzī proclaimed him in Baghdad, but Muḥammad marched there *via* Mosul and Ayaz, and Vizier al-Ṣafī Sa'd al-Mulk Abu'l-Maḥāsīn decided that resistance was hopeless. Muḥammad thus became sultan over the whole of the Saljuq territories.²

The verdict of posterity has been that Berk-Yaruq was not a man of his father's calibre. Yet it is not surprising that he burnt himself out by the age of twenty-five, for he campaigned ceaselessly, was often ill, and was several times wounded by assassins. He was never able to dislodge Muḥammad from Āzarbāijān, and he had continuously to defend the core of his territories, Fārs and Jibāl, while also attempting to maintain his influence in Iraq.

The divisions of power between Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad demonstrated cogently how vital was the principle of a patrimonial share-out. The role of the ghulām commanders and the Türkmen begs becomes very prominent in this period, and local Türkmen dynasties

¹ Bundārī, p. 261; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 131, 133-4; Ḥusainī, pp. 77-8; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 224-36.

² *Mujmal al-Tawārikh*, p. 410; Bundārī, pp. 89-90; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 138, 141-3; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 253-5, 260-8; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, *Mir'āt al-ṣamān fī ta'rīkh al-a'yān*, vol. i, pp. 8, 12-13; Barhebraeus, pp. 238-9.

begin to form: the sons of Bursuq in Khūzistān; the Artuqids in Diyārbakr; at Khilāt the Shāh-Armanids, descendants of Ismā'il b. Yāqūti's ghulām Sukmān al-Quṭbi; and shortly afterwards the Zangids, descendants of Aq-Sonqur, in Mosul. Other local dynasties, e.g. the 'Annāzids and Mazyadids, persisted and even strengthened their position. After Malik-Shāh's death there were many young Saljuq princes in provincial appanages, each normally provided with a Turkish ghulām as his atabeg. These tutors not only exercised power on their charges' behalf, but often succeeded in arrogating effective power for themselves, especially after the death of Sulṭān Muḥammad in 511/1118; towards the middle of the century, for example, the family of Eldigüz, atabeg of Arslan b. Toghril b. Muḥammad, founded a powerful, autonomous dynasty in the north-west.¹ A further notable feature of the 6th/12th century was a rise in the prestige and actual power of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate, due in large part to the need of rival claimants for caliphal support and confirmation of titles.

Many of the troops of Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad were furnished by the Turkish amīrs, whose frequent changes of side show that their interest lay in opposing the reconstitution of an effective central power; yet their attitude did ensure that, however crushingly any contestant was defeated, he could generally reassemble forces fairly quickly. The worst sufferers were, of course, the populations of Iran and the Sawād of Iraq, across which armies were constantly marching. The rival sultans were rarely able to collect regular territorial taxation, and irregular levies were therefore resorted to, above all when cities changed hands: e.g. Muḥammad's generals Inal b. Anūsh-Tegin and his brother 'Ali collected 200,000 dīnārs from Iṣfahān in 496/1102.² To satisfy the soldiery, estates were often confiscated and parcelled out as iqṭā's amongst them; it was said against Berk-Yaruq's vizier, al-'Amīd al-A'azz Abu'l-Maḥāsin al-Dihistānī, that he even seized private properties and turned them into iqṭā's.³ Practices like these inevitably contributed to economic and social regression after the period of internal peace under Malik-Shāh.

Scorched-earth tactics were another recognized military measure. When in 498/1105 Chōkermish was threatened at Mosul by Muḥammad, he gathered everyone inside the walls of the city and then devastated the surrounding countryside. The ravages of Sanjar's army in 494/1101

¹ Cf. Cahen, "Atabak", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

² Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. x, p. 243.

³ Bundārī, p. 89.

as he marched through Qūmis to join Muḥammad at Ray were particularly severe, causing famine and reducing people to cannibalism.¹ This general decline in security also encouraged sectarian and factional disturbance. In the cities of Khurāsān, for instance, the old '*aṣabiyyāt*' (factions), involving unpopular groups such as the Shī'a and Karām-iyya, flared up; in Kurdistan there was fighting between the 'Annāzid Surkhāb and the Türkmen of the Salghur tribe, who had been dispossessing the indigenous Kurds of their pastures.²

Above all, the sources state that disturbed conditions favoured the spread of Ismā'ilism, especially in Kūhistān and Fārs. In northern Syria Riḍwān b. Tutuṣh earned himself eternal obloquy from Sunnī historians by his use of local Ismā'ilis in warfare against his brother. Berk-Yaruq massacred Ismā'ilis in western Iran and Baghdad, and other amīrs carried out operations in Dailam, Fārs, and Khūzistān, without, however, permanently dislodging the sectaries from their strongholds.³ Some of the greatest successes of the Bāṭiniyya in this period were in Kūhistān, where large stretches of territory were under their regular control. Mentioned amongst their allies is a certain al-Munawwar, a descendant of the Simjūrid family who in the 4th/10th century had held Kūhistān from the Sāmānids. Sanjar sent both regular troops and ghāzis into the province, but the most he could achieve was an agreement with the Ismā'ilis that they should voluntarily limit their activities.⁴

Muḥammad reigned for thirteen years as undisputed sultan (498–511/1105–18), while his brother Sanjar remained at Balkh as his viceroy in the east, receiving the title of Malik. Whilst the sources are lukewarm about Berk-Yaruq, they eulogize Muḥammad as "the perfect man of the Saljuqs and their mighty stallion", praising his zeal for the Sunna and his hatred of the Bāṭiniyya.⁵ They do not, on the other hand, reveal him to be a more capable ruler or soldier than Berk-Yaruq. Several facts explain Muḥammad's popularity in pious circles. First, it was his fortune to secure sole power after the kingdom had been

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 207, 262; cf. Sanaullah, *Decline of the Saljuqid Empire*, pp. 70 ff. In 494/1101 Sanjar is said to have taxed even baths and caravanserais at Nīshāpūr (Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, p. 123), and the violence and oppression of his ghulāms and agents at Baihaq is mentioned by Ibn Funduq, p. 269.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 238–9.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 217–18, 220–1; cf. Sanaullah, *op. cit.* pp. 66–8, and Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins*, pp. 88 ff.

⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 217, 221–2, 260; cf. Hodgson, *op. cit.* pp. 74–5, 88.

⁵ Bundārī, p. 118.

gripped by civil war for years, and at a time when it was economically exhausted and ready to accept anyone who could give peace. This period of peace enabled the sultan to give moral encouragement and a certain amount of indirect military help to the Syrian amīrs, who were struggling to contain the Crusaders; even more important, he was able to take action against the Ismā'īlis in Persia, who, profiting by the previous disorders, had consolidated their position in Dailam, Fārs, and Kūhistān. Finally, Muḥammad was the last Great Saljuq to have firm and undisputed control of western Iran and Iraq, the heartland of the sultanate since Toghrīl's time. After his death his sons ruled successively as subordinates of Sanjar, and the centre of gravity of the sultanate tended to shift eastwards to its birthplace, Khurāsān. Since the sources are usually partial to Nizām al-Mulk and his descendants, their picture of Muḥammad is influenced by the fact that he received support from the majority of the Nizāmiyya, which began when Mu'ayyid al-Mulk first espoused his cause in 492/1099. Muḥammad also employed Naṣīr al-Mulk b. Mu'ayyid al-Mulk, first as his chief secretary and then as vizier to his sons; and in 500/1107 Ḍiyyā' al-Mulk Aḥmad b. Nizām al-Mulk, became his own vizier for four years, the sultan insisting on having one of the family because of their innate capability and auspiciousness (*baraka*).¹

The ambiguous attitudes and shifting allegiances of the Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab amīrs of Jibāl, Iraq, al-Jazīreh, and Diyārbakr had added much to the confusion of Berk-Yaruq's reign. Muḥammad now endeavoured to curb these amīrs by reducing over-mighty subjects and diverting energies into the holy wars in Syria. But like all preceding sultans, he had to deal first of all with rival claims from members of his own dynasty. In 499/1105-6 Mengü-Bars b. Böri-Bars rebelled at Nihāvand. He tried to draw the sons of Bursuq to his side, but the sultan captured and jailed him together with other potential claimants, the sons of Tekish. In the following year Qilich-Arslan b. Sulaimān, who had been fighting the Franks at Edessa, came to Mosul at the invitation of Zangī b. Chökermish, established himself there, and claimed the sultanate for himself; eventually defeated by Muḥammad's general Chavli, and knowing himself to be a rebel who could expect only short shrift from the sultan, Sulaimān drowned himself to avoid capture.²

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 89, 93, 96 ff.; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, p. 150; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 304.

² Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, p. 146; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 274, 286-7, 293-8; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, p. 22.

It was a measure of Muḥammad's sense of strength that in 501/1108 he decided to overthrow the Mazyadid Saif al-Daula Ṣadaqa. During the fighting between Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad, the so-called "King of the Arabs" had usually lent his support to the latter, but neither side had had a preponderance in central Iraq and the rivalry of the two Saljuqs had probably been helpful to Mazyadid interests. At first Ṣadaqa continued in high favour. Deputed to recover Baṣra, he and Muhadh^hhib al-Daula of the Banū Abī'l-Jabr expelled from there a Turkish amīr who had installed himself during the previous disturbances, and the city was now restored to Saljuq control. Then in 498/1105 he received the grant of Wāsiṭ.¹ But slanders about Ṣadaqa seem to have been spread at the Saljuq court by the 'Amīd Abū Ja'far al-Balkhī: he was even accused of Ismā'īli inclinations, possibly because of his strongly Shī'ī beliefs.

Yet the sources unite in stressing how Ṣadaqa embodied the traditional Arab virtues of liberality and hospitality. His house in Baghdad was "the inviolate refuge of all those in fear" (Ibn al-Jauzī), and "in his reign, Hilla was the halting-place of the traveller, the refuge of the hopeful ones, the asylum of the outcast, and the sanctuary of the terrified fugitive" (Ibn al-Ṭiḡtaqā). Indeed, it was his sheltering of the refugee Dailamī governor of Āveh and Sāveh which gave the sultan a pretext to move against him; before this Ṣadaqa had behaved very circumspectly, refusing in 500/1107 to go to the aid of Zangī b. Chökermish in Mosul lest the sultan be offended. In a battle in the marshlands of al-Za'farāniyya, Ṣadaqa's Arabs and Kurds were defeated by Muḥammad's forces, amongst whom were the sons of Bursuq and the Kākūyid Abū Kālījār Garshāsp; the sultan's palace ghulāms and Turkish archers played a prominent part in decimating Ṣadaqa's front-line troops, and Ṣadaqa himself was killed. It was not Muḥammad's aim to occupy the Mazyadid capital of Hilla; he contented himself with carrying off Ṣadaqa's son Dubais and even appointed Ṣadaqa's old commander-in-chief as governor of the city.²

For several years al-Jazīreh and Mosul had been disputed among various local amīrs. The region was strategically important as a frontier march against the Türkmen elements in Diyārbakr and

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 276-9, 283-4, 302-3.

² Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 102; Zahir al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, p. 39; Rāvandī, *Rāḥat al-sudūr*, p. 154; Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. ix, pp. 156-7, 159; Ḥusainī, *Akbbār al-daula*, pp. 80-1; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 306-14; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, vol. 1, pp. 25-7; Ibn al-Ṭiḡtaqā, *al-Fakhri*, pp. 269-70 (Whitting tr., pp. 291-2).

Armenia, many of whom were grouped around the Artuqid ruler of Nisibīn, Il-Ghāzī, and around Sukmān al-Qutbī of Akhlāt; it was also a frontier against the Crusaders, who were pressing eastwards from Edessa. Furthermore, in these years Ridwān of Aleppo was trying to bring Mosul into his own sphere of influence and thereby utilize its resources for his wars against the Franks. Muḥammad tried to stabilize the position by the direct appointment of successive ghulām governors in Mosul: Chavli Saqao, Maudūd b. Altun-Tegin, Aq-Sonqur al-Bursuqī, and Ai-Aba Juyūsh (?Chavush) Beg, the last two being made atabegs to his son Mas'ūd. He hoped, too, to use these amīrs and their troops against the Franks in Syria. His relations with the spiritual head of Sunnī Islam, the 'Abbasid caliph, were cordial, and in 502/1108-9 a marriage was arranged between al-Mustaẓhir and Muḥammad's sister, the daughter of Malik-Shāh.¹ Appeals for help against the Franks came from the hard-pressed people of Aleppo and even from the Byzantine Emperor Alexis Comnenus. From 501/1107-8 onwards, Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār, the dispossessed ruler of Tripoli, haunted the Saljuq court, until Muḥammad was moved to send troops and money to his cousin Duqaq of Damascus for the relief of Tripoli.² Chavli, Maudūd, Aq-Sonqur, and Bursuq b. Bursuq all campaigned in Syria with little success, mainly because of the coolness of Il-Ghāzī and of Tugh-Tegin of Damascus, who in 509/1115 allied with the Franks. The crushing victory of the Crusaders at Dānīth in that year, coupled with the death of the Saljuq rulers in Syria, put an end to Muḥammad's hopes of intervening in Syria.

Little is mentioned of internal conditions in western and central Iran during Muḥammad's reign, apart from the continuing activities of the Ismā'īlis. On the north-western frontier an attack on Ganja by the Georgians was repelled (503/1109-10).³ After the suppression of Mengü-Bars' revolt in Jibāl, the sultan took the opportunity of exchanging the iqtā's held by Bursuq's sons in Khūzistān for others in the region of Dīnāvār, presumably to reduce the concentration of their power in the south-west.⁴ Fārs was governed by Fakhr al-Daula Chavli Saqao from 498/1104 to 500/1106, and then again from 502/1109 till his death eight years later. According to Ibn al-Athīr's account, Chavli ruled oppressively, using Muḥammad's infant son Chaghri, for whom he

¹ Ḥusainī, pp. 81-2; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 330, 339; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. 1, p. 27.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 315-17, 339; cf. Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. 1, pp. 31, 35-7, 46.

³ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhail ta'rikh Dimashq*, p. 167; Ḥusainī, p. 81.

⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 274.

was atabeg, as a cloak for his tyrannies and expropriations. On the other hand Ibn al-Balkhī, Chavli's contemporary and the local historian of Fārs, mentions several measures taken by the atabeg to restore order and prosperity. The chief obstacle to order in Fārs remained the Shabānkāra'is, and Chavli began systematically to reduce their castles, capturing over seventy of them and dismantling the fortifications of most of them. Campaigns were also launched against the tribal chiefs of the Kurds, such as Ḥasan b. al-Mubārīz of Fasā and Abū Sa'd b. Muḥammad b. Masā of the Karzuvi tribe. The chief of Dārābjird, Ibrāhīm, was expelled and forced to flee to Kirmān, where his kinsman by marriage, the Saljuq ruler of Kirmān, sheltered him. Chavli accordingly marched against Kirmān in 508/1114-15 to demand the extradition of the Shabānkāra'is who had fled there, but he was unable to get beyond a point on the frontier between Fārs and Kirmān.¹ However, Chavli had many positive achievements in Fārs to his credit: the rebuilding of towns, the restoration of agriculture, and in particular the repair of irrigation works and dams, such as the Band-i Qaṣṣār in the district of Lower Kurbāl and the dam in the district of Rāmjird, which was named "Fakhristān" in his honour. On the whole, Muḥammad's reign witnessed a distinct improvement in the pacification of Fārs; the sultan himself conciliated the tribal chieftains and kept a group of Shabānkāra'i leaders permanently in his service at court.²

Kirmān was ruled from 495/1101 to 537/1142 by Muḥiyy al-Islām Arslan-Shāh b. Kirmān Shāh. Although he ruled longer than any other Saljuqs of Kirmān, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm has very little to say about his reign, presumably because it was in general peaceful and uneventful. He does mention Arslan-Shāh's encouragement of the ulema and scholars, and states that in his reign Kirmān reached new heights of commercial prosperity; chaos and piracy in the Persian Gulf meant that much trade was coming overland, and the trading suburb of the capital expanded greatly. The continued existence of this compact Saljuq amirate in eastern central Iran, with its permanent force of Türkmen soldiery, made it a haven for political refugees and for those seeking military help; it was during this period that Kirmān sheltered the Ghaznavid Bahrām-Shāh b. Mas'ūd III. Arslan-Shāh also intervened at Yazd on behalf of the last members of the Kākūyid family,

¹ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Ta'rikh-i Saljūqiyān-i Kirmān*, p. 26 (cf. Houtsma, "Zur Geschichte der Seljuken von Kermān", *Z.D.M.G.* p. 374); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 361-5.

² Ibn al-Balkhī, *Fārs-Nāma*, pp. 128, 130, 151-2, 157-8 (tr., pp. 29, 32, 39, 65-6, 74); Bundārī, p. 122.

who held their fiefs there, and afterwards he received this town from one of the Kākūyid disputants. Keeping up links with the Great Saljuqs, Arslan-Shāh married one of Sultān Muḥammad's daughters, and was careful not to infringe on the rights of Sanjar in Khurāsān. Thus whilst welcoming Bahrām-Shāh, he refused to give him military help, referring him to Sanjar as the senior representative of the Saljuqs in eastern Iran; it was in fact with Sanjar's help that Bahrām-Shāh was placed on the throne at Ghazna in 510/1117 (see below, pp. 158-9).¹

The freedom from external pressure left Muḥammad free to tackle the question of the Ismā'ilīs with some success, although he never permanently quelled them. The political assassinations carried out by the Bāṭinī fidā'īs created an unpleasant atmosphere of suspicion and fear within the sultanate, while the denunciation of "heretics" is a common feature of Muḥammad's reign. In 500/1107 Vizier Sa'd al-Mulk Abu'l-Mahāsīn was denounced by one of his enemies and executed, together with many of the Divān officials;² fifteen years later, under Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, the celebrated poet and stylist al-Ṭughrā'i was executed on a trumped-up charge of heresy (see pp. 158-9 below). Under the influence of the ra'īs of Iṣfahān, 'Abdallāh al-Khaṭībī, Muḥammad purged the administration of many allegedly Ismā'ilī sympathizers, and started a policy of favouring Khurāsānīs at the expense of "Irāqīs" (i.e. those from western Iran or 'Irāq 'Ajamī), on the plea that the Khurāsānīs were stronger supporters of orthodoxy.³

Amongst the military operations against the Bāṭiniyya, the capture of Shāhdīz near Iṣfahān and that of Khānlanjān in 500/1107 brought the sultan much prestige; despite the fact that some of the defenders escaped to Kūhistān and to other fortresses in Fārs, Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Aṭṭāsh and his son were both killed.⁴ Alamūt, the seat of Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāh, was besieged either in 501/1107-8 or two years later by Vizier Diyā' al-Mulk and Amīr Chavli; it was the vizier's failure here which led to his downfall. In 505/1111-12 the sultan sent the governor of Āveh and Sāveh, Anūsh-Tegin Shīrgīr (?b. Shīrgīr), who captured various castles in the region of Qazvīn and Dailam. Towards

¹ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, pp. 25-7 (cf. Houtsma, *Z.D.M.G.* pp. 374-5).

² Bundārī, p. 92; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 304.

³ Bundārī, pp. 95-6.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 91; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, pp. 151-6 (text of *fatḥ-nāma*); Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, pp. 40 ff.; Rāvandī, pp. 155 ff.; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 150-1; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 299-302; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, pp. 19-20; cf. Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins*, pp. 95-6.

the end of the reign Anūsh-Tegin again besieged Alamūt and was near to capturing it when the news of the sultan's death arrived and the army thereupon dispersed, allowing all its stores and baggage to fall into the Assassins' hands.¹

IX. THE SALJUQ SULTANATE IN THE WEST UNDER THE SONS OF
MUḤAMMAD B. MALIK-SHĀH

Muḥammad died in 511/1118 and in his last illness he appointed his son Maḥmūd as successor. Maḥmūd reigned for fourteen years (511-25/1118-31) with the honorific *Muḡhīth al-Dunyā wa'l-Dīn* ("Bringer of Help in Secular and Religious Affairs"). But there were four other sons, Mas'ūd, Toghril, Sulaimān Shāh, and Saljuq Shāh, who at various times and in various parts of the empire also held power. Indeed, Muḥammad's sons held the sultanate in the west for the next three or four decades, and all but Saljuq Shāh reigned in turn.²

The centrifugal tendencies of the previous two reigns, held in check for a time by Muḥammad, now had free play. The succession in western Iran and Iraq was permanently in dispute, often with as many as three or four claimants at one time, each backed by his atabeg or guardian. The sultans had to find support amongst the powerful Turkish amirs, and this usually meant the alienation of territory and of fiscal rights in the form of iqta's, as well as the interference of amirs even within the sultans' own bureaucracy. Anushīrvān b. Khālīd, who was Maḥmūd's vizier in 521/1127 and 522/1128 and thus had first-hand experience of affairs, laments the decline of the Saljuq state after Muḥammad's death: "In Muḥammad's reign", he says, "the kingdom was united and secure from all attacks; but when it passed to his son Maḥmūd, they split up that unity and destroyed its cohesion. They claimed a share with him in the power, and left him only a bare subsistence."³

In the east Maḥmūd's uncle, Sanjar, remained the senior member of the dynasty. Although it had become the practice for the supreme sultanate to devolve on the ruler of western Iran and Iraq, Sanjar's

¹ Bundārī, p. 117; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, p. 162 (year 501); Ḥusainī, pp. 81-2; Ibn al-Athīr vol. x, pp. 335 (year 503), 369-70; Juvainī, *Ta'rikh-i Jahān-Gushā*, vol. II, pp. 680-1; cf. Hodgson, *op. cit.* pp. 97-8.

² Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 118; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 367-9; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, vol. I, pp. 69-70.

³ Bundārī, p. 134. For a detailed account of Maḥmūd's sultanate, see M. A. Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu tarihi*, vol. II, *İkinci İmparatorluk Devri*, pp. 5-148, 164-73.

seniority gave him a special standing under Turkish customary law. This seems to be reflected in his decision to assume his father Malik-Shāh's old title *Mu'izz al-Dunyā wa'l-Dīn* ("Strengtheners in Secular and Religious Affairs") as soon as Muḥammad had died; and on coins minted by Maḥmūd in the west, Sanjar's name is accorded primacy over his own. Whenever there was doubt over the succession in the west, it was to Sanjar that the problem was taken; on Maḥmūd's death in 525/1131, the Caliph al-Mustashīd refused to interfere personally, but referred the claimants Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad and Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd to Sanjar, who in fact decided in favour of Toghrīl.¹ The later years of Sanjar's rule in the east were clouded by external threats and internal unrest among the Ghuzz tribesmen, but in the earlier period his territories enjoyed relative peace, and this contrasted notably with the instability and confusion of the west, where the atabegs and other amīrs had secured much of the substance of power.

At the outset of his reign, in 513/1119, Maḥmūd had to face an invasion of his lands by Sanjar, who alleged that the Chief Ḥājib 'Alī Bār had secured an objectionable ascendancy over the young ruler, and that Maḥmūd was encouraging the Qarakhānids to attack him from behind. He came with a powerful army, whose commanders were said to include five kings: Sanjar, the rulers of Ghazna and Sīstān, the Khwārazm-Shāh Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad, and the Kākūyid 'Alā' al-Daula Garshāsp, Ismā'ilīs and pagan Turks were among its troops, and there were forty elephants.² Sanjar defeated Maḥmūd at Sāveh, and pushed on through Jibāl as far as Baghdad. When peace and amity were finally restored, Maḥmūd was given one of Sanjar's daughters in marriage and was made his uncle's heir, but he in turn had to relinquish important territories in the north of Iran. Sanjar remained in occupation of Ṭabaristān, Qūmis, Damāvand, and, most important of all, Ray, which was to serve as a kind of watchtower over western Iran.

Nor did Maḥmūd have much direct control over the north-western provinces. His brother Toghrīl had received from Sultan Muḥammad the iqtā's of Sāveh, Āveh, and Zanjān, with Amīr Shīrgīr designated as his atabeg. At the instigation of a new atabeg, Kün-Toghdī, Toghrīl had rebelled against Maḥmūd, and although the rebels were forced to withdraw to Ganja, they strengthened their position through Sanjar's

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 385, 474 ff.; Köymen, *op. cit.* p. 21. For a further discussion of Sanjar's constitutional position, see below, section x, pp. 135-7.

² Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. ix, p. 205; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, p. 77.

Diktat to Maḥmūd. They further obtained Gilān and Dailam, in addition to Qazvīn and several towns of the north-west, and from this base Toghrīl successfully defied Maḥmūd for the whole of the latter's reign.¹

Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad was malik of Mosul, al-Jazīrah, and Āzarbāijān, and Ai-Aba Juyūsh Beg was his atabeg. Ample support for Mas'ūd's ambitions came from the troops of local Türkmen and Kurdish chiefs—especially from 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī, the son of Malik-Shāh's ghulām commander Qasīm al-Daula Aq-Sonqur. Moreover, the Mazyadid Dubais b. Ṣadaqa was eager to see Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd embroiled in warfare. According to Ibn al-Jauzī, "Saif al-Daula [Dubais] rejoiced at the conflict between the two sultans and believed that he and his power would be preserved as long as they were involved together, just as his father Ṣadaqa's position had been favoured by the hostility of the two sultans [Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad]".² Mas'ūd and Juyūsh Beg rebelled openly in 514/1120, but Maḥmūd's general Aq-Sonqur Bursuqī defeated them at Asadābād. Only Mas'ūd's vizier Ḥasan b. 'Alī al-Ṭuḡhrā'i lost his life; Mas'ūd himself was pardoned and Juyūsh Beg conciliated. Two years later Juyūsh Beg was deputed to suppress a revolt in Āzarbāijān led by Toghrīl and his new atabeg Aq-Sonqur Aḥmadīlī, muqta' of Marāgheh. Dubais, however, was forced to flee to his wife's relatives, the Artuqids of Mārdīn, and then to the safety of the inaccessible marshes in the Baṭiḥa of southern Iraq. Mosul was granted to Aq-Sonqur Bursuqī, and in Diyārbakr the death of Il-Ghāzī b. Artuq caused a split in the Artuqid family and a division of their territories which for the moment neutralized this quarter for the sultan.³

Dissension within the Saljuq family allowed the 'Abbāsīd caliphs to increase their secular power in the course of the 6th/12th century. This process is discernible under the capable caliphs al-Mustarshīd (512-29/1118-35) and al-Muqtafī (530-55/1136-60), and it becomes particularly marked in the long and successful reign of al-Nāṣir (575-622/1180-1225).⁴ During Maḥmūd's reign the hostility of the Shī'ī Mazyadids

¹ Bundārī, pp. 125-35, 264-5; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, p. 53; Rāvandī, *Rāhat al-sudūr*, p. 205; Ḥusainī, *Akbbār al-daula al-Saljūqīyya*, pp. 88-90; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 383-9; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, pp. 77-8.

² Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, p. 218; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 378-81.

³ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhail ta'rikh Dimashq*, pp. 202-3; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 54; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 217-18; Ḥusainī, pp. 96-7; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 378-81, 395-7, 414-15, 421-2, 426; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. ii, pp. 89-91; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yan*, vol. i, 463; Köymen, *op. cit.* pp. 27-41.

⁴ For more on al-Nāṣir, see section xii, pp. 168-9 below.

prevented al-Mustarshid from ever alienating the Saljuqs too much. Indeed, Ibn al-Athīr says that the sultans left Dubais in power merely as a check on the caliph; when al-Mustarshid died and Dubais's role here was finished, Mas'ūd executed him.¹ On one occasion the caliph had to implore Maḥmūd to remain in the capital as a safeguard against Dubais, who had sworn to raze Baghdad to the ground. In 516/1122 al-Mustarshid was obliged to accept as his vizier the brother of Maḥmūd's own vizier, Shams al-Mulk 'Uthmān b. Nizām al-Mulk, and when the latter was executed in 518/1124 al-Mustarshid had to remove the brother from office correspondingly. However, in company with Aq-Sonqur Bursuqī the caliph defended Baghdad against Dubais and in 517/1123 took the field personally against him; this act, together with his seizure and destruction of wine in the sultan's market at Baghdad in 514/1120, signified his growing self-confidence. The sultan's shahna in Baghdad, Sa'd al-Daula Yürün-Qush, was perturbed enough in 510/1126 to warn Maḥmūd of the caliph's rising confidence and military expertise, and he foresaw an attack on the sultan's rights in Iraq if the latter did not come personally to enforce them. Maḥmūd did come to Baghdad and besiege al-Mustarshid in the eastern part of the city, forcing him to make peace and hand over the stipulated tribute.²

Dubais joined with Toghrīl in 519/1125 to harass the sultan and caliph in Iraq; but they were unable to remain there, and Maḥmūd pursued them through Jibāl into Khurāsān, where they took refuge with Sanjar. They then aroused Sanjar with stories of Maḥmūd's disaffection and his closeness to the caliph, causing Sanjar to come westwards to Ray in 522/1128. But the two sultans were reconciled there, and Dubais was forced to flee to Hilla, Baṣra, and finally Syria, where he fell into the hands of Zangī and narrowly escaped death. Two years later Mas'ūd came to Sāveh from Khurāsān, where he had been staying with Sanjar; it was feared that the latter was instigating him to rebel, but the two brothers made peace at Kirmānshāh, and Maḥmūd granted to Mas'ūd the iqtā' of Ganja.³

Being so pre-occupied with internal difficulties, Maḥmūd could give

¹ Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 52-3; Ḥusainī, p. 108; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 349-50.

² Ibn al-Qalānisi, pp. 215-16, 217-18; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 218, 232-4, 245-6; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 425, 428-30, 433-4, 447-50; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, pp. 100-1; Köymen, *op. cit.* pp. 43 ff.

³ Ibn al-Qalānisi, pp. 230-1; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 252-4, vol. x, pp. 8-9, 20; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 459, 469-71; Köymen, *op. cit.* pp. 75-91, 117-29.

only intermittent attention to the external frontiers of his part of the empire. During his reign the main danger zone was in the north-west, Arrān and the Caucasus, where the Georgians became very active under "The Restorer", David IV (1089-1125). He not only brought into Georgia large bands of slave troops and Qipchaq mercenaries, but he ceased the payment of tribute to the Saljuqs and interfered with the seasonal migrations of the Türkmén into Georgia. Maḥmūd sent an expedition against him in 515/1121 in which the Artuqid Il-Ghāzī, Toghrīl, Dubais, and Kün-Toghdī took part, but the Muslim army was destroyed and the triumphant Georgians entered Tiflis, dislodging the local Muslim family of the Banū Ja'far. It was probably in 517/1123, shortly after the fall of Tiflis, that David scored a further success by entering Ani without striking a blow. There he deposed the Shaddādīd amīr Abu'l-Asvār II b. Manūchīhr (? 503-17/? 1110-23), restored the Armenian cathedral to its Christian usage, and installed in Ani an Armenian governor. This governor was later threatened by a Saljuq army under Sanjar, probably in 520/1126, and returned the city to Faḍl III b. Abu'l-Asvār II (reigned c. 520-4/c. 1126-30). Georgian expansion eastwards to Shamākhī and Darband also affected the Muslim principality of Shīrvān, and in 517/1123 Maḥmūd came to this province. He seized the Shīrvān Shāh (possibly Manūchīhr II b. Farīdūn) and behaved so repressively that Shīrvān's annual tribute to the Saljuq treasury now dried up; in the end, a threatened attack by David the Restorer compelled the sultan to withdraw.¹ Ibn al-Athīr alleges that in the course of an expedition in 524/1130, just before his death, Maḥmūd captured the Ismā'īlī stronghold of Alamūt; but the verdict of another source, that the sultan achieved no successes here, is probably nearer the truth.²

In judging Maḥmūd as a ruler, the sources praise his justice and clemency and also his excellence as an Arabic scholar, saying that he attained a level of literacy not common among the Saljuqs.³ Conversely, Anūshīrvān b. Khālīd assesses his conduct of administration severely. He lists ten great faults of his reign, including the alienation of Sanjar

¹ Ibn al-Qalānīsī, pp. 204-5; al-Fāriqī, *Ta'rīkh Mayyāfāriqīn*, in Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhail ta'rīkh Dimashq*, pp. 205-6 n.; Bundārī, pp. 139-41; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 398-9, 434; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. 1, pp. 101-2; Minorsky, "Tiflis", and Barthold, "Shīrwānshāh", in *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.); Allen, *A History of the Georgian People*, pp. 96-100; Minorsky, *Studies in Caucasian History*, pp. 83-5.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 469; cf. Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins*, p. 102.

³ Bundārī, p. 156; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 53; Rāvandī, p. 203; Ḥusainī, p. 99; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 471.

and Dubais, the dispersal of royal *ghulāms*, a moral deterioration at court, and the squandering of the treasure amassed by his father. Much obloquy is heaped on his viziers, such as the tyrannical *Shams al-Mulk 'Uthmān*, but above all on *Qiwām al-Dīn Abu'l-Qāsim al-Darguzīnī*, or *al-Ansabādhi*, who acted as 'Arid al-Jaish and then as vizier for *Maḥmūd*; on his dismissal he acted as vizier for *Toghrīl* in *Āzarbāijān*, again achieving a reputation for tyranny, till in 527/1133 *Toghrīl* executed him. *Anushīrvān* sneers at his peasant origin; he also accuses him of friendliness towards the *Bāṭiniyya*, of using his official position to get rid of enemies, and of financial rapacity.¹ Yet it must be remembered that the sultan's financial position was usually parlous. His direct rule extended only to *Jibāl*, northern *Fārs*, and the *Baghdad* area, with a summer capital in *Hamadān* and a winter one in *Baghdad*, and from these regions he had to find *iqṭā's* for the soldiers directly in his employ. Because of financial problems, the sphere of operations of his *divāns* was drastically reduced, and the vizier was compelled to get money by seizures and confiscations. One vizier, *Kamāl al-Mulk 'Alī al-Simirumī*, earned great unpopularity in 514/1120 by reimposing the local tolls and market taxes (*mukūs*) which had been abolished thirteen years previously by *Sultān Muḥammad*.² Accordingly, it is not surprising that *Maḥmūd* got through the greater part of the treasure chest—it contained eighteen million *dīnārs* in cash alone—which his father had assembled.³

A further period of crisis and chaos occurred in 525/1131 when *Maḥmūd* died. At *Hamadān* his young son *Dā'ūd* was proclaimed sultan by *al-Darguzīnī*, with *Aq-Sonqur Aḥmadilī* assuming the office of atabeg. *Dā'ūd* was recognized in *Jibāl* and *Āzarbāijān*, but in *Iraq* *Mas'ūd* proclaimed himself sultan, and in *Fārs* and *Khūzistān* another brother, *Saljuq-Shāh*, supported by the Atabeg *Qaracha*, also claimed the throne. The caliph referred the disputants to *Sanjar*, as senior member of the dynasty, but *Sanjar's* intervention only brought into the arena his own protégé, *Toghrīl*, whose claim he now pushed. *Sanjar* came to *Jibāl* in person and set *Toghrīl* on the throne, giving him *al-Darguzīnī* as his vizier; he also invited *Dubais b. Ṣadaqa* and *Zangī* to invade *Iraq* and embarrass *Mas'ūd's* ally the caliph. Complex military operations followed, but *Sanjar's* withdrawal to *Transoxiana*,

¹ *Bundārī*, pp. 120-4, 138, 144 ff., 163, 166-9; *Ibn al-Athīr*, vol. x, pp. 482-3.

² *Ibn al-Jauzī*, vol. ix, pp. 218, 239; *Ibn al-Athīr*, vol. x, p. 425; *Sibt b. al-Jauzī*, vol. i, p. 91; cf. pp. 107-9.

³ *Bundārī*, pp. 155-6; *Ḥusainī*, pp. 98-9; cf. *Ibn Khallikān*, vol. iii, p. 346.

where a Qarakhānid revolt had broken out, left Toghrīl in a very shaky position (see below, p. 139). He could find no popular support in Jibāl, where the people of Iṣfahān refused to admit him to their city, and after being twice defeated by Mas'ūd, he fled to Ray and then to Ṭabaristān, where the Bāvandid Ispahbadh 'Alā' al-Daula 'Alī b. *Shahriyār* (511-34/1117-40) sheltered him during the winter of 527/1132-3. Mas'ūd's involvement with Dā'ūd, who was holding out in Āzarbāijān, permitted Toghrīl to gather together an army and make a successful *revanche*. Mas'ūd was driven from Hamadān and fled to Baghdad in a wretched state. When at last Toghrīl seemed secure on the throne, he fell ill at Hamadān; and at the beginning of 529/1134, after a troubled reign of only two years, he died.¹

A race for the throne occurred when the news spread of Toghrīl's end. Mas'ūd was in Baghdad, but he managed to clear a way through the mountain snows, using camels to trample a road; he was received in Hamadān by the amīrs and proclaimed sultan with the honorific *Ghiyāth al-Dunyā wa'l-Dīn*. In this fashion he began a reign of nearly twenty years (529-47/1134-52), the longest of any sultan in the west since Malik-*Shāh*'s time. He employed as his vizier Anushīrvān b. *Khalīd* and entrusted to his tutelage his brother Dā'ūd b. Muḥammad.²

As in Maḥmūd's time, the sultan's authority was in practice confined to Jibāl and central Iraq. When Mas'ūd obtained the throne, the rival claimant Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd, who had been cheated of the succession on his father's death two years before, remained in Āzarbāijān, and over the following years he made several attempts from this base to seize the sultanate. Eventually conciliated by Mas'ūd's recognition of him as the valī 'ahd, he now married one of the sultan's daughters and settled down at Tabrīz, but in 538/1143-4 he was assassinated by the Ismā'īlīs, allegedly at the instigation of Zangī, who feared that Mas'ūd was about to send Dā'ūd to take control of his own region of northern Syria.³ In the later years of Mas'ūd's reign the north-west passed into the hands of a series of powerful Turkish amīrs who behaved as virtually independent rulers. After the death of Qara-Sonqur in 535/

¹ Bundārī, pp. 156-72; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, pp. 54-5; Rāvandī, pp. 208-9; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 20-1, 25, 35-6, 41; Ḥusainī, pp. 99-105; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 471, 474-80, 482-3, vol. xi, pp. 6, 10-11; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, pp. 136, 145; Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu tarihi*, vol. ii, pp. 174-218, 237-50.

² Bundārī, pp. 174-5; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, pp. 55-6; Rāvandī, pp. 226-7; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 345; Köymen, *op. cit.* pp. 250-4.

³ Bundārī, p. 195; Ḥusainī, p. 114.

1140-1, Chavli Jāndār took over in Āzarbāijān, Arrān, and Armenia, finally becoming the atabeg to Mas'ūd's son Malik-Shāh.¹ Chavli's own death occurred in 541/1146, after which 'Abd al-Raḥmān Toghan-Yürek succeeded him as atabeg to the young prince and added the governorship of Arrān and Āzarbāijān to his existing iqtā' of Khalkhāl; but in 541/1147, alarmed at Toghan-Yürek's power, the sultan procured his murder (see p. 132 below).² Nevertheless, the end of Mas'ūd's sultanate saw power in Āzarbāijān being monopolized by two Turkish amīrs, Shams al-Dīn Eldigüz, the atabeg of Arslan b. Toghrīl, and Aq-Sonqur (or Arslan) b. Aq-Sonqur Aḥmadīlī of Marāgheh.

Fārs was for many years ruled by the Amīr Boz-Aba, the irreconcilable enemy of Sultan Mas'ūd ever since 531/1136-7, when the sultan had killed Boz-Aba's companion, the atabeg Mengü-Bars. Boz-Aba maintained himself in Fārs till Mas'ūd captured him in battle and executed him (542/1147-8).³ In the years before this violent end, the amīr had successfully fought off attempts by other amīrs to oust him from possession of Fārs, in favour of the princes for whom they were atabegs. Thus in 533/1138-9 the atabeg Qara-Sonqur, together with Dā'ūd and Saljuq-Shāh, the sons of Sultan Muḥammad, had invaded Fārs and placed Saljuq-Shāh on the throne at Shīrāz as local malik; but once Qara-Sonqur had departed, Boz-Aba came back, seized Saljuq-Shāh, and jailed him. At the end of his life Boz-Aba espoused the cause of two of Mahmūd's sons, Muḥammad and Malik-Shāh, and for a brief moment before his final downfall placed them on the throne in Jibāl (see below, p. 131).⁴

With regard to Saljuq influence in Iraq and al-Jazīreh, the most significant event in Mas'ūd's reign was the meteoric rise of 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī b. Aq-Sonqur, a Turkish amīr of slave origin. Zangī's sphere of expansion was essentially that of the Arab lands in al-Jazīreh, Diyārbakr, and northern Syria, but the possession of Mosul gave him an important base for penetration northwards and eastwards into Kurdistān, and on several occasions he allied with the discontented Turkish amīrs in Iran against the sultan and caliph. Indeed, Mas'ūd, came to regard him as the arch-instigator of the rebellious coalitions which encompassed him. As governor of Wāsiṭ and Baṣra in Sulṭān Mahmūd's time, Zangī had successfully administered the difficult and confused delta region of Iraq, and in 521/1127, with the death of the

¹ Bundārī, pp. 195, 203-4.

² Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 76-7.

³ Bundārī, pp. 184, 219-20; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, 78-9.

⁴ Bundārī, pp. 219-20.

governor of Mosul, 'Izz al-Dīn Mas'ūd al-Bursuqī, Maḥmūd appointed Zangī in his stead; he also gave him the custody of his sons Alp-Arslan and Farrukh-Shāh, so that Zangī now became an atabeg.¹

From Mosul, Zangī began a policy of conquest against the Arab and Türkmen rulers of Diyārbakr and northern Syria, as well as against the Franks and Byzantines. First he captured Aleppo, Ḥims, and Ḥamā, and then in 539/1144 he achieved the success which made him the idol of Sunnī historians, the capture of Edessa from Count Jocelyn II. His death came in 541/1146 at the hands of his own ghulāms whilst he was besieging the 'Uqailid Sālīm b. Mālik in Qalāt Ja'bar.² Although his exploits had made him a Sunnī hero, Zangī was always hostile to the 'Abbasids. In Mas'ūd's reign he allied with the Shī'ī Mazyadids and with the deposed Caliph al-Rāshid against the Caliph al-Muqtafī of Baghdad; and in 528/1134, during Toghrīl's reign, his extensive operations in the Hakkārī region of Kurdistān and Armenia were provoked by the Kurdish chiefs' help to al-Mustarshid, given in the previous year when the caliph had besieged Zangī in Mosul and expelled him from it.³

At the close of the year in which Mas'ūd was acknowledged sultan (529/1135), Caliph al-Mustarshid was assassinated by a Bāṭinī, thus ending a reign full of military and political activity. His son al-Rāshid reigned only for one year (529-30/1135-6), and his deposition at Mas'ūd's instigation marks the high tide of Saljuq influence in Baghdad at this time. The new caliph, al-Muqtafī b. al-Mustazhir (530-55/1136-60), proved to be a capable and energetic warrior as well as a religious figurehead. Receiving at the outset of his reign the revenues which his father had held, he began to build up a personal army of Armenian and Greek ghulāms, excluding Turks because he found them unreliable.⁴ He strengthened the wall which al-Mustarshid and his vizier Abū Naṣr Aḥmad b. Nizām al-Mulk had built round Baghdad in 517/1123, and he also dug a trench around the city.⁵ He was therefore able on several occasions to defy the sultans, and when Mas'ūd died and a period of even greater disunity within the Saljuq dynasty ensued, he extended caliphal authority over the whole of lower and

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 453-7.

² Ibn al-Qalanīsī, pp. 284-7; Bundārī, pp. 208-9; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 71-4.

³ *al-Kāmil*, vol. xi, pp. 2-3, 7-9; cf. K. Zetterstéen, "Zengī, 'Imād al-Dīn", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.).

⁴ Bundārī, p. 235; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 28.

⁵ Bundārī, *loc. cit.*; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 233-4; Ibn al-Ṭīqtaqā, p. 273 (Whitting tr., pp. 295-6).

central Iraq to a degree unknown since the early 4th/10th century. As Ibn al-Ṭiṭṭaqā says: "In his reign there occurred much civil strife and warfare between him and the Sultan of Persia, in which the victory lay with him; his reign was also characterized by much activity on the part of 'ayyārs and evil-doers [the sources stress the sharp rise of *'iyāra*, i.e. brigandage and mob violence, in the capital at this time], for the suppression of which he took firm steps."¹

In the early months of Mas'ūd's sultanate, relations with al-Mustarshid deteriorated rapidly. The caliph prepared for war, helped by some Turkish amīrs who had deserted Mas'ūd, and also by Bursuq b. Bursuq of Khūzistān, who linked up with him in Jibāl; whilst Dā'ūd in Āzarbāijān arranged to join forces with the caliph at Dīnāvār. Nevertheless, Mas'ūd coped easily with this coalition. In a battle at Dāi-Marg near Hamadān, which was really little more than a skirmish, the caliph's Turkish troops deserted to the Saljuq army. The caliph himself was taken prisoner, and shortly afterwards was murdered by Ismā'īlis in the sultan's camp at Marāgheh, whither Mas'ūd had gone in pursuit of Dā'ūd. Mas'ūd confiscated al-Mustarshid's estates and property in Baghdad and is said to have looted ten million dinārs worth of goods, the chests of coin alone requiring one hundred and seventy mules to carry them away. From Khurāsān, Sanjar had written enjoining Mas'ūd to treat the caliph with respect, although according to 'Imād al-Dīn, contemporaries whispered that Sanjar himself was really behind al-Mustarshid's assassination.²

The new caliph al-Rāshid was quickly involved in hostilities with Mas'ūd over the non-payment of a tribute customarily due to the sultan. Barring Mas'ūd's representative Yürün-Qush from Baghdad, he formed a grand coalition against the sultan, embracing Dā'ūd from Āzarbāijān, Zangī from Mosul, Ṣadaqa b. Dubais, and his "atabeg" 'Antara b. Abi'l-'Askar (the appearance of this typically Turkish office amongst a purely Arab dynasty is interesting), together with Bursuq b. Bursuq, the son of Aq-Sonqur Aḥmadilī, and the Turkish governors of Qazvin and Iṣfahān. In the extreme south Mas'ūd's brother Saljuq-Shāh came from Khūzistān and seized Wāsiṭ. But Mas'ūd remained master of events. He captured Baghdad, and the caliph fled with

¹ Bundārī, pp. 235-6; Ibn al-Ṭiṭṭaqā, p. 276 (Whitting tr., pp. 298-9).

² Bundārī, pp. 176-8. See also Nizāmī 'Arūḍī, *Chabār Maqāla*, pp. 36-7 (E. G. Browne tr., pp. 23-4); Zahr al-Dīn Nishāpūri, p. 56; Rāvandī, pp. 227-8; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 43-9; Ḥusainī, pp. 106-8; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 14-17; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, pp. 156-8; Juvainī, *Ta'riḥ-i Jabān-Gushā*, vol. ii, pp. 683-5; Ibn Khallikān, vol. iii, p. 364.

Zangī to Mosul. Mas'ūd now assembled the religious dignitaries of the capital and pointed out how al-Rāshid had broken his vow of allegiance and his promise never to take up arms against the sultan. Al-Rāshid's financial requisitions for his soldiers had made him unpopular; a fatwā, or judicial opinion, was secured for his deposition, and his uncle set up as al-Muqtafi (530/1136).¹ This triumph was the peak of Mas'ūd's career. His general Qara-Sonqur followed it up by routing Dā'ūd at Marāgheh; Saljuq-Shāh's position in Khūzistān became unsafe and he actually had to appeal to Mas'ūd for assistance. The sultan obtained the loyalty of Ṣadaqa by marrying the latter's daughter, and he also appointed Ṣadaqa's brother Muḥammad to govern Ḥilla, while the new caliph married Mas'ūd's sister Fāṭima.²

There still remained the threat from Malik Dā'ūd and the ex-caliph al-Rāshid, who gathered round themselves in Āzarbāijān a group of amīrs fearful of a rise in the sultan's power. Al-Rāshid had already appealed to Sanjar for help against Mas'ūd, but Sanjar's preoccupations with Transoxianan affairs compelled him to refuse.³ Mas'ūd defeated and killed the chief of these rebellious amīrs, Mengü-Bars, governor of Fārs, but he was in turn defeated by Amīr Toghan-Yürek, who captured and killed the Mazyadid Ṣadaqa and the sons of Qara-Sonqur, the atabeg of Āzarbāijān. From the south Saljuq-Shāh made an attempt on Baghdad. Al-Rāshid, Dā'ūd, and Boz-Aba established themselves in the Saljuq capital Hamadān; but al-Rāshid was unable to make any further headway, and a group of his Khurāsānian soldiers, possibly having Ismā'īlī sympathies, murdered him at Iṣfahān in 532/1137-8.⁴

Dā'ūd seems now to have despaired of achieving the sultanate for himself, and to have settled for a limited sphere of authority in Āzarbāijān, where for the remaining six years of his life he was governor under the Atabeg Ayaz. To Saljuq-Shāh, Mas'ūd allotted the governorship of Akhlāt, Malāzgird, and Arzan in eastern Anatolia, all the former territories of the Shāh-Armanid Nāṣir al-Dīn Sukmān II; and the amīr of Tabriz, Qiz-Oghlu (?Ghuzz-Oghlu), led an expedition thither to take up possession.⁵ In the next year, 533/1138-9, seeking

¹ Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 56; Rāvandī, p. 229; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 54-62; Ḥusainī, pp. 108-9; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 22-4, 26-9; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, p. 158.

² Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 67, 72; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 29-30; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, p. 161.

³ Ḥusainī, p. 109.

⁴ Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 67-8, 72, 76; Ḥusainī, pp. 109-10; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 39-41; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, pp. 164, 167-8; Juvainī, vol. ii, pp. 685-6.

⁵ Bundārī, p. 185; Ḥusainī, p. 111.

revenge on Boz-Aba for the killing of his son, Qara-Sonqur took with him both Dā'ūd and Saljuq-Shāh (the latter having been recalled from Akhlāt) on an expedition to Fārs. Saljuq-Shāh was placed on the throne as malik of Fārs, but in the following year he was deposed by Boz-Aba, thenceforth disappearing from history and probably dying in captivity. Thus Fārs and Khūzistān remained in the hands of Boz-Aba.¹ In 535/1140-1 Mas'ūd sent two generals against him, Ismā'il Chahārdāngī and Alp-Qush Khūn-Kar, but they were unable to collect sufficient funds in Iraq for the expedition, and after some futile operations in the Baṭīḥa it was abandoned.²

Shortly before this expedition, Qara-Sonqur had had to deal with a descent of the Georgians on Ganja. During Maḥmūd's reign Ganja had been recaptured for a while by one of its ancestral Shaddādid rulers, Faḍl III b. Abī'l-Asvār II, but soon afterwards it fell under the power of a Turkish amīr, Toghan-Arslan al-Aḥḍab ("the hump-backed"), ruler of Bitlis and Arzan, whose son Qurtī was probably responsible for Faḍl's death in 524/1130. The Georgian attack was led by a noble of the Orbeliani family, Ivane b. Abī Laith; it came on top of a serious earthquake at Ganja and caused great loss of life and property, but was repulsed by Qara-Sonqur when he arrived in Arrān.³

In the middle years of his reign, Mas'ūd fell more and more under the influence of the Turkish amīrs. Their ability to dictate to the sultan, even in matters concerning the central bureaucracy, was clearly shown in 533/1139 when they secured the dismissal and death of Mas'ūd's vizier. Mas'ūd had found his first vizier, Anushīrvān b. Khālid, too mild and lenient; his second one, al-Darguzīnī, a relative of the vizier to Maḥmūd and Toghrīl, was useless and incompetent, so in 533/1139 Mas'ūd appointed to the vizierate his treasurer, Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad. Distinguished for his equity and probity Kamāl al-Dīn abolished vexatious taxes and investigated complaints of tyranny. He was zealous in asserting the sultan's financial rights, and uncovered thefts and embezzlements. Not surprisingly he made many enemies, so that Qara-Sonqur threatened a refusal to march against Fārs and a withdrawal of allegiance in favour of one of the Saljuq claimants if the over-zealous vizier were not removed; Mas'ūd was obliged to agree to this and to appoint Qara-Sonqur's personal vizier as his own chief minister.

¹ Bundārī, pp. 188-9; Zāhir al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, p. 57; Rāvandī, p. 231; Ḥusainī, pp. 111-13; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 49.

² *al-Kāmil*, vol. xi, pp. 51-2.

³ Bundārī, p. 190; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 52; cf. Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, pp. 85-6.

After this, says Ibn al-Athīr, "Things became difficult for Sulṭān Mas'ūd. He was impotent to prevent the amīrs from parcelling out the whole land as iqtā's for themselves, so that in the end he had no territory left at all for himself, but merely the name of Sulṭān."¹

Qara-Sonqur died at Ardabīl in 535/1140-1, much mourned by the people of Āzarbāijān. When he was dying, he named the Amīr Chavli Jāndār as his successor in Āzarbāijān and Arrān, and Mas'ūd had to agree to this. In Ray, the Amīr 'Abbās—he was a slave of Jauhar, Sanjar's former governor there—consolidated his power. He collected round himself a large slave guard and soon acquired a reputation as a hammer of the Ismā'īlis in the Alburz area, who had killed his master Jauhar; and on one occasion he led an expedition against Alamūt.² At the sultan's court, the loyalty of the Chief Ḥājib 'Abd al-Rahmān Toghan-Yürek was a dubious quantity, in part because of jealousy of Mas'ūd's favourite, Khāṣṣ Beg Arslan b. Palang-Eri. In his struggle against the disaffected amīrs centred round 'Abbās of Ray, Toghan-Yürek, and Boz-Aba of Fārs, Mas'ūd could generally count upon the support of the two leading figures in Āzarbāijān, Chavli (until his death in 541/1146), and Eldigüz, who was atabeg to Arslan b. Toghrīl and for a time had been Mas'ūd's shāhna in Baghdad.

The sultan resolved to bring 'Abbās to heel and came to Ray with an army, but he was bought off by rich presents from the amīr. A series of conspiratorial negotiations between 'Abbās and Boz-Aba now began, culminating in 540/1145-6 in a definite rebellion. Boz-Aba brought to Iṣfahān and Hamadān the two princes Muḥammad and Malik-Shāh, sons of Sulṭān Maḥmūd, while the sultan left Baghdad for Kirmānshāh, and was joined by Eldigüz and other amīrs of Āzarbāijān whose assistance he had invoked. 'Abbās marched from Ray with yet another Saljuq prince, Mas'ūd's brother Sulaimān-Shāh. Meanwhile, the sultan had pushed on to Marāgheh, where he was joined by Chavli. A battle near Kāshān was imminent, but Sulaimān-Shāh and 'Abbās withdrew towards Ray and then to Ardahān, pursued by Mas'ūd. Boz-Aba was compelled by these desertions to fall back on Iṣfahān with the two Saljuq maliks; from there, with Chavli in pursuit, he escaped to Fārs. Despite this apparent success, Mas'ūd's position was far from strong; the loyalty of his Chief Ḥājib, Toghan-Yürek, was

¹ Bundārī, pp. 185-6; Zahir al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, p. 57; Rāvandī, pp. 230-1; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 78-9; Ḥusainī, pp. 111-12; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 42, 46.

² Bundārī, pp. 190-2; Zahir al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, p. 58; Rāvandī, p. 232; Ḥusainī, p. 113; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 76-7.

uncertain, for it was believed that his sympathies inclined towards the rebels. The sultan made peace with 'Abbās and received the custody of Sulaimān-Shāh, who was now consigned to imprisonment. When Chavli died, Toghan-Yürek received what he had long coveted, the governorship of Arrān and Āzarbāijān, and at the same time he was made atabeg to Mas'ūd's son Malik-Shāh. Moreover the sultan was compelled to accept as his own vizier the personal vizier of Boz-Aba, Tāj al-Dīn Ibn Dārust, and Toghan-Yürek directed all his efforts towards bringing Boz-Aba back into favour at court.¹

In the west the spectacular successes of Zangī were continuing, and from his Mosul base he was gradually mopping up the remaining independent amīrs of al-Jazīreh and Diyārbakr, while also making war on the Kurdish chiefs of the Hakkārī region. Zangī had in his care a Saljuq prince, Sulṭān Maḥmūd's son Alp-Arslan, and was waiting to place this candidate on the throne as soon as Mas'ūd should die. In 538/1143-4 Mas'ūd prepared a punitive expedition against Zangī, regarding him as a source of persistent rebelliousness, but again he was bought off by the promise of a payment; even then, the sultan did not exact the whole of the sum due, hoping that he could still conciliate Zangī.² In central Iraq Baghdad was racked by 'iyāra and the Mazyadid 'Ali b. Dubais roused the local Arab population of the Ḥilla district and wrested the capital from his brother Muḥammad. He defeated an army sent by the shahna of Baghdad, and, despite a brief occupation by Mas'ūd's troops in 542/1147-8, retook Ḥilla and remained in possession of it.³

The death of Zangī in 541/1146 relieved the sultan of this source of worry, and in the same year he also succeeded in breaking out of the iron grip of the Turkish amīrs. He procured the assassination of Toghan-Yürek at Ganja, and that of 'Abbās, who was then deputy-chief ḥājib, at the court in Baghdad.⁴ In place of Toghan-Yürek, Khāṣṣ Beg Arslan b. Palang-Eri was appointed atabeg to Malik Muḥammad, while the obnoxious vizier Ibn Dārust was sent back to Boz-Aba in Fārs. Boz-Aba, his position obviously weakened by the elimination of his two great allies, now marched to Iṣfahān and Hamadān, accompanied by the princes Muḥammad and Malik-Shāh,

¹ Bundārī, pp. 214-15; Zahr al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, pp. 58-62; Rāvandī, pp. 232-7; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 116, 119; Ḥusainī, pp. 114-18; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 69-9.

² *al-Kāmil*, vol. xi, pp. 61-2, 66-7.

³ Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 116, 125.

⁴ Zahr al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, pp. 62-3; Rāvandī, pp. 237-9; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 119, 123; Ḥusainī, pp. 118-19; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 76-7; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, p. 193.

whom he set up in the khutba of those two cities. Mas'ūd hurried from Baghdad, summoning aid from Khāṣṣ Beg, Eldigüz, and Shirgīr in the north-west, and their forces united at Hamadān before Boz-Aba was able to give battle to Mas'ūd alone. There followed a fierce engagement at Marg-i Qara-Tegin, in which the army of Fārs was routed and Boz-Aba and the son of 'Abbās were killed. At the conclusion of this campaign, Mas'ūd married his nephew Muḥammad to his own daughter Jauhar, the widow of Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd, granted him Khūzistān, and proclaimed him the official heir to the throne.¹

The sultan's excessive favour to Khāṣṣ Beg, together with fears among the remaining amīrs that their fate would be similar to that of Boz-Aba and his allies, contributed to the formation of a fresh coalition of rebellious amīrs in 543/1148, this time including many of Mas'ūd's former supporters. Forces were sent from Arrān and Āzarbāijān by Eldigüz and Qaiṣar; from Jibāl by Alp-Quṣh and Tatar; from Wāsiṭ by Turuntai; from Hilla by 'Alī b. Dubais. Other amīrs provided further troops, and they were all joined outside Baghdad by Malik Muḥammad. Mas'ūd entrusted the defence of the city to the caliph, who deepened the protective trench round Baghdad and issued to the citizens a general summons to arms; the sultan himself then withdrew to the fortress of Takrit. After heavy fighting, the allies dispersed. Alp-Quṣh then attempted to place Malik-Shāh b. Maḥmūd on the throne at Baghdad, but his attack on the city was repelled by al-Muqtafi. Sanjar came to Ray in the winter of 544/1149-50, a reconciliation with Mas'ūd took place, and he promised to end Khāṣṣ Beg's ascendancy.²

During Mas'ūd's absence at Ray, several of the previous rebels, including Yürün-Quṣh, Turuntai, and 'Alī b. Dubais, again massed their troops in Iraq, this time in company with Malik-Shāh. They sought the caliph's assurance that he would make the khutba for their nominee, but on Mas'ūd's return to Baghdad the coalition fell apart. During the last year or so of the sultan's life Malik-Shāh's pretensions remained an active threat to security until finally, when he raided Iṣfahān and drove off cattle from there, Mas'ūd sent troops against him. Mas'ūd's death came in the next year, 547/1152, at Hamadān. "With him", says Ibn al-Athīr, "the fortunes of the Saljuq family

¹ Bundārī, pp. 219-20, 222; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, pp. 63-4; Rāvandī, pp. 241-3; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, p. 124; Ḥusainī, pp. 119-20; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 77, 78-9.

² Bundārī, p. 224; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, pp. 46, 64; Rāvandī, pp. 174-5; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 131-3, 137-8; Ḥusainī, pp. 120-1; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 87-8, 94.

died; after him, there was no banner for them to depend on or rally round—'Qais's death was not the death of a single man, but rather the collapse of a whole tribe's foundations.'"¹

All this time the local Saljuq line in Kirmān obtruded little on the wider scene of events in Iran. The long and peaceful reign of Arslan-Shāh had ended in a burst of violence in 537/1142, when, during a quarrel over the future succession, the most aggressive and capable of Arslan-Shāh's sons, Muḥammad, seized his father, killed him, and then imprisoned and blinded some twenty of his own brothers and nephews.² The claims of another brother, Saljuq-Shāh, were dashed in a battle outside Jiruft, and he fled across the Persian Gulf to al-Aḥsā' and Oman. There he assembled a force with the intention of invading Kirmān, but Muḥammad's agents obtained his imprisonment in Oman. Thereafter, Muḥammad was undisturbed on his throne; only at the end of his reign did Saljuq-Shāh manage to escape and return to Kirmān, where he met defeat and death at the hands of the new amir, Toghril-Shāh b. Muḥammad.

Muḥammad b. Arslan-Shāh assumed the honorific *Mughīth al-Dunyā wa'l-Dīn* and reigned for fourteen years (537-51/1142-56). His prestige was such that neighbouring potentates sought his protection and help. The governor of Ṭabas in southern Khurāsān, menaced by the Ghuzz tribesmen who got out of control towards the end of Sanjar's reign in the east, yielded up his town to Muḥammad, in whose hands it remained until the rise of Sanjar's former ghulām, Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ai-Aba, in Khurāsān (see below, pp. 154-5).³ More important was the temporary acquisition of Iṣfahān, transferred to Muḥammad by the commander who had governed it on behalf of the Saljuqs of the west. Although Muḥammad was clearly a bloodthirsty tyrant, he contrived by his ostentatious piety to make a good impression on the chroniclers. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, the local historian, praises the amir for his pensions to the ulema and his bursaries to poor students. He encouraged astronomy and the compilation of astronomical tables (*taqwīms*); he built mosques and libraries in the chief towns of Kirmān, e.g. Bardasir, Jiruft, and Bam; and he never killed anyone without first obtaining for this a fatwā from the religious authorities.⁴

¹ Bundārī, pp. 226-7; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 65; Rāvandī, p. 245; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 147, 151; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 94, 105.

² On Arslan-Shāh, see above, pp. 117-18.

³ *al-Kāmil*, vol. xi, p. 121.

⁴ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Ta'rikh-i Saljūqiyān-i Kirmān*, pp. 28-34. Cf. Houtsma, "Zur Geschichte der Seljuken von Kermān", *Z.M.D.G.* pp. 375-7.

SANJAR'S SULTANATE

X. SANJAR'S SULTANATE IN THE EAST, AND THE RISE OF THE KHWĀRAZM-SHĀHS AND QARA-KHITAI

The fortunes of the eastern provinces of the Saljuq empire were directed for over fifty years by Abu'l-Hārith Aḥmad Sanjar (*Sanjar* = Turkish for "he who thrusts, pierces") b. Malik-Shāh.¹ After the death of Arslan-Arghun in 490/1097, Berk-Yaruq had appointed his half-brother Sanjar, then a lad of ten or twelve years, to the governorship of Kḥurāsān (see above, p. 107). Sanjar remained ruler of the east until shortly after his escape from captivity amongst the Ghuzz; the hardships which he had suffered there seem to have hastened his death in 552/1157.

In the civil strife of Berk-Yaruq's reign, Sanjar took the side of his full brother Muḥammad Tapar, but from the constitutional point of view he regarded himself during this period as subordinate to the sultan in Iraq and western Iran; thus on a coin of his from Marv, probably minted in 499/1105-6, he calls himself simply *Malik al-Mashriq* ("King of the East") and gives the title *al-Sultān al-Mu'azzam* ("Exalted Sultan") to Muḥammad.² However, when the latter died in 511/1118, Sanjar was not disposed to accept a similar status in regard to his nephew Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad. In the past, as we have said, the supreme sultanate had gone to the Saljuq who held Iraq and western Iran, and at the beginning of his reign Maḥmūd's alliance with the Qarakhānids against his uncle might have been a sign of his determination to assert himself as head of the family and thus reduce Sanjar's pretensions.³ But the older Turkish principle of the seniorate now came to the fore, and Sanjar became generally regarded as supreme head of the family. Indeed, Maḥmūd had to acknowledge his own subordination at an early date: coins struck by him at Iṣfahān and dated 511/1118 and 512/1118-19 give Sanjar the title *al-Sultān al-Mu'azzam*, whereas Maḥmūd is given simply his name and patronymic.⁴

Sanjar's campaign in western Iran and his defeat of Maḥmūd at Sāveh in 513/1119 gave him the opportunity clearly to demonstrate his superior status (see pp. 119-20 above). At Ray he treated Maḥmūd as his close vassal. Out of deference to Sanjar, Maḥmūd had to abandon

¹ Cf. Pelliot, *Notes sur l'Histoire de la Horde d'Or*, pp. 176-80.

² Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu tarihi*, vol. II, p. 25. On the general topic of Sanjar's constitutional relations with the other Saljuqs, see Köymen, pp. 5-27, 250-4.

³ Ḥusainī, *Akbbār al-dawla al-Saljūqiyya*, p. 88; cf. Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 120-1.

⁴ Köymen, *op. cit.* p. 25.

his personal privileges as sultan, such as the five-fold *nauba* (salute of military music). He had to hold Sanjar's bridle when he mounted; to prostrate himself before Sanjar; to walk on foot by his side from the audience chamber to Sanjar's personal tent, and to reside in the quarters of Sanjar's children and wives. Maḥmūd's chief officials received investiture patents directly from Sanjar, and Sanjar kept in his hands the city of Ray, perhaps not merely because of its strategic importance but also because during Toghrīl Beg's time it had been the capital of the Saljuqs in Iran. In Iraq Sanjar ordered the reappointment there of the *shāhna* whom Maḥmūd had dismissed. In return, Sanjar made Maḥmūd his heir, and the two names henceforth appear together on Sanjar's coins. Whilst it is true that after 519/1125 Maḥmūd minted coins on which he himself was styled *al-Sultān al-Mu'azzam* and Sanjar was not mentioned, he remained essentially subordinate to his uncle.¹

The relationship of Sanjar to his nephews stayed the same during the succeeding reigns of Toghrīl and Mas'ūd, particularly since Toghrīl was directly beholden to him for his authority. However, at the outset of his reign Mas'ūd rejected a command from Sanjar to execute certain amīrs in his entourage, and thereby announced that he would not be a blind puppet of his uncle.² Sanjar, increasingly preoccupied with such problems as the rise of the *Khawārazm-Shāhs* and of the *Qara-Khitai*, allowed Mas'ūd more freedom of action than might otherwise have been the case; yet with the passage of time the unparalleled length of Sanjar's rule in the east only strengthened his moral position as supreme sovereign.

After Berk-Yaruq nominated him to the governorship of the east, Sanjar and his amīrs had been faced with a certain amount of opposition from rival Saljuq princes. In 490/1097 Muḥammad b. Sulaimān b. *Chaghri* Beg Dā'ūd, whom the sources call *Amīr-i Amīrān* ("Supreme Commander"), obtained a force from the *Ghaznavids* and attempted to seize power in *Khurāsān*; he was defeated by Sanjar's army and blinded. In the following year a Saljuq named Daulat-Shāh, apparently a descendant of Er-Tash b. Ibrāhīm Īnal, collected in *Tukhārīstān* a force of *Türkmen* malcontents, but was likewise defeated and blinded by Sanjar.³

¹ Bundārī, pp. 128-9; Ḥusainī, pp. 88-9; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, p. 394; Köymen, *op. cit.* pp. 8 ff.

² Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. x, pp. 43-4; cf. Köymen, *op. cit.* pp. 250-4.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 181, 191.

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In the early years of Berk-Yaruq's reign, the central and western parts of Khurāsān (i.e. Nīshāpūr, Ṭūs, Isfarā'in, Nasā, etc.), together with Qūmis and Gurgān, were governed from Dāmghān by the *Amīr-i Dād* Ḥabashī b. Altun-Taḡ. Sanjar's base was at this time farther east, at Balkh, and it was a prime task for him and his amīrs, Kündigüz, Er-Ghush, and Rustam, to dislodge Ḥabashī from Khurāsān. In the ensuing warfare Ḥabashī secured the help of 5,000 Ismā'īlī troops from Ṭabas—then in the hands of a Bātinī governor, Ismā'il Kalkālī—and he was also joined by Sulṭān Berk-Yaruq, who had been compelled to flee eastwards after his defeat in 493/1100 at the hands of Muḥammad (see above, p. 109). Ḥabashī and Berk-Yaruq were nevertheless defeated by Sanjar and his amīrs at a place called Naushajān, Ḥabashī being captured and then killed, and Berk-Yaruq retiring to Gurgān and later Iṣfahān.¹ From this time onwards the whole of Khurāsān up to and including Qūmis was firmly in Sanjar's hands, and he subsequently moved his capital to the more central city of Marv. Now he could take direct action against the troublesome Ismā'īlīs of Kūhistān; two expeditions against Ṭabas by the Amīr Boz-Qush are recorded, in both of which regular troops and volunteers took part (494/1101 and 497/1104).²

Thus in these years, when he was still just one of the Saljuq maliks and subordinate to the sultans in the west, Sanjar was primarily concerned to consolidate his power within Khurāsān and to provide financial help or refuge to his brother Muḥammad in his struggle against Berk-Yaruq.³ But this period was also one of turmoil and instability in the neighbouring kingdom of the Qarakhānids, vassals of the Saljuqs from Malik-Shāh's time, and Sanjar was soon drawn into the affairs of Transoxiana. As pointed out on pp. 5-6 above, the rule of the Qarakhānids in Transoxiana, Semirechye, and Kashgharia was essentially that of a loose tribal confederation, and internal dynastic conflicts were frequent. Sanjar was able to follow his Saljuq predecessors' examples and utilize these disputes for his own purposes.

An important religious and political phenomenon is discernible in the Qarakhānid cities of Samarqand and Bukhārā from the middle years of the 5th/11th century onwards. This is the tension between the

¹ *Ibid.* x, pp. 201-2 (the fullest and most convincing account); Bundārī, pp. 259-60; and Husainī, p. 87 (a divergent account); cf. Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins*, pp. 86-7.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 221-2, 260. Cf. Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 88; and see above, section viii, pp. 118-19.

³ Cf. Bundārī, pp. 260-1.

khans and the orthodox religious institution, despite the ostentatious Sunnī piety and zeal for charitable works shown by many of the khans. It is difficult in any period of Islamic history to discern the true feelings of the urban masses; at certain critical points, for example, they seem to have supported the khans, and it was a revolt of the artisans of Bukhārā which in 636/1238-9 ended the domination of the Burhānī *ṣudūr*. On the other hand the military leaders, always jealous of any increase in the central power, gave direct assistance to the religious classes on several occasions. The just and devout Tamghach Khan Ibrāhīm was driven to execute Shaiḫ Abū'l-Qāsim Samarqandī; then in the reign of Aḥmad b. Khidr the faqīhs called in the Saljuq Malik-Shāh and in the end had the khan deposed and executed for alleged Ismā'īlī sympathies (pp. 92-3 above). The power of this clerical caste can be seen in the appearance of lines of hereditary religious leaders, especially in Bukhārā, who often bear the honorary titles of *Ṣudūr* or "prominent men" (sing. *Ṣadr*). Similarly in the 5th/11th century there had been the *imāms* (religious leaders) of the Ṣaffārī family; but Sanjar, in the course of his Transoxianan expedition of 495/1102, deposed the reigning ra'īs and imām of Bukhārā, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm Ṣaffārī, and replaced him by the well-known scholar 'Abd al-'Azīz b. 'Umar of the Burhān family. He invested him personally with the *ṣadāra* (religious leadership) and gave him a sister in marriage, so that 'Abd al-'Azīz and his successors of the Āl-i Burhān became immediate vassals of the Saljuqs. Some decades later these *ṣudūr* dealt directly with the Qarakhitai invaders of Transoxiana and collected the taxes of the Bukhārā region for them. The authority of the Burhānīs accordingly had a political and fiscal aspect as well as a religious one. The family retained its power under the Khwārazm-Shāhs and early Mongols, in spite of a dark period when the Shāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad deposed Ṣadr Burhān al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, and subsequently permitted his mother Terken Khatun to execute the imām.¹ The line ended only with the popular rising of 636/1238-9 in Bukhārā, after which a fresh series of *ṣudūr*, that of the Maḥbūbīs, begins.²

The western Qarakhānīd throne in Transoxiana had been given by Berk-Yaruq to Sulaimān b. Dā'ūd b. Tamghach Khān Ibrāhīm in

¹ Nasawī, *Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti*, p. 23 (tr. pp. 41-2); cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 379, 430.

² Cf. Barthold, pp. 313, 316-17, 320-2; O. Pritsak, "Āl-i Burhān", *Der Islam*, pp. 81-96; Qazvīnī's n. xi in Nizāmī 'Arūḍī, *Chahār Maqāla* (E. G. Browne revised tr., pp. 110-12).

490/1097; the throne then passed quickly to a Maḥmūd-Tegin and to Hārūn b. Sulaimān b. Qadīr Khān Yūsuf, who died in 495/1102. In this year Transoxiana was invaded by Qadīr Khān Jibrā'il b. 'Umar of Talas and Balāsāghūn, who led an army which included both Muslim and pagan Turks. Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad were at this time involved in warfare, whilst Sanjar was in Baghdad, and the Qarakhānid Muḥammad b. Sulaimān b. Dā'ūd fled to Sanjar's capital at Marv; but Qadīr Khān Jibrā'il pressed through Transoxiana, across the Oxus, and into Khurāsān, aided by the defection of one of Sanjar's own amirs, Kūn-Toghdi. In the end the invader was halted and then defeated and killed near Tirmidh by Sanjar, who had hurried eastwards, whilst Kūn-Toghdi fled to the court of the Ghaznavid Mas'ūd III b. Ibrāhīm. Sanjar then sent troops into Transoxiana and placed Muḥammad on the throne in Samarqand; the latter took the Turkish ruling title of Arslan-Khān and remained ruler there till 524/1130. Sanjar also concerned himself with the religious leadership in Transoxiana, and it was at this point that he gave the leadership of the Ḥanafis there to Ṣadr 'Abd al-'Azīz b. 'Umar of the Āl-i Burhān. Like his father, Arslan-Khān Muḥammad was linked to the Saljuqs by a marriage alliance with one of Sanjar's daughters, and on two occasions in the next few years (496/1103 and 503/1109) Sanjar gave him military help against another Qarakhānid claimant, Saghun Beg.¹ This rival has been identified by Pritsak as the Ḥasan b. 'Alī whom Sanjar was to place on the throne of Samarqand in 524/1030. The poet and literary stylist Rashīd al-Dīn Vaṭvāt gives Ḥasan Khān the title of Kōk-Saghun, and it is probable that he came from the line of 'Alī b. Bughra Khān Hārūn, known as 'Alī-Tegin, who had ruled in Soghdia a century before and whose descendants had remained in Farghāna.²

This rivalry excepted, Arslan-Khān Muḥammad enjoyed a reign which was peaceful almost to the end of this life. He became noted as a great builder, rebuilding the citadel and walls of Bukhārā and constructing there a fine Friday mosque and two palaces. He undertook regular campaigns into the surrounding steppes, presumably against pagan Qīpchaq, bringing back slaves and gaining the title Ghāzī.³ Despite these laudable activities, the tension between the dynasty and the religious classes was not stilled. It may well have been

¹ Bundārī, p. 262; Ḥusainī, p. 90; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 239-41, 252; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 318-19; *idem*, "History of the Semirechye", in *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, vol. 1, p. 98.

² Cf. Pritsak, "Karahānlilar", *Islām Ansiklopedisi*.

³ Bundārī, p. 264.

religious elements who in 507/1113-14 complained to Sanjar about the khan's tyranny, a trait which does not accord with the rest of our knowledge of him. In any case the khan was obliged to seek the intercession of the Khwārazm-Shāh Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad and of Sanjar's Amīr Qaimaz, and to go personally and meet the sultan.¹ At the end of his reign Arslan-Khān Muḥammad became embroiled with the Saljuqs. By now a sick man, he ruled in association with his son Naṣr. But an 'Alid faqīh and the ra'īs of Samarqand, leaders of a group representing religious interests, conspired together and killed Naṣr, whereupon the khan appealed to Sanjar for help and appointed another son, Aḥmad, in Naṣr's place. Aḥmad assumed the title of Qadīr-Khān and took draconian measures against the leaders of the plot, but Sanjar was now on his way with an army. Friction occurred between the khan's followers and the Saljuq army, and Sanjar captured Samarqand, plundering part of the city (524/1130). The sick Arslan-Khān surrendered to Sanjar, and, because he was the father of Sanjar's Qarakhānid wife Terken Khātun, was allowed to stay in the sultan's harem. He died soon afterwards, and in his place Sanjar appointed Ḥasan b. 'Alī; on his death in 526/1132, Sanjar chose Arslan-Khān's brother Ibrāhīm, and he was followed by a third son of Arslan-Khān, Maḥmūd, later to be ruler of Khurāsān during Sanjar's captivity amongst the Ghuzz (see below, pp. 153-7).² It was this Maḥmūd who was reigning in Transoxiana when the Qara-Khitai appeared there a few years later.

The province of Khwārazm had passed into Saljuq hands on the defeat of Shāh Malik, the son of the Oghuz Yabghu of Jand and Yengi-Kent (see p. 18 above). It had then come under governors representing the Saljuqs, and for the next few decades Khwārazm made little impact upon eastern Islamic history. Alp-Arslan came thither in 457/1065 to suppress a revolt, visiting Jand and pushing westwards across the Üst Urt plateau towards the Manqishlaq peninsula (see p. 65 above).³ He then appointed Arslan-Arghun as governor, and this man remained in office during the early part of Malik-Shāh's

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 348-9.

² Bundārī, *loc. cit.*; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 44; Rāvandī, p. 169; Ḥusainī, p. 92; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 465-6; Juvainī, *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushā*, vol. 1, pp. 278-9; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 320-2; Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu tarihi*, pp. 158-63.

³ The Soviet authority on this region, S. P. Tolstov, has surmised from the name of one of these rebels in Khwārazm, given by Mirkhwānd as Faghfūr, that this man might possibly have been a survivor from the old Afrighid line of Khwārazm-Shāhs. See *Auf den Spuren der altchoresmischen Kultur*, p. 292.

reign: an exception to the general rule of the time, for Khwārazm was usually granted to ghulām commanders rather than to members of the Saljuq dynasty itself, who, by the province's isolation, might rebel. It seems that the revenues of Khwārazm were used in Malik-Shāh's reign to defray the expenses of a particular office in the royal household, that of the keeper of the wash-bowls (*tashī-dār*), for the ghulām Anūsh-Tegin Gharcha'ī held this office and also bore the title "*shāhna* of Khwārazm".¹

The presence of Turkish governors in Khwārazm after the overthrow of the Ma'mūnid Shāhs in 408/1017—at first they had ruled on behalf of the Ghaznavids, and then on behalf of the Saljuqs—must have favoured the process whereby Khwārazm was gradually transformed from an ethnically and culturally Iranian land into a Turkish one. For many centuries the distinctive local language of Khwārazm had been an Iranian tongue with affinities to Soghdian and, to a lesser extent, to Ossetian. It was still in full use during the Saljuqs' hegemony, not merely for speech but also for writing, with special diacritical marks added to the Arabic alphabet to express the sounds peculiar to Khwārazmian; these are found in some manuscripts of the Khwārazmian al-Bīrūnī's works. Khwārazmian speech probably lasted in upper Khwārazm till the end of the 8th/14th century, but in lower Khwārazm and Gurgānj, the region nearest to the Aral Sea, the process of Turkicization was complete in the 7th/13th century, according to information deducible from the travel narrative of the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini. Today the Khwārazmian language has to be reconstructed from such materials as odd words and phrases in al-Bīrūnī's works, from the glosses on an Islamic legal text, and from a single literary work, a Khwārazmian version of an introduction to Arabic grammar and language by the famous exegete and grammarian, al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1141).

Geographically Khwārazm was a peninsula of advanced cultural and economic life jutting out into the Turkish steppes, and thus its Iranian character was made vulnerable to external ethnic and political as well as linguistic pressure. In the second half of the 5th/11th century these steppes were controlled by Turks of the Qipchaq, Qanghli, Qun, and Pecheneg groups, not all of whom had yet become Muslim; the middle stretches of the Syr Darya were still *Dar al-kufr* ("lands of unbelief") in the 6th/12th century. The Saljuq governors recruited auxiliary troops

¹ Juvainī, trans. Boyle, pp. 277-8; *Turkestan*, pp. 323-4.

from these nomads, and in the latter half of the 6th/12th century the Khwārazm-Shāh Atsüz and his successors relied heavily on the Qipchaq, Qanghli, Yimek, and associated tribes for their armies. Hence they were brought within the boundaries of sedentary Khwārazm, and by settlement and intermarriage the older Iranian population was eventually diluted; already in the 5th/11th century the physical approximation of the Khwārazmian people to the Turkish type was noted.¹

This linguistic and ethnic change was not, however, accompanied by any material or cultural impoverishment. Under the dynasty of Atsüz, Khwārazm became for the first and last time in its history the centre of a great military empire which embraced large parts of Central Asia and Iran. The Khwārazmians were always great travellers, and their merchants continued to journey across the Eurasian steppes as far as southern Russia and even the Danube basin, where certain place-names attest their presence. Intellectually, Khwārazm was never so brilliant as in the 6th/12th and 7th/13th centuries, when it produced great theologians and literary men, and in particular remained a centre of Arabic learning. The much-travelled geographer Yāqūt (d. 626/1229), writing on the eve of the Mongol invasion, said that he had never seen such urban and agricultural prosperity as in Khwārazm; and the walled cities and fortified villages, canals and irrigation works disclosed by Soviet archaeologists confirm the view that the area of cultivated land expanded in the course of the 6th/12th century.²

In the latter part of Malik-Shāh's reign the governor of Khwārazm was, at least titularly, the ghulām Anūsh-Tegin Gharcha'i. (The *nisba* probably refers to the region of Gharchistān in northern Afghanistan, where Anūsh-Tegin had been originally bought by a Saljuq amir; Kafesoğlu has conjectured that he was of Khalaj Turkish origin.)³ Ekinchi b. Qochqar, a ghulām of Qun origin, was appointed as Khwārazm-Shāh, probably on the occasion of Berk-Yaruq's expedition to Khurāsān in 490/1097 against Arslan-Arghun. As Minorsky has

¹ Cf. A. Z. V. Togan and W. Henning, "Über die Sprache und Kultur der alten Chwarezmier", *Z.D.M.G.* vol. xc; Togan, *The Khorezmians and their Civilisation*, pp. 20 ff.; Henning, "The Khwarezmian Language", *Zeki Velidi Togan'a Armağanı* (Istanbul, 1955), pp. 420-36; *idem.* in *Handbuch der Orientalistik*, vol. iv, *Iranistik*, no. 1, *Linguistik* (Leiden, Cologne, 1958), pp. 56-8, 81-4, 109-20.

² Togan, *loc. cit.*; Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, pp. 109-15; Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren*, pp. 295-310.

³ See his long discussion of Anūsh-Tegin's origin in his *Harezmsablar devleti tarihi*, pp. 38-43.

pointed out, Ekinchi must have had considerable renown, as well as a great knowledge of events in the region of Khwārazm and the steppes, to be nominated to this important post.¹ At the end of the same year, however, Ekinchi was killed by rebellious Saljuq amīrs, so that Berk-Yaruq's representative in Khurāsān, the Amīr-i Dād Ḥabashī, appointed in his stead Anūsh-Tegin's son Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad. As Khwārazm Shāh from 490/1097 till his death in 521/1127 or 522/1128, Quṭb al-Dīn had the reputation of being a just ruler who was always obedient to his master Sanjar.² At various points during the Saljuq succession-disputes in western Iran, he fought for Sulṭān Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh and for Sanjar, and in 507/1113-14 he mediated between Arslan-Khān Muḥammad of Samarqand and Sanjar (see above, p. 140).

'Alā' al-Dīn Atsīz succeeded his father and reigned as nominal vassal of the Saljuqs till his death in 551/1156. He came to the governorship of Khwārazm with a reputation, like that of Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad, for loyalty and submissiveness towards Sanjar. Despite this, the course of events was to show that Atsīz had his own ambitions to make Khwārazm as autonomous as possible, and although he had many reverses he pursued this goal with determination, feeling his way between the two neighbouring powers of the Saljuqs and the Qara-Khitai, and laying the foundation for the fully independent policy of his successors. Juvainī and 'Aufī also praise Atsīz for his culture and learning, ascribing to him the composition of verses in Persian.

In his early years as Khwārazm-Shāh, Atsīz aimed primarily at securing the long and vulnerable frontiers of his principality against the nomads; since many of these were still pagans, his efforts earned him amongst the orthodox the title of Ghāzī. Of particular strategic importance here were the steppes between the Aral and Caspian seas, together with the adjacent Manqīshlaq peninsula where many nomads had summer pastures, and the lower Syr Darya region from Uṭrār down to Jand. Both these areas had long been spring-boards for attacks on Khwārazm, and it was to Manqīshlaq and Jand that the followers of Ekinchi b. Qochqar's son Toghril-Tegin had fled in 490/1097 after the latter's bid to regain Khwārazm had been frustrated by Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad.³ Atsīz attended Sanjar regularly, being

¹ Minorsky, *Sharaf al-Zamān Ṭāhir Marvazī on China, the Turks and India* (London, 1942), pp. 101-2.

² Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. x, pp. 181-3; Juvainī, vol. 1, pp. 277-8, quoting Ibn Funduq's *Maṣābir al-tajārib* (probably also the source for Ibn al-Aṭhīr).

³ Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. x, p. 183.

with him, for example, in the Transoxianan campaign of 524/1030, but he did not neglect the frontiers of Khwārazm. According to Ibn al-Athīr, he had already secured Maqīshlaq during his father's lifetime, and in 527/1133 he led a campaign from Jand into the Qīpchaq steppes; Yāqūt quotes a line of verse in praise of the Maqīshlaq victory. After 536/1141 he secured the lower Syr Darya against the Qara-Khitai by paying them an annual tribute in cash and kind.¹

It was not long before Atsīz's relation with his suzerain Sanjar became strained. The sultan allegedly began to grow cold towards the Khwārazm-Shāh during the campaign of 529/1135 against the Ghaznavid Bahrām-Shāh (p. 159 below), and in a proclamation of victory issued after his triumph at Hazārasp, Sanjar accused Atsīz of killing Muslim ghāzis and *murābiṭūn* (frontier fighters) at Maqīshlaq and Jand. In 533/1138 Atsīz rebelled openly, flooding much of the land along the Oxus to impede the advance of Sanjar's army. Yet this did not prevent the sultan from defeating the Khwārazmian army, which included some pagan Turks, at the fortress of Hazārasp; he then executed Atsīz's son Atliḡh. He occupied Khwārazm and granted it to his nephew Sulaimān-Shāh b. Muḥammad, providing him with a vizier, an atabeg, and other administrative officials, but the advent of direct Saljuq rule proved irksome to the Khwārazmians. As soon as Sanjar had left for Marv, Atsīz returned from his refuge in Gurgān, and the people rose and expelled Sulaimān-Shāh. Then in 534/1139-40 the Khwārazm-Shāh took the offensive, capturing Bukhārā from its Saljuq governor and destroying the citadel there. The extent to which Atsīz clearly commanded the sympathies of the Khwārazmians is an indication of the province's continued individuality and its need for a local ruler who could look after its special political and commercial interests. For all this, Sanjar's power and prestige were still formidable, and in 535/1141 Atsīz found it expedient to submit to him.²

Four months later, Sanjar's unexpected and crushing defeat by the Qara-Khitai in the Qatvān steppe was obviously opportune for Atsīz, so much so that several sources accuse him of having incited the

¹ *Ibid.*; Yāqūt, "Maqāshlāgh", *Mu'jam al-buldān*, vol. v, p. 215; Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 278-9, 356; Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, p. 324; *idem*, "A History of the Turkman People", in *Four Studies*, vol. iii, pp. 126-7; and Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti tarihi*, p. 45.

² Continuator of *Narshakhi*, *Ta'rikh-i Bukhārā*, p. 30 (R. N. Frye tr., pp. 24-5); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 44-5; Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 279-82; Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp. 324-6; Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu tarihi*, vol. ii, pp. 312-23; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 46-9.

Qara-Khitai to rise against the sultan as an act of revenge for the killing of his son Atlıgh;¹ but according to Juvainī, the invaders also passed from Transoxiana into Khwārazm, devastating the province and compelling Atsız to pay tribute. When Sanjar fell back before the Qara-Khitai to Tirmidh and Balkh, Atsız made two incursions into Khurāsān in the course of 536/1141-2. In the first expedition he took Sarakhs and Marv, either killing or carrying off several of the local ulema, and appropriating the state treasury at Marv; he then returned the next spring to occupy Nishāpūr (where the khutba was made for him over the next three months), Baihaq, and other parts of Khurāsān. Through his court poet Rashīd al-Dīn Vaṭvāt, the Khwārazm-Shāh boasted that the power of the Saljuqs was at an end and his own dynasty was in the ascendant, but early in 537/1142 Saljuq rule was re-established in Khurāsān. In retaliation, the sultan in 538/1143-4 invaded Khwārazm, besieged Gurgānj, and compelled Atsız to submit and to return the treasuries taken from Marv; but once more the country proved too hostile for the Saljuqs to remain there.²

To Sanjar's troubles with the Qara-Khitai were now added the first rumbles of discontent from the Ghuzz in Khurāsān. Atsız again showed himself rebellious, plotting the sultan's assassination by means of hired Ismā'ilīs and executing an envoy sent from the court at Marv. In 542/1147 Sanjar marched into Khwārazm for the third time, capturing Hazārāsp and Gurgānj, but in 543/1148 he allowed the Khwārazm-Shāh to make a grudging submission. Atsız's adventures in Khurāsān and his attempts to throw off Saljuq suzerainty accordingly came to nought, so he turned once more to his original sphere of activity, the steppes surrounding Khwārazm. One of the consequences of his pre-occupation with events in Khurāsān and the south had been the loss of Jand, which had passed to one Kamāl al-Dīn b. Arslan-Khān Maḥmūd, apparently a Qarakhānid and son of the khan who ruled in Samarqand from 526/1132 to 536/1141. An expedition left Khwārazm in the summer of 547/1152 and occupied Jand without striking a blow. Although Juvainī states that Kamāl al-Dīn had been a friend of Atsız and of Vaṭvāt, he was seized and jailed for the rest of his life. Jand was now placed under the governorship of Atsız's son and

¹ E.g. Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 53.

² Ibn Funduq, *Ta'rikh-i Baihaq*, p. 272; Bundārī, pp. 280-1; Zahīr al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 46; Rāvandī, p. 174; Husainī, pp. 95-6; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 53, 58-9, 63; Juvainī, vol. i, 280-4; Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 327; Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu tarihi*, pp. 336-45; Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti tarihi*, pp. 54-7.

successor Il-Arslan—an illustration of the importance attached to the town.¹

During Sanjar's captivity amongst the Ghuzz, Atsiz remained essentially loyal to the Saljuq connexion. He did try to get Sanjar to grant him Āmul-i Shatt, the strategically important crossing on the river Oxus, but its castellan refused to yield up his charge. At one point the Khawārazm-Shāh's brother Īnal-Tegin marched into Khurāsān, where he devastated the Baihaq oasis in 548-9/1154; Ibn Funduq says that the resultant destruction and depopulation were still visible fourteen years later.² The Qarakhānid Maḥmūd Khān, who had been chosen as ruler of Khurāsān by that part of Sanjar's army which had not joined the Ghuzz, now began negotiating with Atsiz for the dispatch of a Khawārazmian army into Khurāsān to quell the Ghuzz. Atsiz and his son Il-Arslan set out for Khurāsān, leaving a further son Khitai-Khān as regent of Khawārazm (551/1156), and whilst at Shahr-istān they received news of Sanjar's escape from the Ghuzz. Maḥmūd Khān and the other Saljuq amīrs now regretted having invited the ambitious Atsiz into Khurāsān, but in fact the latter behaved with restraint and did nothing provocative. He met Maḥmūd Khān and summoned for aid the Ṣaffārid Abu'l-Faḍl, the Bāvandid Ispahbadh Shāh Ghāzi Rustam, and the Ghūrid 'Alā' al-Dīn Ḥusain; he sent Sanjar a florid letter of congratulation; and he warned Tūṭi Beg, most prominent of the Ghuzz leaders, of the consequences of further rebelliousness. Whatever Atsiz's real intentions, all was now ended, for he died at this point, nine months before Sanjar's own death. Thus he died as a vassal of the Saljuqs, yet the conquests he had made in the steppes and the assembling of a powerful mercenary army enabled his successors to make Khawārazm the nucleus of a powerful empire in the decades before the Mongol invasion: an empire whose part in attracting the Mongols westwards was to have incalculable consequences for the greater part of the Islamic world.³

Until the eighth century A.D., there had been a certain amount of direct contact between the Iranian and the Chinese world. The T'ang dynasty (618-906) never believed that Transoxiana and the formerly Buddhist lands on the upper Oxus were totally lost to the Chinese

¹ Juvainī, vol. 1, pp. 284-5; Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 327-9; Köymen, *op. cit.* pp. 345-53; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 58-61.

² Juvainī, vol. 1, pp. 285-6; Ibn Funduq, p. 271.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 138; Juvainī, vol. 1, pp. 286-7; Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 330-1; Köymen, *op. cit.* pp. 452-63; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 65-72.

empire, although the immense distances involved made any direct control almost impossible. Nevertheless, after the disintegration of the Western Türk's steppe empire in the first half of the eighth century, the Chinese tried to assert their authority in Transoxiana. In 133/751 the Arab general Ziyād b. Šālīḥ defeated near Talas a Chinese army that had appeared in the Syr Darya valley, and the possibility of Chinese political control in this region vanished forever.¹ But commercial and religious movements across Central Asia continued for many centuries to bring some Chinese cultural influences and some luxury imports into the Iranian world. Chinese prisoners taken by Ziyād b. Šālīḥ are said to have taught the Muslims of Samarqand the art of paper-making, and fine porcelain brought from China became highly prized in the Islamic world.²

In the early part of the 6th/12th century there was an intrusion of the Chinese world into eastern Iran, in the shape of the Qara-Khitai invaders from northern China, although the Mongol invasions of the 7th/13th century were to prove more important in spreading Far Eastern cultural and artistic ideas in the Persian world. The domination of the Qara-Khitai affected only Transoxiana and, for a brief while, a strip to the south of the Oxus around Balkh; they did not exterminate existing ruling houses, as the Mongols were to do, but were content to receive tribute and to exercise a supreme overlordship. Perhaps the most significant feature of their dominion in Transoxiana and Semirechye was the temporary check it gave to the spread of Islam in the steppes. The Qara-Khitai possessed the traditional tolerance of the steppe peoples, who have always been at the receiving end of the great religions of Asia.³ They accorded the indigenous Muslims of Transoxiana no special preference among the adherents of other faiths; but neither did they persecute them. Ibn al-Athīr says that the first Gür-Khān ("Supreme, Universal Khan") was a Manichæan;⁴ indeed, when the Christians of Europe first heard dimly of the defeats suffered by the Muslim Saljuqs and Khwārazm-Shāhs, they thought that a great Christian power had arisen in Central Asia, and in this way legends about "Prester John" began to circulate in the West. What is

¹ Cf. Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 195-6; H. A. R. Gibb, *The Arab Conquests in Central Asia* (London, 1923), pp. 95-8; R. Grousset, *L'Empire des steppes*, pp. 165-72.

² Cf. Tha'ālibi, *Laṭā'if al-ma'ārif*, p. 126; P. Kahle, "Chinese Porcelain in the Lands of Islam", in *Opera Minora* (Leiden, 1956), pp. 326-61.

³ Cf. D. Sinor's chapter, "Central Eurasia", in *Orientalism and History* (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 82-103.

⁴ *al-Kāmil*, vol. xi, p. 55.

certain is that Qara-Khitai impartiality allowed the repressed adherents of non-Islamic faiths to flourish more openly, and this can be seen in the missionary enterprise and expansion begun in this period by the Nestorian Christians of eastern Iran and Central Asia.¹ Grousset's verdict, that "the foundation of the Qara-Khitai empire may be viewed as a reaction against the work of Islamization accomplished by the Qarakhānids", may in this wise be true.²

Ethnically the Qara-Khitai were most probably Mongols.³ In Chinese sources they are first called the "K'i-tan" and then, after 947, the "Liao"; over the next two centuries they became deeply Sinicized and in the Chinese annals are accounted a native dynasty. In the tenth century they founded a vast empire stretching from the Altai to the Pacific, with its centre in northern China. The name of their empire, in the form *Khatā* or *Khitā*, was first applied by the Muslims to northern China, passing from them to the Europeans, whence the older English Cathay. Between 1116 and 1123, however, the K'i-tan were overthrown in China by a fresh wave of barbarian invaders, the Jürchet, a Tungusic people from the Amur valley and northern Manchuria. A section of the K'i-tan migrated westwards into Central Asia, where Islamic historians knew them as the Qara-Khitai, i.e. Black (or perhaps "Powerful, mighty") *Khitai*.

This section came in two groups. One went into eastern Turkestan and came up against the branch of the Qarakhānids ruling there. Arslan-Khān Ahmad defeated them before they could reach Kāshghar and captured their leader (whom Ibn al-Athīr calls al-A'war, "the One-eyed"); in a letter from Sanjar to the caliph in 527/1133 this victory is mentioned as a recent event. The other group, numbering some 40,000 tents, took a more northerly route through the Altai and came into the territories of the Qarakhānid ruler of Balāsāghūn, who tried to use the invaders against his own Qarluq and Qanghli enemies but instead found himself deposed. The Qara-Khitai leader, whose name appears in Chinese sources as Yeh-lü Ta-shih (d. 537/1143), now made the Chu valley the centre of his empire and assumed the title of Gūr-Khān. His followers campaigned against the Qanghli in the steppes stretching

¹ Cf. Barthold, *Zur Geschichte des Christentums in Mittel-Asien* (Tübingen, Leipzig, 1901), pp. 55 ff.; *idem*, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, pp. 99-101.

² *L'Empire des steppes*, p. 221.

³ Cf. Sir Gerard Clauson, "Turk, Mongol, Tungus" *Asia Major*, N.S. vol. VIII (1960), pp. 120-1; but in a postscript on p. 123 he admits the possibility that the K'i-tan spoke a language of their own, unrelated to the Altaic tongues.

towards the Aral Sea, against the Kirghiz in the steppes to the north of the Chu, and against the Qarakhānids in Kāshghar and Khotan. In 531/1137 they made contact with the Transoxianan Qarakhānids and defeated Maḥmūd Khān b. Arslan Muḥammad of Samarqand in the Syr Darya valley at Khujand.

The Qara-Khitai halted here for four years, but in 536/1141 internal disputes in Samarqand opened the whole of Transoxiana to them. Several years earlier, Maḥmūd Khān had invoked the aid of his suzerain Sanjar against the unruly Qarluq. According to 'Imād al-Dīn, their families and flocks had increased in number in the Samarqand region and had been damaging property and tillage; yet 'Imād al-Dīn also stresses the initial peaceableness of the Qarluq, who were harried by the sultan's agents, had their pastures reduced and their women and children enslaved, but still offered to pay Sanjar an extensive tribute in beasts. Only after this did they appeal to the Qara-Khitai to intercede for them with the sultan. Sanjar brusquely rejected this approach, and seems deliberately to have made it a *casus belli* against the Qara-Khitai. The latter now invaded Transoxiana in force, and in 536/1141 a bloody battle was fought in the Qatvān steppe in Ushrūsana, to the east of Samarqand. The Muslim losses were huge, and Amīr Qumach, the amīr of Sīstān, and Sanjar's Qarakhānid wife were all captured. Sanjar and Maḥmūd Khān abandoned Transoxiana and fled to Tirmidh; the Gür-Khān occupied Bukhārā, killing the Burhānī *ṣadr* Ḥusām al-Dīn 'Umar, and he sent an army under his commander Erbüz to ravage Atsiz's dominions in Khwārazm.¹

Sanjar's defeat meant the permanent loss of Saljuq sovereignty beyond the Oxus, while the Muslims there fell under "infidel" control. In practice the Qara-Khitai were not fanatics, and Islamic sources speak of the equitable government of the first Gür-Khāns, whereas there had been frequent complaints about the oppression of Sanjar's amīrs. According to the later historian Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Lārī, the people of Herāt rejoiced in 542/1147 when their city passed from the tyranny of the Saljuqs to the just rule of 'Alā' al-Dīn Ḥusain Ghūrī; and the

¹ Nizāmī 'Arūḍī, *Chahār Maqāla*, pp. 37-8 (tr., pp. 24-5); Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 276-8; Zahīr al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, pp. 45-6; Rāvandī, *Rābat al-ṣudūr*, pp. 172-4; Ḥusainī, *Akhhbār al-dawla*, pp. 93-5; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. xi, pp. 54-7; Juvainī, *Ta'rikh-i Jahān-Gushā*, i, pp. 354-6; Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp. 326-7; *idem*, "History of the Semirechye", pp. 100-4; *idem*, "A Short History of Turkestan", pp. 26-30; *idem*, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, pp. 94 ff.; Grousset, *L'Empire des steppes*, pp. 219-22; Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu tarihi*, pp. 323 ff.

boundless justice of the first Gür-Khān forms the subject of one of Nizāmī 'Arūḍī's anecdotes in the *Chabār Maqāla*.¹ Within their newly acquired territories the Qara-Khitai allowed a wide degree of local autonomy: often, for example, existing political and tribal institutions were retained and their members required to collect and forward taxation to the Gür-Khāns' *ordu* (military camp) in the Chu valley; this was the arrangement eventually made with the *ṣudūr* of Bukhārā.

What did suffer irreparably was Sanjar's own prestige, and he spent the rest of his reign striving to preserve his remaining possessions. Beyond Khurāsān were young and expanding powers such as the Khwarazm-Shāhs and Ghūrids; within there was mounting insubordination among the Saljuq amirs and increasing lack of control over the Türkmen. Atsīz seized his chance to invade northern Khurāsān in 536/1141-2, and in a proclamation to the people of Nishāpūr he said that Sanjar's defeat was a divine retribution for ingratitude towards his loyal servant the Khwarazm-Shāh.² News of the Qara-Khitai victory reached the Christian West, causing an access of hope that the tide might now be turning against Islam. In letting Sanjar be defeated, writes Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, "God took vengeance for [the murdered caliph] al-Mustarshid and let loose on him ruin and destruction". From this we may conclude that caliphal circles in Iraq at this time enjoyed a certain amount of *Schadenfreude*, even though Sanjar had in the preceding year attempted to improve relations with Baghdad by returning to al-Muqtafi the Prophet's cloak (*burda*) and the sceptre (*qaḍīb*), which had been taken from al-Mustarshid.³

The historians describe Khurāsān as being in a flourishing state during Sanjar's time, and this may well be true of at least the first decades of his reign. He preserved an unusually long continuity of administration, during which the seat of government, Marv, became a vital centre for culture and intellectual life.⁴ A comparatively rich documentation, in the form of collections of official correspondence, shows that the sultan was aware of his responsibility for provincial administration, even though this was usually delegated to ghulām military commanders or occasionally to Saljuq maliks. However, it is not so clear from these documents how much check and control from the centre there really was. In an investiture patent for the governor-

¹ Nizāmī 'Arūḍī, *loc. cit.*

² Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, p. 327.

³ Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, vol. 1, p. 180; Ibn al-Athīr vol. xi, p. 52.

⁴ Cf. Juvainī, vol. 1, p. 153.

ship of Gurgān, given to his nephew Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad (later sultan in the west), Sanjar points out the importance of such duties as the defence of the region against the pagan Turks of Dihistān and Manqīshlaq, a strict adherence to the tax rates laid down by the central divān in Marv, and the adoption of a generally kind attitude towards the people.¹ Nevertheless, social unrest in the countryside and the violence of 'ayyārs and religious factions in the towns were certainly not stilled in Sanjar's reign. There was, for instance, an *émence* in 510/1116-17 at Ṭūs when the tomb of the Shī'ī Imām 'Alī al-Riḍā was attacked, presumably by Sunnī partisans; the local governor then built a high wall round the shrine.² The Ismā'īlīs continued to be active, especially in Kūhistān. In 520/1126 troops under Sanjar's Vizier Mu'in al-Mulk Abū Naṣr Aḥmad marched against Turathith, or Turshiz, in Kūhistān, and also against Ṭarz in the Baihaq district, and Ibn Funduq mentions operations in others years against the Ismā'īlīs of Ṭarz. In 530/1136 the Saljuq governor at Turshiz was forced to call in Ghuzz tribesmen against the Ismā'īlīs, but on this occasion the cure proved worse than the disease. Sanjar's captivity amongst the Ghuzz and the breakdown of all central government in Khurāsān inevitably favoured the activities of the Bāṭiniyya. In 549/1154 a force of 7,000 Kūhistān Ismā'īlīs banded together to attack Khurāsān whilst the Saljuq forces were being distracted by the Ghuzz. They marched against Khwāf in northern Kūhistān, but were decisively repelled by the amīrs Muḥammad b. Öner and Farrukh-Shāh al-Kāsānī. However, in 551/1156 they sacked Ṭabas, causing great bloodshed and capturing several of Sanjar's officials and retainers.³

One of Sanjar's most pressing problems was that of controlling the pastoralist nomads, who, since the Saljuq invasions of the previous century, had become a permanent element in the demography and economy of Khurāsān. These Türkmēn increased in numbers in the latter part of Sanjar's reign, perhaps because of pressure both from ethnic movements in the Qīpchaq steppe and from the rising power of the Qara-Khitai in Transoxiana. It was of course always difficult for the Saljuq administration to maintain a firm external frontier along

¹ Muntajab al-Dīn Juvainī, *'Atabat al-kataba*, pp. 19-20, quoted in Lambton, "The Administration of Sanjar's Empire as illustrated in the *'Atabat al-Kataba*", *B.S.O.A.S.* pp. 376-7.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 366.

³ Ibn Funduq, pp. 271, 276; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 445, vol. xi, pp. 131-2, 143; Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, vol. iv, p. 33; le Strange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, pp. 354-5; Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins*, pp. 100-2.

the Atrak and Oxus, but by exacting taxation either on flocks or individual tents, it did try to control those nomads who were within the boundaries of the empire. Although the *Türkmen* were an unruly and intractable class, a permanent drag on the machinery of settled government, the *Saljuqs* always felt that they had obligations to them because they had been the original support of their dynasty, and *Nizām al-Mulk*'s opinion concerning the *Türkmen*'s rights continued to have validity (see p. 79 above). Since they were a clearly defined class of the population, special administrative arrangements were often made for the areas where they were most numerous. One such region was that of *Gurgān* and *Dihistān*, and there is extant the text of a diploma from *Sanjar*'s chancery to *Īnanch Bilge Ulugh Jāndār Beg* appointing him military administrator of the *Türkmen* there. In this document *Īnanch Bilge* is enjoined to treat the *Türkmen* well, to share out water and pasture fairly, to refrain from imposing fresh taxes, and generally to act as the channel between the nomads and the sultan.¹

The military campaigns which increasingly occupied *Sanjar* after 529/1135 imposed fresh financial burdens on his subjects; the sultan is said to have expended three million *dīnārs* on his campaign of 536/1141 against the *Qara-Khitai*, not counting the cost of the presents and robes of honour which had to be offered during the course of this expedition into *Transoxiana*.² Both sedentaries and *Türkmen* began to feel increased pressure from the sultan's financial agents, and it was a group of *Oghuz* or *Ghuzz* who occupied pastures in *Khuttal* and *Tukhāristān*, on the upper *Oxus* banks, who finally rebelled against these demands.

Ibn al-Athīr quotes "certain historians of *Khurāsān*" (presumably including *Ibn Funduq*, author of the *Mashārib al-tajārib*), and asserts that these particular *Ghuzz* had been driven from *Transoxiana* by the *Qarluq*, and had then been invited into *Tukhāristān* by the local amīr *Zangī b. Khalifa al-Shaibānī*. Whilst in their previous home they had been allowed by *Atsīz* to spend the winter pasturing on the borders of *Khwārazm*. They were divided into two tribal groups, the *Bozūq* under *Qorqut b. 'Abd al-Hamīd*, and the *Ūcb-Oq* led by *Ṭūṭī Beg b. Ishāq b. Khidr*; other amirs are named as *Dīnār*, *Bakhtiyār*, *Arslan*,

¹ *Muntajab al-Dīn Juvainī*, pp. 81 ff., quoted in *Lambton, B.S.O.A.S. (1957)*, p. 382; see also *Lambton's Landlord and Peasant in Persia*, pp. 56-8.

² *Jūsainī*, p. 95.

Chaghri, and Maḥmūd.¹ Sanjar's representatives at Balkh was the ghulām amir 'Imād al-Dīn Qumach, formerly the sultan's atabeg, who is described as both governor of the province of Tukhāristān, where he held extensive iqṭā's, and shāḥna of the Türkmen there. The capture of Sanjar in 548/1153 was only the climax of a period of discord—a discord aggravated by Qumach's harshness; before this, Tūṭi Beg and Qorqut had been faithful attendants at Sanjar's court.²

When Qumach defeated his enemy Zangī b. Khalifa, he at first confirmed the Ghuzz in their Tukhāristān pastures. He also recruited them as auxiliary troops when the Ghūrīd 'Alā' al-Dīn Ḥusain attacked Balkh in 547/1152, but the Ghuzz soon defected to the Ghūrīds, enabling 'Alā' al-Dīn temporarily to capture Balkh.³ Henceforth, Qumach's hostility towards the Ghuzz was sharpened. They were accustomed to paying an annual tribute of 24,000 sheep for the sultan's kitchens, but this was being extracted with increasing brutality, and when at last the Ghuzz killed a tyrannical tax collector (*muḥaṣṣil*), Qumach had a pretext for attacking and expelling them. He assembled against them an army of 10,000 cavalry. To placate him, the Ghuzz offered a payment of 200 dirhams per tent. Qumach refused this, and in the ensuing battle he and his son 'Alā' al-Dīn Abu Bakr were both slain. Fearing the sultan's wrath, the Ghuzz offered a large propitiatory payment in cash, beasts, and slaves, together with an annual tribute; under the influence of his amīrs, Sanjar rejected this peace-offering and in 548/1153 set out from Marv with an army. Twice defeated by the Ghuzz, he fell back to Marv but was forced to evacuate the capital, and on leaving it he and several of his amīrs were captured by the Ghuzz.

Marv, meanwhile, was plundered and claimed by the Ghuzz leader Bakhtiyār as his personal iqṭā', and the Ghuzz swept on through the other towns of Khurāsān. In 549/1154 Nishāpūr was attacked and, after a struggle, its citadel taken; Ibn al-Athīr's source says that corpses were piled up in the streets and that the Ghuzz dragged out those sheltering in the Manī'ī mosque and burnt its famous library. Only the

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 116; Barthold, *A History of the Turkman People*, pp. 119–20. The whole episode of the Ghuzz rebellion has been examined in detail by Köymen in two articles: "Büyük Selçuklular İmparatorluğunda Oğuz İsyanı", and "Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu Tarihinde Oğuz istilası", in *Ankara Üniv. Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi*, pp. 159–73, 563–620 (German tr., 175–86, 621–60); see also his *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu tarihi*, vol. II, pp. 399–466.

² Bundārī, p. 281.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 107–8, 116–18.

Maṣḥhad 'Alī al-Riḍā at Tūs, and those towns such as Herāt and Dihistān which had strong walls, escaped them. Initially the Türkmen seem to have been actuated by a special animosity against the Saljuq court and administration; all the amīrs captured with Sanjar were executed, and many members of the religious institution, which was closely linked with the established order, were put to death. Even so, the sources may well exaggerate the numbers of those killed. Köymen has added up all those scholars whom the sources say were murdered by the Ghuzz, and his figure of fifty-five is hardly a colossal one.¹ The limited numbers of dead given by contemporary biographers such as Sam'ānī and Ibn Funduq are clearly more reliable than the vast figures given by later historians. It is also certain that indigenious anti-social elements in Khurāsān seized the opportunity offered by the Ghuzz rebellion to pursue their own paths of violence and rapine; it is recorded, for example, that in Nishāpūr at this time the local 'ayyārs behaved worse than the Ghuzz.²

On first being captured, Sanjar did not realize the serious position he had fallen into—for were not the Ghuzz from the same stock as himself? They placed him on the throne each day and, initially at least, kept up the pretence that he was the master and they his obedient slaves. But he was closely guarded, and Juvainī says that after an attempted escape Sanjar was kept in an iron cage; it is likely that towards the end he suffered contemptuous treatment, hunger, and other deprivations, for according to Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, Sanjar's name became proverbial amongst the people of Baghdad for wretchedness and humiliation.³ The Saljuq army was left headless, and ambitious amīrs were now able to indulge their desires for power. Many of the less-disciplined rank-and-file either joined the Ghuzz or else ravaged the province independently; in 522/1157 a section of the army of Khurāsān attacked the caravan of the Pilgrimage of Khurāsān at Bisṭām, killing, plundering, and leaving the pilgrims in such a defenceless state that they were an easy prey for the local Ismā'īlīs.⁴

The most important of Sanjar's amīrs, together with his vizier Nāṣir al-Dīn Ṭāhir b. Fakhr al-Mulk b. Niẓām al-Mulk, came to

¹ Cf. Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu*, pp. 430-45.

² Bundārī, pp. 281-4; Zahr al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, pp. 48-51; Rāvandī, pp. 177-82; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, p. 161; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 116-21; cf. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*, pp. 58-9.

³ Ḥusainī, p. 125; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, p. 133; Juvainī, vol. i, p. 285; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, p. 227.

⁴ Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 148-9.

Nīshāpūr after the sultan's capture and decided to set up the Saljuq Sulaimān-Shāh b. Muḥammad as their sultan; Sulaimān-Shāh had long lived at the court, and as Sanjar's valī 'ahd had been mentioned in the khuṭba of Khurāsān. He and a detachment of the Saljuq army left Marv to engage the Ghuzz and recapture Sanjar, but they fled at the first encounter with them. Indeed, Sulaimān-Shāh proved a feeble and ineffective ruler at a time when strong leadership in the face of two centrifugal forces, the ambitious Saljuq amīrs and the destructive Ghuzz, was necessary. After the Vizier Ṭāhīr died, to be succeeded by his son Nizām al-Mulk Ḥasan, Sulaimān-Shāh decided to abandon the struggle to enforce his rights as sultan. In 549/1154 he finally left Khurāsān for Atsīz's court, where for a time he was well received and married one of the shah's nieces. But he fell out of favour and had to leave Khwārazm; so he decided to try his luck in western Iran and Iraq, where the succession after his brother Maḥmūd's death had not been satisfactorily settled; finally he arrived in Baghdad (see p. 176 below).

The army of Khurāsān now offered the throne to the Qarakhānid Maḥmūd Khān. After the Qara-Khitai victory of 536/1141 Maḥmūd had fled with Sanjar, while the Qara-Khitai had set up Maḥmūd's brother Tamghach-Khān Ibrāhīm III as their ruler in Samarqand; he retained the throne as their tributary until he was killed in 551/1156 by his own Qarluq troops (see p. 187 below). Maḥmūd was the son of Sanjar's sister, who had married Arslan-Khān Muḥammad, and this Saljuq connexion, together with his princely blood from the house of Afrāsiyāb, made him a suitable candidate for the throne. The Saljuq sultan in the west, Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd, agreed to the choice and sent from Hamadān an investiture diploma.¹ Yet the fact that the Saljuq amīrs were quite prepared to abandon the direct line of the Saljuqs illustrates clearly the decline in Sanjar's prestige and that of the dynasty in general.

The real power in Khurāsān was falling into the hands of the Saljuq amīrs, and in the next few years the province became parcelled out amongst these commanders. The most powerful and successful of these was Sanjar's former ghulām Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ai-Aba (d. 569/1174), who for almost twenty years was to be one of the most prominent figures in Khurāsān affairs. Ibn Funduq calls him the "Khusrau [Emperor] of Khurāsān, King of the East".² Ai-Aba began by driving the Ghuzz out of Nīshāpūr, Ṭūs, Nasā, Abīvard, Shahristān, and

¹ Bundārī, p. 284; Zahir al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, p. 52.

² Ibn Funduq, p. 284.

Dāmghān, henceforth establishing himself at Nīshāpūr as the local ruler. There he became known for his justice and good rule—e.g. he lowered taxation and conciliated the landowning classes—so that his effective power began to spread all over the province. Similarly another one of Sanjar's ghulāms, Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Aī-Taq, left Khurāsān when the Ghuzz rebellion broke out and assumed power at Ray, where, his power legitimized by the western sultan Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd and by Sulaimān-Shāh in Marv, he built up a large army and made himself a considerable power in northern Iran. When Maḥmūd Khān was made sultan of Khurāsān, Aī-Aba at first refused to hand over power to him; only after long negotiations did he agree to become Maḥmūd's tributary, whilst nevertheless keeping effective control over the parts of Khurāsān which he held.¹ Maḥmūd felt unable to subdue the Ghuzz single-handed and invited in the Khwārazm-Shāh Atsiz, who died, however, before any practical steps against them could be taken (see above, p. 146).

As for the Ghuzz themselves, their disunity and low level of political and social sophistication prevented them from establishing a territorial administration in Khurāsān, despite their military successes. Hence they did not emulate the Saljuq invaders of a century or so before; on this situation Rāvandī comments that the Ghuzz had the military power but lacked the essential qualities of justice and righteousness without which no state can be founded.² They do, however, seem to have had some slight diplomatic contact with those powers outside Khurāsān who had seized on Sanjar's embarrassments as a chance to advance their own claims. 'Alā' al-Dīn Ḥusain corresponded with them over the extradition of the poet Anvarī, who had satirized the Ghūrid ruler. And we have seen that under Shāh Ghāzī Rustam, the Bāvandids of Ṭabaristān expanded beyond their mountain principality into Qūmis and Dailam, where in 552/1157 Shāh Ghāzī devastated Alamūt and enslaved a large number of Ismā'īlīs (pp. 28-9 above). It seems that early in Shāh Ghāzī's reign the Ismā'īlīs had murdered his son, and this would account for his unrelenting enmity towards them. The Ghuzz leaders Ṭūṭī Beg and Qorqut, who exercised some degree of authority among them, sent envoys to Shāh Ghāzī, encouraging his ambitions for the conquest of western Iran and promising him a share of Khurāsān in return for his alliance.³

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XI, pp. 121-2.

² Rāvandī, p. 186.

³ Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu*, pp. 424-8; Hodgson, *Order of Assassins*, p. 145.

Towards the end of Sanjar's three-year captivity, the disunity and fragmentation of the Ghuzz became more pronounced. Then in 551/1156 a group of the Ghuzz were suborned, and Sanjar succeeded in escaping to Tirmidh and Marv. A year later, at the age of seventy-one, Sanjar died, and with him the authority of the Saljuqs in eastern Iran virtually ceased; Sanjar himself while on his deathbed appointed the Qarakhānid Maḥmūd Khān as his successor. The death of a monarch who had reigned for over sixty years as malik and then as sultan seemed to contemporaries the end of an epoch, and they expressed wonder at the might of a man whose name was in the khuṭba from Mecca to Kāshghar.¹

XI. THE EASTERN FRINGES OF THE IRANIAN WORLD: THE END OF THE GHAZNAVIDS AND THE UPSURGE OF THE GHŪRIDS

Under Ibrāhīm of Ghazna's son 'Alā' al-Daula Mas'ūd III (492-508/1099-1115) the Ghaznavid empire extended over the regions of Ghazna, Kabul, Bust, Quṣḍār, Makrān, and northern India. It continued to be oriented primarily towards the Indian subcontinent, and the dynasty continued to be respected as the spearhead of the faith in the Islamic world. Mas'ūd had close marriage ties with the Saljuqs—his wife Maḥd-i 'Irāq was Sanjar's sister—and all through his reign peaceful relations were maintained with the Saljuqs.

Between the Ghaznavid territories and Saljuq Khurasān lay the buffer province of Ghūr, in central Afghanistan, a mountainous and inaccessible region which was at times subordinate to Ghazna, or to the Saljuqs, but on the whole little disturbed by either. At one point Ibrāhīm of Ghazna had marched into Ghūr at the invitation of some of the chiefs there and had deposed Amīr 'Abbās b. Shīth of the local Shansabāni line. He then set up 'Abbās's son Muḥammad as amīr of Ghūr, and Muḥammad remained till his death a faithful vassal of the Ghaznavids. In his grandson 'Izz al-Dīn Husain, however, who came to power in 493/1100 and began a long reign in Ghūr as tributary to Sanjar and the Saljuqs, we see an indication of the relative decline of the Ghaznavids. It seems that in 501/1107-8 Sanjar led a raid into Ghūr; the stimulus for this is not known, but it is likely that the Ghūri tribesmen, always notorious for their banditry, had been harassing the fringes of Saljuq territory in Bādghīs and Kūhīstān. Sanjar captured

¹ Cf. Zahīr al-Dīn Nishāpūri, p. 45; Rāvandī, p. 171; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, p. 178.

Ḥusain, and Ghūr must now have passed into the Saljuq sphere of influence. According to the Ghūrīd historian Jūzjānī, Ḥusain sent annually to Sanjar the specialities of his region, arms and armour and dogs of the fierce local breed.¹

Therefore the energies of Mas'ūd III of Ghazna were in large part deflected towards India, where his son 'Aḍud al-Daula Shīr-Zād was viceroy at Lahore. During this time the general Toghan-Tegin is said to have penetrated farther across the Ganges than anyone had ever done since the great Maḥmūd's time.² Mas'ūd died in 508/1115, and after the brief reign of Shīr-Zad another son, Arslan-Shāh, became sultan for three years (509-12/1115-18).

A succession struggle between Arslan-Shāh and another brother of his, Bahrām-Shāh, brought about the intervention of Sanjar and a Saljuq declaration of suzerainty over the Ghaznavid empire. Arslan-Shāh imprisoned all his numerous brothers, and only Bahrām-Shāh managed to escape to Khurāsān, where he sought Saljuq assistance. Arslan-Shāh also treated with indignity his father's widow, Sanjar's sister, even though she was probably his own mother.³ Hence Sanjar had a double pretext for intervention. To Sulṭān Muḥammad in western Iran, the supreme head of the dynasty Arslan-Shāh complained about Sanjar's threatening attitude, but this did not avert a Saljuq invasion from Khurāsān. Accompanied by a contingent under the tributary Ṣaffārid amīr of Sistān, Tāj al-Dīn Abu'l Faḍl, the Saljuq army appeared at Bust and defeated Arslan-Shāh. Sanjar now came personally, refusing all peace offers. In a battle outside Ghazna Arslan-Shāh had 30,000 troops and 120 elephants, each with four armed men on its back. But Sanjar gained the victory, and he entered Ghazna to acquire an immense booty of treasure and jewels, and to place Bahrām-Shāh on the throne (510/1117). The latter agreed to pay an annual tribute of 250,000 dīnārs and to make the *khuṭba* for Muḥammad and Sanjar—the first time that the Saljuq *khuṭba* had ever been heard in Ghazna. Not even Malik-Shāh had achieved this, for when he had desired to introduce it Nizām al-Mulk had deterred him, out of respect for the old-established Ghaznavid dynasty. On Sanjar's departure Arslan-Shāh came back

¹ Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, vol. 1, pp. 258-9, 332-5 (Raverty tr., vol. 1, pp. 149, 332-7).

² *Ibid.* vol. 1, p. 240 (tr., pp. 106-7). Cf. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī, "Mas'ud-i Sa'd-i Salman", *J.R.A.S.* pp. 733 ff.

³ This filiation is put forward by Gulam Mustafa Khan in "A History of Bahram Shah of Ghaznin", *Islamic Culture*, pp. 64-6.

from Lahore and reoccupied Ghazna briefly, but Bahrām-Shāh, again securing Saljuq help, captured and executed his brother.¹

Bahrām-Shāh now began a reign of thirty-five years (512-47/1118-52) as a vassal of the Saljuqs; this we know because all his coins, except those of Indian type minted at Lahore, have Sanjar's name before his own. His reign was one of particular cultural splendour, and it forms a late flowering of the civilization of the Ghaznavids. Led by Sayyid Hasan and Sanā'i, there was a numerous circle of court poets; it was to the sultan that the latter dedicated his *magnum opus*, the *Ḥadiqat al-ḥaqīqa*, and likewise to him that Abu'l-Ma'ālī Naṣrallāh dedicated his Persian translation of *Kalīla wa Dimna*. However Bahrām-Shāh had to quell revolts by the governor of India, Muḥammad Bahlīm; and then in 529/1135 the sultan himself became restive under Saljuq domination. Despite wintry conditions, Sanjar, accompanied by the Khwārazm-Shāh Atsīz, marched through northern Afghanistan and occupied Ghazna. Bahrām-Shāh, who had meanwhile fled, returned shortly afterwards and submitted to Sanjar, who restored him to his throne and then returned to Balkh.²

But Bahrām-Shāh's reign was not to end peacefully. The long dominion of the house of Sebük-Tegin was drawing to its close, and the instrument of its overthrow was not to be Sanjar, occupied as he was in Khurāsān and Transoxiana, but the Shansabānī rulers of Ghūr. That this line of petty chiefs should burst forth and compete on equal terms with such dynasties as the Saljuqs, the Ghaznavids, and the Khwārazm-Shāhs, is one of the most remarkable phenomena of the period. Yet the forces underlying this dynamism are very imperfectly understood. The medieval topography and history of Ghūr are known only fragmentarily for its isolation made the Islamic geographers and historians neglect it almost totally; and our knowledge of the Shansabānī dynasty would be meagre indeed were it not for the *Tabaqāt-i Nāṣiri* of the 7th/13th-century author Jūzjānī, in effect a special history of the Ghūrids.³

Until the 5th/11th century, Ghūr remained a pagan enclave ringed

¹ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 262-3; Zahr al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljuq-Nāma*, p. 44; Rāvandī, *Rābat al-ṣudūr*, pp. 168-9; Ḥusainī, *Akhhār al-daula al-Saljuqiyya*, p. 91; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. x, pp. 353-6; Jūzjānī, vol. i, p. 241 (tr., vol. i, pp. 107-9).

² Bundārī, p. 264; Ḥusainī, p. 92; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 17-18; Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 241-2 (tr., vol. i, p. 110); Juvainī, *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushā*, vol. i, p. 279; A. J. Arberry, *Classical Persian Literature*, pp. 88-97.

³ Cf. Arberry, pp. 152-5, and C. E. Bosworth, "Early Sources for the History of the First Four Ghaznavid Sultans (977-1041)", *Islamic Quarterly*, pp. 16-17.

with Muslim ribāṭs and known chiefly as a source for slaves. Islam first came with the early Ghaznavids. After his expedition of 401/1010-11 Maḥmūd left teachers to instruct the Ghūrīs in the precepts of Islam, and he appointed as ruler there a pliant member of the Shansabānīs, a family from Āhangarān on the upper Hari Rūd. This chieftain is praised by Jūzjānī as the man who firmly implanted Islam in Ghūr, but it is likely that paganism persisted there at least till the end of the century. Originally the Shansabānīs were merely one family of petty chiefs among many in Ghūr, but by their ruthlessness and ambition they gradually made themselves supreme there. The main branch of the family became established in the 6th/12th century at Firūzkūh, and *pari passu* with the decline of the Ghaznavids the fortunes of the Ghūrīds rose.¹

With 'Alā' al-Dīn Ḥusain b. 'Izz al-Dīn Ḥusain (544-56/1149-61) the Ghūrīds broke out of the confines of their own province and succeeded to the heritage of the Ghaznavids, eventually becoming the greatest single power on the eastern fringes of the Islamic world. As early as 542/1147 the Ghūrīds were tempted to intervene at Herāt, when its governor rebelled against Sanjar. Bahrām-Shāh feared the nascent strength of the Ghūrīds, and although 'Alā' al-Dīn's brother Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad was related by marriage to the Ghaznavids, the sultan nevertheless had him poisoned; Jūzjānī traces the enmity between the two dynasties to this event.² Bahrām-Shāh killed a further brother, Saif al-Dīn Sūrī, and it was left to 'Alā' al-Dīn Ḥusain to take vengeance. He led an army from Firūzkūh into Zamīndāvar, where, despite the formidable array of elephants fielded by Bahrām-Shāh, he defeated the sultan three times and pursued him into Ghazna. The capital was now given over to a frightful seven days' orgy of plundering and destruction, which earned for 'Alā' al-Dīn the title *Jahān-Sūz* ("World-Incendiary"); as a final gesture of spite, the corpses of all but three of the Ghaznavid sultans were exhumed and burnt (545/1150-1).³

¹ On the topography and early history of Ghūr, see *Hudūd al-'Ālam* (ed. Minorsky), pp. 342-4, and Bosworth, "The Early Islamic History of Ghūr", *Central Asiatic Journal*, pp. 116-33. For general surveys of the Ghūrīd dynasty, see Bosworth, "Ghūrīds", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.); and Wiet's historical chapter in A. Maricq and G. Wiet, *Le Minaret de Djām, la Découverte de la Capitale des Sultans Ghorides (XII^e-XIII^e siècles)*, *Méms. de la Délég. Archéol. Française en Afghanistan*, pp. 31-54.

² Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 47; Rāwandī, p. 176; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 107-8; Jūzjānī, vol. i, p. 336 (tr., vol. i, p. 340).

³ Nizāmī 'Arūdī, *Chabār Maqāla*, p. 46 (tr., pp. 30-1); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 89-90, 107-9; Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 242, 338, 341-6 (tr., vol. i, pp. 110-11, 342, 347-57).

Bahrām-Shāh fled to his Indian possessions. Only when the Ghūrid army had left did he return to Ghazna, and there he died shortly afterwards (547/1152). His son Khusrau-Shāh succeeded, but Ghūrid pressure compelled him to retire to Lahore, where he died in 555/1160.¹ The final Ghaznavid sultan, Khusrau-Malik, was, like his father, ruler in the Punjab only. The fifteen years' occupation of Ghazna by a group of Ghuzz from Khurāsān, who had seized the city after 'Alā' al-Dīn Husain's death, temporarily held up the Ghūrid advance into the Indian plain; but 'Alā' al-Dīn's nephew, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām, attacked and expelled the Ghuzz from Ghazna, and by 579/1183-4 he was besieging Lahore. In 582/1186-7 Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad finally annexed the Punjab, deposing Khusrau-Malik and carrying him off to imprisonment in Ghūr, thus extinguishing the Ghaznavid line.²

To the west of Ghūr the main obstacle to the Shansabānīs' expansion was at first the Saljuqs. 'Alā' al-Dīn, elated by his capture of Ghazna, was little disposed to continue as Sanjar's tributary. He stopped the payment of tribute and in 547/1152 advanced down the Harī Rūd, but after being decisively defeated by Sanjar at Nāb near Herāt, he was captured and held prisoner until a large ransom was paid over. Before his death 'Alā' al-Dīn abandoned the title of Malik, with which his dynasty had so far been content, and in imitation of the Saljuqs and Ghaznavids called himself *al-Sulṭān al-Mu'azzam*.³ From this time onwards the Ghūrid dynasty split into two and ultimately three lines. The main one established itself in Ghūr proper, where Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad (540-1/1145-6) founded the fortress of Firūzkūh in a strategic position on the headwaters of the Harī Rūd, and this became the sultans' summer capital.⁴ The second branch reigned from Bāmiyān over Tukhārīstān and Badakhshān (and also, according to Jūzjānī, over the Transoxianan territories of Chaghāniyān and Vakhsh); these regions had been conquered by 'Alā' al-Dīn after his Ghazna victory and given to his brother Fakhr al-Dīn Mas'ūd, who bore the title Malik. And third, after expelling the Ghuzz from Ghazna in 569/1173, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad set up his brother Shihāb al-Dīn or Mu'izz al-Dīn Muḥammad, as sultan in Ghazna, while he himself retained the

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 124, 173; Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 242-3 (tr., vol. i, pp. 111-13).

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 110-12; Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 243-4, 357, 396, 398 (tr., vol. i, pp. 114-15, 376-7, 448-9, 455-9, 455-7).

³ Nizāmī 'Arūdi, pp. 104, 132 (tr., pp. 74, 96); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 107-9; Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 346-8 (tr., vol. i, pp. 357-61).

⁴ *Ibid.* vol. i, pp. 335-6 (tr., vol. i, pp. 339-40). Cf. Maricq in *Le Minaret de Djām*, pp. 55-64.

ancestral territory of Ghūr and ruled from Fīrūzkūh as supreme head of the dynasty.¹

The empire reached its apogee in the generation or so spanned by the reigns of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad (sultan in Ghūr, 558-99/1163-1203) and of his younger brother Mu'izz al-Dīn Muḥammad (sultan in Ghazna, 569-602/1173-1206). The partnership and amity between the two was a rare phenomenon for the age, but the dual aspect of the empire—i.e. its expansionist policy in Khurāsān and the west, and its succession to the Ghaznavid ghāzī-tradition in India and the east—favoured such a division of power. In India Mu'izz al-Dīn campaigned in the Punjab and the Ganges valley, capturing Delhi in 589/1193; he wrested Multan from the local Ismā'ilīs in 571/1175-6, and he penetrated to the coasts of Sind and Gujerat.² Although latterly he became preoccupied with the defence of the Khurāsānian conquests, his Turkish ghulām commanders, such as Quṭb al-Dīn Aibeg, Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Muḥammad Khaljī, and Nāṣir al-Dīn Qabacha, continued to carry on raids in India; and such was the quality of Mu'izz al-Dīn's leadership and the loyalty which he inspired that these slave amīrs in India continued proudly to call themselves "Mu'izzī", and to place the dead sultan's name on their coins for some decades after the Ghūrid dynasty proper had disappeared.³

The "World-Incendiary" 'Alā' al-Dīn Ḥusain was briefly succeeded by his son Saif al-Dīn Muḥammad (556-8/1161-3), who reversed his father's policy of toleration towards the Ismā'ilīs in Ghūr and drove them out to Kūhistān.⁴ Indeed, the Ghūrids now become conspicuous for their Sunni piety, earning laudatory mention in the sources. Abandoning their support of the literalist Karāmiyya sect, which was strong amongst the people of Ghūr, they adhered to the Shāfi'i law school, with its greater social prestige and intellectual reputation.⁵ Ghiyāth al-Dīn kept up cordial relations with the 'Abbāsīd caliphs in Baghdad. Ambassadors were frequently exchanged, and the sultan sought membership in one of the chivalric orders, known collectively

¹ Jūzjānī, vol. 1, pp. 384-6 (tr., vol. 1, pp. 421-4).

² See the list of his conquests *ibid.* vol. 1, p. 407 (tr., vol. 1, p. 491).

³ Cf. Jūzjānī's *ṭabaqā* or section on the Mu'izziyya sultans of Hind, *ibid.* vol. 1, pp. 415-38 (tr., vol. 1, pp. 508-95).

⁴ *Ibid.* vol. 1, pp. 349, 350-1 (tr., vol. 1, pp. 363, 365); cf. Bosworth, *Central Asiatic Journal* (1961), pp. 132-3.

⁵ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 99-100, 101-2; Jūzjānī, vol. 1, pp. 362-4 (tr., vol. 1, pp. 384-5); Bosworth, "The Rise of the Karāmiyyah in Khurasan", *Muslim World*, vol. 1 (1960), 5-14; and *idem*, in *Central Asiatic Journal* (1961), pp. 128-33.

as the *futuwwa*, by means of which al-Nāṣir was seeking to restore the secular and moral power of the caliphate (see p. 168 below).¹ The caliph also encouraged Ghūrid ambitions in Khurāsān as a counter-weight to the Khwārazm-Shāhs, whose advance into western Iran was causing deep concern in Baghdad.

When Saif al-Dīn Muḥammad was killed in battle with the Ghuzz near Marv, his cousin Ghiyāth al-Dīn was raised to the throne at Firūzkūh by the army.² Ghiyāth al-Dīn had first of all to deal with a coalition of his enemies raised up by his uncle Fakhr al-Dīn Mas'ūd of Bāmiyān, who claimed that the throne should have passed to him by right of seniority. In a battle at Rāgh-i Zar, between Herāt and Firūzkūh, he defeated Fakhr al-Dīn and killed the Turkish governors of Balkh and Herāt, Qumach and Yildiz, both former ghulāms of Sanjar. Fakhr al-Dīn was restored to Bāmiyān in 559/1163, and Ghiyāth al-Dīn began to extend his authority over outlying parts of Afghanistan. Gharchistān, Gūzgān, Bādghīs, and Zamīndāvar were all secured, and the Ghuzz were ejected from Ghazna. Khurāsān, where the collapse of Saljuq power had left a vacuum, now claimed his attention. In 571/1175-6 Sanjar's old ghulām Bahā' al-Dīn Toghrīl had to abandon Herāt to the sultan. Shortly afterwards the amīr of Sistān, Tāj al-Dīn Ḥarb b. Muḥammad, acknowledged Ghiyāth al-Dīn as his suzerain and on several occasions sent troop contingents to the Ghūrid armies; even the amīrs of the Ghuzz in Kirmān, who had succeeded there to the local Saljuq dynasty, sent envoys to Firūzkūh.³

Jūzjānī alleges that there was originally an *entente* between Ghiyāth al-Dīn and the Khwārazm-Shāh Tekish, yet this seems unlikely, for a clash between these two great powers of the east was not long delayed.⁴ For some time Ghiyāth al-Dīn sheltered Tekish's fugitive brother Sulṭān-Shāh, although he refused to give him military aid. Sulṭān-Shāh eventually got help from the Qara-Khitai and assembled at Marv an army with which to attack the Ghūrid province of Bādghīs. In response Ghiyāth al-Dīn summoned troops from Bāmiyān and Sistān, as well as from his brother Mu'izz al-Dīn in Ghazna, and in 586/1190 he defeated Sulṭān-Shāh near Marv, taking over some of his Khurāsānian territories.⁵

¹ Cf. Jūzjānī, vol. I, pp. 301-2, 361 (tr., vol. I, pp. 243, 382-3).

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XI, p. 193; Jūzjānī, vol. I, pp. 351-4 (tr., vol. I, pp. 366-70).

³ *Ibid.* vol. I, pp. 354-8, 385-6 (tr., vol. I, pp. 371-8, 424-5).

⁴ *Ibid.* vol. I, p. 360 (tr., vol. I, p. 382).

⁵ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, p. 38; Jūzjānī, vol. I, pp. 301-2, 358-9 (tr., vol. I, pp. 245-9, 378-9).

In addition to their territories north of the Oxus, the Qara-Khitai had a foothold in Tukhāristān, south of the river. Dislodging the infidels from here became the goal of the Bāmiyān Ghūrīds, who, as supporters of orthodoxy, welcomed this opportunity for jihād. In 594/1198 Bahā' al-Dīn Sām occupied Balkh after the death of its Turkish governor, who had paid tribute to the Qara-Khitai.¹ In the same year a general war broke out in Khurāsān between the Ghūrīds on one side and the Khwārazm-Shāhs and their Qara-Khitai suzerains on the other. Fighting had begun in 590/1194, when the death of the last Saljuq sultan in the west, Toghrīl b. Arslan, had brought the Khwārazm-Shāh to the borders of Iraq (see p. 182 below). Although the caliph al-Nāṣir had wittingly set this train of events in motion, he now sent envoys to Firūzkūh imploring Ghūrīd help. Ghiyāth al-Dīn accordingly threatened to attack Tekish's Khurāsānian possessions unless the latter abandoned his threatening attitude towards the caliph. For his part, Tekish sought the help of the Qara-Khitai, and together they sent an army into Gūzgān, threatening Firūzkūh and demanding of the Bāmiyān Ghūrīds that they pay tribute for Balkh. Tekish himself marched against Herāt, but in a battle on the Oxus banks the Qara-Khitai were routed by the amīrs of the Ghūrīds. Ghiyāth al-Dīn and Mu'izz al-Dīn then took over Marv, Sarakhs, Nasā, Abivard, Tūs, and Nishāpūr, and they installed in Marv Tekish's fugitive grandson Hindū Khān. Finally Mu'izz al-Dīn conducted some operations in Kūhistān against the Ismā'īlis, after which Khurāsān was entrusted to a Ghūrīd prince, Ḍiyā' al-Dīn or 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad (597/1200).²

The Ghūrīds were unpopular among the people of Khurāsān, and they found it hard to maintain their authority there. According to Juvainī, Mu'izz al-Dīn imposed financial levies and confiscated properties in Tūs, and carried off for his army grain which had been committed to the protection of the Imām 'Alī al-Riḍā's shrine. He was compelled to spend much of his time attending to the defence of these western conquests, especially as Ghiyāth al-Dīn was becoming incapacitated by gout or rheumatism and eventually died in 599/1202.³

On his brother's death, Mu'izz al-Dīn allotted various parts of the Ghūrīd empire to his relatives, with Ghūr itself going to Ḍiyā' al-Dīn

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, p. 88; Jūzjānī, vol. I, p. 358 (tr., vol. I, p. 378).

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 108-13; Jūzjānī, vol. I, pp. 301, 359-60 (tr., vol. I, pp. 242-3 379-81); Juvainī, vol. I, pp. 315 ff.; Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti tarihi*, pp. 148-51.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 117-19; Jūzjānī, vol. I, p. 361 (tr., vol. I, p. 383); Juvainī, vol. I, p. 319.

Muḥammad.¹ The Khwārazm-Shāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad came to besiege Herāt; Mu'izz al-Dīn pursued him back into Khwārazm, but the flooding of the Khwārazmian countryside made progress impossible for the Ghūrīd troops. The shah also called in the Qara-Khitai once more, and a large army, whose commanders included Tayangu of Ṭarāz and the Qarakhānīd ruler of Samarqand, 'Uthmān b. Ibrāhīm, joined Muḥammad and drove the Ghūrīds out of Khwārazm; then, in a great battle at Andkhūi on the Oxus, the Qara-Khitai routed Mu'izz al-Dīn (601/1204). Only the mediation of 'Uthmān Khān, who did not want to see the Ghūrīd sultan captured by pagans, permitted Mu'izz al-Dīn's withdrawal to his own land. Of his former lands in Khurāsān, only Herāt remained to him, and he found it expedient to make peace with the Khwārazm-Shāh even though the caliph continued to incite him against Muḥammad, urging an alliance with the Qara-Khitai if this would further their design.² The suppression of a revolt in the Punjab occupied Mu'izz al-Dīn's closing months, for on the way back to Ghazna he was assassinated, allegedly by emissaries of the Ismā'īlīs whom he had often persecuted during his lifetime (602/1206).³

Within a decade of his death the Ghūrīd empire fell apart, passing briefly into the hands of the Khwārazm-Shāhs. The Ghūrīd forces comprised not only local Ghūrī, Afghān, and Sagzī troops, but also the Turkish ghulāms who were found in almost all eastern Islamic armies at this time. Mu'izz al-Dīn's skill had kept all these elements together, but now the Turkish commanders in Ghazna and India began to act as an independent body. The dead sultan had no son of his own; for his successor the Turkish troops inclined to his nephew Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad, whereas the Ghūrī commanders favoured Bahā' al-Dīn Sām of Bāmiyān and then, after the latter's death, his two sons. In the end Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd prevailed, driving out the governor of Ghūr, Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Muḥammad, who was the candidate of the local Karāmiyya adherents, and ascending the throne at Fīrūzkūh.⁴

¹ Jūzjānī, vol. I, p. 401 (tr., vol. I, pp. 472-3); Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti*, p. 155.

² Nasawī, *Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti*, p. 22 (tr., pp. 38-9); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 117-19, 121-4; Jūzjānī, vol. I, pp. 401-3 (tr., vol. I, pp. 473-81); Juvainī, vol. I, pp. 321-5; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 156-61.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 139-41, 142-5; Jūzjānī, vol. I, pp. 403-4 (tr., vol. I, pp. 481-5); Juvainī, vol. I, p. 326.

⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 146-9; Jūzjānī, vol. I, pp. 370-1, 372-4 (tr., vol. I, pp. 394, 396-9).

However, the new sultan was inferior to his predecessors, and never managed to establish his direct authority over the eastern fringes of the Ghūrid empire. The Turkish commander Tāj al-Dīn Yildīz squashed the Bāmiyān Ghūrids' pretensions to rule in Ghazna, but only reluctantly and tardily did he recognize Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd.¹ The latter dared not leave Ghūr unprotected and march to Ghazna; the full measure of his clumsiness was seen when he called in the Khwārazm-Shāh and Ḥusain b. Kharmīl, governor of Herāt, to expel Yildīz from Ghazna and enforce his rights there (603/1206-7). The end of the Fīrūzkūh Ghūrids was now near. Balkh and Tirmidh had both fallen to the Khwārazm-Shāh, the latter being handed over to the Qara-Khitai. The shah was defeated and temporarily held captive by the Qara-Khitai, but he returned to the attack and after a thirteen months' siege took Herāt, the key to the Harī Rūd valley. His forces then invaded Ghūr and captured Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd (605/1208-9). The latter remained sultan, but only as the Khwārazm-Shāh's puppet. He was assassinated either two or four years later, and his son Bahā' al-Dīn Sām was carried off to Khwārazm shortly afterwards. Ghazna was taken in 612/1215-16, Yildīz was driven into India, and the shah's son Jalāl al-Dīn was installed as governor of Ghazna. In the same year the Bāmiyān line of the Ghūrids was extinguished, and Ghūr now relapsed into an obscurity almost as deep as before.²

The "Ghūrid interlude" in eastern Iranian history thus lasted for only a few decades, yet it constituted a remarkable achievement for the chieftains of such a remote corner of Afghanistan. The Ghūrid sultans had drawn upon the manpower resources of their native Afghanistan as well as upon professional mercenaries from outside, and they had skilfully utilized Sunnī religious sentiments in their struggles with the 'Abbasids' enemies, the Khwārazm-Shāhs, and with the pagan Qara-Khitai. Unfortunately for the Ghūrids' ambitions, the resources which they could command, human and moral, did not prove quite enough for the double role in Khurāsān and northern India which the sultans aspired to play.

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 141-6, 153-6, 163-6; Jūzjānī, vol. I, pp. 409 ff. (tr., vol. I, pp. 494 ff.).

² Nasawī, pp. 140-1 (tr., pp. 233-4); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 149-53, 163-6, 172-6, 202-3; Jūzjānī, vol. I, pp. 309, 374 ff. (tr., vol. I, pp. 267, 400 ff., 505-6); Juvainī, vol. I, 327-36, 352-4; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 161-5, 178, 193-6.

THE END OF THE SALJUQS

XII. THE LAST DECADES OF SALJUQ RULE IN THE WEST

The last forty years of Saljuq rule in Iraq and western Iran were characterized by three main trends, each of which was the accentuation of an earlier trend. First, the political and military influence of the 'Abbāsid caliphate continued to rise. Second, the Turkish amīrs and atabegs in the various provinces of the western Saljuq empire consolidated their power, in some cases forming hereditary lines. And finally, the real power of the Saljuq sultans themselves, their dynasty now deeply disunited within itself and dependent on the military support of the Turkish amīrs, continued to decline, and not even the despairing revival of activity on the part of Toghrīl b. Arslan, last of the sultans, could arrest this process and stave off total ruin. Hence the last decade of the 6th/12th century sees western Iran, the territory up to the edge of the Iraqi plain, incorporated into the vast empire which the Khwārazm-Shāhs assembled on the eve of the Mongol invasions.

As we have seen, Caliph al-Muqtafī began vigorously to assert the secular rights of his office (pp. 128-9 above). Two centuries of Būyid and Saljuq control in Baghdad had fostered the idea that the caliph's power was purely spiritual, and that temporal affairs should be left to the amīr or sultan who held the military and political supremacy at the time. This idea was now challenged. Ibn al-Athīr sums up this novel trend in his obituary notice on al-Muqtafī:

He was the first Caliph to get sole power over Iraq, to the exclusion of any Sultan, since the time when the Dailamīs [the Būyids] first appeared. He was also the first Caliph to have firm control over the Caliphate and over his troops and retainers since the time when the slave troops secured an ascendancy over the Caliphs in al-Munstaṣir's time [i.e. in the latter part of the 3rd/9th century] to the present day, with the possible exception of al-Mu'taḍid's reign.¹

Al-Muqtafī recruited troops extensively and was said to have a network of spies and intelligence agents in all lands, while in the field of diplomacy he supported Turkish amīrs in the provinces, e.g. the Eldigüzids in Āzarbāijān, as a check on the Saljuq sultans. After the death of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad the sultans were excluded from Baghdad; Mas'ūd's *shāhna* there, Mas'ūd Bilālī, was expelled when his master died, the caliph took over the sultan's palace and properties and henceforth no *shāhnas* were tolerated in Baghdad.² For much of

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. xi, p. 169.

² *Ibid.* pp. 105-6.

al-Muqtafi's reign and throughout the following one of al-Mustanjid (555-66/1160-70), the rights of the caliphate were strongly upheld by the viziers 'Aun al-Dīn Yaḥyā Ibn Hubaira (d. 560/1165) and his son 'Izz al-Dīn (d. 561/1166 or 562/1167). 'Aun al-Dīn was a staunch Ḥanbalī, and his fiscal policy of making lands once again directly taxable alienated those Shī'is whose shrines were in central Iraq.¹ He was also a capable general, and in 549/1154, after he defeated the Turkish amīrs and their protégé Arslan b. Toghrīl, he was rewarded by the unusual honorifics of *Sulṭān al-'Irāq* ("Sultan of Iraq") and *Malik al-Juyūsh* ("Monarch of the Military Forces").²

With the accession of al-Nāṣir (575-622/1180-1225), the caliph became a central figure in eastern Islamic diplomacy and politics. He gave little attention to the west, leaving the struggle with the Crusaders to Saladin and the Ayyūbids, but he was intensely concerned with such events in the East as the expansion of the Khawārm-Shāhs, whom he endeavoured to check first through the Ghūrīds and then through the Mongols. On the moral and ethical plain he made use of the futuwwa, or chivalric orders, becoming himself a member of the Rahhāṣiyya order in 578/1182-3. He reorganized these futuwwa bands and sought to enroll in them the rulers of the Islamic world, with himself as the head, thus linking together both Sunnī and moderate Shī'ī elements. Rulers such as the Ayyūbids, the Rūm Saljuqs, and the Ghūrīds became affiliated with the Rahhāṣiyya order, and under al-Nāṣir's grandson al-Mustanṣir even the Khawārm-Shāh Jalāl al-Dīn, son of al-Nāṣir's old enemy 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad, was admitted.³

An event which caused a great sensation in the Islamic world was al-Nāṣir's success in securing the return of the Persian and Syrian Ismā'īlīs to the fold of orthodoxy. In 608/1211-12 the Grand Master of Alamūt, Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan III b. Muḥammad, restored the practices of orthodox Islam in the regions under his control, building mosques, burning heretical books, and receiving from the caliph titles of honour such as no previous Grand Master had ever enjoyed. On the Talisman Gate which he built at Baghdad the victorious caliph was depicted tearing apart the jaws of two dragons; the great epigraphist Max van

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 211-12; Ibn al-Ṭīqtaqā, *al-Fakhrī*, p. 281 (Whitting tr., p. 304); cf. Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. x, pp. 214-17; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, *Mir'āt al-Zamān*, vol. 1, pp. 255-61, 267.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 130.

³ *Ibid.* vol. xii, pp. 286-7; cf. F. Taeschner, "Das Futuwwa-Rittertum des islamischen Mittelalters", *Beiträge zur Arabistik, Semitistik und Islamwissenschaft*, pp. 353-7.

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Berchem interpreted these dragons to represent the two great enemies of the caliphate, the Ismā'īlī Grand Master and the Khawārazm-Shāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad.¹

The death of Sulṭān Mas'ūd without direct heir nevertheless left several Saljuq princes with claims to the sultanate, including his brother Sulaimān-Shāh and the sons of his brothers Maḥmūd and Toghrīl. With the exception of Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd, whom 'Imād al-Dīn praises as the most majestic, most learned, and most just of the Saljuqs,² these contenders were of mediocre capability. They were almost wholly dependent on the Turkish amīrs for support, since in this period several of the provincial amīrs kept Saljuq princes at their courts, using them as shields for their own ambitions. Eldigüz, atabeg of Arrān and of part of Āzarbāijān, at first pushed the claims of Malik-Shāh b. Maḥmūd; but he also had with him Arslan b. Toghrīl, who was moreover the atabeg's own stepson—for Eldigüz had married Toghrīl's widow, and it was the children of this union, Pahlavān and Qizil-Arslan, who continued the line of the Eldigüzids.³ Ibn Aq-Sonqur, the Aḥmadilī Atabeg of Marāgheh and Tabriz, likewise had with him a Saljuq prince, apparently a son of Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd. Sulaimān-Shāh b. Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh was held prisoner for some time by the Zangid ruler of Mosul, Quṭb al-Dīn Maudūd, until he was released to reign for a brief period in Hamadān as sultan (555-6/1160-1). On the death of Malik-Shāh b. Maḥmūd, his son Maḥmūd was taken by his supporters to Fārs, where the Salghurid atabeg Muẓaffar al-Dīn Zangī seized him and held him at Iṣṭakhr as a possible claimant.⁴

The north-western provinces of Iran remained quite outside the sultans' sphere of direct influence. Power here was divided between the Eldigüzids and the Aḥmadilis. Shams al-Dīn Eldigüz (d. 570/1174-5 or possibly 571/1175-6) was originally a slave of Sulṭān Maḥmūd's vizier, al-Kamāl al-Simirumī; then he passed into the possession of

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, p. 195; Juvainī, *Ta'rikh-i Jahān-Gushā*, vol. ii, pp. 364, 391, 699ff. Cf. M. van Berchem, "Das Baghdad Talismantor", in *Archaeologische Reise im Euphrat- und Tigris-Gebiet*, ed. F. Sarre and E. Herzfeld (Berlin, 1911), vol. i; van Berchem, "Épigraphie des Assassins de Syrie", *J.A.* ser. 9, vol. ix (1897), pp. 474-7; Taeschner, "al-Nāsir", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.); *idem*, "Das Futuwwa-Rittertum", pp. 377-8. See also, *The Order of Assassins*, pp. 215-25, where Hodgson combats van Berchem's interpretation of the Talisman Gate decoration (pp. 222-3 n. 31).

² Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, p. 288.

³ *Ibid.* p. 297; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, p. 75; Ḥusainī, *Akḥbār al-daula al-Saljūqiyya*, pp. 133, 197; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 168, 176.

⁴ Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, pp. 75-6; Ḥusainī, pp. 142-3; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 135-7, 177, 208; Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāsiri*, vol. i, p. 270 (tr., vol. i, pp. 174-5).

Sulṭān Mas'ūd, who appointed him governor of Arrān.¹ For some time he kept aloof from the quarrels over the sultanate, until the fortunate marriage which he had made with Toghrīl's widow Mu'mina Khatun enabled him to champion the succession of Arslan b. Toghrīl; the latter he duly set up at Hamadān on the murder of Sulaimān-Shāh in 556/1161.² His son Nuṣrat al-Dīn Pahlavān Muḥammad was Sulṭān Arslan's half-brother, and Pahlavān succeeded not only to the paternal territories in Arrān and much of Āzarbāijān, but also to Jibāl, Iṣfahān, and Ray, with his brother Qizil-Arslan 'Uthmān ruling in Tabriz as his subordinate. Pahlavān held Arslan and his young son and successor Toghrīl under close tutelage until his death c. 581/1186. Only with Qizil-Arslan's rule did Toghrīl manage to burst out of this constriction, and after the Eldigüzid's murder in 587/1191 he briefly turned the tables on Qizil-Arslan's successor, Qutluḡ Inanj b. Pahlavān. The Eldigüzid line did not, however, survive beyond the first quarter of the 7th/13th century. For much of Iran, the irruption of the Khwārazm-Shāhs marked the end of an epoch, and in 622/1225 Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn finally deposed Öz-Beg b. Pahlavān.³ Thus the historical significance of the Eldigüzids lies, first, in their virtually undisputed rule over much of north-western Iran for several decades (just before his death Qizil-Arslan was even bold enough to claim the sultanate for himself);⁴ and second, in their role as champions of Muslim arms on the north-eastern frontier, where they faced the resurgent power of the Georgian kings (see pp. 178-9 below).

The Aḥmadilis of Marāgheh took their name from the Rawwādid Aḥmadīl b. Ibrāhīm of Tabriz, who was murdered in 510/1116.⁵ In accordance with the prevalent practice, his Turkish slave Aq-Sonqur took the surname of his master's family, Aḥmadilī, and founded a line which endured in Marāgheh for over a century, until, like the Eldigüzids, it was extinguished by the Khwārazm-Shāhs. Aq-Sonqur became atabeg to Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd and supported his brief tenure as sultan in Āzarbāijān and Jibāl in 525-6/1131-2. The name of his son and successor is somewhat uncertain, but in the sources he is often

¹ Minorsky has pointed out (*B.S.O.A.S.* [1949-50], p. 877) that the date 568/1172-3—which Ibn al-Athīr gives as the year of Eldigüz's death—is wrong; the correct date is either that of Ḥusainī (570) or of Fāriqī and Rāvandī (571), and probably the latter.

² Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 75; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 175-7, 255-6.

³ See Houtsma, "Ildegiz" and "Tughril II b. Arslan", and Zettersteen, "Pehlewān, Muḥammad b. Ildegiz" and "Kizil Arslan", in *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.).

⁴ Bundārī, p. 302; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, p. 49.

⁵ On the Rawwādids, see above, pp. 32 ff.

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called Aq-Sonqur; he now became the Eldigüzids' rival for power in the north-west. Whereas Eldigüz pressed the claims of Arslan b. Toghril, Aq-Sonqur II was in 554/1159 entrusted with the infant son of Muḥammad b. Mas'ūd; he refused to recognize the succession of Arslan in 556/1160, and the Caliph's vizier 'Aun al-Dīn Ibn Hubaira incited him to set up as a rival the Saljuq child whom he had in his keeping.¹ Falak al-Dīn b. Aq-Sonqur II lost Tabriz in 570/1174-5 to Pahlavān b. Eldigüz, and conflict between the two families persisted into the next century. The Aḥmadilī 'Alā' al-Dīn Qara-Sonqur or Körp-Arslan, patron of the poet Nizāmī, attempted in 602/1205-6 to dispose the drunk and incompetent Eldigüzid Nuṣrat al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Pahlavān, but the latter reacted with unwonted vigour and captured Marāgheh from 'Alā' al-Dīn, allotting him in exchange Urmīyeh and Ishnū. When in 605/1208-9 'Alā' al-Dīn's infant son and successor died, almost all the Aḥmadilī lands fell to Abū Bakr, although scions of the family are still heard of after the engulfing waves of the Khwār-azm-Shāhs and Mongols had passed over Āzarbāijān.²

In Armenia the Shāh-Armanids, descendants of the ghulām Sukmān al-Quṭbī, were frequently involved in the politics and warfare of Āzarbāijān, tending to take the side of Aq-Sonqur II against the Eldigüzids. But when Naṣr al-Dīn Sukmān died without heir in 581/1185, a bloodless struggle for power took place between Pahlavān b. Eldigüz, who had married a daughter to the aged Shāh-Arman in order to acquire a succession claim, and the Ayyūbid Saladin. In the end, Pahlavān took over Akhlāt, whilst Saladin annexed Mayyāfāriqīn in Diyārbakr, a possession of the Artuqids of Mārdīn which had been latterly under the protectorship of the Shāh-Arman.³ Mosul and the Jazīreh remained under Zangid rule, although the relentless advance of Saladin into the Jazīreh posed a serious threat to the Zangids, driving the last Shāh-Arman and the atabeg 'Izz al-Dīn Mas'ūd b. Quṭb al-Dīn Maudūd into alliance against Ayyūbid aggression.⁴ After the death of Saladin in 589/1193, the Zangids recaptured most of the towns and fortresses of the Jazīreh.

From c. 550/1155 till his death in 570/1174-5, a Türkmen of the Avṣhar tribe of the Oghuz, named Ai-Toghdī or Shumla, maintained

¹ Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 76; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 177.

² *al-Kāmil*, vol. xi, p. 280, vol. xii, pp. 157, 182; cf. Minorsky, "Marāgha", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.), and *idem*, "Aḥmadilī", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 339-41; Barhebraeus, *Chronography*, pp. 318-19.

⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 317-23.

control in Khūzistān.¹ Between 553/1158 and 556/1161, Malik-Shāh b. Muḥammad took from him part of Khūzistān, but thereafter it reverted entirely to Shumla, who held it till his death in battle against Eldigūzid forces. On two occasions, in 526/1167 and 569/1173-4, Shumla had tried to encroach on caliphal territory in Iraq, but was repulsed by forces from Baghdad; in 564/1169 he temporarily occupied Fārs at the invitation of the army of the Salghurid ruler of Fārs, Muẓaffar al-Dīn Zangī, who had become unpopular for his tyranny.² Like other provincial amīrs, Shumla sheltered a Saljuq prince, the son of Malik-Shāh b. Maḥmūd, and after Shumla's death this prince continued to harry the borders of Iraq. One of Shumla's sons reigned in Khūzistān for a further twenty years till his death in 591/1195, when al-Nāṣir's vizier Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn Qaṣṣāb invaded the province, annexing it and carrying off Shumla's grandsons to Baghdad. The caliph then appointed ghulām commanders to rule Khūzistān, but in 603/1206-7 he was faced with a rebellion there of one of his former ghulāms, who had built up a coalition of local Kurdish chiefs, the Salghurid ruler of Fārs, 'Izz al-Dīn Sa'd, and the former Eldigūzid ghulām Ai-Toghmiṣh, now ruler of Ray, Iṣfahān, and Hamadān. The threat was surmounted, but the caliph had to suppress a further revolt in Khūzistān in 607/1210-11.³

In Fārs the Salghurid family of Atabegs ruled for some 120 years as tributaries first of the Saljuqs, then of the Khwārazm-Shahs, and then of the Mongols. They were of Türkmen origin, and the Salghur (or Salur) tribe seems to have played an important role in the establishment of the Saljuq sultanate of Rūm. The line of atabegs is usually said to start in 543/1148 with Muẓaffar al-Dīn Sonqur, who took advantage of the troubles of Sulṭān Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad by extending his power over Fārs; the sources state that Sonqur was a nephew of the previous ruler in Fārs, Boz-Aba, though this affiliation is uncertain. Sonqur's son Zangī (d. 570/1174-5) was confirmed in Fārs by Sulṭān Arslan b. Toghrīl, and the province seems to have enjoyed a moderate prosperity under his rule; but the real florescence of this minor dynasty came in

¹ *Ibid.* p. 133; Bundārī, pp. 286-7; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 161, 255. Cf. Cahen, "Les Tribus Turques d'Asie Occidentale pendant la période Seljukide", *W.Z.K.M.* p. 181; M. F. Köprülü, "Afshār", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

² Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, p. 221; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 156-7, 173-4, 216-17, 229, 270, 280; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, p. 268.

³ Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 291-2, vol. xii, pp. 70-1, 170, 190-1; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, pp. 330, 445; Ibn al-Ṭiqtaqā, p. 289 (tr., p. 312).

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the reign of 'Izz al-Dīn Sa'd (590-628/1194-1231). It was from this ruler that the poet Sa'di derived his *takehalluṣ* (*nom de plume*), his father having been in the atabeg's service. After an eight-year struggle with his cousin Toghril, Sa'd had to restore internal prosperity to his devastated province; he subdued the Shabānkāra'i Kurds and attacked Kirmān, but finally had to submit to the Khwārazm-Shāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad and to cede part of his territory to him (see p. 184 below).¹

Just as the rebellion of the Ghuzz in Khurāsān led directly to the decline and disappearance of Saljuq power in that province, so the irruption of these nomads into Kirmān brought about the end of the local Saljuq dynasty there. In 582/1186 the last Saljuq of Kirmān, Muḥammad Shāh b. Bahrām-Shāh, fled before the Ghuzz leader Malik Dīnār; yet for some years before that the Saljuq family in Kirmān had been seriously weakened by internecine conflict, for Toghril-Shāh b. Muḥammad² left four sons, Bahrām-Shāh, Arslan-Shāh, Tūrān-Shāh, and Terken-Shāh, all of whom except the last subsequently achieved the throne.³

Bahrām-Shāh ruled in Jiruft from 565/1169-70 to 570/1174-5, proclaimed ruler there by the eunuch atabeg Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Raiḥān, in whose hands lay much of the real power. But the other important town of Bardasir, was held by Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad (son of an earlier and now displaced atabeg, Boz-Qush), who eventually espoused the cause of Arslan-Shāh when he made a bid for the throne. On his behalf Tūrān-Shāh also appeared from Fārs with forces supplied by the Salghurid Zangī. Bahrām-Shāh got aid from Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ai-Aba in Nishāpūr, but Arslan-Shāh returned to the attack, this time with forces lent by Sulṭān Arslan b. Toghril and the atabeg Eldigüz. In the end, Arslan-Shāh and Bahrām-Shāh agreed to partition Kirmān between them, the former to have two thirds and the latter to have the eastern third of the province.⁴

Both were in fact dead by 572/1176-7, and the third brother Tūrān-

¹ Ḥamd Allāh Mustaufī, *Ta'rikh-i Guzida*, pp. 505-7 (tr., pp. 120-2); Mīrzā Ḥasan Shīrāzī Fasā'i, *Fārs-Nāma-yi Nāṣirī*, cited in Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*, p. 76 n. 1; T. W. Haig, "Salghurids", and Köprülüẓāde Fu'ād, "Salur", in *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.); and Cahen, *W.Z.K.M.* (1948-52), pp. 180-1.

² On Toghril-Shāh b. Muḥammad, see p. 134 above.

³ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Ta'rikh-i Saljūqiyān-i Kirmān*, pp. 36-8; cf. Houtsma, "Zur Geschichte der Seljuken von Kermān", *Z.D.M.G.* p. 378.

⁴ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, pp. 38-56; cf. Houtsma, *op. cit.* pp. 378-86; Ḥusainī, pp. 164-6; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 235-6.

Shāh came to the throne for a seven years' reign (572/1176-7 to 579/1183-4). His reign, too, was stormy; at the outset the Salghurid Zangī allied with the atabeg Muḥammad b. Boz-Qush to force Tūrān-Shāh off the throne, and shortly afterwards a force of Ghuzz invaded Kirmān penetrating as far as Makrān and Fārs. Expelled from the Sarakhs area of Khurāsān by the Khwārazm-Shāh's brother Sultān-Shāh, these Ghuzz comprised 5,000 mounted men plus their dependants. Their arrival threw Kirmān into chaos, and their own depredations together with the nibbling of their flocks brought economic dislocation and then famine. The trading suburb or *rabad* of Bardasīr, once an international resort for merchants and caravans, was destroyed, and never in this period did it revive. Kirmān now became the base for Ghuzz raids as far as Iṣfahān, Fārs, and Sīstān.¹ Tūrān-Shāh's nephew and successor Muḥammad-Shāh (579-82/1183-6) found the old centre of Bardasīr too stricken by ruin and famine to serve as his capital, so he transferred to Bam. Nevertheless he was unable to withstand the pressure of the Ghuzz, and in the end he abandoned Kirmān, seeking help first in Fārs and Iraq and then from Tekish in Khurāsān. Despairing of recovering Kirmān, Muḥammad-Shāh finished his days in the service of the Ghūrids.²

Kirmān was now fully in the hands of the Ghuzz leader Malik Dīnār, who had come there in 582/1186 from Nīshāpūr after the death of Toghan-Shāh b. Ai-Aba (p. 190 below).³ As ruler of Kirmān, Malik Dīnār showed statesmanship and foresight; he took measures for the restoration of agricultural and economic prosperity, conciliated the ulema, and tried to legitimize his rule by marrying a Saljuq princess, the daughter of Toghrīl-Shāh. He led expeditions against the local rulers of Hormuz and the island of Qais and made them his tributaries. When Malik Dīnār died in 591/1195, his incompetent son Farrukh-Shāh was unable to control the Ghuzz, and as a ruling force the horde now disintegrated. Farrukh-Shāh had been ready to recognize the suzerainty of the Khwārazm-Shāhs, by then the greatest single power in Iran, and after his death in 592/1196 Tekish's authority was established in Kirmān through the agency of the atabeg Nuṣrat al-Dīn b. Muḥammad Öner. Faced by a powerful Khwārazmian army, the Ghuzz of Kirmān gave up the attempt to retain their power there and

¹ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, pp. 101-2, 106-20; cf. Houtsma, *op. cit.* pp. 386-90.

² Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, pp. 124-36; cf. Houtsma, *op. cit.* pp. 390-1, and Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti tarihi*, p. 107 n. 111.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 248-9; Juvainī, vol. i, p. 294.

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abandoned the province, entering the ranks of the Khwārazmian army after a twenty-year domination of Kirmān.¹

Thus in the second half of the 6th/12th century, the Saljuqs of Iraq and western Iran ruled no more than the province of Jibāl; Hamadān and Iṣfahān were the centres of their power, though they did have occasional control over Ray. When the fugitive Sulaimān-Shāh came in 550/1155 to Baghdad, Caliph al-Muqtafī recognized him as sultan but required in return that Sulaimān-Shāh should never make any hostile move against Iraq; and after the failure of Sulṭān Muḥammad's siege of Baghdad in 551-2/1157, the sultans never again seriously tried to assert their former authority there.²

On the death in 547/1152 of Sulṭān Mas'ūd, the Amīr Khāṣṣ Beg Arslan, in accordance with the dead monarch's wishes, proclaimed Malik-Shāh b. Maḥmūd as his successor. Al-Muqtafī seized the opportunity for a great onslaught on Saljuq authority in Iraq. Mas'ūd's old shaḥna in Baghdad, Mas'ūd Bilālī, was driven out, the sultan's properties expropriated, and even poets attached to the Saljuq court circle, including the famous Ḥaiṣ-Baiṣ, were arrested, whilst caliphal forces took over the outlying towns of Hilla, Kūfa, and Wāsiṭ.³

Malik-Shāh was allowed to reign only for a few months, and in 548/1153 he was replaced by his brother Muḥammad, who was brought from Khūzistān. During his six years as sultan, Muḥammad tried energetically to restore the slipping authority of his dynasty in Iraq. The caliph was at this time clearing Iraq of the remaining Turkish elements, who had rallied round Mas'ūd Bilālī in Takrīt. These amīrs brought out from captivity in Takrīt the young Saljuq prince Arslan, and set him up as sultan; according to 'Imād al-Dīn, the commanders had said to Mas'ūd Bilālī, "Fetch Malik Arslan b. Toghrīl, the Sultan's nephew, so that the troops and the Türkmen contingents may take heart from his presence". At first forced back on Baghdad, the caliph assembled an army of Arabs and Kurds, and with his vizier, 'Aun al-Dīn Ibn Hubaira, he led them in 549/1154 to victory at Bazimzā near Baghdad against Mas'ūd Bilālī, Al-Qush, and their protégé Arslan.

¹ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, pp. 138-201; cf. Houtsma, *op. cit.* pp. 392 ff.; Nasawī, *Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti*, pp. 27-8 (tr., pp. 46-9); cf. Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 144, 196-8.

² Ibn al-Jauzī, *al-Muntaẓam*, vol. x, pp. 161, 164; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. xi, p. 139.

³ Bundārī, *Zubdat al-nuṣra*, pp. 227-9; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, *Saljūq-Nāma*, pp. 66-7; Rāvandī, *Rāhat al-ṣudūr*, pp. 249-56; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 147-8, 153-4; Ḥusainī, *Al-ḥbbār al-dawla*, pp. 129-30; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 105-7; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, vol. i, pp. 212-13.

The latter fled into Kurdistān and eventually found shelter with his stepfather Eldigüz.¹

The Saljuq prince Sulaimān-Shāh b. Muḥammad Tapar had been his uncle Sanjar's heir in Khurāsān, but the ascendancy of the Ghuzz drove him westwards, and in 550/1155 he appeared at Baghdad with a small force. Al-Muqtafī saw in him a useful weapon against Sultān Muḥammad, and he recognized Sulaimān-Shāh as a rival sultan, placing his name in the khutba. He also provided him with an army, but his bid for power in Jibāl was easily defeated by Muḥammad. The latter was naturally incensed at the caliph's aid to his rival, and he summoned all his forces for a siege of Baghdad in 551-2/1157. As well as the Saljuq army from Hamadān, Zangid forces under Zain al-Dīn 'Alī Kūchūk came from Mosul, and contingents came from the Mazyadids in Hilla and from southern Iraq. Heavy fighting, both on land and on the rivers, followed. Ibn Hubaira had laid in good stocks of food for the army, but the interruptions to commerce made the spirits of Baghdad's merchant classes flag. The vizier distributed money and presents amongst the besiegers, together with skilful propaganda about the impiety of attacking the caliph; he also wrote to Eldigüz inciting him to make a countermove in Jibāl and to set up there a Saljuq prince as rival to Muḥammad. This diplomacy had its effect. The army of Mosul grew lukewarm, and when Muḥammad received the news that Eldigüz had come with the princes Arslan and Malik-Shāh and had occupied the capital Hamadān, he lifted the siege. He drove Eldigüz back into Āzarbāijān and cleared his partisans from Ray and Iṣfahān, but by now he was a sick man. He was unable to consummate his marriage with the daughter of Muḥammad b. Arslan-Shāh of Kirmān, and remained in Hamadān till his death in 554/1159 at the age of thirty-two.²

There was dissension among the amīrs regarding a successor. Muḥammad's own infant son was committed to the Aḥmadilī Aq-Sonqur II at Marāḡheh. Some amīrs favoured Malik-Shāh b. Maḥmūd, to whom Muḥammad had latterly allocated the province of Fārs; and though he managed to conquer part of this from Shumla, he died at

¹ Bundārī, pp. 236-40; Zāhīr al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, pp. 67-8, 75; Rāvandī, pp. 258 ff.; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 156-8; Ḥusainī, pp. 131-3; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 106-7, 125, 128-30; Barhebraeus, *Chronography*, pp. 282-3.

² Bundārī, pp. 240-2, 251-3, 285-8; Zāhīr al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, pp. 68-72, 75; Rāvandī, pp. 262-70; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 161, 164-5, 168-75; Ḥusainī, pp. 131-3, 143; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, 135-7, 140-2, 166; Barhebraeus, p. 285.

Iṣfahān in 555/1160, reputedly poisoned by the Vizier Ibn Hubaira, for Malik-Shāh had been threatening to march against the caliph in Baghdad.¹ Others supported Arslan b. Toghrīl, but a majority, including Īnanch Sonqur, the powerful governor of Ray, favoured Sulaimān-Shāh on grounds of seniority and acceptability to al-Muqtafi. Sulaimān-Shāh was accordingly released from captivity at Mosul, and with difficulty established himself at Hamadān. He reigned for a few months only in the year 555/1160, during which time he leant heavily on the support of such amīrs as Īnanch Sonqur and Sharaf al-Dīn Gird-Bāzū, while from fear of Eldigüz he was compelled to invest Arslan with the governorship of Arrān and make him his heir. Sulaimān-Shāh dreamed of re-establishing Saljuq influence in Baghdad by the appointment there of a *shaḥna*, but the negotiations with al-Mustanjid were inconclusive. Sulaimān-Shāh's drunkenness and general ineffectiveness soon lost him the amīrs' support. They invited Eldigüz to set up Arslan as sultan; Gird-Bāzū arrested Sulaimān-Shāh, who was first imprisoned and then in 556/1161 strangled with a bowstring.²

In this fashion Arslan was installed at Hamadān in 556/1161 as nominal sultan. He remained under the tutelage of Eldigüz, who took the title of *Atabeg al-A'ẓam* ("Supreme Atabeg") and his vizier was Shihāb al-Dīn Muḥammad Nishāpūri, formerly minister to Īnanch-Sonqur of Ray. Arslan now married Muḥammad's widow, the *Khatun-i Kirmāni*.³ This succession was nevertheless disputed. Īnanch of Ray was temporarily mollified by the marriage of his daughter to Pahlavān b. Eldigüz, but the caliph refused to recognize Arslan as sultan, fearing the constitution of a powerful Saljuq-Eldigüzid state in western Iran. His vizier stirred up Aq-Sonqor II Aḥmadīlī, who had with him the son of Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd, and Aq-Sonqur in alliance with the Shāh-Arman of Akhlāt routed the army of Pahlavān on the banks of the Safīd Rūd. Ibn Hubaira further encouraged the Salghurid Zangī in Shīrāz to press the succession claims of Maḥmūd b. Malik-Shāh b. Maḥmūd.⁴

A coalition of discontented amīrs, including Īnanch-Sonqur, 'Izz al-Dīn Satmaz, and Alp-Arghun of Qazvīn, marched on Hamadān,

¹ Bundārī, pp. 286-7, 295; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 173-4.

² Bundārī, pp. 288-9, 293-6; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūri, pp. 72-4, 76; Rāvandī, pp. 274-9; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, pp. 192, 196; Ḥusainī, pp. 143-4; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, 166, 168, 175-7.

³ Bundārī, pp. 296-7; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūri, p. 76; Rāvandī, p. 286.

⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 177-8.

but in a battle at Marg-i Qara-Tegin they were defeated by Sulṭān Arslan, Eldigüz, and Gird-Bāzū. Īnanch fled first to the Bāvandid Caspian territories and then to the Khwārazm-Shāh Il-Arslan. Despite the support of a Khwārazmian army, his invasion of the Qazvīn-Zanjān area proved a failure, and the excesses of his troops alienated the local people (562/1166-7). Īnanch then took refuge in Gurgān, returning later with Bāvandid support, and this time recapturing Ray. But Eldigüz came in 564/1169 with an army to besiege Īnanch in the citadel of Ṭabarak, after which he suborned some of Īnanch's ghulāms to kill him. Ray was then granted to Pahlavān, with the Vizier Sa'd al-Dīn al-Aṣhall left there to administer it.¹

Eldigüz's diplomatic and military activity reached well beyond the borders of his territories of Āzarbāijān and Jibāl. Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ai-Aba of Khurāsān had long been one of Eldigüz's friends, and in 558/1163 he placed Sulṭān Arslan in the khuṭba of the towns in his possession. Therefore in 562/1167, when Khwārazmian pressure seemed to be uncomfortably close, it was natural that Ai-Aba should write to Eldigüz, warning him of Il-Arslan's ambitions not merely in Khurāsān but in the whole of Iran; Eldigüz wrote to the shāh warning him that Khurāsān was part of Sulṭān Arslan's territories, and he came himself to Bisṭām to check a Khwārazmian move against Khurāsān.² In 563/1168 Pahlavān led an army against the Aḥmadilīs and forced them to make peace; Eldigüz sent to Mosul and had Quṭb al-Dīn Maudūd read the khuṭba for Arslan, and in 564/1169 he sent an army to Kirmān to aid the claimant Arslan-Shāh.³

The defence of the north-west was one of Eldigüz's particular concerns, for the period of the Eldigüzids in Āzarbāijān coincided with a phase of renewed activity by the Bagratid kings of Christian Georgia. Under Dmitri (1125-54 or 1156), the Georgian monarchy was largely occupied with internal struggles against the Orbeliani family of nobles, but in 549/1154, apparently at the invitation of the local Shaddādid ruler Fakhr al-Dīn Shaddād, the Georgians descended on Ani and defeated and captured 'Izz al-Dīn Saltuq of Erzerum.⁴ The reign of

¹ Bundārī, pp. 298-300; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūri, pp. 76-81; Rāvandī, pp. 290 ff.; Ḥusainī, pp. 145-53; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 177-9, 229-30.

² *al-Kāmil*, vol. xi, pp. 192-3; Ḥusainī, pp. 162-4.

³ Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm, p. 52; cf. Houtsma, *Z.D.M.G.* (1885), pp. 380-1; Ḥusainī, pp. 162-6; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, p. 208.

⁴ Fāriqī, in Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dbail ta'rikh Dimashq*, p. 328 n.; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 125-6, 133; Minorsky, "Caucasica II. 1. The Georgian Maliks of Ahar", *B.S.O.A.S.* vol. xiii/4 (1951), pp. 874-7; *idem*, *Studies in Caucasian History*, pp. 86-7.

Dmitri's son Giorgi III (1156-84) was one of internal prosperity and warfare against the Muslims. In 556/1161 Ani passed from Faḍl IV b. Maḥmūd to the Christians, and in the next year a Georgian army took Dvin. These successes provoked a grand Muslim coalition of Sulṭān Arslan, Eldigüz, Aq-Sonqur Aḥmadīlī, and the Shāh-Arman Sukmān b. Ibrāhīm, which in 557/1162 invaded Georgia and defeated King Giorgi.¹ Eldigüz's efforts gradually slowed down Georgian expansion, though we still find the Christians raiding as far as Ganja in 561/1166 and even intervening at Darband to assist the Shīrvān-Shāh Akhsitan, who was related by marriage to the Bagratids.²

Under Queen Tamara (1184-1212) the dynamism of the Georgians reached its peak. Guided by her *Amīr-Spasalari* (Commander-in-Chief) Zakharia Mkhargrdzeli and his brother the "atabeg" Ioanne, she deliberately diverted attention from internal questions by directing Georgian energies outwards. The later Eldigüzids were not of the calibre of Eldigüz and Pahlavān. In the succession struggles amongst the latter's sons, Amīr Amīrān 'Umar fled at one point to Queen Tamara, and from her and her vassal the Shīrvān-Shāh he received help against his brother Abū Bakr. Later realizing that he could not stand up to Georgian arms, Abū Bakr contracted a marriage with a Georgian princess in order to safeguard his position.³ In the succeeding years the Georgians took Dvin, Kars and Ardābil; they operated in the west without hindrance as far as Malāzgird, Akhlāt, Arjīsh, and Erzerum, eventually coming up against the Saljuqs of Rūm; and after 600/1204 Tamara gave aid to the fugitive Comneni in Trebizond. Most of these conquests were not held for very long, and though Giorgi IV (1212-23) continued to draw tribute from Erzerum, Ganja, Nakhchivān, and Akhlāt, the Mongols appeared in the Caucasus in 617/1220 and a period of disaster began for the Georgians.⁴

When Eldigüz died at Nakhchivān in 570/1174-5 or 571/1175, his son Pahlavān Muḥammad succeeded to his position as atabeg. Sulṭān Arslan had long resented his subordination to Eldigüz, and it seems that at this juncture he endeavoured to break away from Eldigüzid

¹ Fāriqī, in Ibn al-Qalānisi, pp. 360-4; Zahr al-Dīn Nishāpūri, p. 77; Rāvandī, pp. 287-8; Ḥusainī, pp. 156-62; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 184, 188-9; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, pp. 89 ff.; M. Canard, "Dwīn", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).

² Ḥusainī, pp. 185 ff.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 185-6; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 120, 160.

⁴ Ḥusainī, pp. 188-9; Ibn al-Athīr, xii, pp. 133-4, 159, 169, 184. Cf. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People*, pp. 100-10; Minorsky, "Tiflis", *Encyc. of Islam* (1st ed.).

control. Some discontented amīrs having provided him with money and troops, he moved to Zanjān intending to conquer Āzarbāijān; but in 571/1176, at the age of forty-three, he fell ill and died. 'Imād al-Dīn asserts—and it is not improbable—that Pahlavān had conveniently poisoned the sultan. Pahlavān now set up Arslan's young son Toghrīl as sultan, and successfully fought off an attempt to seize the throne, made by Arslan's elder brother Muḥammad, who had been living in Khūzistān.¹

Pahlavān died in 582/1186, and in accordance with the Turkish practice of seniorate his position as atabeg fell to his childless brother Qizil-Arslan 'Uthmān. But Pahlavān also divided his personal territories among his four sons, who were to be under Qizil-Arslan's general supervision, and this partition was to prove a source of dissension and weakness. Pahlavān's wife Īnanch Khatun, daughter of Īnanch-Sonqur of Ray, supported the claims of her two sons against the other two children, sons of Pahlavān by slave mothers; one of these latter, Abū Bakr, was particularly favoured by Qizil-Arslan and seemed likely to succeed, as in fact he did, to the whole of the Eldigüzid inheritance.²

The new Sultān Toghrīl, last of the Saljuqs in Iran, is praised in the sources for his manifold qualities, scholarly as well as soldierly. He soon became restive under Qizil-Arslan's tutelage, for whereas he had been on good terms with Pahlavān, the new atabeg treated him harshly.³ Toghrīl allied with the forces supporting Īnanch Khatun's son Qutluḡ Īnanch Muḥammad in opposition to Qizil-Arslan and Abū Bakr. In 583/1187 he was in Māzandarān seeking help from the Bāvandid Ḥusām al-Daula Ardāshīr. Also in this year he sent an envoy to Baghdad asking that the old palace of the Saljuq sultans be repaired in order that he might occupy it. Al-Nāṣir's answer was to raze the palace to the ground and to send an army of 15,000 troops, under his vizier Jalāl al-Dīn 'Ubaidallāh b. Yūnus, to support Qizil-Arslan, who agreed to become the caliph's direct vassal. Toghrīl defeated the caliphal forces at Dāi-Marg near Hamadān in 584/1188, but he lost support by his arbitrary behaviour and his execution of opponents in Hamadān. Qizil-Arslan now set up Sanjar b. Sulaimān-Shāh as a rival sultan and drove Toghrīl into the Lake Urmīyeh

¹ Bundārī, p. 301; Zahir al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, p. 82; Rāwandī, p. 351; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. x, p. 264; Ḥusainī, pp. 168-71; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 255-6, 257. Cf. Houtsma, "Some Remarks on the History of the Saljuks", *Acta Orientalia*, pp. 140-2.

² Ḥusainī, pp. 172-5; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 346-7.

³ Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Dhail-i Saljuq-Nāma*, p. 86.

region; and though he tried despairingly to obtain help from the Ayyūbid Saladin and to conciliate the caliph, even sending one of his infant sons to Baghdad as a hostage, Toghrīl was obliged in 586/1190 to surrender to Qizil-Arslan, who imprisoned him and his son Malik-Shāh in a castle near Tabriz.¹

Qizil-Arslan now claimed the sultanate for himself, assuming the appropriate style and privileges; but in the next year he was mysteriously murdered, possibly by one of his own amīrs, possibly by Īnanch Khatun, whom Qizil-Arslan had married on his brother's death. Toghrīl's subsequent execution of Īnanch Khatun may point to the second alternative.² After two years' incarceration, Toghrīl was released by one of the amīrs of Āzarbāijān. Near Qazvin he speedily defeated Īnanch Khatun's two sons, Qutlugh-Īnanch and the Amīr-Amīrān 'Umar, and drove them into Āzarbāijān (588/1192). There they were again defeated, this time by their half-brother Abū Bakr who was then at Nakhchivān, but they later returned with help from Georgia and Arrān and defeated Abū Bakr. Toghrīl was now master of Jibāl, Hamadān, and Iṣfahān, and he had also secured the treasuries left by Pahlavān. But an enemy more dangerous than the Eldigūzids had meanwhile appeared.³

Qutlugh-Īnanch had summoned help from the Khwārazm-Shāh Tekish, who in 588/1192 came to Māzandarān and then Ray, and demanded that the khuṭba of western Iran recognize his name immediately after that of the caliph. After this was granted, however, he was obliged to return to Khurāsān on receiving news of a projected attack on Khwārazm by his brother Sulṭān-Shāh. Tekish therefore made peace with Toghrīl, but the sultan felt that a Khwārazmian army in Ray, with its commanding position of the roads into Jibāl and Āzarbāijān, was a threat which could not be endured; and no doubt he felt too that his prestige was involved. Tekish had distractions in Khurāsān, and does not seem at this point to have been implacably hostile towards Toghrīl, despite urgings from Caliph al-Nāṣir.

In 589/1193 Toghrīl marched eastwards and cleared the Khwārazm-

¹ Bundārī, pp. 301-2; Abū Ḥamid, pp. 86-9; Rāvandī, pp. 339-62; Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rikh-i Tabaristān*, p. 252; Ḥusainī, pp. 176-80; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 347, 371, vol. xii, pp. 15-16; Ibn al-Ṭiṭṭaqā, p. 288 (tr., p. 311); Houtsma, *Acta Orientalia* (1924), pp. 145-50.

² Bundārī, p. 302; Abū Ḥamid, p. 89; Rāvandī, pp. 363, 367; Ibn Isfandiyār, p. 254; Ḥusainī, pp. 181, 184; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 49-50; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, p. 406; Houtsma, *op. cit.* pp. 142-4.

³ Abū Ḥamid, pp. 89-90; Rāvandī, pp. 365-9; Ḥusainī, pp. 182-7; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, p. 61.

ian garrison out of Ray; and in the following year he defeated Qutlugh-Īnanch there, despite the 7,000 Khwārazmian reinforcements which the Eldigüzid had obtained from Dāmghān. Tekish returned to Ray in 590/1194. Against the advice of his amirs, Toghril refused to withdraw and negotiate a peace, or even to wait for additional troops to come up from Isfahān and Zanjān. In a battle outside Ray the Saljuq army was defeated and Toghril killed at the age of twenty-five, his head being sent by Tekish to Baghdad. In this fashion, the sources note, the Saljuq dynasty ended as it began, with a Toghril; though in fact two of the dead sultan's sons remained in the custody of the Khwārazm-Shāhs till their execution at the time of the Mongol invasion of Khwārazm in 616/1219-20, and a daughter of Toghril survived to marry first the Eldigüzid Öz-Beg b. Pahlavān and then the Khwārazm-Shāh Jalāl al-Dīn himself.¹

Tekish occupied Hamadān and the whole of Jibāl, making Qutlugh-Īnanch governor over it, but much of the land was divided into iqtā's for his amirs, and he left his sons Yūnus Khān and Muḥammad Khān in control.² It was readily predictable that the caliph would find the proximity of Tekish uncomfortable, and deep mutual suspicion arose. Al-Nāṣir's vizier, Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Qaṣṣāb, had taken over Khūzistān on the death of Shumla's son, and in 591/1195 was joined there by Qutlugh-Īnanch, who had quarrelled with the Khwārazmian Commander-in-Chief Shams al-Dīn Mayanchuq. The two of them invaded Jibāl and drove the Khwārazm-Shāh's son from Hamadān and then Ray into Qūmis and Gurgān. Returning to Hamadān in 592/1196, Tekish disinterred and mutilated the body of Ibn al-Qaṣṣāb; but disorder in his territories on the lower Syr Darya compelled his withdrawal once more (see p. 191 below).³

The caliph judged it wise to bow in some degree to the military superiority of the shah, and in 595/1199 he sent to Tekish an investiture patent for the sultanate of Iraq, Khurāsān, and Turkestan. Reports about Mayanchuq's misconduct brought Tekish westwards once again

¹ Bundārī, pp. 302-3; Abū Ḥamid, pp. 90-1; Rāvandī, pp. 370-4; Ḥusainī, pp. 189-93; Nasawī, pp. 21, 39, 118-19, 153-4 (tr., pp. 37, 66, 96-8, 254-7); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 69-70; Jūzjānī, vol. I, p. 267 (tr., vol. I, pp. 166-7); Juvainī, *Ta'rikh-i Jahān-Gushā*, vol. I, pp. 299-303; Barhebraeus, pp. 344-5; Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp. 366-7; Houtsma, *op. cit.* pp. 150-2; Kafesoğlu, *Flarezmşahlar devleti tarihi*, pp. 116-19, 123-6.

² Abū Ḥamid, p. 92; Rāvandī, p. 385; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 69-70; Jūzjānī, vol. I, p. 304 (tr., vol. I, pp. 249-50); Barhebraeus, p. 345; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 126-7.

³ Rāvandī, p. 389; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XII, pp. 72-3; Juvainī, vol. I, pp. 303-4; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 131-7.

THE END OF THE SALJUQS

in this same year, and after the rebellious governor had been pursued into Dailam and defeated, the shāh turned to attack the Ismā'ilis there, capturing the fortress of Arslan-Gushāi near Qazvīn.¹ In all these campaigns the Kh̲wārazmian army included a large proportion of Türkmen troops from the Q̲ipchaq steppes, many of whom were still pagan; the army became hated in western Iran for its violence and rapine, which Rāvandī says were worse than the excesses of the Christian Georgians and Franks and even of the pagan Qara-Khitai. When in 596/1200 Tekish died, the people of Jibāl rose and massacred all the Kh̲wārazmians they could find.²

Al-Nāṣir now agreed to partition western Iran between himself and Nūr al-Dīn Gökche, a former Eldigüzid ghulām who had taken over Ray, Sāveh, Qum, and Kāshān; the caliph was to have Iṣfahān, Hamadān, Qazvīn, and Zanjān.³ Thus the nominal authority of the Eldigüzids survived in northern Jibāl and Dailam, and when in 600/1203-4 Gökche was killed in battle with another of Pahlavān's old ghulāms, Shams al-Dīn Ai-Toghmish, the latter set up Öz-Beg b. Pahlavān as titular ruler of Gökche's territories. In Āzarbāijān, Abū Bakr b. Pahlavān held on and secured a reputation with posterity for his patronage of scholars and his foundation of mosques and madrasas. With Ai-Toghmish's aid in 602/1205-6 he fought off an attack by the Aḥmadili ruler of Marāgheh, 'Alā' al-Dīn Qara-Sonqur, and three years later he took over almost all the Aḥmadili possessions (see above, pp. 170-1).⁴ The Eldigüzid ghulāms remained a potent force in Jibāl and in 608/1211-12 a further upheaval took place in which Ai-Toghmish was replaced by Mengli. Mengli's power soon excited the fears of neighbouring powers, however, and in 612/1215-16 the caliph organized a grand coalition against him, including Öz-Beg, the amīrs of al-Jazīreh and Kurdistān, and the Ismā'ili Grand Master Ḥasan III, newly returned to the fold of orthodoxy (see p. 168 above). Mengli was defeated in battle and eventually executed by Öz-Beg, who now appointed the ghulām Saif al-Dīn Īghlamish as governor of Jibāl.⁵

Tekish was followed as Kh̲wārazm-Shāh by his son 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad. At the end of his life Tekish had demanded of al-Nāṣir

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 100-1; Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 310-12; Kafesoğlu, pp. 141-5.

² Rāvandī, pp. 393 ff.; Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp. 347-8.

³ Rāvandī, p. 400; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 76-7.

⁴ *al-Kāmil*, vol. xii, pp. 156-7, 168, 182; Jūzjānī, vol. i, p. 270 (tr., i, p. 173); Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 180-1.

⁵ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 200-1; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 199-201; Hodgson, *Order of Assassins*, pp. 220-2.

that his son's name be put in the khutba at Baghdad, but for many years his successor was too occupied with his opponents the Ghūrids, the Qara-Khitai, and the Qipchaq to contemplate expansion in the west. However, in 614/1217, on the very eve of the Mongol invasion, 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad demanded recognition by the caliph and came westwards. Īghlāmīsh in Jibāl recognized him, but was shortly afterwards murdered by an Ismā'īlī assassin. The Salghurid atabeg Sa'd b. Zangī, seeing a chance to add Jibāl to his existing province of Fārs, marched on Ray only to meet defeat and capture at the hands of the Khawārazmian army. He was forced to pay a tribute of a third of his annual revenues for the rest of his life, and to allot certain of his territories as fiefs for Khawārazmian commanders. In return, Sa'd was given a Khawārazmian bride together with help to recover his province, for in his absence his son Abū Bakr Qutluḡh Khān had taken over Fārs; later one of Sa'd's daughters was to marry Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn.¹

'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad knew from captured diplomatic correspondence that the caliph had in the past incited the Ghūrids against him and was now using Ismā'īlī assassins to remove his opponents.² Because of his anti-caliphal attitude he was unable to count on Sunnī opinion, and so the shāh adopted a pro-Shī'ī policy. He secured a fatwā from the religious authorities of his empire saying that al-Nāṣir was unfit to rule and that the 'Abbāsids had usurped the caliphate from the house of 'Alī, and he proclaimed the Sayyid 'Alā' al-Mulk Tirmidhī as Anti-Caliph. He began a march on Baghdad, but in the winter of 614/1217-18 snowstorms of unparalleled ferocity, together with harrying by hostile Türkmen and Hakkārī Kurds, halted him on the borders of Iraq and Iran. Hearing of the Mongols' appearance in the east, the shāh returned to Khurāsān, leaving his son Rukn al-Dīn Ghūr-Sanjī with the care of eastern Iran.³

¹ Nasawī, *Histoire*, pp. 3, 13-14, 19-20, 167 (tr., 6, 24-6, 33-5, 278); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 206-7; Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 271-2 (tr., vol. i, pp. 176-8); Juvainī, vol. ii, pp. 365-6; Ḥamd Allāh Mustaufī, *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, pp. 496, 506-7 (tr., pp. 114-15, 120-1); Kafesoğlu, *Harezmsahlār devleti tarīhi*, p. 204.

² Juvainī, vol. ii, pp. 390-1; cf. Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 301-2 (tr., vol. i, p. 243).

³ Nasawī, pp. 11-21 (tr., pp. 20-36); Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. xii, pp. 206-7; Juvainī, vol. ii, pp. 364-7, 392, 474; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, vol. ii, pp. 582-3; Ḥamd Allāh Mustaufī, *op. cit.* p. 496 (tr., pp. 114-15); Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 373-5; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 202-5, 214-20. [Ed.: Ibn al-Athīr's mention of the Mongols is anachronistic; he probably meant the Qipchaq Turks on Muḥammad's northern frontier. See Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 369.]

XIII. KHURĀSĀN IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 6TH/12TH CENTURY, AND THE EXPANSION OF THE KHWĀRAZM-SHĀHS

After Sanjar's death in 552/1157, Khurāsān remained politically fragmented. For despite the authority which should have come to him when Sanjar nominated him as heir, the Qarakhānid Maḥmūd Khān was never able to enjoy more than a limited authority. Amongst the former ghulāms of Sanjar's army the most powerful single figure was Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ai-Aba of Nishāpūr. Maḥmūd Khān, unable single-handed to make much headway against him, allied with Ai-Aba, confirmed him in the governorship of Nishāpūr and Tūs, and fell more and more under his influence.¹ The end of the eastern branch of the Saljuqs left a power vacuum in Khurāsān, and this inevitably invited the intervention of external powers such as the ambitious Bāvandid Shāh Ghāzī Rustam (534-58/1140-63) and the Khwārazm-Shāh Tāj al-Dunyā wa'l-Dīn Il-Arslan (551-68/1156-72). The internal politics of Khurāsān were for twenty years dominated by the disputes of the Turkish amīrs and the Ghuzz tribesmen, with the Khwārazm-Shāhs stepping in only so far as their dependence on the Qara-Khitai allowed. But after the capture of Herāt by the Ghūrids in 571/1175-6, a new major power appeared in the province, and down to the last decade of the century there was a three-cornered struggle for hegemony in Khurāsān involving the Ghūrids, the Khwārazm-Shāh Tekish, and his estranged brother Sultān-Shāh. Squeezed among these combatants, the Ghuzz tribesmen were either compelled to migrate to adjacent regions such as Kirmān, or else they were absorbed into the Khwārazmian and Ghūrīd armies.

In the rivalry after Sanjar's death between Ai-Aba and Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Ai-Taḡ, the latter received help from Shāh Ghāzī Rustam (p. 156 above). Ai-Taḡ collected an army in Māzandarān, but was defeated by Ai-Aba and Maḥmūd Khān. A peace between the two sides in 553/1158 freed Ai-Aba to deal with Sonqur 'Azizī, another of Sanjar's former ghulāms, who had rebelled in Herāt during Ai-Aba's preoccupation with Ai-Taḡ. Ai-Aba and Maḥmūd Khān then attempted to subdue the independent Türkmen bands who were established in several parts of Khurāsān, but found this an uphill task; they were defeated by the Ghuzz, who followed up this victory by occupying Marv and then raiding Ai-Aba's towns of Sarakhs and Tūs. The Ghuzz now

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. XI, pp. 121, 171-2.

offered their allegiance to Maḥmūd, and the khan, although personally distrustful of the Türkmén, saw a chance to reduce his dependence on Ai-Aba. From his refuge in Gurgān he sent his son Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad to the Ghuzz, who had meanwhile taken Nīshāpūr and temporarily expelled Ai-Aba (554/1159).¹

However, Ai-Aba returned in the same year and firmly resumed power in Nīshāpūr, taking stern measures to repress the *fitna*, or internal strife, which had been raging there.² It seems that the collapse of Saljuq authority in Khurāsān had given free rein to local faction and violence. Agriculture was interrupted by the trampling of opposing armies as well as by the nomads' flocks, and famine resulted. Religious and social sectarianism, the curse of the Khurāsānian cities, flared up on several occasions: in Astarābād Shāh Ghāzī Rustam had to mediate between Shī'īs and Shāfi'īs, and in Nīshāpūr in 556/1161 Ai-Aba jailed the *naqīb* (head) of the 'Alids, holding him responsible for clashes which had ruined much of the city and had caused the destruction of such a famous library as that of the 'Uqaili mosque.³ Maḥmūd Khān soon tired of his *entente* with the Ghuzz, and in 556/1161 decided to make his peace with Ai-Aba; but the latter seized, blinded, and imprisoned the khan and his son Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad, and made the *khuṭba* in Nīshāpūr for himself alone.⁴

Ai-Aba was now systematically extending his power. He disputed the possession of Pūshang and Herāt with the Ghūrīds; he conquered Qūmis and installed as governor of Bīṣṭām one of his ghulāms, although this last was in 559/1164 driven out by the Bāvandids. In the previous year the sultan in the west, Arslan b. Toghrīl, had given him presents and an investiture patent, and he accordingly placed Arslan in the *khuṭba* of those parts of Khurāsān held by him (i.e. Nīshāpūr, Tūs, Qūmis, and the region between Nasā and Ṭabas).⁵ The Amīr Ai-Taḡ had been defeated by a group of Ghuzz under the Yazīr chief Yaghmur Khān, but had obtained help first from the Bāvandids and then from the Khwārazm-Shāh; he finally planted himself in Gurgān and Dihīstān, and there made the *khuṭba* for Il-Arslan. Other towns of Khurāsān, such as Balkh, Marv, Sarakhs, Herāt, and Ṭāliqān, along with the region

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 146-7, 149-50, 152-5.

² *Ibid.* pp. 171-2.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 154-5, 165, 171-2, 179.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 179-80; Zahir al-Dīn Nīshāpūri, *Saljuq-nāma*, p. 52; Juvaini, *Ta'rikh-i Jahān-Gushā*, vol. 1, p. 289.

⁵ Ibn al-Āthīr, vol. xi, pp. 185-6, 192-3, 206; Jūzjāni, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, vol. 1, p. 273 (tr., vol. 1, pp. 180-1); Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti tarihi*, p. 77.

of Gharchistān, were in the hands of Ghuzz amīrs or former ghulām commanders of Sanjar's army, who made the *khutba* first for the dead Sanjar and then for themselves.¹ The amīr of Herāt, Ai-Tegin, died in 559/1164, and rather than face an occupation by the Ghuzz, the local people handed the city over to Ai-Aba. The latter also sent expeditions against the Ghuzz in Marv and Sarakhs, but his attempt to occupy Nasā was forestalled by the appearance of a Khwārazmian army. Il-Arslan's troops threatened Nishāpūr for a while, but then turned westwards and drove the shāh's erstwhile protégé Ai-Taḡ from Dihistān (560/1165). Ibn Funduq mentions the presence of Khwārazmian troops at Baihaq and Nishāpūr in 561-2/1166-7, but the time for the shāhs' full-scale intervention in Khurāsān was not yet come, for they still had many problems to face north of the Oxus.²


Both the Khwārazm-Shāhs and the Qarakhānids remained vassals of the Qara-Khitai, though the latter were little disposed to interfere in the internal administration of Khwārazm or of Bukhārā and Samarqand, provided that order was kept and the required taxation forwarded to the Gür-Khān's *ordu* (military camp) in Semirechye. Unfortunately for the Qarakhānids, many elements within their territories made for disorder, and the ensuing troubles brought about interference in Transoxiana from both the Khwārazm-Shāhs and the Qara-Khitai. The endeavours of the khans to consolidate their authority had often in the past caused clashes with the military classes, whose interests lay in a weak central power. Disputes with the Qarluq tribal divisions culminated in the murder of Tamghach-Khān Ibrāhīm III of Samarqand in 551/1156. His successor Chaghri Khān, or Kōk-Saghīr 'Alī Khān, sought revenge by slaying the leader of the Qarluq and driving out others of their chiefs to Khwārazm. According to the account in Ibn al-Athīr, Chaghri Khān tried to carry out the orders of his suzerain the Gür-Khān by disarming the Qarluq and planting them in Kashgharia as agriculturists—and this, not surprisingly, provoked a Qarluq revolt.

Whatever the exact sequence of events, the result was an invasion of Transoxiana by Il-Arslan on behalf of the Qarluq (553/1158). Chaghri Khān appealed to the Qipchaq of the lower Syr Darya and to the Qara-Khitai, but the Qara-Khitai army was reluctant to face a battle with the

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XI, pp. 192-3, 205-6; Barthold, "A History of the Turkman People", pp. 122-3; Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti tarihi*, pp. 76-7.

² Ibn Funduq, *Ta'rikh-i Baihaq*, p. 2841; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XI, p. 208; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 77-8.

THE IRANIAN WORLD (A.D. 1000-1217)



Map 4. The Iranian world, c. 575/1180.

Khwarezmian troops, and a peace was arranged whereby Chaghri Khān had to take back the Qarluq chiefs with full honours.¹ There was a further revolt of the Qarluq in the reign of Chaghri Khān's brother and successor Qilich Tamghach-Khān Mas'ūd II (556-74/1160-78), but this was suppressed, and the khan was then free to send an expedition across the Oxus and carry on warfare against the Ghuzz of Khurāsān.²

The Khwarezm-Shāh Il-Arslan died in 567/1172, after fighting off an invasion of the Qara-Khitai provoked by tardy payment of tribute to the Gür-Khān.³ He was eventually succeeded by his eldest son 'Alā'

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 205; Juvainī, *Ta'rikh-i Jahān-Gushā*, vol. i, pp. 288-9; Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp. 333-4; Pritsak, "Karahaniyar", *Islam Ansiklopedisi*; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 80-2.

² Muhammad b. 'Alī al-Zahīrī al-Kātib al-Samarqandī, *A'rāḍ al-riyāsa fī aghrāḍ al-siyāsa*, quoted in Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 336; Pritsak, *op. cit.*

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 246; Juvainī, vol. i, p. 289; Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 336-7; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 82-3.

al-Dīn Tekish, in whose long and important reign (567-96/1172-1200) Ghūrīd ambitions in Khurāsān were combatted and Khwārazmian arms carried into western Iran against the last Saljuq sultan. At the moment of Il-Arslan's death Tekish was governor of Jand, a strategic outpost against the Qipchaq, but distant from the centre of power in Khwārazm. Hence the Queen-Mother Terken Khatun placed Tekish's younger brother Sulṭān-Shāh on the throne. Tekish appealed to the Qara-Khitai, and an army under the first Gūr-Khān's son-in-law Fuma (chinese *fu-ma* = son-in-law of the emperor) placed him on the throne before the end of 567/1172 without bloodshed. Sulṭān-Shāh in his turn sought help from Ai-Aba of Nishāpūr; Ai-Aba led an expedition into Khwārazm, but it ended in disaster for him, as he was captured by Tekish and killed. Sulṭān-Shāh fled successively to Dihistān, to Nishāpūr, and finally to Ghiyāth al-Dīn's court at Firūzkūh in Ghūr.¹

Tekish owed his throne to the Qara-Khitai, yet he looked for an early opportunity to throw off their authority. The sources stress that whereas the first Qara-Khitai in Transoxiana had behaved with exemplary impartiality and equity, their tax collectors became increasingly arrogant and oppressive. Moreover the central power of the Qara-Khitai dynasty, never very cohesive, was weakened by the long periods of regency exercised by women, and this may well have caused a relaxation of control over subordinate officials.² It was of course convenient for the shahs to raise the banner of jihād against the infidels, and towards the end of Tekish's reign and in that of his son 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad, this crusading attitude had some value as a counterbalance to the shāhs' unpopularity in orthodox circles, which was due to their anti-caliphal policy (see above, p. 184).

Tekish's pretext for revolt came from the alleged extortions of the Qara-Khitai tribute collector. Sulṭān-Shāh, who was to be a thorn in his brother's flesh for a number of years, judged it a suitable moment to get Qara-Khitai help in regaining the throne which he had briefly occupied in Khwārazm. The Qara-Khitai army under Fuma was halted in Khwārazm by the traditional manoeuvre of opening the dykes, but Sulṭān-Shāh, aided by a detachment of Qara-Khitai troops, was more successful in Khurāsān. He drove the Ghuzz Malik Dīnār out of Sarakhs and defeated Ai-Aba's son and successor Toghan-Shāh, so

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, pp. 247 ff.; Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 289-91; Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 337-8; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 84-6.

² Cf. Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 75, 292, 342, 358; Barthold, "History of the Semirechye", pp. 104-5.

that Nīshāpūr and Tūs both fell into his hands (576/1181).¹ It seems also that Sulṭān-Shāh harried the fringes of Ghūrīd territory in Bādghīs, and during the following years he held several towns in Khurāsān, acting as a third force between Tekish and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad. He occasionally lent his support to the Ghūrīds, but in general he pursued an independent policy.²

Tekish's immediate interests lay in preserving a balance of power in central Khurāsān between Sulṭān-Shāh and Toghan-Shāh, and in turning his brother against the Ghūrīds in Marv and other cities. The unwarlike Toghan-Shāh found his position in Nīshāpūr increasingly untenable; he failed to get adequate help from Tekish or from the Ghūrīds, despite his marriage with one of Ghiyāth al-Dīn's daughters, and many of his amīrs drifted to the side of Sulṭān-Shāh.³ In 581/1185 or the next year he died, leaving a son, Sanjar-Shāh, as his successor, but real power was now held by Sanjar-Shāh's atabeg, Mengli Beg or Mengli-Tegin. On hearing about the disorders in Khurāsān, Tekish came southwards in 582/1186, avoided Sulṭān-Shāh, now ruling in Marv, and besieged Sanjar-Shāh and Mengli Beg in Shādyākh, the suburb of Nīshāpūr to which the city had been moved after the Ghuzz devastations.⁴ After a second siege in 583/1187, Tekish captured Shādyākh and executed Mengli Beg. Sanjar-Shāh was carried off to Khwārazm and later blinded for continuing to intrigue with the people of Nīshāpūr. This city was now placed under Tekish's son Malik-Shāh, the former governor of Jand; and though Sulṭān-Shāh still coveted Nīshāpūr, he was forced to make peace with his brother in 585/1189 when Tekish came once more to Khurāsān. Sulṭān-Shāh was, moreover, hard-pressed by the Ghūrīds; in that same year Ghiyāth al-Dīn came from Fīrūzkūh and by 586/1190 had defeated him and stripped him of many of his possessions. But from his centre of Sarakhs, Sulṭān-Shāh once again came to blows with his brother, for while Tekish was absent in western Iran during 588/1192 he prepared to attack Khwārazm (see p. 181 above). Tekish had to hurry back, but

¹ Malik Dīnār later passed into Kirmān and extinguished the local Saljuq line there: see above, section XII, pp. 174-5.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XI, pp. 247 ff.; Jūzjānī, vol. I, pp. 302-3 (tr., vol. I, pp. 245-8); Juvainī, vol. I, pp. 292-3; Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 339; Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti tarihi*, pp. 88-91. 98-101.

³ Jūzjānī, vol. I, p. 274 (tr., vol. I, p. 182).

⁴ Cf. Ibn al-Athīr, vol. XI, pp. 180-1; and for the general history of Shādyākh, see the copious materials collected by Sa'īd Nafīsī in the notes to his edition of Baihaqī's *Ta'rikh-i Mas'ūdi*, vol. II, pp. 897-914.

the death of Sulṭān-Shāh in the following year relieved him of danger from this quarter.¹

Tekish was also concerned with the northern frontiers of his empire. Along the frontiers of Khwārazm and the lower Syr Darya, where Jand was held by the shāhs, there lived a number of Türkmen, and even though many of them were still pagan, the Khwārazm-Shāhs had to achieve some sort of *modus vivendi* with them. As part of this policy marriage links were cultivated, and the famous Terken Khatun, wife of Tekish and mother of 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad, is variously described in the sources as being from the Qanghli or the Baya'ut tribe of the Yemek, being the daughter of the Qipchaq Khān.² Tekish admitted large numbers of the Qipchaq and their associated peoples into his armies, and it was in large measure these barbarians who gave the Khwārazmian troops in Iran a reputation for excessive violence and cruelty. According to Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn's biographer Muḥammad Nasawī, the majority of 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad's top commanders were from Terken Khatun's tribe (which he names as the Yemek), and the need to attach them to his side was one reason why the shah leant so heavily on his mother for advice.³

But diplomacy did not always work, and punitive expeditions into the steppes were also necessary. In the winter of 591/1194-5 Tekish led an expedition to Siḡhnaq and Jand against the Qipchaq chief Qayir Buqu Khān; and though he was defeated after some of the Qipchaq troops in the Khwārazmian army defected to the enemy, Tekish was nevertheless able to utilize a dispute between the khan and his nephew Alp-Direk, first to capture the khan and then to release him against the refractory nephew.⁴

With regard to Khwārazmian policy in Transoxiana, there is a mention in some of the shāhs' official correspondence of an expedition to Bukhārā in 578/1182, when the local *sudūr* surrendered to Tekish.⁵ Alone of the historians, Ibn al-Athīr records a further expedition in

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 249, vol. xii, pp. 38, 67; Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 274, 303-4 (tr., vol. i, pp. 181-2, 248-9); Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 293-301; Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 340, 342, 346; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 103-6, 113-22.

² Nasawī, *Sirat Jalāl al-Dīn*, pp. 25, 42 (tr., pp. 44, 72); Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 300, 306 (tr., vol. i, pp. 240, 254); Juvainī, vol. ii, 465; cf. Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 130-1.

³ Nasawī, pp. 28, 42, cf. pp. 56-7, 162-3 (tr., pp. 50, 72, cf. pp. 96, 286-8).

⁴ Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 304-5, 309-11; Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 340, 342-4; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 128-30.

⁵ Bahā' al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Baghdādī, *al-Tawassul ila'l-Tarassul*, in Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 341-2; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 95-8.

594/1198. In his struggle with the Ghūrids, it is said, Tekish had sought help from the Qara-Khitai, and the latter had crossed into Tukhāristān hoping to recover from the Ghūrids of Bāmiyān the town of Balkh, formerly tributary to the Gūr-Khān. The Qara-Khitai were soundly beaten, and they now blamed Tekish for involving them with the Ghūrids (see pp. 164-5 above). After rapidly making peace with the Ghūrid Sultān Ghīyāth al-Dīn, Tekish turned on the Qara-Khitai. He repelled an invasion of Khwārazm and pursued the enemy to Bukhārā, whose population rallied to the Qara-Khitai and held out against the shāh until the city was at last stormed. From the silence of Juvainī and the other sources, Barthold has doubted the historicity of this last campaign in Transoxiana.¹

Tekish died in 596/1200 and was succeeded by his second son Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad, who now assumed the honorific 'Alā' al-Dīn ("Eminence of Religion"). Muḥammad's nephew Hindū-Khān b. Malik-Shāh had pretensions to the throne, and his cause was espoused by the Ghūrids, who seized several towns of Khurāsān from the new Khwārazm-Shāh and set up Hindū-Khān at Marv.² Ghūrid rule in Khurāsān was unpopular, and Muḥammad soon restored the position there. On his return from India in 601/1204, Mu'izz al-Dīn Ghūrī took the offensive and invaded Khurāsān, but he was defeated by the Khwārazm-Shāh and his Qara-Khitai allies (pp. 165 above). After Mu'izz al-Dīn's death in 602/1206, the threat from the Ghūrids' imperial policy receded. Herāt was finally taken in 605/1208-9, and in the same year a rebellion led by Közli (governor of Nishāpūr) and his son was suppressed.³ In the Caspian provinces there was a succession struggle after the death of the Bāvandid Ḥusām al-Daula Ardāshīr in 602/1205-6, which permitted Muḥammad's brother 'Alī Shāh' to step in and make the new Bāvandid ruler a Khwārazmian vassal.⁴ As for western Iran, it was neutralized by the rivalries of the caliph, the last Eldigüzids, and other Turkish amīrs (see pp. 182-3 above). Yet despite this secure position, Muḥammad was not yet prepared definitely to defy his Qara-Khitai suzerains. In 602/1206 he restored to them the recaptured town of

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 88-90; Barhebraeus, p. 347; Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 344-6; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* p. 97 n. 84.

² Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 103-4; Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 304-5 (tr., vol. i, pp. 251-2); Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 148 ff.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 172-5; Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 307-8 (tr., vol. i, pp. 257-60); Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 333-40; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 167-72.

⁴ Ibn Isfandiyyār, *Ta'rikh-i Tabaristān*, pp. 256-7; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 166-7; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 166-7.

Tirmidh, and indeed Jūzjānī alleges that before Tekish died he en-joined his son never to quarrel with the Qara-Khitai.¹

In Muḥammad's subsequent struggle with the Qara-Khitai, the last Qarakhānid ruler of Samarqand, the "Sultan of Sultans" 'Uthmān Khān b. Ibrāhīm (600-8/1203-4 to 1212), played a prominent role; but the details and chronology are unclear, for our main authority, Juvainī, gives two parallel but widely differing accounts of events. Barthold thought that on the whole the second one accorded best with what is known from other sources, and it is this version which is essentially followed below.² Like his father, Muḥammad had to safeguard his northern frontier, and he led a successful campaign against the Qipchaq (probably to be placed in the summer of 605-6/1209). Elated with this victory, and no longer requiring the Qara-Khitai for his struggle with the Ghūrids, Muḥammad began preparing the ground in Transoxiana. He came to Bukhārā and negotiated with 'Uthmān Khān and with other local magnates who were discontented with the exactions of the Qara-Khitai financial agents.³ It is dubious, however, whether the Muslim cause in Transoxiana would have made much headway against the still-formidable Qara-Khitai power had it not been for the general revolt of the Gūr-Khān's Muslim vassals in eastern Turkestan.⁴ On the crest of these disorders the Naiman Mongol chief Küchlüg rose to power in the eastern part of the Qara-Khitai empire after his flight westwards from his rival Chingiz-Khān.⁵ In Samarqand, 'Uthmān Khān had been offended by the Gūr-Khān's refusal to give him a daughter in marriage and had proclaimed his allegiance to the Khwārazm-Shāh, but this assertion of independence ended in failure for the Qarakhānid, whose capital was occupied by a Qara-Khitai army (probably in 606/1209-10).⁶

However, Küchlüg's successes in Semirechye compelled the Gūr-Khān to leave Samarqand. The Khwārazm-Shāh Muḥammad, in alliance once more with 'Uthmān Khān, followed the retreating Qara-

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 152-3; Jūzjānī, vol. i, p. 302 (tr., vol. i, p. 244); Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 352; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 164-5.

² Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 341-52 (first version), pp. 354-61 (second version); cf. Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 335 ff., and Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 172 ff., for full critiques and discussions. The account in Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 171-9, accords best with the second version.

³ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 171-2; Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 342-3; Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar devleti tarihi*, pp. 183-4.

⁴ Juvainī, vol. i, p. 359.

⁵ Cf. Barthold, "A Short History of Turkestan", pp. 33-5; *idem*, "History of the Semirechye", pp. 106-9; Grousset, *L'Empire des Steppes*, pp. 269-71, 294-6; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 189-93.

⁶ Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 359-60; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 176-7, 182-3.

Khitai and won a victory near Talas, capturing the Qara-Khitai general Tayangu. Although the Gür-Khān defeated Küchlüg, his army mutinied and Küchlüg successfully put himself at the head of the rebels. A Mongol detachment under Qubilai Noyan, one of Chingiz-Khān's generals, had appeared in northern Semirechye, and the Gür-Khān was obliged to surrender to Küchlüg and abdicate all real power; he died shortly afterwards.¹ The substitution of Muslim Khwārazmian rule for that of the pagan Qara-Khitai in Transoxiana proved unwelcome both to the local rulers there and to the population at large. The Qarakhānid ruler of Uṭrār, Tāj al-Dīn Bilge-Khān, rebelled against the Khwārazm-Shāh, and 'Uṭhmān Khān decided, despite his marriage to Muḥammad's daughter, to renew his connexion with the Qara-Khitai.² After a general massacre in Samarqand of the hated Khwārazmians, the shāh came and took a terrible vengeance: the city was ruthlessly sacked, and 'Uṭhmān Khān and other members of his dynasty executed (608/1212). In the general slaughter of the Qarakhānids, only Tāj al-Dīn Bilge-Khān of Uṭrār seems to have survived for some years more.³

Extinguishing the remnants of the western Qarakhānids was not difficult for Muḥammad, but he was much less successful against Küchlüg, who had taken over the former Qara-Khitai territories. Even after his Talas victory the Khwārazm-Shāh was unable to bring relief to the Muslim inhabitants of Balāsāghūn, a town that had then been sacked by the Gür-Khān's army;⁴ and he was equally impotent to protect the Muslim population of Kashgharia against Küchlüg's fiercely anti-Muslim policy there. Nor could he even guard the people of northern Transoxiana: according to Muslim sources, he had to evacuate the inhabitants of Farghāna, Chāch, and Isfijāb and devastate these provinces, thereby rendering them useless to Küchlüg; on the other hand, a Chinese traveller who passed through the Syr Darya valley a few years later does not mention any signs of ruin there.⁵

¹ Nasawī, pp. 7-8 (tr., pp. 12-14); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 176-7; Jūzjānī, vol. i, pp. 309-10 (tr., vol. i, pp. 261-2); Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 360-1; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 358-9, 363-4; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 183-5, 192-3.

² Nasawī, p. 22 (tr., pp. 38-9—with *ibn 'amm*, "cousin", mistranslated as "nephew"), says that Tāj al-Dīn Bilge-Khān was 'Uṭhmān Khān's cousin.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 22-3 (tr., pp. 38-41); Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, pp. 177-8; Juvainī, vol. i, pp. 347-9; Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 364-6; Pritsak, "Karahānlār", *Islām Ansiklopedisi*; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 187-9.

⁴ Juvainī, vol. i, p. 360; Barthold, *op. cit.* pp. 358-9; Kafesoğlu, *op. cit.* pp. 185-6.

⁵ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, p. 179; E. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources* (London, 1910), vol. i, pp. 75 ff.; cf. Barthold, "A Short History of Turkestan", p. 35.

Although Kūchlūg's transient empire would eventually crumble before the advance of Chingiz-Khān, the removal of Kūchlūg only postponed the day of reckoning for the Khwārazm-Shāh.

XIV. THE PERIOD IN RETROSPECT

Between A.D. 1000 and 1200 the Islamic cult and faith became completely accepted in the Iranian world: herein lies the social and religious significance of these two centuries. The process of conversion actually went on till the early 5th/11th century, by which time the only substantial remaining pockets of paganism were on the far eastern fringes, in what is now Afghanistan; the remote region of Ghūr was probably the last to accept the new faith (see p. 157 above). On the whole, the Iranian peoples accepted Islam speedily and peacefully; this was especially true of the landowning classes, anxious to preserve their social and tenurial privileges under the new Arab regime. Nevertheless, the period up to the 4th/10th century was punctuated by several socio-religious protest movements, in some of which elements of the older faiths of Iran, such as Mazdakism and Zoroastrianism, rose to the surface; and on one occasion the political and military leader Dailamī Mardāvīj b. Ziyār (d. 323/935) ostentatiously paraded his hostility to Islam. After the year 1000 such anti-Islamic currents die away. It was not that feelings of social protest and resentment against the ruling and official classes disappeared altogether, but rather that they were channelled into such activities as *'iyāra* (brigandage and mob violence) and into such movements as Ismā'ilism and radical Shī'ism. Only in the Ṣafavid period did Shī'ism become the dominant faith in Persia proper (the Iranian parts of Central Asia and Afghanistan were only marginally affected by this process); but in the pre-Mongol period we hear of lively Shī'ī activity in several towns of Persia, and it is probable that the bases of later dominance were quietly being consolidated amongst the 'Alid communities of these places.

Of significance to the whole of the Middle East, and not merely to the Iranian world, were the ethnic, political, and military changes caused by the incoming movements of Turkish peoples from beyond the Oxus and Syr Darya. Turks had long been familiar enough in the Iranian world as peaceful settlers on the north-eastern frontiers, as nomadic predators on the agricultural lands there, and as mercenary soldiers in the armies of the Baghdad caliphs and their provincial epigoni, but it

was only in the Saljuq period that this trickle of individuals became a flood. However, the 'Turks' westward movement was not confined to the period of the Saljuq invasions in the middle 5th/11th century—the number of incomers at this time was not unduly large; rather, it continued steadily up to and after the Mongol invasions. Some tribes of southern Iran, such as the Bahārī, the Aīnālī, and the Qashghai traditionally date their migration thither to post-Mongol times. In the Saljuq period there were always many outlets for Türkmen energies in the frontier warfare with the Byzantines and the Christian powers of the Caucasus, as well as in the complex warfare between Arab amirates and the Crusaders in Syria and Palestine, and many Türkmen passed through Iran to these western battlefields. Others, however, found suitable pasture grounds for their flocks within Iran, especially in such favourable regions as Āzarbāijān, the Caspian coastlands of Mūghān, Gurgān and Dihistān, and in the oases of Khurāsān. Hence there begins the process of settlement that has made Āzarbāijān, parts of Kurdistān, including the Hamadān region, and a large section of Fārs, Turkish-speaking.¹

The migrating peoples were originally the rank and file of Turkish tribal and military aristocracies, and in our period these leaders imposed their political authority over the Iranian world at large. This trend towards Turkish political domination began when the Iranian Samanids and the Afrīghid and Ma'mūnid Khwārazm-Shāhs were replaced by the Ghaznavids and Qarakhānids. The Ghaznavids were of servile origin, but their steppe beginnings were speedily overlaid by the Iranian culture and the Iranian administrative techniques which they adopted. The Qarakhānids initially represented a still lower level of assimilation into the Iranian-Islamic culture. In 5th/11th- and 6th/12th-century Transoxiana the trend towards this assimilation was always offset by the fresh arrivals of Turkish peoples from the outer steppes. The Saljuqs and the Oghuz approximated at first to the social and cultural level of the earliest Qarakhānids—if, indeed, they were not at a lower one. Yet, like the Ghaznavids, the Saljuq leaders soon discovered practical advantages in the Iranian-Islamic tradition of statecraft and government: its exaltation of the sovereign above his people; its ideal of state centralization, and of a professional, standing army to buttress the ruler's power; and its concepts of passivity and obedience with which the subject masses were inculcated. Aided by Iranian advisers such as Kundurī and Nizām al-Mulk, the Saljuqs Toghrīl, Alp-Arslan, and

¹ Cf. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*, p. 77 n. 1.

Malik-Shāh passed from the position of mere tribal chiefs, with only circumscribed authority, to that of "Most Exalted Sultans" (*Salāṭīn-i A'ẓam*) with the full panoply of a hierarchical court, an Iranian-staffed bureaucracy, and a multi-national, partly slave army to execute their plans.

It is not surprising that tension arose between the sultans in their newly acquired splendour and aloofness, and the Türkmen rank and file. In the early stages of the Saljuq invasions these Türkmen had been the Saljuq family's ladder to power, but in the later years of the 5th/11th century the new professional and slave army was making them militarily less vital. Concentrated as they tended to be in the remoter parts of Āzarbāijān or Khurāsān, Gurgān or Fārs, the Türkmen—who in any case were never a very articulate group—could be heard only with difficulty in the sophisticated, Iranian atmosphere of the sultans' court in Iṣfahān, Hamadān, or Baghdad. It soon became apparent to the Türkmen that there had grown up a gulf between themselves and the sultans, and that the latter were quite prepared to use Arab or Kurdish or any other troops against their fellow Turks. Hence they tended to rally round those members of the Saljuq family who were discontented or who had been passed over for the succession despite their valid claims of seniority within the family; such aspirants as Ibrāhīm Īnal, Qutlumush b. Arslan Isrā'il, and Qavurt were accordingly able to use Türkmen resentment against the sultans to support their own pretensions. A clear-sighted statesman like Nizām al-Mulk recognized the Türkmen's legitimate claims to gratitude and advocated attention to their needs; but after his death such counsels were heard less often. It was the blundering and officious handling of the Türkmen by Sanjar's officials and commanders that led to the outburst of Ghuzz violence in Khurāsān at the end of his reign, resulting in the capture and detention of the sultan himself, the nomads' overrunning the main towns of Khurāsān, the end of direct Saljuq power in north-eastern Iran, and the eventual destruction of the Saljuq principality of Kirmān (see above, pp. 152 ff.).

During the second half of the 6th/12th century the trend towards a uniform Turkish domination of the Iranian world was temporarily halted in the east by the Ghūrid dynasty in Afghanistan, whose rulers, originally mountain chieftains in Ghūr, had become sovereigns of an empire that stretched from Biṣṭām in the west to the Ganges valley in the east. This achievement was only transient, for it was destroyed by the dynamism of the Khwārazm-Shāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad. Yet

the shāh's victory was largely Pyrrhic: he overstrained his military resources in fighting the Ghūrids and in mounting a campaign in western Iran against the 'Abbāsīd caliph (a campaign that brought him much obloquy in orthodox Sunnī circles), and he himself went down before the rising power of the Mongols. In Afghanistan today the Ghūrids have been assigned an important place in the country's history—they are described as the first native Islamic dynasty to make Afghanistan the centre of an empire—and attempts have been made to show that the Ghūrids were Pashto-speaking, and that the earliest Pashto literature sprang from their court circle.¹

Already by the latter part of Toghrīl's reign the Saljuq sultan depended to a considerable extent on a professional, standing army, which comprised a nucleus of slave commanders and their retainers (ghulāms) drawn from a multiplicity of nationalities: Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Caucasians, and even negroes. This nucleus was supplemented by contingents from tributary Arab, Kurdish, and Persian rulers in Iraq, Kurdistān, the Caspian provinces, Sistān, and so on. The Türkmen tribesmen continued to be of military significance in the 5th/11th century, but the sultans gradually adopted a policy of diverting the Türkmen begs and their followers to the frontiers of the empire, to Anatolia, the Caucasus, Syria, etc., where there were plentiful opportunities for jihād against the Christians or against heterodox Muslim groups such as the Syrian Ismā'īlis and the Fātimids.

Maintaining a standing army was expensive; and since an increase was required in the state's revenue, the degree of centralization and administrative complexity inevitably grew also. Nizām al-Mulk built up a nexus of relatives and clients within the central government and in the key posts of the provincial administrations, and in this way surveillance over the empire was far-reaching in Malik-Shāh's reign. The basic solution for paying the army was an extended and regularized system of iqṭā's, land grants, whose revenues were used to support the soldiers. Here the Saljuqs were not innovators, for the system had its roots in the Arab caliphate, and had been widely used in the 4th/10th century by such dynasties as the Būyids and Hamdānids; but with the political decline of the Būyids and their inability to control their troops,

¹ See examples of allegedly Ghūrid Pashto poetry in M. M. Kaleem's section on Pashto literature in *The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan*, ed. S. M. Ikram and Sir Percival Spear (Karachi, 1955), pp. 145-6, 149; but cf. G. Morgenstierne, "Afghān; iii. Pashto literature", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.). The earliest authenticated written Pashto literature comes, in fact, from the early 17th century.

their iqtā' system in western Iran became disordered and riddled with abuses. In the 5th/11th century the Saljuq central government regularized the position of the iqtā'-holders (muqta's). In his *Siyāsat-Nāma* Nizām al-Mulk regards the system as firmly established in his time, and he is mainly concerned to prevent the muqta' from becoming over-powerful, i.e. oppressing the peasantry and denying the sultan his ultimate rights over the land. Nevertheless, the power of the muqta's over the estates grew steadily, especially in the 6th/12th century when control from the centre weakened. Many estates originally granted as iqtā's (and therefore revocable, at least in theory) must at this time have passed into legally private ownership (*milk*).

What was in effect a large-scale application of the iqtā' system was the Saljuq sultans' practice of granting provinces or regions as appanages for other members of the family. This arose originally from Turkish tribal practice, where a tribal chief's patrimony was often divided amongst his male relatives while the most senior relative remained overlord. Given the size of the Saljuq empire in the second half of the 5th/11th century, such a measure of administrative devolution was sensible enough; it was only in the next century, when the empire was losing its cohesion, that the Saljuq maliks in the provinces successfully used their appanages to defy the central power and further their own ambitions.¹

The degree of unity achieved in the Saljuq empire under Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shāh could not be maintained by their successors. Yet the power of the dynasty, at least in the first half of the following century, was far from ineffective. Undoubtedly as capable an administrator and as vigorous a campaigner as his father Malik-Shāh had been, Sanjar ruled directly over Khurāsān and the east, and after his brother Muḥammad's death in 511/1118 he exercised ultimate sovereignty over his relatives the Saljuq sultans in western Iran and Iraq. Some western sultans, e.g. Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd, and the last of the line, Toghril b. Arslan, were vigorous and capable rulers, but their freedom of action decreased and their resources became more exiguous as the century progressed.

There are three main reasons why the Saljuqs found their effective power reduced during the 6th/12th century.²

¹ Cf. Lambton, *op. cit.* pp. 53 ff.

² Cf. H. A. R. Gibb, "An Interpretation of Islamic History", *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, vol. 1 (1953), pp. 54 ff. [= *Muslim World*, vol. XLV (1955), pp. 124 ff.].

First, the institution of the atabegate developed and flourished in this century, especially after the death of Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh. Beginning as genuine tutors attached to the households of young Saljuq princes, Turkish slave commanders often secured an ascendancy over their charges and then set them aside, ruling themselves as provincial governors or in the end as independent potentates. By the second half of the century, Turkish provincial governors were founding dynasties and calling themselves atabegs even when they had never had a Saljuq prince in their charge (e.g. the Salghurids of Fārs: see above, p. 172).

In the succession disputes which now racked the Saljuq empire in the west, the atabegs espoused various Saljuq candidates and gave them military support, hoping thereby to place a weak and pliant ruler on the throne. For their part, the sultans could not easily control these centrifugal tendencies. The rise of such atabeg dynasties as the Zangids in Mosul, the Eldigüzids and Aḥmadilis in Āzarbāijān and Arrān, the Salghurids in Fārs, and so on, meant that the territory in the west directly administered by the sultans was shrinking. Yet they still had to maintain armies against rivals to the succession, against overbearing atabegs, and against the increasingly activist policy of the 'Abbasid caliphs. The territory which they controlled was inadequate for granting iqtā's to their troops, and the troubled social and political conditions of the period cannot have favoured the regular collection of taxation from the population. The sultans were forced willy-nilly into alliances and coalitions with the atabegs and other Turkish military commanders in order to draw upon their troops. Thus the sultans had little space in which to manoeuvre, and by the time of Arslan b. Toghril, the creature of the Eldigüzids, it had shrunk to narrow proportions.

Second, the century sees a rise in the material power and prestige of the 'Abbasid caliph of Baghdad. The end of the "Dailamī interlude" in Iranian history meant the failure of the Shī'ī bid for supreme authority in Iran. The Fāṭimids were repulsed from Iraq and northern Syria by the incoming Saljuqs, and after the death in 487/1094 of al-Mustaṣṣir, they were no longer a vigorous and expansionist power. Although Ismā'ilism increased in strength after the Nizārī split from the main Fāṭimid line of al-Musta'li, it was notable more for its terrorism than for its political and territorial achievements; only in Kūhistān, parts of Dailam, and in parts of Fārs did the Ismā'ilis control substantial stretches of territory.

The 'Abbāsids, having survived a period of degradation in the 4th/10th century, now had the secular support of the strongly Sunnī Saljuqs. The early Saljuqs allowed the caliphs little more practical political power than had the Būyids. However, they had to defer to the caliphs, who were the moral and spiritual leaders of the Sunnī world, for it was by no means obvious even in Malik-Shāh's time that the Fāṭimids' ability to harm the Saljuqs had passed its peak. Only at the very close of his reign, when the steadying influence of Nizām al-Mulk had just been removed, did Malik-Shāh seem to harbour thoughts of displacing the 'Abbāsids from Baghdad (see p. 101 above); but the sultan's own death ended this project. After the nonentities and weaklings of the early Būyid period, the 'Abbāsīd family was now yielding some capable and effective caliphs: e.g. al-Mustaẓhir, al-Mustarshīd, al-Muqtafī, and al-Nāṣir. They in turn were aided by such outstanding vizierial families as the Banū Jahīr in the 5th/11th century and the Banū Hubaira in the next one. When disputes arose over the succession to the sultanate, the caliphs seized the opportunity first to consolidate their hold over Baghdad and central Iraq (after 547/1152 no Saljuq shāhna was allowed in the capital), and then to intervene directly in the warfare in Iraq and western Persia; such caliphs as al-Mustarshīd, al-Rāshīd, and al-Muqtafī personally took the field at the head of their forces. The rise in the caliphate's power and prestige reached its peak under al-Nāṣir, who, by his patronage of the Futuwwa, together with a diplomacy that embraced such distant dynasties as the Ghūrīds, the Ayyūbīds, and the Rūm Saljuqs, made the caliphate for the first time in centuries an international power in the Islamic world.

Thirdly, a final blow to Saljuq power came from the Khwārazm-Shāhs, a new and aggressive power that arose in the north-east of the Iranian world during the 6th/12th century. Their origin was not dissimilar to that of several other provincial lines which sprang from atabegs or local slave governors, but the peripheral position of Khwārazm and its old traditions of independence favoured a long and uninterrupted tenure of power by Anūgh-Tegin Gharcha'i and his descendants. The shāhs became virtually independent after Sanjar's death, subject only to the suzerainty of the Qara-Khitai. Their imperialist ambitions, blocked in the east by the Qara-Khitai, accordingly turned southwards and westwards into Iran. A struggle with the Ghūrīds for power in Khurāsān long prevented the shāhs from taking advantage of the fragmented condition of western and central Iran, and it was only in the

last years of the 6th/12th century that Tekish vanquished the last Saljuq Sulṭān Toghrīl b. Arslan and moved Khwārazmian troops to the borders of Iraq (see above, pp. 182-3). Al-Nāṣir deployed all his diplomatic weapons against the Khwārazm-Shāh, encouraging the Ghūrids and Qara-Khitai against him and organizing in Iran coalitions of atabegs and local governors threatened by the Khwārazmian advance. (It does not seem, however, that the caliph encouraged the Mongols to attack the Khwārazmians from the rear.)¹ Also, the caliph threw his moral and spiritual weight against the shāhs for their impiety in threatening the caliphate and their pro-Shī'ī activities. Certainly the Khwārazmians made themselves intensely unpopular in Iran, but whether the caliph's could have stayed the Khwārazmian march on Iraq is an unsolved question of history. The distant pressure of the Mongols was already being felt on the borders of Transoxiana and Khwārazm, and within the next fifty years both the caliphs of Baghdad and their opponents the Khwārazm-Shāhs were to go down for ever before the hordes of Chingiz-Khān and Hülegü.

¹ This accusation appears only in late sources; see Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp. 399-400.

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Volume Editor's Note

The bibliographies printed below are selective and incomplete. Their purpose is not to list all publications that bear directly or indirectly on the subject, but to enable readers to carry further the study of selected topics. A later volume in this series (vol. 8) will present at much greater length a systematic bibliography. As a rule, books and articles superseded by later publications have not been included, and references to general treatises not directly relevant to the subject-matter of individual chapters have been reduced to a minimum.

Within the limits set by these principles, contributors were free to compile bibliographies as they thought best. The "layout" of the lists, therefore, varies from chapter to chapter. The editor did not even find it desirable to produce a uniform method of abbreviating references to learned periodicals. Form of presentation is, therefore, the decision of the individual author.

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